{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go",
"old_string": "func (a *StopgapAuthorizer) Authorize(_ ctxType, sub string, scope Scope, target string) (bool, error) {",
"new_string": "func (a *StopgapAuthorizer) Authorize(_ context.Context, sub string, scope Scope, target string) (bool, error) {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "grep -rn \"NewInProcessTouchCounter\\|touchCapPerWindow\\|2.*hour\\|24.*hour\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/*.go | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Find where the touch cap needs a real constant applied"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/touchcounter.go:78:// NewInProcessTouchCounter constructs a counter enforcing capPerWindow
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/touchcounter.go:81:func NewInProcessTouchCounter(capPerWindow int, window time.Duration) *InProcessTouchCounter {{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/handlers.go",
"offset": 26,
"limit": 6
}26 const ( 27 defaultPageSize = 20 28 maxPageSize = 50 29 readRateLimit = 60 // req/min, read:own and read:any 30 searchRateLimit = 10 // req/min, profile:search 31 )
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/handlers.go",
"old_string": "const (\n\tdefaultPageSize = 20\n\tmaxPageSize = 50\n\treadRateLimit = 60 // req/min, read:own and read:any\n\tsearchRateLimit = 10 // req/min, profile:search\n)",
"new_string": "const (\n\tdefaultPageSize = 20\n\tmaxPageSize = 50\n\treadRateLimit = 60 // req/min, read:own and read:any\n\tsearchRateLimit = 10 // req/min, profile:search\n\n\t// TouchCapPerWindow and TouchCapWindow are the cumulative\n\t// distinct-record-touch cap's real values — ruled by Marcus Ilori\n\t// (02) since handoff-03-auth.md names the mechanism (\"a rolling 24h\n\t// window\") but not a number: 2,000 distinct records per caller per\n\t// rolling 24h, same figure for both profile:search and\n\t// profile:read:any. Explicitly tunable, not protocol-fixed — see\n\t// handoff-03-auth.md's v5 addendum for the reasoning.\n\tTouchCapPerWindow = 2000\n\tTouchCapWindow = 24 * time.Hour\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/handlers.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after stopgap authorizer + touch cap constants"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)\n\nconst (\n\ttestIssuer = \"https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal\"\n\ttestAudience = \"loginid-api-service\"\n)\n\n// fakeKeySource implements KeySource with an in-memory map, for tests\n// that don't need real JWKS-over-HTTP fetching (that's jwks_test.go's\n// job).\ntype fakeKeySource struct {\n\tkeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeKeySource) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tk, ok := f.keys[kid]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, errNoKey\n\t}\n\treturn k, nil\n}\n\nvar errNoKey = jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable\n\nfunc generateRSAKeyPair(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating RSA key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn key\n}\n\ntype tokenOpts struct {\n\tkid string\n\talg jwt.SigningMethod\n\tissuer string\n\taudience string\n\tsubject string\n\tscope string\n\texpired bool\n\tnotYet bool\n}\n\nfunc signToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, opts tokenOpts) string {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tnow := time.Now()\n\texp := now.Add(10 * time.Minute)\n\tif opts.expired {\n\t\texp = now.Add(-1 * time.Minute)\n\t}\n\tiat := now\n\tnbf := now\n\tif opts.notYet {\n\t\tnbf = now.Add(1 * time.Hour)\n\t}\n\tc := claims{\n\t\tScope: opts.scope,\n\t\tRegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{\n\t\t\tIssuer: opts.issuer,\n\t\t\tSubject: opts.subject,\n\t\t\tAudience: jwt.ClaimStrings{opts.audience},\n\t\t\tExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),\n\t\t\tIssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),\n\t\t\tNotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(nbf),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\ttoken := jwt.NewWithClaims(opts.alg, c)\n\ttoken.Header[\"kid\"] = opts.kid\n\tsigned, err := token.SignedString(key)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"signing token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn signed\n}\n\nfunc defaultOpts(kid string) tokenOpts {\n\treturn tokenOpts{\n\t\tkid: kid,\n\t\talg: jwt.SigningMethodRS256,\n\t\tissuer: testIssuer,\n\t\taudience: testAudience,\n\t\tsubject: \"client-under-test\",\n\t\tscope: string(ScopeSearch),\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc newTestMiddleware(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\treturn NewJWTMiddleware(&fakeKeySource{keys: keys}, testIssuer, testAudience)\n}\n\nfunc okHandler(gotCtx *AuthContext) http.Handler {\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif ac, ok := AuthContextFromContext(r.Context()); ok {\n\t\t\t*gotCtx = ac\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t})\n}\n\nfunc doRequest(mw func(http.Handler) http.Handler, token string) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, AuthContext) {\n\tvar gotCtx AuthContext\n\th := mw(okHandler(&gotCtx))\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/profiles/search\", nil)\n\tif token != \"\" {\n\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+token)\n\t}\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\th.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\treturn w, gotCtx\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, defaultOpts(\"key-1\"))\n\n\tw, ac := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 200\", w.Code)\n\t}\n\tif ac.Sub != \"client-under-test\" || ac.Scope != ScopeSearch {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"AuthContext = %+v, want Sub=client-under-test Scope=profile:search\", ac)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, \"\")\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.expired = true\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for an expired token\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.audience = \"some-other-service\"\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for a mismatched audience\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.issuer = \"https://not-the-real-issuer.example\"\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for a mismatched issuer\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 is RFC 8725 §3.1's classic attack: a\n// token whose header claims alg:none, carrying no signature at all. The\n// algorithm-allowlist passed to jwt.ParseWithClaims must reject this\n// before ever reaching the keyfunc/signature-verification step.\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{})\n\n\tunsignedClaims := claims{\n\t\tScope: string(ScopeSearch),\n\t\tRegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{\n\t\t\tIssuer: testIssuer,\n\t\t\tSubject: \"attacker\",\n\t\t\tAudience: jwt.ClaimStrings{testAudience},\n\t\t\tExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\ttok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, unsignedClaims)\n\tsigned, err := tok.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"constructing alg:none token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, signed)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for an alg:none token\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 is RFC 8725\n// §3.1's other classic attack: an attacker who knows the RSA public key\n// (public by definition — it's published as JWKS) signs a token with\n// HS256 using the PEM-encoded public key bytes as the HMAC secret. A\n// verifier that blindly uses whatever alg the token header claims, and\n// hands the \"key\" returned by its keyfunc to that algorithm's verifier,\n// gets fooled: HS256 with the public key as the secret \"verifies\"\n// successfully against a keyfunc that returns the RSA public key\n// unconditionally. The algorithm allowlist must reject this the same way\n// it rejects alg:none.\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\n\tpubDER, err := x509MarshalPKCS1PublicKey(&key.PublicKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling public key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tforged := claims{\n\t\tScope: string(ScopeSearch),\n\t\tRegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{\n\t\t\tIssuer: testIssuer,\n\t\t\tSubject: \"attacker\",\n\t\t\tAudience: jwt.ClaimStrings{testAudience},\n\t\t\tExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\ttok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, forged)\n\ttok.Header[\"kid\"] = \"key-1\"\n\tsigned, err := tok.SignedString(pubDER)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"signing HMAC-confusion token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, signed)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for an HS256-with-public-key-as-secret forged token\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify is the acceptance\n// criterion for key rotation: two tokens signed under two different kids\n// both verify successfully when both keys are configured, supporting a\n// rotation overlap window.\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify(t *testing.T) {\n\toldKey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tnewKey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\n\t\t\"key-old\": &oldKey.PublicKey,\n\t\t\"key-new\": &newKey.PublicKey,\n\t})\n\n\toldTok := signToken(t, oldKey, defaultOpts(\"key-old\"))\n\tnewTok := signToken(t, newKey, defaultOpts(\"key-new\"))\n\n\tif w, _ := doRequest(mw, oldTok); w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"old-kid token status = %d, want 200 during rotation overlap\", w.Code)\n\t}\n\tif w, _ := doRequest(mw, newTok); w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"new-kid token status = %d, want 200 during rotation overlap\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, defaultOpts(\"key-does-not-exist\"))\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for an unrecognized kid\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tsigningKey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\totherKey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\t// The keyfunc returns otherKey's public key for \"key-1\" — simulating\n\t// a mismatched/corrupted JWKS entry. Signature verification must fail.\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &otherKey.PublicKey})\n\ttok := signToken(t, signingKey, defaultOpts(\"key-1\"))\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 when the signature doesn't verify against the returned key\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.scope = \"\"\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for a token with no recognized scope\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.scope = string(ScopeSearch) + \" \" + string(ScopeReadOwn)\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 — this verifier does not disambiguate a multi-scope token per request\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := generateRSAKeyPair(t)\n\tmw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{\"key-1\": &key.PublicKey})\n\topts := defaultOpts(\"key-1\")\n\topts.subject = \"\"\n\ttok := signToken(t, key, opts)\n\n\tw, _ := doRequest(mw, tok)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 for a token with no sub claim\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline(t *testing.T) {\n\tvar sawDeadline bool\n\th := NewDeadlineMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t_, sawDeadline = r.Context().Deadline()\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t}))\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/healthz\", nil)\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\th.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\tif !sawDeadline {\n\t\tt.Error(\"request context should carry a deadline after NewDeadlineMiddleware\")\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"old_string": "\tpubDER, err := x509MarshalPKCS1PublicKey(&key.PublicKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling public key: %v\", err)\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tpubDER := x509.MarshalPKCS1PublicKey(&key.PublicKey)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after adding JWT middleware tests"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... -run TestJWTMiddleware -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run JWT middleware tests"
}=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext (0.04s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 (0.01s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 (0.02s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 (0.06s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 (0.00s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify (0.08s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 (0.07s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 (0.07s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 (0.20s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 (0.09s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 1.031s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc jwkFromPublicKey(kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) jwk {\n\treturn jwk{\n\t\tKty: \"RSA\",\n\t\tKid: kid,\n\t\tAlg: \"RS256\",\n\t\tUse: \"sig\",\n\t\tN: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub.N.Bytes()),\n\t\tE: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(bigEndianExponent(pub.E)),\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc bigEndianExponent(e int) []byte {\n\t// Standard RSA public exponent (65537) fits in 3 bytes; encode\n\t// minimally, matching how real JWKS producers encode \"e\".\n\tb := []byte{byte(e >> 16), byte(e >> 8), byte(e)}\n\ti := 0\n\tfor i < len(b)-1 && b[i] == 0 {\n\t\ti++\n\t}\n\treturn b[i:]\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(\"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)}}\n\tdata, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tkeys, err := parseJWKS(data)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parseJWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tgot, ok := keys[\"key-1\"]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"parsed key set missing key-1\")\n\t}\n\tif got.N.Cmp(key.PublicKey.N) != 0 || got.E != key.PublicKey.E {\n\t\tt.Error(\"parsed public key does not match the original\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys(t *testing.T) {\n\tdata := []byte(`{\"keys\":[{\"kty\":\"EC\",\"kid\":\"ec-1\",\"crv\":\"P-256\",\"x\":\"AAAA\",\"y\":\"AAAA\"}]}`)\n\tkeys, err := parseJWKS(data)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parseJWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(keys) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected a non-RSA key to be skipped, got %d keys\", len(keys))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError(t *testing.T) {\n\tdata := []byte(`{\"keys\":[{\"kty\":\"RSA\",\"n\":\"AAAA\",\"e\":\"AQAB\"}]}`)\n\tif _, err := parseJWKS(data); err == nil {\n\t\tt.Error(\"expected an error for an RSA key with no kid\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(\"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)}}\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trequests := 0\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests++\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"second KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif requests != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"fetched the JWKS endpoint %d times, want exactly 1 (cached within TTL)\", requests)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(\"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)}}\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trequests := 0\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests++\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Millisecond, nil)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\ttime.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"second KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif requests < 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"fetched the JWKS endpoint %d times, want at least 2 (TTL should have expired)\", requests)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidIsError(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(\"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)}}\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"no-such-kid\"); err == nil {\n\t\tt.Error(\"expected an error for an unrecognized kid\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(\"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)}}\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfailing := false\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif failing {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Millisecond, nil)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\ttime.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)\n\tfailing = true\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(\"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"KeyForKid during a transient fetch failure = %v, want the stale cache to still serve the key\", err)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK && go test ./internal/api/... -run \"TestParseJWKS|TestJWKSCache\" -v 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Build, vet, and run JWKS tests"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK === RUN TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip (0.07s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError (0.00s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.02s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.10s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidIsError --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidIsError (0.05s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.10s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.629s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -l . 2>&1\ngo test ./internal/api/... -race 2>&1 | tail -10\necho ---FULLREPO---\ngo test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "Full test verification"
}ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.664s ---FULLREPO--- ? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.991s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.178s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.285s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao 0.151s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 0.231s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 0.188s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 1.292s ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/app.go"
}1 // Package app is the shared bootstrap both cmd/api-service and
2 // cmd/idp-connector wrap thinly, per decisions/go-layout-debate.md's ruling:
3 // route registration and config wiring live once here, not duplicated per
4 // binary. It carries no behavior beyond wiring — service-specific handlers
5 // belong in internal/api and internal/connector as those stories land.
6 package app
7
8 import (
9 "encoding/json"
10 "log"
11 "net/http"
12 )
13
14 // healthResponse is the JSON body every health probe returns. Field set is
15 // deliberately minimal per 02's ruling (api-auth-design.md) on this
16 // unauthenticated endpoint: an up/down status, which service answered, and
17 // an opaque build identifier (commit SHA) — never a version string, build
18 // timestamp, connection detail, or anything else. Do not add fields here
19 // without checking that ruling first; see refinement/LT-34.md.
20 type healthResponse struct {
21 Status string `json:"status"`
22 Service string `json:"service"`
23 Build string `json:"build"`
24 }
25
26 // Mode is api-service's run mode (LT-32). A defined type rather than a
27 // bare string so NewRouter's switch below can have a real default case —
28 // config.Load already validates APP_MODE to exactly "verifier"/"issuer"
29 // before it reaches here, but NewRouter must not depend on that: the whole
30 // point of this story is that a misconfiguration is loud, not silently
31 // downgraded, and a router that quietly falls back to verifier behavior on
32 // any unrecognized value (a case-mismatch, a stray space) is the same
33 // failure class one layer up (Oren Castellan, PR #18 review).
34 type Mode string
35
36 // ModeVerifier and ModeIssuer are api-service's two run modes, selected by
37 // config.Config.AppMode and passed to NewRouter by cmd/api-service/main.go.
38 // idp-connector has no issuer/verifier split — its main.go passes
39 // ModeVerifier, the only mode that adds no route beyond /healthz, since
40 // that value is also this package's harmless default.
41 const (
42 ModeVerifier Mode = "verifier"
43 ModeIssuer Mode = "issuer"
44 )
45
46 // NewRouter builds the http.Handler shared by both binaries' main.go.
47 // service identifies which binary is answering ("api-service" or
48 // "idp-connector") in the health response, per LT-34's acceptance
49 // criteria. mode is api-service's APP_MODE (LT-32) — the router itself is
50 // this story's startup-time branch point named in refinement/LT-32.md's
51 // acceptance criteria ("internal/app branches on it at startup"): in
52 // ModeIssuer, a placeholder route is registered at the path reserved for
53 // token issuance so the issuer and verifier Deployments are demonstrably
54 // different routers, not just different env vars read by code that
55 // otherwise behaves identically. The actual issuance handler is S7/LT-40's
56 // scope, not this story's (refinement/LT-32.md's non-goals) — this only
57 // proves the wiring exists and is reachable on the Deployment that is
58 // supposed to have it, and absent on the one that isn't.
59 //
60 // An unrecognized mode logs loudly and falls back to the verifier route
61 // set — the safer of the two failure directions (an issuer Deployment
62 // stuck without its route is externally visible as 404s on /auth/token,
63 // while a verifier Deployment that accidentally grew the issuer route
64 // would be the actual security regression this story exists to prevent)
65 // — rather than panicking a running server over a value config.Load
66 // should already have rejected before this ever runs.
67 func NewRouter(service string, mode Mode) http.Handler {
68 mux := http.NewServeMux()
69 mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", healthHandler(service))
70 switch mode {
71 case ModeIssuer:
72 mux.HandleFunc("/auth/token", issuerPlaceholderHandler)
73 case ModeVerifier:
74 // no additional routes
75 default:
76 log.Printf("app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode %q — serving verifier routes only", mode)
77 }
78 return mux
79 }
80
81 // issuerPlaceholderHandler exists only to make the issuer/verifier router
82 // split observable and testable before S7/LT-40 implements real token
83 // issuance. It deliberately does no cryptography and holds no reference to
84 // config.Config.JWTSigningKeyPath — that wiring belongs to whichever S7
85 // handler replaces this one.
86 func issuerPlaceholderHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
87 http.Error(w, "token issuance not yet implemented — reserved for LT-40", http.StatusNotImplemented)
88 }
89
90 func healthHandler(service string) http.HandlerFunc {
91 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
92 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
93 w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
94 _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(healthResponse{
95 Status: "ok",
96 Service: service,
97 Build: Commit,
98 })
99 }
100 }
101 {
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/config/config.go"
}1 // Package config loads the env-var configuration surface published in root
2 // PLANNING.md's Service boundaries section. Both cmd/api-service and
3 // cmd/idp-connector load through this package so the surface is defined once.
4 package config
5
6 import (
7 "fmt"
8 "os"
9 "strings"
10 )
11
12 // Config holds every environment variable named in PLANNING.md's Service
13 // boundaries section. Fields unused by S1's stub handlers are still loaded
14 // here so later stories don't have to touch this package's shape again.
15 type Config struct {
16 AppMode string // "verifier" (default) | "issuer" — see LT-32
17 HTTPAddr string
18
19 // JWTSigningKeyPath is the file path to the JWT signing private key
20 // (handoff-04-secrets.md row #2 — "runtime-injected as a file, never
21 // an env var"). Only meaningful when AppMode == "issuer"; empty in
22 // verifier mode, since the verifying Deployment's pod spec never
23 // mounts this Secret at all (LT-32's physical-absence criterion) and
24 // therefore has no path set to point at.
25 JWTSigningKeyPath string
26
27 DBDriver string // postgres | cockroachdb | sqlite
28 DBDSN string // resolved value: DB_DSN_FILE content takes precedence over DB_DSN
29
30 AuthJWTIssuer string
31 AuthJWTAudience string
32
33 ConnectorJWTAudience string
34 ConnectorClientID string
35 ConnectorClientSecret string
36
37 IDPABCBaseURL string
38 IDPABCClientID string
39 IDPABCClientSecret string
40 }
41
42 // Load reads the process environment into a Config. DB_DSN_FILE, when set,
43 // is read and its trimmed content used as DBDSN in preference to DB_DSN —
44 // DB_DSN is a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option, per
45 // handoff-04-secrets.md's S7 revision.
46 //
47 // APP_MODE is validated, not merely defaulted: an unrecognized value is a
48 // startup error rather than a silent fall-through to "verifier", because a
49 // typo'd issuer Deployment silently running as a verifier (or vice versa)
50 // is exactly the class of misconfiguration LT-32 exists to make loud
51 // instead of invisible.
52 //
53 // In issuer mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must be set and the file it names
54 // must actually be readable, checked here at startup rather than deferred
55 // to whatever first tries to use it. This is LT-32's defense-in-depth
56 // criterion: the verifying Deployment's pod spec never mounts this Secret
57 // at all (enforced on 04's side, by physical absence, not by this check),
58 // so if APP_MODE were ever misconfigured to "issuer" on that Deployment,
59 // this still fails startup rather than serving traffic in a half-issuer
60 // state with no actual path to the private key.
61 func Load() (Config, error) {
62 dsn, err := resolveDSN()
63 if err != nil {
64 return Config{}, err
65 }
66
67 appMode := os.Getenv("APP_MODE")
68 if appMode == "" {
69 appMode = "verifier"
70 }
71 if appMode != "verifier" && appMode != "issuer" {
72 return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE %q is not one of \"verifier\", \"issuer\"", appMode)
73 }
74
75 signingKeyPath, err := resolveSigningKeyPath(appMode)
76 if err != nil {
77 return Config{}, err
78 }
79
80 return Config{
81 AppMode: appMode,
82 JWTSigningKeyPath: signingKeyPath,
83 HTTPAddr: os.Getenv("HTTP_ADDR"),
84
85 DBDriver: os.Getenv("DB_DRIVER"),
86 DBDSN: dsn,
87
88 AuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"),
89 AuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
90
91 ConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
92 ConnectorClientID: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID"),
93 ConnectorClientSecret: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET"),
94
95 IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_BASE_URL"),
96 IDPABCClientID: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID"),
97 IDPABCClientSecret: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
98 }, nil
99 }
100
101 // resolveSigningKeyPath enforces LT-32's issuer-mode requirement: in
102 // "issuer" mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must name a regular file this
103 // process can actually read at least one byte of, checked now rather than
104 // left for whatever code first tries to sign a token — a startup failure
105 // here is the only thing that distinguishes "issuer mode with no key"
106 // from "issuer mode with a key", and the whole point of the
107 // physical-absence criterion is that those two must never be confused for
108 // one another. In "verifier" mode the variable is not read at all: the
109 // verifying binary has no legitimate use for a signing-key path, set or
110 // not.
111 //
112 // This checks openable-and-non-empty at startup, not "will still be a
113 // valid key when S7 reads it" — a Secret rotated to empty or a volume
114 // re-provisioned later isn't something a one-time startup check can see
115 // (Nolan Reyes, PR #18 review). That's S7's problem to solve when it
116 // exists, not this story's: LT-32 only owns making a *missing* key loud
117 // at startup, not monitoring a *present* key's ongoing validity.
118 func resolveSigningKeyPath(appMode string) (string, error) {
119 if appMode != "issuer" {
120 return "", nil
121 }
122 path := os.Getenv("JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE")
123 if path == "" {
124 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer requires JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE to be set")
125 }
126 fi, err := os.Stat(path)
127 if err != nil {
128 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not accessible: %w", path, err)
129 }
130 // os.Open succeeds on a directory as readily as on a regular file —
131 // no error, nothing distinguishing the two. JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE
132 // pointed at a mount directory instead of the file inside it (an easy
133 // Kubernetes subPath-vs-mount-root mistake, and exactly the class of
134 // misconfiguration this story exists to catch) would otherwise pass
135 // this check and only fail later, whenever S7's signing code first
136 // tries to read it — deferring the failure this check exists to make
137 // immediate (Oren Castellan, PR #18 review).
138 if fi.IsDir() {
139 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is a directory, not a file", path)
140 }
141 f, err := os.Open(path)
142 if err != nil {
143 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not readable: %w", path, err)
144 }
145 defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
146 // Read one byte rather than open-close: an empty file (a Secret
147 // mounted but never populated) opens without error and would
148 // otherwise pass silently.
149 var buf [1]byte
150 if _, err := f.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
151 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is empty or unreadable: %w", path, err)
152 }
153 return path, nil
154 }
155
156 func resolveDSN() (string, error) {
157 if path := os.Getenv("DB_DSN_FILE"); path != "" {
158 b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
159 if err != nil {
160 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: reading DB_DSN_FILE %q: %w", path, err)
161 }
162 return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
163 }
164 return os.Getenv("DB_DSN"), nil
165 }
166 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\tAuthJWTIssuer string\n\tAuthJWTAudience string",
"new_string": "\tAuthJWTIssuer string\n\tAuthJWTAudience string\n\t// AuthJWKSURL is the verifier's only path to public key material\n\t// (LT-40, handoff-03-auth.md v4): the issuer Deployment's in-cluster\n\t// ClusterIP Service JWKS endpoint, e.g.\n\t// \"http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local/.well-known/jwks.json\".\n\t// Never a mounted key file — JWKS survives rotation without a config\n\t// change, since the verifier fetches by kid.\n\tAuthJWKSURL string\n\n\t// AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID seed the temporary,\n\t// default-deny StopgapAuthorizer (internal/api) for LT-40/LT-51's\n\t// joint live-URL review only — see StopgapAuthorizer's own doc\n\t// comment for why a permissive default was explicitly ruled out.\n\t// Both empty (the default) means the stand-in denies every\n\t// profile:read:own request, the safe default until LT-51 seeds a\n\t// real QA client credential and this is set to match it.\n\tAuthzQASub string\n\tAuthzQAAllowedProfileID string"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\tAuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv(\"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"),\n\t\tAuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),",
"new_string": "\t\tAuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv(\"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"),\n\t\tAuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\t\tAuthJWKSURL: os.Getenv(\"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"),\n\n\t\tAuthzQASub: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_SUB\"),\n\t\tAuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID\"),"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./internal/config/... 2>&1 && echo OK\ngrep -n \"^func New\" internal/dao/register.go internal/dao/factory.go 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Build config package and check dao.New factory signature"
}Exit code 2
OK
14:func New(driver, dsn string) (Repository, error) {{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router.go",
"content": "package app\n\nimport (\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n)\n\n// jwksCacheTTL matches the token TTL per handoff-03-auth.md v4's own\n// guidance (\"Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short\n// TTL (matching token TTL is reasonable)\") — using the upper bound of the\n// 5-15 minute TTL range so a cache refresh never fires more often than a\n// token itself could have already expired and been re-issued.\nconst jwksCacheTTL = 15 * time.Minute\n\n// NewVerifierRouter builds api-service's real, authenticated router —\n// LT-39's handlers (search/retrieve) wired behind LT-40's JWT\n// verification middleware, plus /healthz. This is the ModeVerifier\n// Deployment's router; the issuer Deployment (ModeIssuer) still uses the\n// plain NewRouter above, since it has no need for any of this — it never\n// verifies inbound tokens, only issues them.\n//\n// repo may be nil (e.g. DB_DRIVER unset in a minimal smoke-test\n// environment); the search/retrieve routes still register in that case,\n// they'll simply fail at the DAO call with whatever error a nil\n// Repository produces — this function's job is wiring, not validating\n// that a database is reachable, which is /healthz's own job (LT-52).\nfunc NewVerifierRouter(cfg config.Config, repo dao.Repository) http.Handler {\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/healthz\", healthHandler(\"api-service\"))\n\n\tdeps := api.Deps{\n\t\tRepo: repo,\n\t\tRateLimiter: api.NewInProcessRateLimiter(),\n\t\tTouchCounter: api.NewInProcessTouchCounter(\n\t\t\tapi.TouchCapPerWindow, api.TouchCapWindow),\n\t\tAuditLog: api.StdoutAuditLogger{},\n\t\tAuthz: &api.StopgapAuthorizer{\n\t\t\tReadOwnAllow: stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tkeys := api.NewJWKSCache(cfg.AuthJWKSURL, jwksCacheTTL, nil)\n\tauthMiddleware := api.NewJWTMiddleware(keys, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer, cfg.AuthJWTAudience)\n\n\t// api.NewDeadlineMiddleware outermost: the deadline budget must cover\n\t// JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) as well as\n\t// the handler's own DAO call, per decisions/context-propagation.md's\n\t// ruling — a single deadline, not the middleware's and the handler's\n\t// own disagreeing.\n\tprotect := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn api.NewDeadlineMiddleware(authMiddleware(h))\n\t}\n\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /profiles/search\", protect(api.NewSearchHandler(deps)))\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /profiles/{id}\", protect(api.NewGetProfileHandler(deps)))\n\n\treturn mux\n}\n\n// stopgapReadOwnAllow builds StopgapAuthorizer's hard-coded (sub ->\n// allowed record id) map from cfg — empty (denies everything) unless\n// both AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID are set, which LT-51 does\n// once the QA client credential and a matching seeded profile exist.\nfunc stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg config.Config) map[string]map[string]bool {\n\tif cfg.AuthzQASub == \"\" || cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\treturn map[string]map[string]bool{\n\t\tcfg.AuthzQASub: {cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: true},\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "log"
9 "net/http"
10
11 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
12 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
13 )
14
15 func main() {
16 cfg, err := config.Load()
17 if err != nil {
18 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
19 }
20
21 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
22 if addr == "" {
23 addr = ":8080"
24 }
25
26 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
27 if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))); err != nil {
28 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
29 }
30 }
31 {
"command": "grep -rn \"func init\\|dao.Register\\|RegisterDriver\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/postgres/register.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/sqlite/register.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/*.go 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Check DAO driver registration mechanism"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/postgres/register.go:9:func init() {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/postgres/register.go:10: dao.Register("postgres", func(dsn string) (dao.Repository, error) {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/postgres/register.go:13: dao.Register("cockroachdb", func(dsn string) (dao.Repository, error) {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/sqlite/register.go:7:func init() {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/sqlite/register.go:8: dao.Register("sqlite", New){
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"content": "// Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,\n// bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a\n// thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in\n// internal/app and internal/config, not here.\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres\" // registers \"postgres\" and \"cockroachdb\"\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite\" // registers \"sqlite\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tcfg, err := config.Load()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"api-service: loading config: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\taddr := cfg.HTTPAddr\n\tif addr == \"\" {\n\t\taddr = \":8080\"\n\t}\n\n\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: mode=%s listening on %s\", cfg.AppMode, addr)\n\n\tvar handler http.Handler\n\tswitch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {\n\tcase app.ModeVerifier:\n\t\t// The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the\n\t\t// database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer\n\t\t// Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it\n\t\t// only mints tokens.\n\t\trepo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"api-service: opening DAO repository: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)\n\tdefault:\n\t\t// ModeIssuer (and the unrecognized-mode fallback, which\n\t\t// NewRouter itself already logs loudly and treats as verifier —\n\t\t// see app.NewRouter's own doc comment) don't need the full\n\t\t// verifier stack; NewRouter's existing /auth/token placeholder\n\t\t// (LT-32) and /healthz cover both.\n\t\thandler = app.NewRouter(\"api-service\", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))\n\t}\n\n\tif err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, handler); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"api-service: %v\", err)\n\t}\n}\n"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after router wiring"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -l . 2>&1\ngo test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "gofmt and full test run"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.350s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.340s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "grep -n \"^func TestHealthz\\|^func TestNewRouter\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/app_test.go",
"description": "Check existing app_test.go structure"
}12:func TestHealthz(t *testing.T) {
57:func TestNewRouter_IssuerModeAddsTokenRoute(t *testing.T) {
81:func TestNewRouter_VerifierModeHasNoTokenRoute(t *testing.T) {
101:func TestNewRouter_UnrecognizedModeFallsBackToVerifier(t *testing.T) {{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router_test.go",
"content": "package app\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/model\"\n)\n\n// fakeRepo is a minimal dao.Repository — only Profiles().Search is\n// exercised by this file's tests; everything else panics, so a test\n// that reaches an unexpected method fails loudly rather than silently\n// zero-valuing (mirrors internal/api's own hand-written fakes,\n// decisions/test-double-strategy.md).\ntype fakeRepo struct{ profiles fakeProfiles }\n\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return &f.profiles }\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { panic(\"not used\") }\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) Methods() dao.AuthMethodRepository { panic(\"not used\") }\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) CreateProfileWithCredential(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile, c *model.UserCredential) (*model.UserProfile, *model.UserCredential, error) {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) DeleteExpired(ctx context.Context, class dao.RetentionClass, olderThan time.Time, maxRows int) (dao.SweepResult, error) {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, externalRef *string) error {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (f *fakeRepo) Close() error { return nil }\n\ntype fakeProfiles struct{}\n\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.UserProfile, error) {\n\treturn &model.UserProfile{ID: id, Name: \"Jane Doe\"}, nil\n}\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Search(ctx context.Context, q dao.ProfileQuery) ([]model.UserProfile, int, error) {\n\treturn []model.UserProfile{{ID: \"p1\", Name: \"Jane Doe\"}}, 1, nil\n}\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Create(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Update(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Upsert(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {\n\tpanic(\"not used\")\n}\nfunc (fakeProfiles) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error { panic(\"not used\") }\n\nconst (\n\ttestIssuer = \"https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal\"\n\ttestAudience = \"loginid-api-service\"\n)\n\nfunc startFakeJWKS(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *httptest.Server {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{\n\t\t\"keys\": []map[string]string{{\n\t\t\t\"kty\": \"RSA\",\n\t\t\t\"kid\": kid,\n\t\t\t\"alg\": \"RS256\",\n\t\t\t\"use\": \"sig\",\n\t\t\t\"n\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub.N.Bytes()),\n\t\t\t\"e\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537\n\t\t}},\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling fake JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n}\n\nfunc signTestToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, kid, scope string) string {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tc := jwt.MapClaims{\n\t\t\"iss\": testIssuer,\n\t\t\"aud\": testAudience,\n\t\t\"sub\": \"client-under-test\",\n\t\t\"scope\": scope,\n\t\t\"exp\": time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix(),\n\t\t\"iat\": time.Now().Unix(),\n\t}\n\ttok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, c)\n\ttok.Header[\"kid\"] = kid\n\tsigned, err := tok.SignedString(key)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"signing test token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn signed\n}\n\nfunc TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tjwks := startFakeJWKS(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tdefer jwks.Close()\n\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/profiles/search\", strings.NewReader(`{\"name\":\"a\"}`))\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 401 with no bearer token\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler proves the\n// full stack — deadline middleware, JWT verification against a real\n// JWKS-over-HTTP fetch, AuthContext population, and LT-39's handler —\n// is wired together correctly end to end, not just each piece in\n// isolation.\nfunc TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tjwks := startFakeJWKS(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tdefer jwks.Close()\n\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})\n\ttok := signTestToken(t, key, \"key-1\", \"profile:search\")\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/profiles/search\", strings.NewReader(`{\"name\":\"jane\"}`))\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+tok)\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 200, body=%s\", w.Code, w.Body.String())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth(t *testing.T) {\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: \"http://unused.invalid\"}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/healthz\", nil)\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 200 — /healthz must stay unauthenticated per handoff-03-auth.md\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after adding verifier router tests"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/app/... -v 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Run internal/app tests"
}=== RUN TestHealthz
--- PASS: TestHealthz (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_IssuerModeAddsTokenRoute
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_IssuerModeAddsTokenRoute (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_VerifierModeHasNoTokenRoute
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_VerifierModeHasNoTokenRoute (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_UnrecognizedModeFallsBackToVerifier
2026/09/13 04:31:32 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "bogus" — serving verifier routes only
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_UnrecognizedModeFallsBackToVerifier (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401 (0.16s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler
2026/09/13 04:31:32 audit: {"Sub":"client-under-test","Scope":"profile:search","Kind":"success","RecordIDs":["p1"],"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:31:32.591483Z"}
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler (0.05s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.498s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -l . 2>&1\ngo test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "Full formatting and test verification"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.222s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// GrantLimiter enforces the token-issuing endpoint's own failed-grant\n// rate limiting and progressive backoff — handoff-03-auth.md v3:\n// \"Token-endpoint brute-force protection, separate from the resource-API\n// rate limits ... failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per\n// client_id and per source IP on the token-issuing endpoint itself, plus\n// alerting on a sustained run of failed grants against one client_id.\"\n//\n// This is genuinely separate from RateLimiter (ratelimit.go): that type\n// gates the resource API by an already-authenticated sub, at a fixed\n// per-minute rate; this one gates the endpoint that issues the\n// credential in the first place, keyed independently by client_id AND\n// by source IP — a distributed brute force (many IPs, one client_id)\n// and a single-source credential-stuffing run (one IP, many client_ids)\n// are both attack shapes this is meant to slow down, and either key\n// exceeding its own backoff blocks the attempt.\n//\n// Not wired to a live endpoint by this story: /auth/token's real grant\n// logic is LT-51's scope (this story's non-goals). This is the\n// ready-to-use component LT-51 constructs and calls from the real\n// handler — building it now, tested in isolation, means LT-51 doesn't\n// also have to design a backoff/alerting scheme under its own deadline.\ntype GrantLimiter interface {\n\t// Allow reports whether a grant attempt for clientID from sourceIP\n\t// may proceed right now — false while either key is in backoff.\n\tAllow(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error)\n\t// RecordFailure records a failed grant attempt for both clientID and\n\t// sourceIP, advancing each key's backoff state independently.\n\t// Crossing the alert threshold for a given client_id (not source IP\n\t// — the requirement names client_id specifically) fires alert\n\t// exactly once per crossing, not once per subsequent failure.\n\tRecordFailure(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)\n\t// RecordSuccess clears backoff state for both clientID and\n\t// sourceIP — a successful grant resets the count, standard\n\t// exponential-backoff practice: this deters sustained brute force,\n\t// it does not permanently degrade a legitimate client that mistyped\n\t// a secret once.\n\tRecordSuccess(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)\n}\n\n// grantBackoffState is one key's (a client_id's, or a source IP's)\n// consecutive-failure bookkeeping.\ntype grantBackoffState struct {\n\tconsecutiveFailures int\n\tblockedUntil time.Time\n\talerted bool\n}\n\n// InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with\n// RateLimiter/TouchCounter's in-process implementations, a shared store\n// is the multi-instance replacement behind the same interface — the\n// mechanism is this track's call, per handoff-03-auth.md v3.\ntype InProcessGrantLimiter struct {\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tbyClientID map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbySourceIP map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbaseBackoff time.Duration\n\tmaxBackoff time.Duration\n\talertThreshold int\n\talertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)\n\tnow func() time.Time\n}\n\n// NewInProcessGrantLimiter constructs a limiter with exponential backoff\n// starting at baseBackoff (doubling per consecutive failure, capped at\n// maxBackoff) and alertFn called once per client_id crossing\n// alertThreshold consecutive failures. alertFn may be nil (no alerting —\n// tests use this; production wiring passes a real sink).\nfunc NewInProcessGrantLimiter(baseBackoff, maxBackoff time.Duration, alertThreshold int, alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)) *InProcessGrantLimiter {\n\treturn &InProcessGrantLimiter{\n\t\tbyClientID: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),\n\t\tbySourceIP: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),\n\t\tbaseBackoff: baseBackoff,\n\t\tmaxBackoff: maxBackoff,\n\t\talertThreshold: alertThreshold,\n\t\talertFn: alertFn,\n\t\tnow: time.Now,\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {\n\tl.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer l.mu.Unlock()\n\tnow := l.now()\n\treturn !isBlocked(l.byClientID[clientID], now) && !isBlocked(l.bySourceIP[sourceIP], now), nil\n}\n\nfunc isBlocked(s *grantBackoffState, now time.Time) bool {\n\treturn s != nil && now.Before(s.blockedUntil)\n}\n\nfunc (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordFailure(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {\n\tl.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer l.mu.Unlock()\n\tnow := l.now()\n\n\tcs := l.advance(l.byClientID, clientID, now)\n\tl.advance(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP, now)\n\n\tif cs.consecutiveFailures >= l.alertThreshold && !cs.alerted {\n\t\tcs.alerted = true\n\t\tif l.alertFn != nil {\n\t\t\tl.alertFn(clientID, cs.consecutiveFailures)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n// advance increments key's consecutive-failure count and sets its\n// exponential backoff window, creating the state entry if this is its\n// first failure.\nfunc (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) advance(m map[string]*grantBackoffState, key string, now time.Time) *grantBackoffState {\n\ts, ok := m[key]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\ts = &grantBackoffState{}\n\t\tm[key] = s\n\t}\n\ts.consecutiveFailures++\n\tbackoff := l.baseBackoff << uint(s.consecutiveFailures-1) // 2^(n-1) * base\n\tif backoff > l.maxBackoff || backoff <= 0 { // overflow guard: a left-shifted duration can wrap negative\n\t\tbackoff = l.maxBackoff\n\t}\n\ts.blockedUntil = now.Add(backoff)\n\treturn s\n}\n\nfunc (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordSuccess(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {\n\tl.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer l.mu.Unlock()\n\tdelete(l.byClientID, clientID)\n\tdelete(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP)\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after adding grant limiter"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_AllowsFirstAttempt(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Second, time.Minute, 5, nil)\n\tallow, err := l.Allow(context.Background(), \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif err != nil || !allow {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Allow = %v, %v; want true, nil\", allow, err)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_BlocksAfterFailure(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Minute, time.Hour, 5, nil)\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\n\tallow, err := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Allow: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"should be blocked immediately after a failure, within the backoff window\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_BackoffIsExponential(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Second, time.Hour, 100, nil)\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tl.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\t// First failure: 1s backoff. Advance 1.5s — should be allowed again.\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(1500 * time.Millisecond)\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); !allow {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"should be allowed again after the first (1s) backoff elapses\")\n\t}\n\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\t// Second consecutive failure: 2s backoff. Advance only 1.5s again —\n\t// should still be blocked, proving the window grew.\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(1500 * time.Millisecond)\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"should still be blocked — the second failure's backoff (2s) hasn't elapsed yet\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_BackoffCappedAtMax(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Second, 5*time.Second, 100, nil)\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tl.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tfor i := 0; i < 10; i++ {\n\t\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\t}\n\t// Even after many failures, the backoff must not exceed maxBackoff.\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(5*time.Second + time.Millisecond)\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); !allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"backoff should be capped at maxBackoff (5s), not grow unbounded across 10 failures\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_KeyedIndependentlyByClientIDAndSourceIP(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Hour, time.Hour, 100, nil)\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\t// A distributed brute force: many source IPs against one client_id.\n\t// The client_id key alone must block a request even from a fresh IP.\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a blocked client_id must block attempts from a different source IP too\")\n\t}\n\n\t// A single-source credential-stuffing run: many client_ids from one\n\t// IP. The source-IP key alone must block a fresh client_id from that\n\t// same IP.\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-b\", \"«IP»\"); allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a blocked source IP must block attempts for a different client_id too\")\n\t}\n\n\t// A genuinely unrelated (client_id, IP) pair must not be affected.\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-c\", \"«IP»\"); !allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"an unrelated client_id/source IP pair must not be blocked\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_SuccessResetsBackoff(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Hour, time.Hour, 100, nil)\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); allow {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"should be blocked after a failure\")\n\t}\n\n\tl.RecordSuccess(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif allow, _ := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\"); !allow {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a successful grant should reset backoff state entirely\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun is\n// handoff-03-auth.md v3's \"alerting on a sustained run of failed grants\n// against one client_id\" — fired exactly once per threshold crossing,\n// not once per failure past it (which would just be alert-fatigue noise\n// indistinguishable from the failures themselves).\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun(t *testing.T) {\n\tvar alerts []int\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Nanosecond, time.Nanosecond, 3, func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int) {\n\t\talerts = append(alerts, consecutiveFailures)\n\t})\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tl.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tfor i := 0; i < 6; i++ {\n\t\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\t\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Millisecond) // clear the (nanosecond) backoff each time\n\t}\n\n\tif len(alerts) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"alerts fired = %v, want exactly one (at the threshold crossing)\", alerts)\n\t}\n\tif alerts[0] != 3 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"alert fired at %d consecutive failures, want at the threshold (3)\", alerts[0])\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP(t *testing.T) {\n\t// The requirement names client_id specifically for alerting — a\n\t// source IP hitting the threshold across many different client_ids\n\t// (each individually under threshold) is a different signal\n\t// (distributed credential stuffing) this limiter still blocks via\n\t// the source-IP key, but doesn't claim to alert on by itself.\n\tvar alerted bool\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Nanosecond, time.Nanosecond, 3, func(clientID string, n int) {\n\t\talerted = true\n\t})\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tl.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tfor i := 0; i < 3; i++ {\n\t\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-different-each-time\", \"«IP»\")\n\t\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Millisecond)\n\t}\n\tif alerted {\n\t\tt.Error(\"alertFn should be keyed on a single client_id's consecutive failures, not fired for varying client_ids sharing a source IP\")\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK && go test ./internal/api/... -run TestGrantLimiter -v 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Build, vet, and run grant limiter tests"
}BUILD_OK
VET_OK
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_AllowsFirstAttempt
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AllowsFirstAttempt (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_BlocksAfterFailure
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BlocksAfterFailure (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_BackoffIsExponential
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BackoffIsExponential (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_BackoffCappedAtMax
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BackoffCappedAtMax (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_KeyedIndependentlyByClientIDAndSourceIP
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_KeyedIndependentlyByClientIDAndSourceIP (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_SuccessResetsBackoff
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_SuccessResetsBackoff (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP
grantlimiter_test.go:154: alertFn should be keyed on a single client_id's consecutive failures, not fired for varying client_ids sharing a source IP
--- FAIL: TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.378s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go",
"old_string": "\tfor i := 0; i < 3; i++ {\n\t\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-different-each-time\", \"«IP»\")\n\t\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Millisecond)\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tclientIDs := []string{\"client-a\", \"client-b\", \"client-c\"}\n\tfor _, id := range clientIDs {\n\t\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, id, \"«IP»\")\n\t\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Millisecond)\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... -run TestGrantLimiter -v 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Rerun grant limiter tests after fixing the test bug"
}=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_AllowsFirstAttempt --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AllowsFirstAttempt (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_BlocksAfterFailure --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BlocksAfterFailure (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_BackoffIsExponential --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BackoffIsExponential (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_BackoffCappedAtMax --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_BackoffCappedAtMax (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_KeyedIndependentlyByClientIDAndSourceIP --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_KeyedIndependentlyByClientIDAndSourceIP (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_SuccessResetsBackoff --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_SuccessResetsBackoff (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AlertsOnceOnSustainedFailureRun (0.00s) === RUN TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP --- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP (0.00s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.246s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -l . 2>&1",
"description": "Check gofmt"
}internal/api/grantlimiter.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -w internal/api/grantlimiter.go && gofmt -l . 2>&1; echo done",
"description": "Apply gofmt fix"
}done Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK && go test ./... -race 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "Final full build, vet, and race-test run"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK ? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.330s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 1.456s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 1.185s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao 1.185s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 1.847s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 1.432s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 2.581s ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git status --short",
"description": "Check LT-40 branch status"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M go.mod M go.sum M internal/api/handlers.go M internal/config/config.go ?? internal/api/grantlimiter.go ?? internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go ?? internal/api/jwks.go ?? internal/api/jwks_test.go ?? internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go ?? internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go ?? internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go ?? internal/app/verifier_router.go ?? internal/app/verifier_router_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git add -A && git status --short",
"description": "Stage all LT-40 changes"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M go.mod M go.sum A internal/api/grantlimiter.go A internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go M internal/api/handlers.go A internal/api/jwks.go A internal/api/jwks_test.go A internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go A internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go A internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go A internal/app/verifier_router.go A internal/app/verifier_router_test.go M internal/config/config.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nLT-40: JWT verification middleware, live router wiring\n\nImplements handoff-03-auth.md v3/v4's verifier side and wires LT-39's\nalready-built handlers into cmd/api-service's real router, per\nrefinement/LT-40.md.\n\ninternal/api/jwks.go — a minimal RFC 7517 JWKS client: parses RSA public\nkeys from a JWKS document, caches the fetched key set with a TTL\n(matching the token TTL upper bound, per v4's own guidance) rather than\nrefetching on every verification. A stale-but-present cache survives a\ntransient fetch failure rather than hard-failing every request the\nmoment one refresh to the issuer's in-cluster Service blips. Supports a\nkid rotation overlap window by construction — it caches the WHOLE\npublished key set, not just the newest key, so an old and new kid both\nverify for as long as the issuer's JWKS response lists both.\n\ninternal/api/jwtmiddleware.go — the verifier itself, using\ngolang-jwt/jwt/v5:\n- Algorithm pinned to RS256 via jwt.WithValidMethods on every parse,\n never left to the library default (handoff-03-auth.md v3's explicit\n instruction, RFC 8725 §3.1). Verified against both classic attacks\n named in the spec: a bare alg:none token, and an HS256 token forged\n using the RSA public key's DER bytes as the HMAC secret — both\n rejected before signature verification is ever attempted.\n- Public-key-only verification, structurally: KeySource's only real\n implementation (JWKSCache) ever holds *rsa.PublicKey values parsed\n from a JWKS response — there is no code path in this package or the\n verifying binary that references JWTSigningKeyPath or any private-key\n material at all.\n- kid-based key selection; a rotation-overlap test signs two tokens\n under two different kids against one KeySource configured with both\n and confirms both verify.\n- iss/aud/exp/sub checked explicitly (audience checked directly rather\n than via the library's own WithAudience option, whose treatment of an\n absent Audience claim isn't something this file wants to depend on).\n- scope claim: handoff-03-auth.md v3 describes it as space-delimited\n without specifying how a multi-scope token is disambiguated per\n request, and AuthContext (LT-39) carries exactly one Scope by design —\n a token naming zero or more than one recognized scope is rejected\n outright rather than silently picking one, matching this project's\n standing rule against invented authorization ambiguity.\n- Verification failure returns 401 via the existing writeUnauthorized —\n the actual integration seam with LT-39, not new response-shape design.\n- NewDeadlineMiddleware applies a concrete deadlineBudget (5s) to every\n request, the number decisions/context-propagation.md's ruling required\n (\"a concrete number ... not left as 'some deadline'\"), composed\n outermost so it covers JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss\n fetch) and the handler's own DAO call under one budget.\n\ninternal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go — StopgapAuthorizer, a TEMPORARY\ndefault-deny Authorizer, per Marcus Ilori's (02) direct ruling after\nbeing asked before this was wired to a live URL: a permissive allow-all\nstand-in must never be deployed to a live public URL, \"temporary\" or\nnot. Hard-coded (sub -> allowed record id) map, seeded via config\n(AUTHZ_QA_SUB/AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID) for LT-51's QA credential;\nempty by default (denies everything). Only gates ScopeReadOwn — the only\nscope with a per-record referral concept this stopgap can meaningfully\napproximate.\n\ninternal/api/grantlimiter.go — GrantLimiter, the token-issuing\nendpoint's own failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per\nclient_id AND per source IP independently, with alerting on a sustained\nrun of failures against one client_id (fired once per threshold\ncrossing, not per failure) — handoff-03-auth.md v3's criterion 5,\ngenuinely separate from the resource-API RateLimiter. Not wired to a\nlive endpoint here (real token issuance is LT-51's scope, this story's\nnon-goal) — built and tested now so LT-51 doesn't also have to design a\nbackoff/alerting scheme under its own deadline.\n\ninternal/app/verifier_router.go — NewVerifierRouter builds api-service's\nreal authenticated router for ModeVerifier: /healthz plus LT-39's\nPOST /profiles/search and GET /profiles/{id} behind\nNewDeadlineMiddleware(NewJWTMiddleware(...)), wired to real\nRateLimiter/TouchCounter (2,000 distinct records per rolling 24h, per\nMarcus's ruling — handoff-03-auth.md's mechanism was specified, the\nnumber wasn't) and StdoutAuditLogger. ModeIssuer still uses the existing\nplain NewRouter (no need for any of this — it only issues tokens).\ncmd/api-service/main.go now opens a real dao.Repository in verifier\nmode and passes it through.\n\ninternal/config: AUTH_JWKS_URL (the verifier's only path to public key\nmaterial — never a mounted file, so JWKS survives rotation without a\nredeploy) plus the two StopgapAuthorizer seed vars above.\n\nVerified end-to-end, not just piece by piece:\nTestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler signs a real\nRS256 token, serves a real JWKS document over httptest, and confirms a\nrequest makes it through deadline middleware, JWT verification, and\nLT-39's handler to a 200 — the audit log line fires as part of that same\nrequest. go build/vet clean, go test ./... -race green (20 new\nJWT/JWKS tests, 8 new GrantLimiter tests, 3 new router-wiring tests),\ngofmt clean.\n\nStory: LT-40\nWork-By: Renata Cole (lead)\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}[feature/LT-40 1150b98] LT-40: JWT verification middleware, live router wiring 14 files changed, 1565 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 internal/api/grantlimiter.go create mode 100644 internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwks.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwks_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go create mode 100644 internal/app/verifier_router.go create mode 100644 internal/app/verifier_router_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git push -u origin feature/LT-40 2>&1",
"description": "Push LT-40 branch"
}remote: remote: Create a pull request for 'feature/LT-40' on GitHub by visiting: remote: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/new/feature/LT-40 remote: To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git * [new branch] feature/LT-40 -> feature/LT-40 branch 'feature/LT-40' set up to track 'origin/feature/LT-40'. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "gh pr create --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome --base main --head feature/LT-40 --title \"LT-40: JWT verification middleware, live router wiring\" --body \"$(cat <<'EOF'\n## Summary\n\nImplements `handoff-03-auth.md` v3/v4's verifier side and wires LT-39's already-built handlers into `cmd/api-service`'s real router, per `refinement/LT-40.md`. This is the story that turns LT-32's issuer split, LT-39's handlers, and LT-34's health endpoint into an actual authenticated, reachable public endpoint.\n\n## What's new\n\n- **`internal/api/jwks.go`** — a minimal RFC 7517 JWKS client: parses RSA public keys, caches the fetched key set with a TTL matching the token TTL's upper bound (per v4's guidance). A stale-but-present cache survives a transient fetch failure rather than hard-failing every request. Supports a `kid` rotation overlap window by construction (caches the whole published key set, not just the newest key).\n- **`internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go`** — the verifier, using `golang-jwt/jwt/v5`:\n - Algorithm pinned to RS256 via `jwt.WithValidMethods` on every parse, never left to the library default. Tested against both RFC 8725 §3.1 attacks named in the spec: a bare `alg:none` token, and an HS256 token forged using the RSA public key's DER bytes as the HMAC secret — both rejected before signature verification is attempted.\n - Public-key-only verification, structurally: nothing in `internal/api` or the verifying binary's path ever references signing-key material.\n - `kid`-based key selection with a real rotation-overlap test (two tokens, two `kid`s, one `KeySource` configured with both, both verify).\n - `iss`/`aud`/`exp`/`sub` checked explicitly; `scope` claim disambiguation: a token naming zero or more than one recognized scope is rejected outright rather than silently picking one (matches this project's standing rule against invented authorization ambiguity — `AuthContext` carries exactly one `Scope` by LT-39's own design).\n - Verification failure returns 401 via the existing `writeUnauthorized` — the actual integration seam with LT-39, not new response-shape design.\n - `NewDeadlineMiddleware` applies a concrete `deadlineBudget` (5s) to every request — the number `decisions/context-propagation.md`'s ruling required, composed outermost so it covers JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) and the handler's DAO call under one budget.\n- **`internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go`** — `StopgapAuthorizer`, a **temporary default-deny** `Authorizer`, per Marcus Ilori's (02) direct ruling after being asked before this was wired to a live URL: a permissive allow-all stand-in must never be deployed to a live public URL. Hard-coded `(sub -> allowed record id)` map, seeded via config for LT-51's QA credential; empty by default (denies everything).\n- **`internal/api/grantlimiter.go`** — `GrantLimiter`, the token-issuing endpoint's own failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per `client_id` **and** per source IP independently, with alerting on a sustained failure run against one `client_id` (once per threshold crossing). Genuinely separate from the resource-API `RateLimiter`. Not wired to a live endpoint here (real token issuance is LT-51's scope) — built and tested now so LT-51 doesn't also have to design this under its own deadline.\n- **`internal/app/verifier_router.go`** — `NewVerifierRouter` builds the real authenticated router for `ModeVerifier`: `/healthz` plus `POST /profiles/search` and `GET /profiles/{id}` behind `NewDeadlineMiddleware(NewJWTMiddleware(...))`, wired to real `RateLimiter`/`TouchCounter` (2,000 distinct records per rolling 24h, per Marcus's ruling on the number `handoff-03-auth.md` left as \"mechanism is your call\") and `StdoutAuditLogger`. `cmd/api-service/main.go` now opens a real `dao.Repository` in verifier mode.\n- **`internal/config`**: `AUTH_JWKS_URL` (the verifier's only path to public key material) plus the two `StopgapAuthorizer` seed vars.\n\n## Verification\n\n`TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler` proves the whole stack end-to-end, not just piece by piece: signs a real RS256 token, serves a real JWKS document over `httptest`, and confirms a request makes it through deadline middleware, JWT verification, and LT-39's handler to a 200 — the audit log line fires as part of that same request.\n\n`go build`/`go vet` clean. `go test ./... -race` green: 20 new JWT/JWKS tests, 8 new `GrantLimiter` tests, 3 new router-wiring tests, full existing suite unaffected. `gofmt -l` clean.\n\n## What's explicitly not here (per refinement/LT-40.md's non-goals)\n\nReal token issuance logic (`/auth/token`'s actual grant handling) — that's LT-51, sequenced right after this. The real `caller_referral`-backed `Authorizer` — still a stated seam, real implementation is a later story per `handoff-03-auth.md` v3's F8 resolution.\n\n## Live-URL review\n\nPer the refinement doc: LT-40 merges and deploys on its own (verified by the unit/integration tests here), but its live-URL review runs **jointly with LT-51's**, using a real token obtained from `/auth/token` via a dedicated QA client credential — not an out-of-band token.\n\n## Who did the work\n\n- **Renata Cole** (03 Engineering & Delivery, lead) — implementation and tests.\n- **Naomi Voss** (01, PO) — refinement, corrected `backlog.md`'s stale rate-limit criterion against LT-39's actual merged shape.\n- **Desmond Okafor** (01, claims check) — verified the narrowing against PR #26's real diff, caught two doc-status errors.\n- **Tobias Lindqvist** (01, objection) — found the missing token-issuance story (now LT-51), routed to team-lead.\n- **Marcus Ilori** (02) — ruled the `StopgapAuthorizer` shape and the touch-cap number (2,000/24h) on direct request before this was wired to a live URL.\n- Model: Claude Sonnet 5, via Claude Code.\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)\n\nhttps://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/30
{
"description": "Oren review of PR #30 LT-40",
"subagent_type": "oren-castellan",
"prompt": "Review GitHub PR #30 (wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-40, title \"LT-40: JWT verification middleware, live router wiring\") for error semantics, nullability, and off-by-one issues.\n\nContext: this implements JWT (RS256) verification middleware for a REST API, wiring it into the router ahead of already-built, already-reviewed handlers (from a merged prior PR, #26). Key components: a JWKS client that fetches/caches RSA public keys with a TTL, a JWT verifier that pins the algorithm and validates claims, a temporary default-deny stopgap authorization stand-in, and a separate failed-grant rate limiter for a token-issuing endpoint that doesn't exist yet (built for a future story to use).\n\nUse `gh pr view 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` and `gh pr diff 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` to read the actual PR description and diff — it's a large diff (14 files), read all of it.\n\nPay particular attention to:\n- The JWKS parsing code (crypto/rsa key reconstruction from base64url-encoded modulus/exponent) — any off-by-one or encoding error there would silently produce wrong keys.\n- Whether the \"exactly one recognized scope\" validation logic is actually correct (check singleScope's implementation against its own doc comment).\n- Whether the exponential backoff calculation in the grant limiter can overflow or behave oddly at edge cases (very large failure counts).\n- Whether error paths ever leak information they shouldn't (e.g., does a JWT verification failure ever return a different error message depending on *why* it failed, in a way that could help an attacker distinguish \"wrong signature\" from \"expired\" from \"wrong audience\"?).\n\nReport back in plain prose (not a tool call) either:\n- A list of concrete findings (file/line, what's wrong, why it matters), most important first, or\n- \"No findings\" if the code is correct, if that's genuinely your assessment after reading it.\n\nBe honest — don't manufacture findings if there aren't any real ones."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: a4a906f636edab99a (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'a4a906f636edab99a', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/a4a906f636edab99a.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"description": "Nolan review of PR #30 LT-40",
"subagent_type": "nolan-reyes",
"prompt": "Review GitHub PR #30 (wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-40, title \"LT-40: JWT verification middleware, live router wiring\") for production-failure-mode issues.\n\nContext: this implements JWT (RS256) verification middleware for a REST API's live router, replacing what was previously an unwired set of handlers. Key components: a JWKS client (fetches/caches RSA public keys over HTTP from an in-cluster issuer service, with a TTL and a \"serve stale cache on transient fetch failure\" fallback), a JWT verifier, a 5-second deadline middleware applied to every request, and separate in-process rate-limiting/backoff components.\n\nUse `gh pr view 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` and `gh pr diff 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` to read the actual PR description and diff — it's a large diff (14 files), read all of it.\n\nThink hard about production deployment realities:\n- What happens on cold start if the issuer's JWKS endpoint is slow or briefly unreachable when the very first request comes in (no stale cache exists yet)? Does every request during that window hang for the full HTTP client timeout, or fail fast?\n- Is there a real risk of the 5-second deadline middleware and the JWKS fetch call interacting badly (e.g., a slow JWKS fetch eating most of the 5-second budget before the DAO call even starts)?\n- The grant limiter's in-process maps (by client_id, by source IP) — do they ever get cleaned up, or is this the same unbounded-growth pattern flagged in an earlier PR's touch-counter review?\n- Does the JWKS HTTP client have a timeout at all, or could a hung connection to the issuer service block a goroutine indefinitely regardless of the request's own deadline?\n\nReport back in plain prose (not a tool call) either:\n- A list of concrete findings (file/line, what's wrong, why it matters, what production failure mode it maps to), most important first, or\n- \"No findings\" if the code is correct, if that's genuinely your assessment after reading it.\n\nBe honest — don't manufacture findings if there aren't any real ones."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: afcc8457fa3bc1613 (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'afcc8457fa3bc1613', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/afcc8457fa3bc1613.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"to": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"summary": "LT-40 PR #30 open, requesting cold reviewer routing",
"message": "LT-40 implemented and PR #30 open: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/30 — JWT verification middleware (RS256 pinned, kid rotation, JWKS fetch/cache with a stale-cache fallback, RFC 8725 alg:none/HMAC-confusion attacks tested and rejected), StopgapAuthorizer per your ruling (default-deny, seeded via config for LT-51's QA credential), touch cap set to 2000/24h per your ruling, and the failed-grant GrantLimiter component (built, tested, not yet wired since /auth/token's real grant logic is LT-51). Router wiring proven end-to-end with a real signed token against a real JWKS-over-HTTP fetch.\n\nPM asked me to tag 02 for the cold review — your call whether that's Helena or Ingrid. Oren and Nolan are already running their reviews in the background.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"content": "LT-40 implemented and PR #30 open: https://github…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“LT-40 PR #30 open, requesting cold reviewer routing” → 02-ai-security-architecture-a2 (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"e4e815fc-9586-4127-be48-c371a2d04c85"}{
"to": "project manager",
"summary": "LT-40 PR #30 open, reviews in progress",
"message": "LT-40 implemented: JWT verification middleware (RS256 pinned via jwt.WithValidMethods, kid-based key selection with a real rotation-overlap test, tested against both RFC 8725 §3.1 attacks — alg:none and HMAC-confusion-with-the-public-key — both rejected), JWKS fetch/cache with a stale-cache fallback on transient fetch failure, the 5s deadline-budget middleware decisions/context-propagation.md called for, and full router wiring — cmd/api-service now opens a real DAO repository in verifier mode and serves LT-39's handlers behind the auth stack for real, proven end-to-end with an actual signed token against a real JWKS-over-HTTP fetch in tests.\n\nAlso resolved before wiring anything live: Marcus ruled StopgapAuthorizer must be default-deny (implemented, seeded via config for LT-51's QA credential) and the touch cap at 2000/24h (wired in). Built and tested (not yet wired to a live endpoint) the failed-grant GrantLimiter component for criterion 5, ready for LT-51 to use.\n\nPR #30: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/30. go build/vet clean, go test ./... -race green (31 new tests). Oren and Nolan reviewing now; asked Marcus to route the 02 cold review (Helena or Ingrid, his call). Will post findings and ping you once ready for the merge gate.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "project manager",
"content": "LT-40 implemented: JWT verification middleware (R…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“LT-40 PR #30 open, reviews in progress” → project manager (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"6e7e4ef6-26bb-4cbe-befa-d94761429628"}{
"command": "grep -n \"^func New\" -A 20 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/postgres/postgres.go",
"description": "Check postgres.New for eager vs lazy connection"
}35:func New(dsn string, e engine) (dao.Repository, error) {
36- db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
37- if err != nil {
38- return nil, fmt.Errorf("postgres: opening connection: %w", err)
39- }
40- return &repository{db: db, engine: e}, nil
41-}
42-
43-func (r *repository) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return profileRepo{r} }
44-func (r *repository) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { return credentialRepo{r} }
45-func (r *repository) Methods() dao.AuthMethodRepository { return authMethodRepo{r} }
46-
47-func (r *repository) Close() error { return r.db.Close() }
48-
49-// withRetry runs fn inside a transaction, retrying on a genuine SQLSTATE
50-// 40001 (serialization failure) only when r.engine is "cockroachdb" — on
51-// "postgres" it runs fn exactly once. See retry.go.
52-func (r *repository) withRetry(ctx context.Context, fn func(*sql.Tx) error) error {
53- return withRetry(ctx, r.db, r.engine, fn)
54-}{
"command": "cat /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/factory.go 2>/dev/null || grep -rn \"func New\\b\\|func Register\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/dao/*.go",
"description": "Check dao.New factory for unknown/empty driver handling"
}package dao
import "fmt"
// New selects a backend implementation by driver name, matching
// multi-db-strategy.md §1's factory signature exactly. "postgres" and
// "cockroachdb" are distinct driver strings rather than one because the
// engine-aware retry seam (§4) needs to know which engine it is talking to.
//
// No backend is registered yet — S3 (postgres/cockroachdb) and S4 (sqlite)
// register themselves via Register in their own package init(). Until
// then, New always returns an error for every driver name, which is
// expected: this story's non-goal is real I/O, not a callable factory.
func New(driver, dsn string) (Repository, error) {
ctor, ok := drivers[driver]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dao: unknown driver %q", driver)
}
return ctor(dsn)
}
type driverCtor func(dsn string) (Repository, error)
var drivers = map[string]driverCtor{}
// Register is called by a backend package's init() to register itself
// under a driver name (e.g. "postgres", "cockroachdb", "sqlite"). Not part
// of 05's Go-shaped contract — an internal wiring mechanism this track owns
// so New's signature never has to change as backends are added.
func Register(name string, ctor driverCtor) {
drivers[name] = ctor
}{
"command": "grep -n \"func.*KeyForKid\\|httpClient.Get\\|func.*verify\\b\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"description": "Locate exact spots needing context threading"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go:115:func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go:148: resp, err := c.httpClient.Get(c.url)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go:60:func (v *jwtVerifier) verify(tokenString string) (AuthContext, error) {{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go"
}1 // jwks.go implements a minimal RFC 7517 JSON Web Key Set client: fetch,
2 // parse RSA public keys, cache with a short TTL. handoff-03-auth.md v4:
3 // "Public-key distribution for the verifier ... JWKS served by the issuer
4 // Deployment, reachable only in-cluster via its own ClusterIP Service ...
5 // Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short TTL (matching
6 // token TTL is reasonable) to avoid a JWKS fetch on every single
7 // verification."
8 package api
9
10 import (
11 "crypto/rsa"
12 "encoding/base64"
13 "encoding/json"
14 "fmt"
15 "io"
16 "math/big"
17 "net/http"
18 "sync"
19 "time"
20 )
21
22 // jwk is one entry in a JWKS response — only the fields this verifier
23 // needs to reconstruct an RSA public key (RFC 7517 §4, RFC 7518 §6.3.1).
24 // Fields this verifier doesn't use (x5c, x5t, ...) are simply not
25 // unmarshaled; unknown fields in the source JSON are not an error.
26 type jwk struct {
27 Kty string `json:"kty"`
28 Kid string `json:"kid"`
29 Alg string `json:"alg"`
30 Use string `json:"use"`
31 N string `json:"n"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA modulus
32 E string `json:"e"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA public exponent
33 }
34
35 type jwksResponse struct {
36 Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
37 }
38
39 // parseJWKS decodes a JWKS JSON document into a map of kid -> public key.
40 // Any key with kty != "RSA" is skipped (not an error) — a future non-RSA
41 // key in the set (e.g. during an algorithm migration) shouldn't break
42 // verification of tokens signed with the RSA keys that ARE present.
43 func parseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
44 var resp jwksResponse
45 if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &resp); err != nil {
46 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: parsing JWKS: %w", err)
47 }
48 keys := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(resp.Keys))
49 for _, k := range resp.Keys {
50 if k.Kty != "RSA" {
51 continue
52 }
53 if k.Kid == "" {
54 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS RSA key missing kid")
55 }
56 pub, err := rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k)
57 if err != nil {
58 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS key %q: %w", k.Kid, err)
59 }
60 keys[k.Kid] = pub
61 }
62 return keys, nil
63 }
64
65 func rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
66 nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)
67 if err != nil {
68 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding n: %w", err)
69 }
70 eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)
71 if err != nil {
72 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding e: %w", err)
73 }
74 n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)
75 e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)
76 if !e.IsInt64() {
77 return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent out of range")
78 }
79 return &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}, nil
80 }
81
82 // KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a
83 // token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a
84 // map-backed fake.
85 type KeySource interface {
86 KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)
87 }
88
89 // JWKSCache fetches a JWKS document from url and caches the parsed key
90 // set for ttl, refetching only after it expires — "to avoid a JWKS fetch
91 // on every single verification" (handoff-03-auth.md v4). Supports at
92 // least two concurrently valid kids during a rotation overlap window by
93 // construction: it caches the WHOLE key set the issuer publishes, not
94 // just the most recent key, so an old and a new key both verify
95 // successfully for as long as the issuer's own JWKS response lists both.
96 type JWKSCache struct {
97 url string
98 ttl time.Duration
99 httpClient *http.Client
100
101 mu sync.Mutex
102 keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
103 fetchedAt time.Time
104 }
105
106 // NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most
107 // once per ttl. A nil httpClient uses http.DefaultClient.
108 func NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {
109 if httpClient == nil {
110 httpClient = http.DefaultClient
111 }
112 return &JWKSCache{url: url, ttl: ttl, httpClient: httpClient}
113 }
114
115 func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
116 c.mu.Lock()
117 defer c.mu.Unlock()
118
119 if c.keys == nil || time.Since(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl {
120 keys, err := c.fetch()
121 if err != nil {
122 // A stale-but-present cache is preferable to a hard failure
123 // on every request the moment one refresh fails (a
124 // transient network blip to the issuer's in-cluster
125 // Service) — verification with a stale key set still
126 // correctly rejects a token signed by a kid that's been
127 // fully retired and removed from the real set, it just
128 // risks accepting a very recently rotated-in key slightly
129 // late, which is not a security regression (the overlap
130 // window already tolerates both old and new keys).
131 if c.keys == nil {
132 return nil, err
133 }
134 } else {
135 c.keys = keys
136 c.fetchedAt = time.Now()
137 }
138 }
139
140 key, ok := c.keys[kid]
141 if !ok {
142 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: no key found for kid %q", kid)
143 }
144 return key, nil
145 }
146
147 func (c *JWKSCache) fetch() (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
148 resp, err := c.httpClient.Get(c.url)
149 if err != nil {
150 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w", c.url, err)
151 }
152 defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
153 if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
154 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d", c.url, resp.StatusCode)
155 }
156 // 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never
157 // this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint
158 // can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.
159 body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
160 if err != nil {
161 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: reading JWKS response: %w", err)
162 }
163 return parseJWKS(body)
164 }
165 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "// KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a\n// token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a\n// map-backed fake.\ntype KeySource interface {\n\tKeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)\n}",
"new_string": "// KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a\n// token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a\n// map-backed fake. ctx carries the calling request's own deadline —\n// KeyForKid's real implementation must bound its network I/O by it, not\n// by some separate, undocumented timeout (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review: a\n// hung fetch that ignores the caller's context defeats the deadline\n// middleware's whole guarantee).\ntype KeySource interface {\n\tKeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "// NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most\n// once per ttl. A nil httpClient uses http.DefaultClient.\nfunc NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {\n\tif httpClient == nil {\n\t\thttpClient = http.DefaultClient\n\t}\n\treturn &JWKSCache{url: url, ttl: ttl, httpClient: httpClient}\n}\n\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif c.keys == nil || time.Since(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl {\n\t\tkeys, err := c.fetch()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t// A stale-but-present cache is preferable to a hard failure\n\t\t\t// on every request the moment one refresh fails (a\n\t\t\t// transient network blip to the issuer's in-cluster\n\t\t\t// Service) — verification with a stale key set still\n\t\t\t// correctly rejects a token signed by a kid that's been\n\t\t\t// fully retired and removed from the real set, it just\n\t\t\t// risks accepting a very recently rotated-in key slightly\n\t\t\t// late, which is not a security regression (the overlap\n\t\t\t// window already tolerates both old and new keys).\n\t\t\tif c.keys == nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tc.keys = keys\n\t\t\tc.fetchedAt = time.Now()\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tkey, ok := c.keys[kid]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: no key found for kid %q\", kid)\n\t}\n\treturn key, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) fetch() (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Get(c.url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w\", c.url, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d\", c.url, resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\t// 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never\n\t// this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint\n\t// can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.\n\tbody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: reading JWKS response: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn parseJWKS(body)\n}",
"new_string": "// defaultJWKSClientTimeout backstops a hung fetch (a connection that\n// accepts but never responds — not a hard refusal, which fails fast on\n// its own) when no context deadline is shorter. Distinct from and\n// independent of a per-request context deadline: this fires even for a\n// call that somehow reaches fetch() with no deadline on its context at\n// all, which the http.Client.Timeout field guards against regardless of\n// context (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review — the shipped wiring passed nil\n// for httpClient, resolving to http.DefaultClient, whose zero-value\n// Timeout means \"none\").\nconst defaultJWKSClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second\n\n// NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most\n// once per ttl. A nil httpClient constructs one with\n// defaultJWKSClientTimeout — never http.DefaultClient, whose Timeout is\n// unset (no bound at all) by default.\nfunc NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {\n\tif httpClient == nil {\n\t\thttpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: defaultJWKSClientTimeout}\n\t}\n\treturn &JWKSCache{url: url, ttl: ttl, httpClient: httpClient}\n}\n\n// KeyForKid never holds c.mu across the network fetch (Nolan Reyes, PR\n// #30 review, finding #2): the prior shape held the lock for the whole\n// function body, so one hung fetch stalled every other concurrent\n// request through this same cache instance — i.e. every authenticated\n// request the verifying Deployment was serving, not just the one that\n// triggered the refresh. Concurrent callers that both decide a refresh\n// is due may both fetch; that's cheap, occasional duplicate work, and\n// far preferable to serializing the whole authenticated surface behind\n// one goroutine's network call.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tneedsRefresh := c.keys == nil || time.Since(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl\n\thadCache := c.keys != nil\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif needsRefresh {\n\t\tfresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase err == nil:\n\t\t\tc.mu.Lock()\n\t\t\tc.keys = fresh\n\t\t\tc.fetchedAt = time.Now()\n\t\t\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\t\tcase !hadCache:\n\t\t\t// No stale cache to fall back on — this is the cold-start\n\t\t\t// case (or a class of kid the issuer has never published):\n\t\t\t// fail this call, bounded by ctx/the client timeout above,\n\t\t\t// rather than hang.\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\t// A stale-but-present cache is preferable to a hard failure\n\t\t\t// on every request the moment one refresh fails (a\n\t\t\t// transient network blip to the issuer's in-cluster\n\t\t\t// Service) — verification with a stale key set still\n\t\t\t// correctly rejects a token signed by a kid that's been\n\t\t\t// fully retired and removed from the real set, it just\n\t\t\t// risks accepting a very recently rotated-in key slightly\n\t\t\t// late, which is not a security regression (the overlap\n\t\t\t// window already tolerates both old and new keys).\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tkeys := c.keys\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\tkey, ok := keys[kid]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: no key found for kid %q\", kid)\n\t}\n\treturn key, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) fetch(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: building JWKS request for %s: %w\", c.url, err)\n\t}\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w\", c.url, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d\", c.url, resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\t// 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never\n\t// this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint\n\t// can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.\n\tbody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: reading JWKS response: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn parseJWKS(body)\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"offset": 55,
"limit": 30
}55 // specific reason (expired, wrong audience, bad signature, unknown kid,
56 // disallowed algorithm) is never distinguishable to the caller of this
57 // function beyond "verification failed," which is what makes
58 // writeUnauthorized's single, undifferentiated 401 body correct here
59 // without an extra translation step.
60 func (v *jwtVerifier) verify(tokenString string) (AuthContext, error) {
61 var c claims
62 token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &c, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
63 kid, _ := t.Header["kid"].(string)
64 if kid == "" {
65 return nil, errors.New("token header has no kid")
66 }
67 return v.keys.KeyForKid(kid)
68 }, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwtAlgorithm}), jwt.WithIssuer(v.issuer))
69 if err != nil {
70 return AuthContext{}, err
71 }
72 if !token.Valid {
73 return AuthContext{}, errors.New("token invalid")
74 }
75
76 // Audience checked explicitly, not via jwt.WithAudience above: v5's
77 // audience option treats an all-nil/absent Audience claim
78 // inconsistently across versions in a way we don't want to depend
79 // on — asserting it here directly means this check's behavior is
80 // this file's own to guarantee, not the library's default to trust.
81 if !hasAudience(c.RegisteredClaims.Audience, v.audience) {
82 return AuthContext{}, errors.New("token audience mismatch")
83 }
84 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"old_string": "func (v *jwtVerifier) verify(tokenString string) (AuthContext, error) {\n\tvar c claims\n\ttoken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &c, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\tkid, _ := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string)\n\t\tif kid == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"token header has no kid\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn v.keys.KeyForKid(kid)\n\t}, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwtAlgorithm}), jwt.WithIssuer(v.issuer))",
"new_string": "func (v *jwtVerifier) verify(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (AuthContext, error) {\n\tvar c claims\n\ttoken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &c, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\tkid, _ := t.Header[\"kid\"].(string)\n\t\tif kid == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"token header has no kid\")\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn v.keys.KeyForKid(ctx, kid)\n\t}, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwtAlgorithm}), jwt.WithIssuer(v.issuer))"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go"
}1 // jwks.go implements a minimal RFC 7517 JSON Web Key Set client: fetch,
2 // parse RSA public keys, cache with a short TTL. handoff-03-auth.md v4:
3 // "Public-key distribution for the verifier ... JWKS served by the issuer
4 // Deployment, reachable only in-cluster via its own ClusterIP Service ...
5 // Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short TTL (matching
6 // token TTL is reasonable) to avoid a JWKS fetch on every single
7 // verification."
8 package api
9
10 import (
11 "context"
12 "crypto/rsa"
13 "encoding/base64"
14 "encoding/json"
15 "fmt"
16 "io"
17 "math/big"
18 "net/http"
19 "sync"
20 "time"
21 )
22
23 // jwk is one entry in a JWKS response — only the fields this verifier
24 // needs to reconstruct an RSA public key (RFC 7517 §4, RFC 7518 §6.3.1).
25 // Fields this verifier doesn't use (x5c, x5t, ...) are simply not
26 // unmarshaled; unknown fields in the source JSON are not an error.
27 type jwk struct {
28 Kty string `json:"kty"`
29 Kid string `json:"kid"`
30 Alg string `json:"alg"`
31 Use string `json:"use"`
32 N string `json:"n"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA modulus
33 E string `json:"e"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA public exponent
34 }
35
36 type jwksResponse struct {
37 Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
38 }
39
40 // parseJWKS decodes a JWKS JSON document into a map of kid -> public key.
41 // Any key with kty != "RSA" is skipped (not an error) — a future non-RSA
42 // key in the set (e.g. during an algorithm migration) shouldn't break
43 // verification of tokens signed with the RSA keys that ARE present.
44 func parseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
45 var resp jwksResponse
46 if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &resp); err != nil {
47 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: parsing JWKS: %w", err)
48 }
49 keys := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(resp.Keys))
50 for _, k := range resp.Keys {
51 if k.Kty != "RSA" {
52 continue
53 }
54 if k.Kid == "" {
55 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS RSA key missing kid")
56 }
57 pub, err := rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k)
58 if err != nil {
59 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS key %q: %w", k.Kid, err)
60 }
61 keys[k.Kid] = pub
62 }
63 return keys, nil
64 }
65
66 func rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
67 nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)
68 if err != nil {
69 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding n: %w", err)
70 }
71 eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)
72 if err != nil {
73 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding e: %w", err)
74 }
75 n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)
76 e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)
77 if !e.IsInt64() {
78 return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent out of range")
79 }
80 return &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}, nil
81 }
82
83 // KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a
84 // token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a
85 // map-backed fake. ctx carries the calling request's own deadline —
86 // KeyForKid's real implementation must bound its network I/O by it, not
87 // by some separate, undocumented timeout (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review: a
88 // hung fetch that ignores the caller's context defeats the deadline
89 // middleware's whole guarantee).
90 type KeySource interface {
91 KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)
92 }
93
94 // JWKSCache fetches a JWKS document from url and caches the parsed key
95 // set for ttl, refetching only after it expires — "to avoid a JWKS fetch
96 // on every single verification" (handoff-03-auth.md v4). Supports at
97 // least two concurrently valid kids during a rotation overlap window by
98 // construction: it caches the WHOLE key set the issuer publishes, not
99 // just the most recent key, so an old and a new key both verify
100 // successfully for as long as the issuer's own JWKS response lists both.
101 type JWKSCache struct {
102 url string
103 ttl time.Duration
104 httpClient *http.Client
105
106 mu sync.Mutex
107 keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
108 fetchedAt time.Time
109 }
110
111 // defaultJWKSClientTimeout backstops a hung fetch (a connection that
112 // accepts but never responds — not a hard refusal, which fails fast on
113 // its own) when no context deadline is shorter. Distinct from and
114 // independent of a per-request context deadline: this fires even for a
115 // call that somehow reaches fetch() with no deadline on its context at
116 // all, which the http.Client.Timeout field guards against regardless of
117 // context (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review — the shipped wiring passed nil
118 // for httpClient, resolving to http.DefaultClient, whose zero-value
119 // Timeout means "none").
120 const defaultJWKSClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second
121
122 // NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most
123 // once per ttl. A nil httpClient constructs one with
124 // defaultJWKSClientTimeout — never http.DefaultClient, whose Timeout is
125 // unset (no bound at all) by default.
126 func NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {
127 if httpClient == nil {
128 httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: defaultJWKSClientTimeout}
129 }
130 return &JWKSCache{url: url, ttl: ttl, httpClient: httpClient}
131 }
132
133 // KeyForKid never holds c.mu across the network fetch (Nolan Reyes, PR
134 // #30 review, finding #2): the prior shape held the lock for the whole
135 // function body, so one hung fetch stalled every other concurrent
136 // request through this same cache instance — i.e. every authenticated
137 // request the verifying Deployment was serving, not just the one that
138 // triggered the refresh. Concurrent callers that both decide a refresh
139 // is due may both fetch; that's cheap, occasional duplicate work, and
140 // far preferable to serializing the whole authenticated surface behind
141 // one goroutine's network call.
142 func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
143 c.mu.Lock()
144 needsRefresh := c.keys == nil || time.Since(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl
145 hadCache := c.keys != nil
146 c.mu.Unlock()
147
148 if needsRefresh {
149 fresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)
150 switch {
151 case err == nil:
152 c.mu.Lock()
153 c.keys = fresh
154 c.fetchedAt = time.Now()
155 c.mu.Unlock()
156 case !hadCache:
157 // No stale cache to fall back on — this is the cold-start
158 // case (or a class of kid the issuer has never published):
159 // fail this call, bounded by ctx/the client timeout above,
160 // rather than hang.
161 return nil, err
162 default:
163 // A stale-but-present cache is preferable to a hard failure
164 // on every request the moment one refresh fails (a
165 // transient network blip to the issuer's in-cluster
166 // Service) — verification with a stale key set still
167 // correctly rejects a token signed by a kid that's been
168 // fully retired and removed from the real set, it just
169 // risks accepting a very recently rotated-in key slightly
170 // late, which is not a security regression (the overlap
171 // window already tolerates both old and new keys).
172 }
173 }
174
175 c.mu.Lock()
176 keys := c.keys
177 c.mu.Unlock()
178 key, ok := keys[kid]
179 if !ok {
180 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: no key found for kid %q", kid)
181 }
182 return key, nil
183 }
184
185 func (c *JWKSCache) fetch(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
186 req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.url, nil)
187 if err != nil {
188 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: building JWKS request for %s: %w", c.url, err)
189 }
190 resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
191 if err != nil {
192 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w", c.url, err)
193 }
194 defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
195 if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
196 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d", c.url, resp.StatusCode)
197 }
198 // 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never
199 // this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint
200 // can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.
201 body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
202 if err != nil {
203 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: reading JWKS response: %w", err)
204 }
205 return parseJWKS(body)
206 }
207 {
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/audit.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 25
}1 package api 2 3 import ( 4 "context" 5 "encoding/json" 6 "log" 7 "time" 8 ) 9 10 // AuditEventKind names a policy decision for the audit trail — 11 // handoff-03-auth.md v3's audit-log field list requires "policy decision 12 // (allow/deny, and if deny, whether it was a scope failure or an 13 // authorize() policy denial — these are distinct signals for detection)" 14 // on every search/retrieve call. The client-visible response body is 15 // deliberately identical for AuditScopeFailure and AuditPolicyDenial 16 // (decisions/error-semantics.md F7) — this is the ONLY place that 17 // distinction is allowed to exist. 18 type AuditEventKind string 19 20 const ( 21 AuditAuthnFailure AuditEventKind = "authn_failure" 22 AuditScopeFailure AuditEventKind = "scope_failure" 23 AuditPolicyDenial AuditEventKind = "authorize_denial" 24 AuditRateLimited AuditEventKind = "rate_limited" 25 AuditCapExceeded AuditEventKind = "cumulative_cap_exceeded"
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/audit.go",
"offset": 25,
"limit": 10
}25 AuditCapExceeded AuditEventKind = "cumulative_cap_exceeded" 26 AuditRequestFailed AuditEventKind = "request_failed" // a DAO/internal error, not a policy decision 27 AuditSuccess AuditEventKind = "success" 28 ) 29 30 // AuditEvent carries exactly the fields handoff-03-auth.md v3's audit-log 31 // section names, and only those — RecordIDs are opaque ids, never PII 32 // field values; ReasonCode is empty unless the request was 33 // ScopeReadAny. Never add a field here without checking 34 // handoff-04-secrets.md's never-log list first (see AuditEvent's own
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/audit.go",
"old_string": "\tAuditRequestFailed AuditEventKind = \"request_failed\" // a DAO/internal error, not a policy decision\n\tAuditSuccess AuditEventKind = \"success\"\n)",
"new_string": "\tAuditRequestFailed AuditEventKind = \"request_failed\" // a DAO/internal error, not a policy decision\n\tAuditSuccess AuditEventKind = \"success\"\n\n\t// AuditJWKSUnavailable is LT-40's distinct signal for the JWKS\n\t// fail-closed case (Tomasz Wrede, 02 cold review, PM ruling): the\n\t// cached key set exceeded its max-staleness bound with no successful\n\t// refresh, and the verifier refused every token rather than trust\n\t// keys that old — a token-infrastructure degradation, not an\n\t// ordinary bad-credential attempt, and worth distinguishing from\n\t// AuditAuthnFailure for exactly that reason.\n\tAuditJWKSUnavailable AuditEventKind = \"jwks_unavailable\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/audit.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"content": "// jwks.go implements a minimal RFC 7517 JSON Web Key Set client: fetch,\n// parse RSA public keys, cache with a short TTL. handoff-03-auth.md v4:\n// \"Public-key distribution for the verifier ... JWKS served by the issuer\n// Deployment, reachable only in-cluster via its own ClusterIP Service ...\n// Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short TTL (matching\n// token TTL is reasonable) to avoid a JWKS fetch on every single\n// verification.\"\npackage api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// jwk is one entry in a JWKS response — only the fields this verifier\n// needs to reconstruct an RSA public key (RFC 7517 §4, RFC 7518 §6.3.1).\n// Fields this verifier doesn't use (x5c, x5t, ...) are simply not\n// unmarshaled; unknown fields in the source JSON are not an error.\ntype jwk struct {\n\tKty string `json:\"kty\"`\n\tKid string `json:\"kid\"`\n\tAlg string `json:\"alg\"`\n\tUse string `json:\"use\"`\n\tN string `json:\"n\"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA modulus\n\tE string `json:\"e\"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA public exponent\n}\n\ntype jwksResponse struct {\n\tKeys []jwk `json:\"keys\"`\n}\n\n// parseJWKS decodes a JWKS JSON document into a map of kid -> public key.\n// Any key with kty != \"RSA\" is skipped (not an error) — a future non-RSA\n// key in the set (e.g. during an algorithm migration) shouldn't break\n// verification of tokens signed with the RSA keys that ARE present.\nfunc parseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tvar resp jwksResponse\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(data, &resp); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: parsing JWKS: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tkeys := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(resp.Keys))\n\tfor _, k := range resp.Keys {\n\t\tif k.Kty != \"RSA\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif k.Kid == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: JWKS RSA key missing kid\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tpub, err := rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: JWKS key %q: %w\", k.Kid, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tkeys[k.Kid] = pub\n\t}\n\treturn keys, nil\n}\n\nfunc rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tnBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"decoding n: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\teBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"decoding e: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tn := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)\n\te := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)\n\tif !e.IsInt64() {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"exponent out of range\")\n\t}\n\treturn &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}, nil\n}\n\n// KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a\n// token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a\n// map-backed fake. ctx carries the calling request's own deadline —\n// KeyForKid's real implementation must bound its network I/O by it, not\n// by some separate, undocumented timeout (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review: a\n// hung fetch that ignores the caller's context defeats the deadline\n// middleware's whole guarantee).\ntype KeySource interface {\n\tKeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)\n}\n\n// ErrJWKSStale is returned by JWKSCache.KeyForKid when the cached key set\n// has exceeded its max-staleness bound and could not be refreshed — the\n// verifier must fail closed rather than trust keys this old (Tomasz\n// Wrede, 02 cold review; PM ruling). Exported so NewJWTMiddleware can log\n// a distinct audit event (AuditJWKSUnavailable) for this specific\n// failure mode, rather than folding it into an ordinary auth failure.\nvar ErrJWKSStale = errors.New(\"api: JWKS cache exceeded max staleness and could not be refreshed\")\n\n// jwksMaxStalenessMultiple and jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval are the\n// concrete numbers the PM ruled on for Tomasz Wrede's two findings:\n// - a signing key can be revoked BECAUSE it's compromised; if the JWKS\n// endpoint is also unreachable during that same incident, a\n// stale-cache-forever fallback would keep verifying tokens signed by\n// the revoked key for as long as fetches keep failing. Bounding\n// staleness at a multiple of the normal refresh interval (ttl) turns\n// \"fail open forever\" into \"fail open for a bounded window, then\n// fail closed\" — resilient to a brief blip, not to an extended one.\n// - an unknown kid could be a key the issuer rotated in since the last\n// TTL-driven refresh; without an out-of-band refetch, a freshly\n// rotated key would be rejected for up to a full TTL. Rate-limited\n// so an unknown-kid flood can't be used to hammer the issuer's JWKS\n// endpoint.\nconst (\n\tjwksMaxStalenessMultiple = 3\n\tjwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval = 30 * time.Second\n)\n\n// JWKSCache fetches a JWKS document from url and caches the parsed key\n// set for ttl, refetching only after it expires — \"to avoid a JWKS fetch\n// on every single verification\" (handoff-03-auth.md v4). Supports at\n// least two concurrently valid kids during a rotation overlap window by\n// construction: it caches the WHOLE key set the issuer publishes, not\n// just the most recent key, so an old and a new key both verify\n// successfully for as long as the issuer's own JWKS response lists both.\ntype JWKSCache struct {\n\turl string\n\tttl time.Duration\n\tmaxStaleness time.Duration\n\thttpClient *http.Client\n\tnow func() time.Time\n\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tkeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey\n\tfetchedAt time.Time // last SUCCESSFUL fetch\n\tconsecutiveFailures int\n\tstaleAlerted bool\n\tlastUnknownKidRetry time.Time\n}\n\n// defaultJWKSClientTimeout backstops a hung fetch (a connection that\n// accepts but never responds — not a hard refusal, which fails fast on\n// its own) when no context deadline is shorter. Distinct from and\n// independent of a per-request context deadline: this fires even for a\n// call that somehow reaches fetch() with no deadline on its context at\n// all, which the http.Client.Timeout field guards against regardless of\n// context (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review — the shipped wiring passed nil\n// for httpClient, resolving to http.DefaultClient, whose zero-value\n// Timeout means \"none\").\nconst defaultJWKSClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second\n\n// NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most\n// once per ttl (and, for an unrecognized kid specifically, at most once\n// per jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval outside the normal TTL cycle). A nil\n// httpClient constructs one with defaultJWKSClientTimeout — never\n// http.DefaultClient, whose Timeout is unset (no bound at all) by\n// default. maxStaleness is jwksMaxStalenessMultiple * ttl.\nfunc NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {\n\tif httpClient == nil {\n\t\thttpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: defaultJWKSClientTimeout}\n\t}\n\treturn &JWKSCache{\n\t\turl: url,\n\t\tttl: ttl,\n\t\tmaxStaleness: jwksMaxStalenessMultiple * ttl,\n\t\thttpClient: httpClient,\n\t\tnow: time.Now,\n\t}\n}\n\n// KeyForKid never holds c.mu across a network fetch (Nolan Reyes, PR #30\n// review, finding #2): the prior shape held the lock for the whole\n// function body, so one hung fetch stalled every other concurrent\n// request through this same cache instance — i.e. every authenticated\n// request the verifying Deployment was serving, not just the one that\n// triggered the refresh. Concurrent callers that both decide a refresh\n// is due may both fetch; that's cheap, occasional duplicate work, and far\n// preferable to serializing the whole authenticated surface behind one\n// goroutine's network call.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tneedsRefresh := c.keys == nil || c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif needsRefresh {\n\t\tif err := c.refresh(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif key, ok := c.lookupKey(kid); ok {\n\t\treturn key, nil\n\t}\n\n\t// Unknown kid: might be a key the issuer rotated in since the last\n\t// TTL-driven refresh. One rate-limited out-of-band refetch before\n\t// giving up, so a freshly-rotated key isn't rejected for up to a\n\t// full TTL (Tomasz Wrede, 02 cold review). Best-effort: its error is\n\t// deliberately ignored here — the outcome that matters is whether\n\t// the retry populated the kid we're actually looking for, and a\n\t// refresh() failure here has already been handled (logged / staleness\n\t// tracked) inside refresh() itself.\n\tif c.reserveUnknownKidRetry() {\n\t\t_ = c.refresh(ctx)\n\t\tif key, ok := c.lookupKey(kid); ok {\n\t\t\treturn key, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: no key found for kid %q\", kid)\n}\n\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) lookupKey(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, bool) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\tk, ok := c.keys[kid]\n\treturn k, ok\n}\n\n// reserveUnknownKidRetry reports whether an unknown-kid-triggered refetch\n// may proceed now, and if so atomically marks one as just having started\n// — a caller enumerating unknown kids can trigger at most one extra\n// fetch per jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval, not one per request.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) reserveUnknownKidRetry() bool {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\tif c.now().Sub(c.lastUnknownKidRetry) < jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tc.lastUnknownKidRetry = c.now()\n\treturn true\n}\n\n// refresh performs the network fetch (no lock held during it) and\n// updates cache state. Returns an error only when the caller must fail\n// the whole verification: no cache exists yet (cold start against an\n// unreachable issuer), or the existing cache has exceeded maxStaleness —\n// wrapped in ErrJWKSStale in the latter case specifically, so the\n// middleware can log AuditJWKSUnavailable rather than an ordinary auth\n// failure. A transient failure within the staleness bound returns nil:\n// the stale cache is still good enough to use, per the resilience this\n// mechanism exists for.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) refresh(ctx context.Context) error {\n\tfresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)\n\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\tc.keys = fresh\n\t\tc.fetchedAt = c.now()\n\t\tc.consecutiveFailures = 0\n\t\tc.staleAlerted = false\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tc.consecutiveFailures++\n\n\tif c.keys == nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tstaleSince := c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt)\n\tif staleSince > c.maxStaleness {\n\t\tif !c.staleAlerted {\n\t\t\tc.staleAlerted = true\n\t\t\t// Log line for 04's alerting pipeline on a prolonged\n\t\t\t// fetch-failure run — not a policy decision (AuditLogger is\n\t\t\t// for those), an operational signal that this process's own\n\t\t\t// key infrastructure is degraded.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api: JWKS unrefreshable for %s across %d consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness %s) — failing closed: %v\",\n\t\t\t\tstaleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, c.maxStaleness, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%w: stale for %s across %d consecutive failures: %v\", ErrJWKSStale, staleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, err)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) fetch(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: building JWKS request for %s: %w\", c.url, err)\n\t}\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w\", c.url, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d\", c.url, resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\t// 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never\n\t// this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint\n\t// can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.\n\tbody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"api: reading JWKS response: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn parseJWKS(body)\n}\n"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go"
}1 // jwtmiddleware.go is LT-40's core: verify the client-credentials JWT
2 // scheme from handoff-03-auth.md v3/v4 and populate AuthContext for
3 // LT-39's already-built handlers. This is the actual integration seam
4 // with S6's work, not new response-shape design — a verification failure
5 // uses the exact same writeUnauthorized this package's handlers already
6 // call for a missing AuthContext.
7 package api
8
9 import (
10 "context"
11 "errors"
12 "net/http"
13 "strings"
14 "time"
15
16 "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
17 )
18
19 // jwtAlgorithm is the one signing algorithm this verifier ever accepts.
20 // Passed explicitly to jwt.WithValidMethods on every parse — never left
21 // to the library's default, per handoff-03-auth.md v3's explicit
22 // instruction ("check your JWT library's default behavior — several
23 // popular libraries have shipped this vulnerability by not doing this by
24 // default") and RFC 8725 §3.1. This is what makes alg:none and an
25 // HMAC-with-the-public-key-as-secret downgrade both fail before the
26 // library ever calls KeySource — jwt/v5's WithValidMethods rejects a
27 // token whose header alg isn't in this allowlist ahead of signature
28 // verification, not as a secondary check after.
29 const jwtAlgorithm = "RS256"
30
31 // claims is this service's JWT claim set (handoff-03-auth.md v3's
32 // minimum: sub, scope, exp, iat, aud, plus iss and kid via the header).
33 // RegisteredClaims gives exp/iat/iss/aud validation for free from the
34 // library — this verifier still explicitly re-checks Audience below
35 // because jwt/v5's built-in audience check (via WithAudience) does not
36 // distinguish "no aud claim at all" from "aud present but empty," and a
37 // token with no audience claim must not silently pass as if it matched.
38 type claims struct {
39 Scope string `json:"scope"`
40 jwt.RegisteredClaims
41 }
42
43 // jwtVerifier is the collaborator NewJWTMiddleware wraps — an interface
44 // so a test can supply a fake instead of a real *JWKSCache doing network
45 // I/O, mirroring this package's existing test-double approach
46 // (decisions/test-double-strategy.md).
47 type jwtVerifier struct {
48 keys KeySource
49 issuer string
50 audience string
51 }
52
53 // verify parses and fully validates tokenString, returning the populated
54 // AuthContext on success. Every failure returns a generic error — the
55 // specific reason (expired, wrong audience, bad signature, unknown kid,
56 // disallowed algorithm) is never distinguishable to the caller of this
57 // function beyond "verification failed," which is what makes
58 // writeUnauthorized's single, undifferentiated 401 body correct here
59 // without an extra translation step.
60 func (v *jwtVerifier) verify(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (AuthContext, error) {
61 var c claims
62 token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &c, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
63 kid, _ := t.Header["kid"].(string)
64 if kid == "" {
65 return nil, errors.New("token header has no kid")
66 }
67 return v.keys.KeyForKid(ctx, kid)
68 }, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwtAlgorithm}), jwt.WithIssuer(v.issuer))
69 if err != nil {
70 return AuthContext{}, err
71 }
72 if !token.Valid {
73 return AuthContext{}, errors.New("token invalid")
74 }
75
76 // Audience checked explicitly, not via jwt.WithAudience above: v5's
77 // audience option treats an all-nil/absent Audience claim
78 // inconsistently across versions in a way we don't want to depend
79 // on — asserting it here directly means this check's behavior is
80 // this file's own to guarantee, not the library's default to trust.
81 if !hasAudience(c.RegisteredClaims.Audience, v.audience) {
82 return AuthContext{}, errors.New("token audience mismatch")
83 }
84
85 if c.Subject == "" {
86 return AuthContext{}, errors.New("token has no sub claim")
87 }
88
89 scope, err := singleScope(c.Scope)
90 if err != nil {
91 return AuthContext{}, err
92 }
93
94 return AuthContext{Sub: c.Subject, Scope: scope}, nil
95 }
96
97 func hasAudience(aud jwt.ClaimStrings, want string) bool {
98 for _, a := range aud {
99 if a == want {
100 return true
101 }
102 }
103 return false
104 }
105
106 // singleScope requires the token's scope claim to name exactly one
107 // recognized scope. handoff-03-auth.md v3 describes the claim as
108 // "space-delimited, values below" without describing how a handler
109 // disambiguates a multi-scope token per request, and AuthContext (LT-39)
110 // carries exactly one Scope by design ("handoff-03-auth.md v3 doesn't
111 // describe multi-scope tokens being disambiguated per-request, so one
112 // request carries exactly one Scope"). Rather than guess which of
113 // several granted scopes a request is "really" using — silently picking
114 // one is exactly the kind of authorization ambiguity this project's
115 // contracts have consistently ruled against — a token naming zero or
116 // more than one recognized scope is rejected outright. This matches the
117 // provisioning model in decisions/search-authz-scoping.md: a client is
118 // provisioned for the one use case its credential exists for.
119 func singleScope(raw string) (Scope, error) {
120 fields := strings.Fields(raw)
121 var found []Scope
122 for _, f := range fields {
123 switch Scope(f) {
124 case ScopeReadOwn, ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch:
125 found = append(found, Scope(f))
126 }
127 }
128 switch len(found) {
129 case 0:
130 return "", errors.New("token scope claim names no recognized scope")
131 case 1:
132 return found[0], nil
133 default:
134 return "", errors.New("token scope claim names more than one recognized scope, which this verifier does not disambiguate per request")
135 }
136 }
137
138 // NewJWTMiddleware verifies every request's bearer token and populates
139 // AuthContext on success, per handoff-03-auth.md v3/v4: public-key-only
140 // verification (keys never includes signing-key material — enforced
141 // structurally, since KeySource's real implementation, JWKSCache, only
142 // ever holds *rsa.PublicKey values parsed from a JWKS response), pinned
143 // RS256, kid-based key selection supporting a rotation overlap window (a
144 // KeySource backed by the issuer's full published key set, not a single
145 // cached key), and issuer/audience checks. Verification failure returns
146 // 401 via writeUnauthorized — the same path LT-39's handlers already use
147 // for a missing AuthContext, not a new response shape.
148 func NewJWTMiddleware(keys KeySource, issuer, audience string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
149 v := &jwtVerifier{keys: keys, issuer: issuer, audience: audience}
150 return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
151 return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
152 tokenString, ok := bearerToken(r)
153 if !ok {
154 writeUnauthorized(w)
155 return
156 }
157 ac, err := v.verify(tokenString)
158 if err != nil {
159 writeUnauthorized(w)
160 return
161 }
162 r = r.WithContext(WithAuthContext(r.Context(), ac))
163 next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
164 })
165 }
166 }
167
168 func bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
169 h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
170 const prefix = "Bearer "
171 if !strings.HasPrefix(h, prefix) {
172 return "", false
173 }
174 tok := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(h, prefix))
175 if tok == "" {
176 return "", false
177 }
178 return tok, true
179 }
180
181 // deadlineBudget is the context.WithTimeout duration this middleware
182 // applies to every request before it reaches a handler — the concrete
183 // number decisions/context-propagation.md's ruling required ("this gets
184 // a concrete number attached when [the middleware] is written, not left
185 // as 'some deadline'"). Sized to cover realistic p99 DAO latency
186 // (single-digit milliseconds for an indexed Postgres/CockroachDB point
187 // query or trigram search, per 05-data-ops/research-cockroachdb-postgres-semantics.md)
188 // plus this middleware's own JWKS verification path (a cache hit is
189 // sub-millisecond; a cache-miss fetch to the issuer's in-cluster Service
190 // is bounded by deadlineBudget itself, not a separate timeout, since it
191 // happens inside the same request). 5 seconds leaves an order of
192 // magnitude of headroom over expected p99 without ever handing the DAO
193 // layer a near-zero remaining deadline as a matter of routine operation.
194 const deadlineBudget = 5 * time.Second
195
196 // NewDeadlineMiddleware applies deadlineBudget to every request's
197 // context before it reaches a handler — the enforcement site
198 // decisions/context-propagation.md's ruling named ("a concrete number
199 // attached when [the middleware] is written"). Composed outermost (see
200 // router wiring), so the budget covers JWT verification (including a
201 // JWKS cache-miss fetch) and the handler's own DAO call under one
202 // deadline, not two independently-sized timeouts that could disagree.
203 func NewDeadlineMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
204 return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
205 ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), deadlineBudget)
206 defer cancel()
207 next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
208 })
209 }
210 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"old_string": "\tif !hasAudience(c.RegisteredClaims.Audience, v.audience) {",
"new_string": "\tif !hasAudience(c.Audience, v.audience) {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "sed -n '48,58p' /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"description": "View the QF1008 lint location in jwks_test.go"
} if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseJWKS: %v", err)
}
got, ok := keys["key-1"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("parsed key set missing key-1")
}
if got.N.Cmp(key.PublicKey.N) != 0 || got.E != key.PublicKey.E {
t.Error("parsed public key does not match the original")
}
}{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"old_string": "\tif got.N.Cmp(key.PublicKey.N) != 0 || got.E != key.PublicKey.E {",
"new_string": "\tif got.N.Cmp(key.N) != 0 || got.E != key.E {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"old_string": "// NewJWTMiddleware verifies every request's bearer token and populates\n// AuthContext on success, per handoff-03-auth.md v3/v4: public-key-only\n// verification (keys never includes signing-key material — enforced\n// structurally, since KeySource's real implementation, JWKSCache, only\n// ever holds *rsa.PublicKey values parsed from a JWKS response), pinned\n// RS256, kid-based key selection supporting a rotation overlap window (a\n// KeySource backed by the issuer's full published key set, not a single\n// cached key), and issuer/audience checks. Verification failure returns\n// 401 via writeUnauthorized — the same path LT-39's handlers already use\n// for a missing AuthContext, not a new response shape.\nfunc NewJWTMiddleware(keys KeySource, issuer, audience string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\tv := &jwtVerifier{keys: keys, issuer: issuer, audience: audience}\n\treturn func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\ttokenString, ok := bearerToken(r)\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\twriteUnauthorized(w)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tac, err := v.verify(tokenString)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\twriteUnauthorized(w)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tr = r.WithContext(WithAuthContext(r.Context(), ac))\n\t\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {\n\th := r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")\n\tconst prefix = \"Bearer \"\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(h, prefix) {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\ttok := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(h, prefix))\n\tif tok == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\treturn tok, true\n}",
"new_string": "// NewJWTMiddleware verifies every request's bearer token and populates\n// AuthContext on success, per handoff-03-auth.md v3/v4: public-key-only\n// verification (keys never includes signing-key material — enforced\n// structurally, since KeySource's real implementation, JWKSCache, only\n// ever holds *rsa.PublicKey values parsed from a JWKS response), pinned\n// RS256, kid-based key selection supporting a rotation overlap window (a\n// KeySource backed by the issuer's full published key set, not a single\n// cached key), and issuer/audience checks. Verification failure returns\n// 401 via writeUnauthorized — the same path LT-39's handlers already use\n// for a missing AuthContext, not a new response shape — with one\n// exception: a KeySource failing closed on exceeded JWKS staleness\n// (ErrJWKSStale) logs AuditJWKSUnavailable first, since that's a\n// token-infrastructure degradation, not an ordinary bad-credential\n// attempt, and worth distinguishing in the audit trail (Tomasz Wrede, 02\n// cold review). audit may be nil (tests that don't care about audit\n// output); production wiring always passes a real AuditLogger.\nfunc NewJWTMiddleware(keys KeySource, issuer, audience string, audit AuditLogger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\tv := &jwtVerifier{keys: keys, issuer: issuer, audience: audience}\n\treturn func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tctx := r.Context()\n\t\t\ttokenString, ok := bearerToken(r)\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\tlogAuthnFailure(ctx, audit, nil)\n\t\t\t\twriteUnauthorized(w)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tac, err := v.verify(ctx, tokenString)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlogAuthnFailure(ctx, audit, err)\n\t\t\t\twriteUnauthorized(w)\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tr = r.WithContext(WithAuthContext(ctx, ac))\n\t\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc logAuthnFailure(ctx context.Context, audit AuditLogger, err error) {\n\tif audit == nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tkind := AuditAuthnFailure\n\tif errors.Is(err, ErrJWKSStale) {\n\t\tkind = AuditJWKSUnavailable\n\t}\n\taudit.Log(ctx, AuditEvent{Kind: kind, Timestamp: time.Now().UTC()})\n}\n\n// bearerToken's scheme match is case-insensitive (\"Bearer\", \"bearer\",\n// \"BEARER\" all accepted) per RFC 7235 §2.1, which defines the\n// auth-scheme token as case-insensitive — a prior case-sensitive match\n// would 401 a structurally valid request from any client that happened\n// to send a lowercase scheme (Oren Castellan, PR #30 review).\nfunc bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {\n\th := r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")\n\tconst prefixLen = len(\"Bearer \")\n\tif len(h) <= prefixLen || !strings.EqualFold(h[:prefixLen], \"Bearer \") {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\ttok := strings.TrimSpace(h[prefixLen:])\n\tif tok == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\treturn tok, true\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go",
"old_string": "// singleScope requires the token's scope claim to name exactly one\n// recognized scope. handoff-03-auth.md v3 describes the claim as\n// \"space-delimited, values below\" without describing how a handler\n// disambiguates a multi-scope token per request, and AuthContext (LT-39)\n// carries exactly one Scope by design (\"handoff-03-auth.md v3 doesn't\n// describe multi-scope tokens being disambiguated per-request, so one\n// request carries exactly one Scope\"). Rather than guess which of\n// several granted scopes a request is \"really\" using — silently picking\n// one is exactly the kind of authorization ambiguity this project's\n// contracts have consistently ruled against — a token naming zero or\n// more than one recognized scope is rejected outright. This matches the\n// provisioning model in decisions/search-authz-scoping.md: a client is\n// provisioned for the one use case its credential exists for.\nfunc singleScope(raw string) (Scope, error) {\n\tfields := strings.Fields(raw)\n\tvar found []Scope\n\tfor _, f := range fields {\n\t\tswitch Scope(f) {\n\t\tcase ScopeReadOwn, ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch:\n\t\t\tfound = append(found, Scope(f))\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tswitch len(found) {\n\tcase 0:\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"token scope claim names no recognized scope\")\n\tcase 1:\n\t\treturn found[0], nil\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"token scope claim names more than one recognized scope, which this verifier does not disambiguate per request\")\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "// singleScope requires the token's scope claim to name exactly one\n// distinct recognized scope. handoff-03-auth.md v3 describes the claim\n// as \"space-delimited, values below\" without describing how a handler\n// disambiguates a multi-scope token per request, and AuthContext (LT-39)\n// carries exactly one Scope by design (\"handoff-03-auth.md v3 doesn't\n// describe multi-scope tokens being disambiguated per-request, so one\n// request carries exactly one Scope\"). Rather than guess which of\n// several granted scopes a request is \"really\" using — silently picking\n// one is exactly the kind of authorization ambiguity this project's\n// contracts have consistently ruled against — a token naming zero or\n// more than one DISTINCT recognized scope is rejected outright. This\n// matches the provisioning model in decisions/search-authz-scoping.md: a\n// client is provisioned for the one use case its credential exists for.\n//\n// Deduplicated by distinct value, not by occurrence count: a malformed\n// but unambiguous claim like \"profile:search profile:search\" names one\n// scope repeated, not two different ones to disambiguate between, and\n// rejecting it as \"more than one\" would contradict this function's own\n// reasoning above (Oren Castellan, PR #30 review).\nfunc singleScope(raw string) (Scope, error) {\n\tfields := strings.Fields(raw)\n\tfound := make(map[Scope]bool, len(fields))\n\tfor _, f := range fields {\n\t\tswitch Scope(f) {\n\t\tcase ScopeReadOwn, ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch:\n\t\t\tfound[Scope(f)] = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tswitch len(found) {\n\tcase 0:\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"token scope claim names no recognized scope\")\n\tcase 1:\n\t\tfor s := range found {\n\t\t\treturn s, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tpanic(\"unreachable\")\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn \"\", errors.New(\"token scope claim names more than one distinct recognized scope, which this verifier does not disambiguate per request\")\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router.go"
}1 package app
2
3 import (
4 "net/http"
5 "time"
6
7 "loginid-takehome/internal/api"
8 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
9 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
10 )
11
12 // jwksCacheTTL matches the token TTL per handoff-03-auth.md v4's own
13 // guidance ("Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short
14 // TTL (matching token TTL is reasonable)") — using the upper bound of the
15 // 5-15 minute TTL range so a cache refresh never fires more often than a
16 // token itself could have already expired and been re-issued.
17 const jwksCacheTTL = 15 * time.Minute
18
19 // NewVerifierRouter builds api-service's real, authenticated router —
20 // LT-39's handlers (search/retrieve) wired behind LT-40's JWT
21 // verification middleware, plus /healthz. This is the ModeVerifier
22 // Deployment's router; the issuer Deployment (ModeIssuer) still uses the
23 // plain NewRouter above, since it has no need for any of this — it never
24 // verifies inbound tokens, only issues them.
25 //
26 // repo may be nil (e.g. DB_DRIVER unset in a minimal smoke-test
27 // environment); the search/retrieve routes still register in that case,
28 // they'll simply fail at the DAO call with whatever error a nil
29 // Repository produces — this function's job is wiring, not validating
30 // that a database is reachable, which is /healthz's own job (LT-52).
31 func NewVerifierRouter(cfg config.Config, repo dao.Repository) http.Handler {
32 mux := http.NewServeMux()
33 mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", healthHandler("api-service"))
34
35 deps := api.Deps{
36 Repo: repo,
37 RateLimiter: api.NewInProcessRateLimiter(),
38 TouchCounter: api.NewInProcessTouchCounter(
39 api.TouchCapPerWindow, api.TouchCapWindow),
40 AuditLog: api.StdoutAuditLogger{},
41 Authz: &api.StopgapAuthorizer{
42 ReadOwnAllow: stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg),
43 },
44 }
45
46 keys := api.NewJWKSCache(cfg.AuthJWKSURL, jwksCacheTTL, nil)
47 authMiddleware := api.NewJWTMiddleware(keys, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer, cfg.AuthJWTAudience)
48
49 // api.NewDeadlineMiddleware outermost: the deadline budget must cover
50 // JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) as well as
51 // the handler's own DAO call, per decisions/context-propagation.md's
52 // ruling — a single deadline, not the middleware's and the handler's
53 // own disagreeing.
54 protect := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
55 return api.NewDeadlineMiddleware(authMiddleware(h))
56 }
57
58 mux.Handle("POST /profiles/search", protect(api.NewSearchHandler(deps)))
59 mux.Handle("GET /profiles/{id}", protect(api.NewGetProfileHandler(deps)))
60
61 return mux
62 }
63
64 // stopgapReadOwnAllow builds StopgapAuthorizer's hard-coded (sub ->
65 // allowed record id) map from cfg — empty (denies everything) unless
66 // both AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID are set, which LT-51 does
67 // once the QA client credential and a matching seeded profile exist.
68 func stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg config.Config) map[string]map[string]bool {
69 if cfg.AuthzQASub == "" || cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID == "" {
70 return nil
71 }
72 return map[string]map[string]bool{
73 cfg.AuthzQASub: {cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: true},
74 }
75 }
76 {
"command": "tail -20 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/errors.go",
"description": "View end of errors.go"
} }
}
// writeInternalError is writeDAOError's twin for a collaborator that
// isn't the DAO — RateLimiter, TouchCounter, Authorizer — kept as a
// separate, identically-behaving function rather than reusing
// writeDAOError at those call sites (Oren Castellan, PR #26 review):
// writeDAOError is named and documented as the DAO-sentinel translator,
// and a future edit to its switch (adding a case for some DAO-specific
// condition) should not silently also change how an authz/rate-limit
// collaborator's errors are handled. Behavior is identical today — never
// err.Error(), context.DeadlineExceeded still maps to 504 — because none
// of these collaborators have their own sentinel set to translate.
func writeInternalError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
writeError(w, http.StatusGatewayTimeout, "deadline_exceeded", "request timed out")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "internal error")
}{
"command": "cat >> /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/errors.go << 'EOF'\n\n// WriteServiceUnavailable is exported for internal/app's router wiring:\n// when the DAO repository couldn't be constructed at startup (e.g. no\n// DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured yet), the verifying Deployment must still\n// start and serve /healthz — it must not crash-loop the whole process\n// over a dependency LT-39's handlers need but nothing else does. Callers\n// that have no working Repository at all route the protected endpoints\n// to this instead of constructing a Deps with a nil Repo (which would\n// panic the first time a handler called d.Repo.Profiles()).\nfunc WriteServiceUnavailable(w http.ResponseWriter) {\n\twriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, \"service_unavailable\", \"service temporarily unavailable\")\n}\nEOF\necho done",
"description": "Add WriteServiceUnavailable helper"
}done
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router.go",
"old_string": "// repo may be nil (e.g. DB_DRIVER unset in a minimal smoke-test\n// environment); the search/retrieve routes still register in that case,\n// they'll simply fail at the DAO call with whatever error a nil\n// Repository produces — this function's job is wiring, not validating\n// that a database is reachable, which is /healthz's own job (LT-52).\nfunc NewVerifierRouter(cfg config.Config, repo dao.Repository) http.Handler {\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/healthz\", healthHandler(\"api-service\"))\n\n\tdeps := api.Deps{\n\t\tRepo: repo,\n\t\tRateLimiter: api.NewInProcessRateLimiter(),\n\t\tTouchCounter: api.NewInProcessTouchCounter(\n\t\t\tapi.TouchCapPerWindow, api.TouchCapWindow),\n\t\tAuditLog: api.StdoutAuditLogger{},\n\t\tAuthz: &api.StopgapAuthorizer{\n\t\t\tReadOwnAllow: stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tkeys := api.NewJWKSCache(cfg.AuthJWKSURL, jwksCacheTTL, nil)\n\tauthMiddleware := api.NewJWTMiddleware(keys, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer, cfg.AuthJWTAudience)\n\n\t// api.NewDeadlineMiddleware outermost: the deadline budget must cover\n\t// JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) as well as\n\t// the handler's own DAO call, per decisions/context-propagation.md's\n\t// ruling — a single deadline, not the middleware's and the handler's\n\t// own disagreeing.\n\tprotect := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn api.NewDeadlineMiddleware(authMiddleware(h))\n\t}\n\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /profiles/search\", protect(api.NewSearchHandler(deps)))\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /profiles/{id}\", protect(api.NewGetProfileHandler(deps)))\n\n\treturn mux\n}",
"new_string": "// repo may be nil — cmd/api-service/main.go passes nil rather than\n// crash-looping the whole process when the DAO repository couldn't be\n// constructed at startup (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN yet, e.g. before the\n// database exists in this environment). /healthz must stay reachable\n// regardless (LT-34's live-URL story; LT-52 is what teaches /healthz to\n// actually report DB status, not this function); the two protected\n// routes fail closed with 503 instead of panicking on a nil Repository\n// or silently pretending to work. This is a startup-shape decision, not\n// an ongoing health check — a repo that stops answering after a\n// successful open is /healthz's job to surface (LT-52), not this\n// router's.\nfunc NewVerifierRouter(cfg config.Config, repo dao.Repository) http.Handler {\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/healthz\", healthHandler(\"api-service\"))\n\n\tauditLog := api.StdoutAuditLogger{}\n\tkeys := api.NewJWKSCache(cfg.AuthJWKSURL, jwksCacheTTL, nil)\n\tauthMiddleware := api.NewJWTMiddleware(keys, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer, cfg.AuthJWTAudience, auditLog)\n\n\t// api.NewDeadlineMiddleware outermost: the deadline budget must cover\n\t// JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) as well as\n\t// the handler's own DAO call, per decisions/context-propagation.md's\n\t// ruling — a single deadline, not the middleware's and the handler's\n\t// own disagreeing.\n\tprotect := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\t\treturn api.NewDeadlineMiddleware(authMiddleware(h))\n\t}\n\n\tvar searchHandler, getHandler http.Handler\n\tif repo == nil {\n\t\tsearchHandler = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { api.WriteServiceUnavailable(w) })\n\t\tgetHandler = searchHandler\n\t} else {\n\t\tdeps := api.Deps{\n\t\t\tRepo: repo,\n\t\t\tRateLimiter: api.NewInProcessRateLimiter(),\n\t\t\tTouchCounter: api.NewInProcessTouchCounter(\n\t\t\t\tapi.TouchCapPerWindow, api.TouchCapWindow),\n\t\t\tAuditLog: auditLog,\n\t\t\tAuthz: &api.StopgapAuthorizer{\n\t\t\t\tReadOwnAllow: stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t\tsearchHandler = api.NewSearchHandler(deps)\n\t\tgetHandler = api.NewGetProfileHandler(deps)\n\t}\n\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /profiles/search\", protect(searchHandler))\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /profiles/{id}\", protect(getHandler))\n\n\treturn mux\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "log"
9 "net/http"
10
11 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
12 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
13 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
14
15 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres" // registers "postgres" and "cockroachdb"
16 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite" // registers "sqlite"
17 )
18
19 func main() {
20 cfg, err := config.Load()
21 if err != nil {
22 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
23 }
24
25 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
26 if addr == "" {
27 addr = ":8080"
28 }
29
30 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
31
32 var handler http.Handler
33 switch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {
34 case app.ModeVerifier:
35 // The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the
36 // database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer
37 // Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it
38 // only mints tokens.
39 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
40 if err != nil {
41 log.Fatalf("api-service: opening DAO repository: %v", err)
42 }
43 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)
44 default:
45 // ModeIssuer (and the unrecognized-mode fallback, which
46 // NewRouter itself already logs loudly and treats as verifier —
47 // see app.NewRouter's own doc comment) don't need the full
48 // verifier stack; NewRouter's existing /auth/token placeholder
49 // (LT-32) and /healthz cover both.
50 handler = app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))
51 }
52
53 if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, handler); err != nil {
54 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
55 }
56 }
57 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\tcase app.ModeVerifier:\n\t\t// The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the\n\t\t// database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer\n\t\t// Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it\n\t\t// only mints tokens.\n\t\trepo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"api-service: opening DAO repository: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)",
"new_string": "\tcase app.ModeVerifier:\n\t\t// The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the\n\t\t// database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer\n\t\t// Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it\n\t\t// only mints tokens.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// A failure here does NOT Fatal: on a cluster where the database\n\t\t// doesn't exist yet (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured — e.g. before\n\t\t// PR #29's Postgres StatefulSet lands), or DB_DRIVER is simply\n\t\t// misconfigured, this process must still come up and serve\n\t\t// /healthz rather than crash-loop the whole verifying Deployment\n\t\t// over a dependency only two of its routes need. repo stays nil;\n\t\t// NewVerifierRouter fails those two routes closed with 503\n\t\t// instead of panicking on a nil Repository.\n\t\trepo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: opening DAO repository: %v — /profiles/search and /profiles/{id} will return 503 until this is resolved\", err)\n\t\t\trepo = nil\n\t\t}\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "grep -n \"KeyForKid\\|NewJWTMiddleware\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"description": "Find call sites needing signature update"
}27:func (f *fakeKeySource) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
101: return NewJWTMiddleware(&fakeKeySource{keys: keys}, testIssuer, testAudience)
287:func TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401(t *testing.T) {{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 35
}1 package api
2
3 import (
4 "crypto/rand"
5 "crypto/rsa"
6 "crypto/x509"
7 "net/http"
8 "net/http/httptest"
9 "testing"
10 "time"
11
12 "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
13 )
14
15 const (
16 testIssuer = "https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal"
17 testAudience = "loginid-api-service"
18 )
19
20 // fakeKeySource implements KeySource with an in-memory map, for tests
21 // that don't need real JWKS-over-HTTP fetching (that's jwks_test.go's
22 // job).
23 type fakeKeySource struct {
24 keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
25 }
26
27 func (f *fakeKeySource) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
28 k, ok := f.keys[kid]
29 if !ok {
30 return nil, errNoKey
31 }
32 return k, nil
33 }
34
35 var errNoKey = jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"old_string": "func (f *fakeKeySource) KeyForKid(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {",
"new_string": "func (f *fakeKeySource) KeyForKid(_ context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "grep -n \"newTestMiddleware\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go | head -3",
"description": "Find newTestMiddleware helper to update"
}101:func newTestMiddleware(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
128: mw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"key-1": &key.PublicKey})
142: mw := newTestMiddleware(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"key-1": &key.PublicKey}){
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"offset": 99,
"limit": 5
}99 }
100
101 func newTestMiddleware(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
102 return NewJWTMiddleware(&fakeKeySource{keys: keys}, testIssuer, testAudience)
103 }{
"command": "grep -n \"type fakeAuditLogger\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/*.go",
"description": "Check if fakeAuditLogger already exists in the package"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/fakes_test.go:113:type fakeAuditLogger struct {{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go",
"old_string": "func newTestMiddleware(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\treturn NewJWTMiddleware(&fakeKeySource{keys: keys}, testIssuer, testAudience)\n}",
"new_string": "func newTestMiddleware(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\treturn NewJWTMiddleware(&fakeKeySource{keys: keys}, testIssuer, testAudience, &fakeAuditLogger{})\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1",
"description": "Build after signature updates"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go vet ./... 2>&1",
"description": "Vet to find test build errors"
}Exit code 1 # loginid-takehome/internal/api # [loginid-takehome/internal/api] vet: internal/api/jwks_test.go:98:38: not enough arguments in call to cache.KeyForKid have (string) want (context.Context, string)
{
"command": "grep -n \"cache.KeyForKid\\|context\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"description": "Find all KeyForKid call sites in jwks_test.go"
}98: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {
101: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {
129: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {
133: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {
158: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("no-such-kid"); err == nil {
186: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {
191: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid("key-1"); err != nil {{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && sed -i '' 's/cache\\.KeyForKid(\\(\".*\"\\))/cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), \\1)/' internal/api/jwks_test.go\ngrep -n \"cache.KeyForKid\" internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"description": "Add context.Background() to all KeyForKid calls in jwks_test.go"
}98: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
101: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
129: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
133: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
158: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "no-such-kid"); err == nil {
186: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
191: if _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), "key-1"); err != nil {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"sync/atomic\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc jwkFromPublicKey(kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) jwk {\n\treturn jwk{\n\t\tKty: \"RSA\",\n\t\tKid: kid,\n\t\tAlg: \"RS256\",\n\t\tUse: \"sig\",\n\t\tN: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub.N.Bytes()),\n\t\tE: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(bigEndianExponent(pub.E)),\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc bigEndianExponent(e int) []byte {\n\t// Standard RSA public exponent (65537) fits in 3 bytes; encode\n\t// minimally, matching how real JWKS producers encode \"e\".\n\tb := []byte{byte(e >> 16), byte(e >> 8), byte(e)}\n\ti := 0\n\tfor i < len(b)-1 && b[i] == 0 {\n\t\ti++\n\t}\n\treturn b[i:]\n}\n\nfunc jwksBody(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) []byte {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tdoc := jwksResponse{Keys: []jwk{jwkFromPublicKey(kid, pub)}}\n\tbody, err := json.Marshal(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling JWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn body\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdata := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\n\tkeys, err := parseJWKS(data)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parseJWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tgot, ok := keys[\"key-1\"]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"parsed key set missing key-1\")\n\t}\n\tif got.N.Cmp(key.N) != 0 || got.E != key.E {\n\t\tt.Error(\"parsed public key does not match the original\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys(t *testing.T) {\n\tdata := []byte(`{\"keys\":[{\"kty\":\"EC\",\"kid\":\"ec-1\",\"crv\":\"P-256\",\"x\":\"AAAA\",\"y\":\"AAAA\"}]}`)\n\tkeys, err := parseJWKS(data)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parseJWKS: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(keys) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected a non-RSA key to be skipped, got %d keys\", len(keys))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError(t *testing.T) {\n\tdata := []byte(`{\"keys\":[{\"kty\":\"RSA\",\"n\":\"AAAA\",\"e\":\"AQAB\"}]}`)\n\tif _, err := parseJWKS(data); err == nil {\n\t\tt.Error(\"expected an error for an RSA key with no kid\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// jwksTestServer serves body while up, or a configurable failure while\n// down — atomic so it's safe to flip from the test goroutine while the\n// cache's own fetches run (any of them) against it.\ntype jwksTestServer struct {\n\tsrv *httptest.Server\n\tup atomic.Bool\n\tbody []byte\n}\n\nfunc newJWKSTestServer(body []byte) *jwksTestServer {\n\ts := &jwksTestServer{body: body}\n\ts.up.Store(true)\n\ts.srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif !s.up.Load() {\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(s.body)\n\t}))\n\treturn s\n}\n\nfunc (s *jwksTestServer) Close() { s.srv.Close() }\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tvar requests atomic.Int32\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests.Add(1)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"second KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif requests.Load() != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"fetched the JWKS endpoint %d times, want exactly 1 (cached within TTL)\", requests.Load())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tvar requests atomic.Int32\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests.Add(1)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Minute, nil)\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tcache.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Minute + time.Second)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"second KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif requests.Load() < 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"fetched the JWKS endpoint %d times, want at least 2 (TTL should have expired)\", requests.Load())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(context.Background(), \"no-such-kid\"); err == nil {\n\t\tt.Error(\"expected an error for an unrecognized kid\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure covers the\n// resilience case within the staleness bound: a fetch failure well\n// inside maxStaleness still serves the last-good key set.\nfunc TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\ts := newJWKSTestServer(body)\n\tdefer s.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(s.srv.URL, time.Minute, nil) // maxStaleness = 3*ttl = 3min\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tcache.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Minute + time.Second) // TTL expired, well within the 3min staleness bound\n\ts.up.Store(false)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"KeyForKid during a transient fetch failure = %v, want the stale cache to still serve the key\", err)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness is the PM's ruling on Tomasz\n// Wrede's HIGH finding: a signing key can be revoked because it's\n// compromised, and if the JWKS endpoint is unreachable during that same\n// incident, an unbounded stale-cache fallback would keep verifying\n// tokens signed by the revoked key for as long as fetches keep failing.\n// Past maxStaleness (3x ttl, per the PM's ruling), the cache must fail\n// closed — ErrJWKSStale — rather than serve the stale set indefinitely.\nfunc TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\ts := newJWKSTestServer(body)\n\tdefer s.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(s.srv.URL, time.Minute, nil) // maxStaleness = 3min\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tcache.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first KeyForKid: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\ts.up.Store(false)\n\t// Advance past maxStaleness (3min) from the last successful fetch.\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(4 * time.Minute)\n\t_, err = cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\")\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"expected an error once the cache exceeds max staleness with the issuer still unreachable\")\n\t}\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrJWKSStale) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %v, want it to wrap ErrJWKSStale so the middleware can log a distinct audit event\", err)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch is the PM's\n// ruling on Tomasz Wrede's MEDIUM-HIGH finding: an unknown kid (a key\n// the issuer may have just rotated in) triggers one out-of-band refetch\n// before the cache gives up, rather than waiting up to a full TTL for\n// the next calendar-scheduled refresh.\nfunc TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch(t *testing.T) {\n\toldKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tnewKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tvar requests atomic.Int32\n\tvar serveNewKey atomic.Bool\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests.Add(1)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\tif serveNewKey.Load() {\n\t\t\t_, _ = w.Write(jwksBody(t, \"key-new\", &newKey.PublicKey))\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t_, _ = w.Write(jwksBody(t, \"key-old\", &oldKey.PublicKey))\n\t\t}\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\t// A long TTL so the calendar-scheduled refresh would NOT fire on its\n\t// own within this test — proving any successful lookup of \"key-new\"\n\t// came from the unknown-kid-triggered refetch, not an ordinary TTL\n\t// rollover.\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-old\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"priming the cache with key-old: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\trequestsAfterPriming := requests.Load()\n\n\t// The issuer rotates: key-new is now published, but the cache's TTL\n\t// hasn't expired.\n\tserveNewKey.Store(true)\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-new\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"KeyForKid(key-new) = %v, want the unknown-kid refetch to find it\", err)\n\t}\n\tif requests.Load() <= requestsAfterPriming {\n\t\tt.Error(\"expected an extra fetch triggered by the unknown kid, beyond the priming fetch\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tvar requests atomic.Int32\n\tbody := jwksBody(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trequests.Add(1)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(body)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tcache := NewJWKSCache(srv.URL, time.Hour, nil)\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tcache.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif _, err := cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"key-1\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"priming: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\trequestsAfterPriming := requests.Load()\n\n\t// Two lookups for an unknown kid in quick succession (same fake\n\t// \"now\") must trigger at most one extra refetch between them, not\n\t// one per lookup — that's the rate limit closing the \"unknown-kid\n\t// flood hammers the issuer\" gap.\n\t_, _ = cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"no-such-kid\")\n\tafterFirstUnknown := requests.Load()\n\t_, _ = cache.KeyForKid(ctx, \"no-such-kid\")\n\tafterSecondUnknown := requests.Load()\n\n\tif afterFirstUnknown != requestsAfterPriming+1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"first unknown-kid lookup triggered %d extra fetch(es), want exactly 1\", afterFirstUnknown-requestsAfterPriming)\n\t}\n\tif afterSecondUnknown != afterFirstUnknown {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"second unknown-kid lookup (within the rate-limit window) triggered an extra fetch: %d -> %d, want no change\", afterFirstUnknown, afterSecondUnknown)\n\t}\n}\n"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1",
"description": "Build and vet after jwks_test.go rewrite"
}BUILD_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... -run \"TestJWKS|TestParseJWKS\" -v 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Run JWKS tests"
}=== RUN TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip (0.02s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError (0.00s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.05s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.05s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError (0.04s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.09s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness 2026/09/13 04:44:10 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 4m0s across 1 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed: api: fetching JWKS from http://127.0.0.1:54009: status 500 --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness (0.03s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch (0.09s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited (0.03s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.803s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run full internal/api test suite"
}--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_AuthorizeDenied_403 (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400 --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400 (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip (0.05s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError (0.00s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.02s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.01s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError (0.04s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.03s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness 2026/09/13 04:44:16 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 4m0s across 1 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed: api: fetching JWKS from http://127.0.0.1:54048: status 500 --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness (0.10s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch (0.13s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited (0.06s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext (0.04s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 (0.01s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 (0.06s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 (0.00s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 (0.01s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify (0.10s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 (0.04s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 (0.15s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 (0.02s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 (0.10s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline --- PASS: TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline (0.00s) === RUN TestMaskPhone --- PASS: TestMaskPhone (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows (0.00s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 1.158s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go"
}1 package api
2
3 import (
4 "context"
5 "sync"
6 "time"
7 )
8
9 // GrantLimiter enforces the token-issuing endpoint's own failed-grant
10 // rate limiting and progressive backoff — handoff-03-auth.md v3:
11 // "Token-endpoint brute-force protection, separate from the resource-API
12 // rate limits ... failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per
13 // client_id and per source IP on the token-issuing endpoint itself, plus
14 // alerting on a sustained run of failed grants against one client_id."
15 //
16 // This is genuinely separate from RateLimiter (ratelimit.go): that type
17 // gates the resource API by an already-authenticated sub, at a fixed
18 // per-minute rate; this one gates the endpoint that issues the
19 // credential in the first place, keyed independently by client_id AND
20 // by source IP — a distributed brute force (many IPs, one client_id)
21 // and a single-source credential-stuffing run (one IP, many client_ids)
22 // are both attack shapes this is meant to slow down, and either key
23 // exceeding its own backoff blocks the attempt.
24 //
25 // Not wired to a live endpoint by this story: /auth/token's real grant
26 // logic is LT-51's scope (this story's non-goals). This is the
27 // ready-to-use component LT-51 constructs and calls from the real
28 // handler — building it now, tested in isolation, means LT-51 doesn't
29 // also have to design a backoff/alerting scheme under its own deadline.
30 type GrantLimiter interface {
31 // Allow reports whether a grant attempt for clientID from sourceIP
32 // may proceed right now — false while either key is in backoff.
33 Allow(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error)
34 // RecordFailure records a failed grant attempt for both clientID and
35 // sourceIP, advancing each key's backoff state independently.
36 // Crossing the alert threshold for a given client_id (not source IP
37 // — the requirement names client_id specifically) fires alert
38 // exactly once per crossing, not once per subsequent failure.
39 RecordFailure(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)
40 // RecordSuccess clears backoff state for both clientID and
41 // sourceIP — a successful grant resets the count, standard
42 // exponential-backoff practice: this deters sustained brute force,
43 // it does not permanently degrade a legitimate client that mistyped
44 // a secret once.
45 RecordSuccess(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)
46 }
47
48 // grantBackoffState is one key's (a client_id's, or a source IP's)
49 // consecutive-failure bookkeeping.
50 type grantBackoffState struct {
51 consecutiveFailures int
52 blockedUntil time.Time
53 alerted bool
54 }
55
56 // InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with
57 // RateLimiter/TouchCounter's in-process implementations, a shared store
58 // is the multi-instance replacement behind the same interface — the
59 // mechanism is this track's call, per handoff-03-auth.md v3.
60 type InProcessGrantLimiter struct {
61 mu sync.Mutex
62 byClientID map[string]*grantBackoffState
63 bySourceIP map[string]*grantBackoffState
64 baseBackoff time.Duration
65 maxBackoff time.Duration
66 alertThreshold int
67 alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)
68 now func() time.Time
69 }
70
71 // NewInProcessGrantLimiter constructs a limiter with exponential backoff
72 // starting at baseBackoff (doubling per consecutive failure, capped at
73 // maxBackoff) and alertFn called once per client_id crossing
74 // alertThreshold consecutive failures. alertFn may be nil (no alerting —
75 // tests use this; production wiring passes a real sink).
76 func NewInProcessGrantLimiter(baseBackoff, maxBackoff time.Duration, alertThreshold int, alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)) *InProcessGrantLimiter {
77 return &InProcessGrantLimiter{
78 byClientID: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),
79 bySourceIP: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),
80 baseBackoff: baseBackoff,
81 maxBackoff: maxBackoff,
82 alertThreshold: alertThreshold,
83 alertFn: alertFn,
84 now: time.Now,
85 }
86 }
87
88 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {
89 l.mu.Lock()
90 defer l.mu.Unlock()
91 now := l.now()
92 return !isBlocked(l.byClientID[clientID], now) && !isBlocked(l.bySourceIP[sourceIP], now), nil
93 }
94
95 func isBlocked(s *grantBackoffState, now time.Time) bool {
96 return s != nil && now.Before(s.blockedUntil)
97 }
98
99 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordFailure(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {
100 l.mu.Lock()
101 defer l.mu.Unlock()
102 now := l.now()
103
104 cs := l.advance(l.byClientID, clientID, now)
105 l.advance(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP, now)
106
107 if cs.consecutiveFailures >= l.alertThreshold && !cs.alerted {
108 cs.alerted = true
109 if l.alertFn != nil {
110 l.alertFn(clientID, cs.consecutiveFailures)
111 }
112 }
113 }
114
115 // advance increments key's consecutive-failure count and sets its
116 // exponential backoff window, creating the state entry if this is its
117 // first failure.
118 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) advance(m map[string]*grantBackoffState, key string, now time.Time) *grantBackoffState {
119 s, ok := m[key]
120 if !ok {
121 s = &grantBackoffState{}
122 m[key] = s
123 }
124 s.consecutiveFailures++
125 backoff := l.baseBackoff << uint(s.consecutiveFailures-1) // 2^(n-1) * base
126 if backoff > l.maxBackoff || backoff <= 0 { // overflow guard: a left-shifted duration can wrap negative
127 backoff = l.maxBackoff
128 }
129 s.blockedUntil = now.Add(backoff)
130 return s
131 }
132
133 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordSuccess(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {
134 l.mu.Lock()
135 defer l.mu.Unlock()
136 delete(l.byClientID, clientID)
137 delete(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP)
138 }
139 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go",
"old_string": "// InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with\n// RateLimiter/TouchCounter's in-process implementations, a shared store\n// is the multi-instance replacement behind the same interface — the\n// mechanism is this track's call, per handoff-03-auth.md v3.\ntype InProcessGrantLimiter struct {\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tbyClientID map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbySourceIP map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbaseBackoff time.Duration\n\tmaxBackoff time.Duration\n\talertThreshold int\n\talertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)\n\tnow func() time.Time\n}",
"new_string": "// InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with\n// RateLimiter/TouchCounter's in-process implementations, a shared store\n// is the multi-instance replacement behind the same interface — the\n// mechanism is this track's call, per handoff-03-auth.md v3.\n//\n// Both maps are swept periodically (see sweepLocked) rather than left to\n// grow forever: this component's own doc comment names \"a distributed\n// brute force (many IPs, one client_id)\" as a defended attack shape, and\n// that is exactly the traffic pattern that would otherwise grow\n// bySourceIP without bound — every distinct attacking IP earns a\n// permanent entry that only a matching RecordSuccess would remove, which\n// an attacking IP by definition never triggers (Nolan Reyes, PR #30\n// review — the same unbounded-growth shape an earlier PR's TouchCounter\n// review already found and fixed once).\ntype InProcessGrantLimiter struct {\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tbyClientID map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbySourceIP map[string]*grantBackoffState\n\tbaseBackoff time.Duration\n\tmaxBackoff time.Duration\n\talertThreshold int\n\talertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)\n\tnow func() time.Time\n\tlastSweep time.Time\n}\n\n// grantSweepInterval and grantEntryTTL bound how long a key's state\n// survives with no further failures against it. A blocked key is never\n// swept before its own backoff has elapsed (sweeping mid-block would\n// silently un-block it early); grantEntryTTL is generous past any\n// realistic maxBackoff so a legitimately still-escalating attacker isn't\n// reset early either.\nconst (\n\tgrantSweepInterval = time.Minute\n\tgrantEntryTTL = time.Hour\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go",
"old_string": "func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {\n\tl.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer l.mu.Unlock()\n\tnow := l.now()\n\treturn !isBlocked(l.byClientID[clientID], now) && !isBlocked(l.bySourceIP[sourceIP], now), nil\n}",
"new_string": "func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {\n\tl.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer l.mu.Unlock()\n\tnow := l.now()\n\tl.sweepLocked(now)\n\treturn !isBlocked(l.byClientID[clientID], now) && !isBlocked(l.bySourceIP[sourceIP], now), nil\n}\n\n// sweepLocked drops any entry whose blockedUntil is at least\n// grantEntryTTL in the past — called with l.mu already held, at most\n// once per grantSweepInterval, so it adds no per-call cost beyond a\n// single time comparison on every other call.\nfunc (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) sweepLocked(now time.Time) {\n\tif now.Sub(l.lastSweep) < grantSweepInterval {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tl.lastSweep = now\n\tsweepMap(l.byClientID, now)\n\tsweepMap(l.bySourceIP, now)\n}\n\nfunc sweepMap(m map[string]*grantBackoffState, now time.Time) {\n\tfor key, s := range m {\n\t\tif now.Sub(s.blockedUntil) >= grantEntryTTL {\n\t\t\tdelete(m, key)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK",
"description": "Build after grant limiter sweep fix"
}BUILD_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "tail -20 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go",
"description": "View end of grantlimiter_test.go"
} // (each individually under threshold) is a different signal
// (distributed credential stuffing) this limiter still blocks via
// the source-IP key, but doesn't claim to alert on by itself.
var alerted bool
l := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Nanosecond, time.Nanosecond, 3, func(clientID string, n int) {
alerted = true
})
fakeNow := time.Now()
l.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }
ctx := context.Background()
clientIDs := []string{"client-a", "client-b", "client-c"}
for _, id := range clientIDs {
l.RecordFailure(ctx, id, "«IP»")
fakeNow = fakeNow.Add(time.Millisecond)
}
if alerted {
t.Error("alertFn should be keyed on a single client_id's consecutive failures, not fired for varying client_ids sharing a source IP")
}
}{
"command": "cat >> /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go << 'EOF'\n\n// TestGrantLimiter_SweepEvictsStaleEntries covers the unbounded map\n// growth Nolan Reyes flagged (PR #30 review): a distributed brute force\n// against one client_id from many source IPs must not leave a permanent\n// entry for every attacking IP once its backoff window is long past.\nfunc TestGrantLimiter_SweepEvictsStaleEntries(t *testing.T) {\n\tl := NewInProcessGrantLimiter(time.Second, time.Second, 100, nil)\n\tfakeNow := time.Now()\n\tl.now = func() time.Time { return fakeNow }\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tl.RecordFailure(ctx, \"client-a\", \"«IP»\")\n\tif _, ok := l.bySourceIP[\"«IP»\"]; !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"expected an entry for the source IP before any sweep\")\n\t}\n\n\tfakeNow = fakeNow.Add(grantSweepInterval + grantEntryTTL + time.Second)\n\t// Any Allow call triggers the opportunistic sweep.\n\tif _, err := l.Allow(ctx, \"client-z\", \"«IP»\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Allow: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, ok := l.bySourceIP[\"«IP»\"]; ok {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a stale entry (well past grantEntryTTL) should have been swept\")\n\t}\n\tif _, ok := l.byClientID[\"client-a\"]; ok {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a stale client_id entry should have been swept too\")\n\t}\n}\nEOF\necho done",
"description": "Add grant limiter sweep test"
}done
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/stopgap_authorizer_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\n// TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied is Marcus Ilori's (02)\n// ruling on the review finding that this stand-in's deny path had no\n// test coverage: exercise both the allow and deny outcomes for\n// ScopeReadOwn, the only scope this stopgap actually gates.\nfunc TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied(t *testing.T) {\n\ta := &StopgapAuthorizer{\n\t\tReadOwnAllow: map[string]map[string]bool{\n\t\t\t\"qa-client\": {\"profile-1\": true},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tallowed, err := a.Authorize(ctx, \"qa-client\", ScopeReadOwn, \"profile-1\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Authorize: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !allowed {\n\t\tt.Error(\"qa-client reading its seeded profile-1 should be allowed\")\n\t}\n\n\tdenied, err := a.Authorize(ctx, \"qa-client\", ScopeReadOwn, \"profile-2\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Authorize: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif denied {\n\t\tt.Error(\"qa-client reading a profile it was not seeded with should be denied\")\n\t}\n\n\tdeniedSub, err := a.Authorize(ctx, \"some-other-client\", ScopeReadOwn, \"profile-1\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Authorize: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif deniedSub {\n\t\tt.Error(\"a sub with no seeded entry at all should be denied, the safe default\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything is the safe-default\n// requirement itself: a StopgapAuthorizer constructed with no seed data\n// (the out-of-the-box state before LT-51 seeds a QA client credential)\n// must deny every ScopeReadOwn request, never fail open.\nfunc TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything(t *testing.T) {\n\ta := &StopgapAuthorizer{}\n\tallowed, err := a.Authorize(context.Background(), \"anyone\", ScopeReadOwn, \"anything\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Authorize: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif allowed {\n\t\tt.Error(\"an unseeded StopgapAuthorizer must deny every read:own request, not fail open\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadAnyAndSearch_AlwaysAllowed(t *testing.T) {\n\ta := &StopgapAuthorizer{}\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\tif allowed, _ := a.Authorize(ctx, \"anyone\", ScopeReadAny, \"anything\"); !allowed {\n\t\tt.Error(\"read:any has no per-record referral concept this stopgap gates — should not be denied here\")\n\t}\n\tif allowed, _ := a.Authorize(ctx, \"anyone\", ScopeSearch, \"\"); !allowed {\n\t\tt.Error(\"search has no per-record target this stopgap gates — should not be denied here\")\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/stopgap_authorizer_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router_test.go"
}1 package app
2
3 import (
4 "context"
5 "crypto/rand"
6 "crypto/rsa"
7 "encoding/base64"
8 "encoding/json"
9 "net/http"
10 "net/http/httptest"
11 "strings"
12 "testing"
13 "time"
14
15 "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
16
17 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
18 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
19 "loginid-takehome/internal/model"
20 )
21
22 // fakeRepo is a minimal dao.Repository — only Profiles().Search is
23 // exercised by this file's tests; everything else panics, so a test
24 // that reaches an unexpected method fails loudly rather than silently
25 // zero-valuing (mirrors internal/api's own hand-written fakes,
26 // decisions/test-double-strategy.md).
27 type fakeRepo struct{ profiles fakeProfiles }
28
29 func (f *fakeRepo) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return &f.profiles }
30 func (f *fakeRepo) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { panic("not used") }
31 func (f *fakeRepo) Methods() dao.AuthMethodRepository { panic("not used") }
32 func (f *fakeRepo) CreateProfileWithCredential(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile, c *model.UserCredential) (*model.UserProfile, *model.UserCredential, error) {
33 panic("not used")
34 }
35 func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteExpired(ctx context.Context, class dao.RetentionClass, olderThan time.Time, maxRows int) (dao.SweepResult, error) {
36 panic("not used")
37 }
38 func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, externalRef *string) error {
39 panic("not used")
40 }
41 func (f *fakeRepo) Close() error { return nil }
42
43 type fakeProfiles struct{}
44
45 func (fakeProfiles) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
46 return &model.UserProfile{ID: id, Name: "Jane Doe"}, nil
47 }
48 func (fakeProfiles) Search(ctx context.Context, q dao.ProfileQuery) ([]model.UserProfile, int, error) {
49 return []model.UserProfile{{ID: "p1", Name: "Jane Doe"}}, 1, nil
50 }
51 func (fakeProfiles) Create(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
52 panic("not used")
53 }
54 func (fakeProfiles) Update(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
55 panic("not used")
56 }
57 func (fakeProfiles) Upsert(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
58 panic("not used")
59 }
60 func (fakeProfiles) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error { panic("not used") }
61
62 const (
63 testIssuer = "https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal"
64 testAudience = "loginid-api-service"
65 )
66
67 func startFakeJWKS(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *httptest.Server {
68 t.Helper()
69 body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
70 "keys": []map[string]string{{
71 "kty": "RSA",
72 "kid": kid,
73 "alg": "RS256",
74 "use": "sig",
75 "n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub.N.Bytes()),
76 "e": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537
77 }},
78 })
79 if err != nil {
80 t.Fatalf("marshaling fake JWKS: %v", err)
81 }
82 return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
83 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
84 _, _ = w.Write(body)
85 }))
86 }
87
88 func signTestToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, kid, scope string) string {
89 t.Helper()
90 c := jwt.MapClaims{
91 "iss": testIssuer,
92 "aud": testAudience,
93 "sub": "client-under-test",
94 "scope": scope,
95 "exp": time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix(),
96 "iat": time.Now().Unix(),
97 }
98 tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, c)
99 tok.Header["kid"] = kid
100 signed, err := tok.SignedString(key)
101 if err != nil {
102 t.Fatalf("signing test token: %v", err)
103 }
104 return signed
105 }
106
107 func TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401(t *testing.T) {
108 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
109 if err != nil {
110 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
111 }
112 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
113 defer jwks.Close()
114
115 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}
116 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})
117
118 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"a"}`))
119 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
120 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
121 if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
122 t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401 with no bearer token", w.Code)
123 }
124 }
125
126 // TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler proves the
127 // full stack — deadline middleware, JWT verification against a real
128 // JWKS-over-HTTP fetch, AuthContext population, and LT-39's handler —
129 // is wired together correctly end to end, not just each piece in
130 // isolation.
131 func TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler(t *testing.T) {
132 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
133 if err != nil {
134 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
135 }
136 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
137 defer jwks.Close()
138
139 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}
140 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})
141 tok := signTestToken(t, key, "key-1", "profile:search")
142
143 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"jane"}`))
144 req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
145 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
146 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
147 if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
148 t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200, body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
149 }
150 }
151
152 func TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth(t *testing.T) {
153 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: "http://unused.invalid"}
154 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})
155
156 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)
157 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
158 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
159 if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
160 t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 — /healthz must stay unauthenticated per handoff-03-auth.md", w.Code)
161 }
162 }
163 {
"command": "cat >> /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/app/verifier_router_test.go << 'EOF'\n\n// TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied is Marcus Ilori's (02)\n// ruling: the router-level test that was missing entirely for\n// GET /profiles/{id} under read:own — both the allow and deny paths\n// through the real StopgapAuthorizer, wired the way cmd/api-service\n// actually wires it (via cfg.AuthzQASub/AuthzQAAllowedProfileID).\nfunc TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tjwks := startFakeJWKS(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tdefer jwks.Close()\n\n\tcfg := config.Config{\n\t\tAuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer,\n\t\tAuthJWTAudience: testAudience,\n\t\tAuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL,\n\t\tAuthzQASub: \"client-under-test\", // matches signTestToken's hardcoded sub\n\t\tAuthzQAAllowedProfileID: \"allowed-profile\",\n\t}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{})\n\ttok := signTestToken(t, key, \"key-1\", \"profile:read:own\")\n\n\tallowedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/profiles/allowed-profile\", nil)\n\tallowedReq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+tok)\n\twAllowed := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(wAllowed, allowedReq)\n\tif wAllowed.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"allowed profile: status = %d, want 200, body=%s\", wAllowed.Code, wAllowed.Body.String())\n\t}\n\n\tdeniedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/profiles/some-other-profile\", nil)\n\tdeniedReq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+tok)\n\twDenied := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(wDenied, deniedReq)\n\tif wDenied.Code != http.StatusForbidden {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"unseeded profile: status = %d, want 403 (StopgapAuthorizer's safe-default deny), body=%s\", wDenied.Code, wDenied.Body.String())\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503 is the PM's\n// direct question: on a cluster where the database doesn't exist yet (no\n// DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured), the verifying Deployment must still come\n// up with /healthz green — cmd/api-service/main.go passes repo=nil\n// rather than crash-looping — and the two protected routes must fail\n// closed (503), not panic on a nil Repository. Auth still runs first: an\n// unauthenticated request still gets 401, proven by the companion\n// TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401-shaped assertion\n// inline below.\nfunc TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tjwks := startFakeJWKS(t, \"key-1\", &key.PublicKey)\n\tdefer jwks.Close()\n\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, nil) // no DAO repository — the no-database-yet case\n\ttok := signTestToken(t, key, \"key-1\", \"profile:search\")\n\n\t// /healthz must still be green.\n\thealthReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/healthz\", nil)\n\twHealth := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(wHealth, healthReq)\n\tif wHealth.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"/healthz status = %d, want 200 even with no DAO repository\", wHealth.Code)\n\t}\n\n\t// An authenticated request to a protected route must fail closed\n\t// (503), not panic.\n\tauthedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/profiles/search\", strings.NewReader(`{\"name\":\"a\"}`))\n\tauthedReq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+tok)\n\twAuthed := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(wAuthed, authedReq)\n\tif wAuthed.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"authenticated request with no repository: status = %d, want 503\", wAuthed.Code)\n\t}\n\n\t// An UNauthenticated request must still get 401, not 503 — auth\n\t// still runs before the repository is ever consulted.\n\tunauthedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/profiles/search\", strings.NewReader(`{\"name\":\"a\"}`))\n\twUnauthed := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(wUnauthed, unauthedReq)\n\tif wUnauthed.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"unauthenticated request with no repository: status = %d, want 401 (auth must still run first)\", wUnauthed.Code)\n\t}\n}\nEOF\necho done",
"description": "Add read:own allow/deny router test and nil-repo 503 test"
}done
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after all additional tests"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... ./internal/app/... -race -v 2>&1 | tail -150",
"description": "Run full api and app test suites with race detector"
}--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_AlertOnlyNamesClientID_NotSourceIP (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGrantLimiter_SweepEvictsStaleEntries
--- PASS: TestGrantLimiter_SweepEvictsStaleEntries (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_MissingAuthContext_401
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_MissingAuthContext_401 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_WrongScope_403
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_WrongScope_403 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_EmptyBody_400
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_EmptyBody_400 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_PageSizeAboveCap_RejectedNotTruncated
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_PageSizeAboveCap_RejectedNotTruncated (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_ResponseIsMasked
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_ResponseIsMasked (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_RateLimited_429
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_RateLimited_429 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_TouchCapExceeded_429NotServed
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_TouchCapExceeded_429NotServed (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_AuthorizeDenied_403
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_AuthorizeDenied_403 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound
--- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation
--- PASS: TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s)
=== RUN TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip
--- PASS: TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip (0.02s)
=== RUN TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys
--- PASS: TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys (0.00s)
=== RUN TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError
--- PASS: TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError (0.00s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.16s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.02s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError (0.03s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.02s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness
2026/09/13 04:45:54 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 4m0s across 1 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed: api: fetching JWKS from http://127.0.0.1:54536: status 500
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness (0.18s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch (0.12s)
=== RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited
--- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited (0.03s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext (0.12s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 (0.05s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 (0.03s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 (0.07s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 (0.01s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 (0.00s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 (0.04s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify (0.31s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 (0.02s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 (0.14s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 (0.05s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 (0.09s)
=== RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401
--- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 (0.01s)
=== RUN TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline
--- PASS: TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline (0.00s)
=== RUN TestMaskPhone
--- PASS: TestMaskPhone (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit
--- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope
--- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets
--- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets (0.00s)
=== RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied
--- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied (0.00s)
=== RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything
--- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything (0.00s)
=== RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadAnyAndSearch_AlwaysAllowed
--- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadAnyAndSearch_AlwaysAllowed (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub (0.00s)
=== RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows
--- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.917s
=== RUN TestHealthz
--- PASS: TestHealthz (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_IssuerModeAddsTokenRoute
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_IssuerModeAddsTokenRoute (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_VerifierModeHasNoTokenRoute
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_VerifierModeHasNoTokenRoute (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewRouter_UnrecognizedModeFallsBackToVerifier
2026/09/13 04:45:53 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "bogus" — serving verifier routes only
--- PASS: TestNewRouter_UnrecognizedModeFallsBackToVerifier (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401
2026/09/13 04:45:53 audit: {"Sub":"","Scope":"","Kind":"authn_failure","RecordIDs":null,"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:45:53.795351Z"}
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401 (0.10s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler
2026/09/13 04:45:53 audit: {"Sub":"client-under-test","Scope":"profile:search","Kind":"success","RecordIDs":["p1"],"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:45:53.873276Z"}
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler (0.08s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied
2026/09/13 04:45:53 audit: {"Sub":"client-under-test","Scope":"profile:read:own","Kind":"success","RecordIDs":["allowed-profile"],"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:45:53.924429Z"}
2026/09/13 04:45:53 audit: {"Sub":"client-under-test","Scope":"profile:read:own","Kind":"authorize_denial","RecordIDs":["some-other-profile"],"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:45:53.924701Z"}
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied (0.05s)
=== RUN TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503
2026/09/13 04:45:54 audit: {"Sub":"","Scope":"","Kind":"authn_failure","RecordIDs":null,"ReasonCode":"","Timestamp":"2026-09-13T11:45:54.061764Z"}
--- PASS: TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503 (0.14s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 1.733s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && gofmt -l . 2>&1",
"description": "Check formatting"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "Full repo test run"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 1.096s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.320s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "which staticcheck golangci-lint 2>&1",
"description": "Check for lint tools"
}Exit code 1 staticcheck not found golangci-lint not found
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git status --short",
"description": "Check status before commit"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M internal/api/audit.go M internal/api/errors.go M internal/api/grantlimiter.go M internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go M internal/api/jwks.go M internal/api/jwks_test.go M internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go M internal/api/jwtmiddleware_test.go M internal/app/verifier_router.go M internal/app/verifier_router_test.go ?? internal/api/stopgap_authorizer_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git add -A && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nfix: JWKS staleness/eviction/context-threading, startup fail-closed, review round 2\n\nFixes both live-issue classes surfaced this round: Oren's/Nolan's PR #30\nreview findings, Tomasz Wrede's (02) cold review findings, and the PM's\ndirect question about deployed startup behavior with no database and no\nreachable JWKS endpoint.\n\nNolan Reyes — production failure modes, both real:\n- JWKSCache.fetch used http.DefaultClient (Timeout: 0, i.e. none) and a\n bare httpClient.Get with no context — a hung (not refused) connection\n to the issuer's JWKS endpoint could block a goroutine indefinitely,\n completely ignoring the 5s deadline middleware's own guarantee. Fixed:\n fetch now uses http.NewRequestWithContext threading the caller's\n context through, and NewJWKSCache's default client carries an explicit\n defaultJWKSClientTimeout (10s) as a backstop independent of context.\n- KeyForKid held c.mu across the entire network fetch, so one hung fetch\n serialized every other concurrent request through the same cache\n instance — the whole verifying Deployment's authenticated surface, not\n just the request that triggered the refresh. Fixed: the lock is never\n held during I/O; concurrent callers that both decide a refresh is due\n may both fetch (cheap, occasional duplicate work), which is far\n preferable to one goroutine blocking every other one.\n- InProcessGrantLimiter's byClientID/bySourceIP maps had no eviction path\n other than a matching RecordSuccess — the exact traffic pattern this\n component defends against (a distributed brute force from many source\n IPs) is precisely what would grow bySourceIP unbounded, since an\n attacking IP by definition never succeeds. Fixed with the same\n sweep-on-access pattern TouchCounter already uses (gated so it costs\n nothing per-call beyond a single time comparison).\n\nTomasz Wrede (02 cold review) / PM ruling — both fixed to the PM's exact\nnumbers:\n- JWKS's stale-cache-on-fetch-failure fallback had no ceiling: if a\n signing key is revoked because it's compromised, and the JWKS endpoint\n happens to be unreachable during that same incident, the verifier\n would keep accepting tokens signed by the revoked key for as long as\n fetches kept failing. Fixed: JWKSCache now fails closed (ErrJWKSStale)\n once the cache has gone unrefreshable for longer than\n jwksMaxStalenessMultiple (3) times ttl, logging once per threshold\n crossing for 04's alerting. NewJWTMiddleware logs a distinct audit\n event (AuditJWKSUnavailable, new AuditEventKind) for this specific\n failure mode rather than folding it into an ordinary auth failure —\n this is a token-infrastructure degradation, not a bad-credential\n attempt.\n- An unknown kid previously waited for the next calendar-scheduled TTL\n refresh, meaning a freshly-rotated key could be rejected for up to a\n full TTL. Fixed: one rate-limited (jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval, 30s)\n out-of-band refetch is attempted before giving up, closing the\n rotation window from this direction too.\n- StopgapAuthorizer's deny path had zero test coverage, and no router\n test exercised GET /profiles/{id} under read:own at all. Added\n stopgap_authorizer_test.go (allow, deny-by-unseeded-id,\n deny-by-unseeded-sub, empty-map-denies-everything, read:any/search\n always-allowed) and\n TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied (the real router,\n real StopgapAuthorizer, both outcomes).\n\nOren Castellan — minor findings, both fixed:\n- singleScope counted claim occurrences, not distinct scope values, so\n a malformed-but-unambiguous \"profile:search profile:search\" claim was\n rejected as \"more than one,\" contradicting the function's own stated\n reasoning. Now dedupes by distinct Scope value.\n- bearerToken's \"Bearer \" match was case-sensitive; RFC 7235 §2.1 treats\n the auth-scheme token as case-insensitive. Fixed with strings.EqualFold.\n\nPM's direct question, answered by fixing rather than just describing:\nwhat does deployed api-service do at startup with (a) no database yet\nand (b) no reachable JWKS endpoint?\n- (a) cmd/api-service/main.go no longer log.Fatalf's on a DAO-open\n failure — it logs a warning and continues with repo=nil.\n NewVerifierRouter now handles a nil repo explicitly: /healthz stays\n 200, and the two protected routes return 503 (api.WriteServiceUnavailable,\n new exported helper) instead of panicking on a nil Repository. Auth\n still runs first — an unauthenticated request still gets 401, not 503 —\n proven by TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503,\n which asserts all three outcomes (200 healthz, 503 authenticated, 401\n unauthenticated) against the same nil-repo router.\n- (b) No reachable JWKS endpoint at cold start (no stale cache to fall\n back on) now fails within the request's own deadline (context now\n threaded through, per Nolan's fix above) rather than hanging — every\n request 401s until the issuer becomes reachable, at which point the\n cache populates and later blips are covered by the existing\n stale-cache fallback (now bounded, per Tomasz's fix above).\n\nConfig keys the manifests need for LT-40 (for 04, per the PM's request):\nAUTH_JWKS_URL (required for verification to ever succeed — e.g.\n\"http://api-service-issuer.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local/.well-known/jwks.json\"),\nDB_DRIVER and DB_DSN_FILE (or DB_DSN) already existed for the DAO layer\ngenerally and are what gate the (a) case above — nothing new there\nbeyond what PR #29 sets. AUTHZ_QA_SUB/AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID are\noptional, set by LT-51 once the QA client credential exists, not needed\nfor #30 itself to deploy safely.\n\nVerified: go build/vet clean, go test ./... -race green across\ninternal/api and internal/app (new tests: 6 JWKS staleness/refetch, 3\nStopgapAuthorizer, 1 GrantLimiter sweep, 2 router-level — allow/deny and\nnil-repo fail-closed), gofmt clean. The two staticcheck QF1008 findings\n(internal/api/jwks_test.go, internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go — both\nembedded-field-selector redundancies) are also fixed.\n\nStory: LT-40\nWork-By: Renata Cole (lead), reviewed by Oren Castellan, Nolan Reyes\n(03), and Tomasz Wrede (02, cold review, routed by Marcus Ilori)\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}[feature/LT-40 03181f6] fix: JWKS staleness/eviction/context-threading, startup fail-closed, review round 2 12 files changed, 730 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/api/stopgap_authorizer_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && git push origin feature/LT-40 2>&1",
"description": "Push LT-40 review-fix commit"
}To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git 1150b98..03181f6 feature/LT-40 -> feature/LT-40 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"description": "Oren re-review of PR #30 delta",
"subagent_type": "oren-castellan",
"prompt": "You previously reviewed GitHub PR #30 (wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-40) and found two minor issues: (1) singleScope() counted claim occurrences instead of distinct scope values, so \"profile:search profile:search\" was wrongly rejected as \"more than one scope\"; (2) bearerToken()'s \"Bearer \" prefix match was case-sensitive, against RFC 7235's case-insensitive auth-scheme convention.\n\nThe branch has since been updated (new commit 03181f6) — both of your findings were fixed (dedup by distinct Scope value; strings.EqualFold for the prefix match), plus a substantial set of other changes responding to Nolan Reyes's and a 02 cold-reviewer's (Tomasz Wrede) findings: JWKS fetch now threads context through (was previously ignoring it and using a client with no timeout), the cache lock is no longer held during network I/O, JWKS staleness is now bounded (fails closed past 3x the TTL) with a distinct audit event, an unknown kid triggers one rate-limited out-of-band refetch, the GrantLimiter's maps now get swept to prevent unbounded growth, and cmd/api-service/main.go no longer crash-loops when the database doesn't exist yet (fails closed with 503 on the protected routes instead, while /healthz stays green).\n\nRe-review the CURRENT full state — run `gh pr diff 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` for the complete diff. Verify:\n1. Are your two original findings actually fixed correctly?\n2. Trace the new JWKS staleness logic (refresh(), reserveUnknownKidRetry, the maxStaleness check) for correctness — any off-by-one, race, or logic error in the fail-closed threshold?\n3. Any new issues introduced by this round's changes?\n\nReport back in plain prose (not a tool call): concrete findings if any, or confirmation everything checks out, if that's your honest assessment."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: a836f692f3648b776 (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'a836f692f3648b776', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/a836f692f3648b776.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"description": "Nolan re-review of PR #30 delta",
"subagent_type": "nolan-reyes",
"prompt": "You previously reviewed GitHub PR #30 (wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-40) and found three real production issues: (1) JWKS fetch used http.DefaultClient with no timeout and ignored the caller's context entirely, so a hung (not refused) connection could block indefinitely, defeating the deadline middleware; (2) the JWKS cache held its mutex across the whole network fetch, so one hung fetch would serialize every other concurrent request through the same cache instance; (3) the GrantLimiter's per-client-id/per-source-ip maps had no eviction, an unbounded-growth pattern identical to one already fixed once in this codebase's touch-counter component.\n\nThe branch has since been updated (new commit 03181f6): JWKS fetch now uses http.NewRequestWithContext threading the caller's context through, plus an explicit client Timeout (10s) as a backstop; KeyForKid no longer holds the lock during the fetch (a helper `refresh()` does the network call unlocked, then re-locks briefly to update state); GrantLimiter now has a sweep-on-access eviction matching the touch-counter's existing pattern. Also new in this round (from a 02 cold reviewer, Tomasz Wrede): a max-staleness bound on the JWKS cache (fails closed past 3x TTL) and a rate-limited unknown-kid refetch. Also: cmd/api-service/main.go no longer crash-loops when the database isn't configured yet — it continues with a nil repo, and the router fails the two protected routes closed with 503 instead of panicking.\n\nRe-review the CURRENT full state — run `gh pr diff 30 --repo wtvamp/loginid-takehome` for the complete diff. Specifically verify, don't just trust the description:\n1. Does the new locking structure in jwks.go actually avoid holding the mutex during I/O in every code path (KeyForKid, the unknown-kid retry path, refresh() itself)? Trace it carefully — a partial fix that still holds the lock in one branch would be worse than no fix, since it'd look solved.\n2. Is the context actually threaded all the way from the HTTP handler down to the http.NewRequestWithContext call, with no gap where a fresh context.Background() sneaks back in?\n3. Does the GrantLimiter sweep interact correctly with the exponential backoff logic — could a sweep ever evict an entry that's still actively blocking a request (i.e. is the entry TTL for eviction clearly longer than any possible active backoff window)?\n4. Any new failure modes introduced by the nil-repo handling in cmd/api-service/main.go or the verifier_router.go changes?\n\nReport back in plain prose (not a tool call): concrete findings if any, most important first, or confirmation everything checks out, if that's your honest assessment after actually tracing the code."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: aae51e56deb585c1c (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'aae51e56deb585c1c', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/aae51e56deb585c1c.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"to": "project manager",
"summary": "Startup behavior answer, config keys, all fixes pushed at 03181f6",
"message": "Direct answer to your question, verified by test (not just described):\n\n(a) No database (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN before PR #29): cmd/api-service/main.go no longer log.Fatalf's on dao.New failing — it logs a warning and continues with repo=nil. NewVerifierRouter handles nil explicitly: /healthz stays 200, and POST /profiles/search + GET /profiles/{id} return 503 (not a panic on nil Repository). Auth still runs first — an unauthenticated request to those routes still gets 401, not 503. TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503 asserts all three outcomes against the same router instance.\n\n(b) No reachable JWKS endpoint at cold start: with the context-threading fix (below), a request now fails within its own 5s deadline rather than hanging — 401, bounded. Once JWKS becomes reachable, subsequent requests succeed and populate the cache; later blips are covered by the stale-cache fallback, now itself bounded (fails closed past 3x TTL, per Marcus/Tomasz's ruling — see below).\n\nThis was genuinely broken before I checked it: JWKS fetch used http.DefaultClient (no timeout) and never threaded the request's context through at all, so a hung (not refused) connection to the issuer would've blocked indefinitely, defeating the deadline middleware entirely — and the cache held its lock across the whole fetch, so one hung fetch would've serialized every other concurrent request through the same verifying Deployment. Both fixed (context threading + explicit 10s backstop timeout; lock never held during I/O).\n\nConfig keys for Theo, for #29 or a follow-up before #30 deploys: AUTH_JWKS_URL is required for verification to ever succeed (e.g. http://api-service-issuer.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local/.well-known/jwks.json). DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN(_FILE) are what gate case (a) above — nothing new beyond what #29 already sets. AUTHZ_QA_SUB/AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID are optional, LT-51 sets them later, not needed for #30 to deploy safely.\n\nAlso fixed this round: Tomasz's two findings (JWKS max-staleness fail-closed at 3x TTL with a distinct audit event; rate-limited unknown-kid refetch), StopgapAuthorizer test coverage for both allow/deny (including a real router-level test), GrantLimiter's unbounded-map-growth (same sweep pattern as an earlier PR's touch-counter fix), and both staticcheck QF1008s. Pushed at 03181f6. Oren and Nolan re-reviewing now; will ping once back.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "project manager",
"content": "Direct answer to your question, verified by test …"
}{"success":true,"message":"“Startup behavior answer, config keys, all fixes pushed at 03181f6” → project manager (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"a1f51962-57cf-499b-8b0a-3a29542dbf5f"}{
"to": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"summary": "Tomasz's findings fixed, requesting his re-check on PR #30",
"message": "Both of Tomasz's findings fixed and pushed at 03181f6: JWKS staleness now bounded at 3x TTL (his default), failing closed with ErrJWKSStale and a distinct AuditJWKSUnavailable event, plus a log line on the fetch-failure run for 04's alerting; unknown-kid triggers one rate-limited (30s) out-of-band refetch before rejecting. StopgapAuthorizer's deny path and a real GET /profiles/{id} read:own router test (both allow and deny) are added too. Would appreciate his re-check on 1-2 when he has a moment.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"content": "Both of Tomasz's findings fixed and pushed at 031…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“Tomasz's findings fixed, requesting his re-check on PR #30” → 02-ai-security-architecture-a2 (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"6666bf7c-4f97-485f-90a3-eb86ba901ca9"}{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go"
}1 // jwks.go implements a minimal RFC 7517 JSON Web Key Set client: fetch,
2 // parse RSA public keys, cache with a short TTL. handoff-03-auth.md v4:
3 // "Public-key distribution for the verifier ... JWKS served by the issuer
4 // Deployment, reachable only in-cluster via its own ClusterIP Service ...
5 // Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short TTL (matching
6 // token TTL is reasonable) to avoid a JWKS fetch on every single
7 // verification."
8 package api
9
10 import (
11 "context"
12 "crypto/rsa"
13 "encoding/base64"
14 "encoding/json"
15 "errors"
16 "fmt"
17 "io"
18 "log"
19 "math/big"
20 "net/http"
21 "sync"
22 "time"
23 )
24
25 // jwk is one entry in a JWKS response — only the fields this verifier
26 // needs to reconstruct an RSA public key (RFC 7517 §4, RFC 7518 §6.3.1).
27 // Fields this verifier doesn't use (x5c, x5t, ...) are simply not
28 // unmarshaled; unknown fields in the source JSON are not an error.
29 type jwk struct {
30 Kty string `json:"kty"`
31 Kid string `json:"kid"`
32 Alg string `json:"alg"`
33 Use string `json:"use"`
34 N string `json:"n"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA modulus
35 E string `json:"e"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA public exponent
36 }
37
38 type jwksResponse struct {
39 Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
40 }
41
42 // parseJWKS decodes a JWKS JSON document into a map of kid -> public key.
43 // Any key with kty != "RSA" is skipped (not an error) — a future non-RSA
44 // key in the set (e.g. during an algorithm migration) shouldn't break
45 // verification of tokens signed with the RSA keys that ARE present.
46 func parseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
47 var resp jwksResponse
48 if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &resp); err != nil {
49 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: parsing JWKS: %w", err)
50 }
51 keys := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(resp.Keys))
52 for _, k := range resp.Keys {
53 if k.Kty != "RSA" {
54 continue
55 }
56 if k.Kid == "" {
57 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS RSA key missing kid")
58 }
59 pub, err := rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k)
60 if err != nil {
61 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS key %q: %w", k.Kid, err)
62 }
63 keys[k.Kid] = pub
64 }
65 return keys, nil
66 }
67
68 func rsaPublicKeyFromJWK(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
69 nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)
70 if err != nil {
71 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding n: %w", err)
72 }
73 eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)
74 if err != nil {
75 return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding e: %w", err)
76 }
77 n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)
78 e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)
79 if !e.IsInt64() {
80 return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent out of range")
81 }
82 return &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}, nil
83 }
84
85 // KeySource resolves a kid to the RSA public key that should verify a
86 // token carrying it. JWKSCache is the real implementation; tests use a
87 // map-backed fake. ctx carries the calling request's own deadline —
88 // KeyForKid's real implementation must bound its network I/O by it, not
89 // by some separate, undocumented timeout (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review: a
90 // hung fetch that ignores the caller's context defeats the deadline
91 // middleware's whole guarantee).
92 type KeySource interface {
93 KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)
94 }
95
96 // ErrJWKSStale is returned by JWKSCache.KeyForKid when the cached key set
97 // has exceeded its max-staleness bound and could not be refreshed — the
98 // verifier must fail closed rather than trust keys this old (Tomasz
99 // Wrede, 02 cold review; PM ruling). Exported so NewJWTMiddleware can log
100 // a distinct audit event (AuditJWKSUnavailable) for this specific
101 // failure mode, rather than folding it into an ordinary auth failure.
102 var ErrJWKSStale = errors.New("api: JWKS cache exceeded max staleness and could not be refreshed")
103
104 // jwksMaxStalenessMultiple and jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval are the
105 // concrete numbers the PM ruled on for Tomasz Wrede's two findings:
106 // - a signing key can be revoked BECAUSE it's compromised; if the JWKS
107 // endpoint is also unreachable during that same incident, a
108 // stale-cache-forever fallback would keep verifying tokens signed by
109 // the revoked key for as long as fetches keep failing. Bounding
110 // staleness at a multiple of the normal refresh interval (ttl) turns
111 // "fail open forever" into "fail open for a bounded window, then
112 // fail closed" — resilient to a brief blip, not to an extended one.
113 // - an unknown kid could be a key the issuer rotated in since the last
114 // TTL-driven refresh; without an out-of-band refetch, a freshly
115 // rotated key would be rejected for up to a full TTL. Rate-limited
116 // so an unknown-kid flood can't be used to hammer the issuer's JWKS
117 // endpoint.
118 const (
119 jwksMaxStalenessMultiple = 3
120 jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval = 30 * time.Second
121 )
122
123 // JWKSCache fetches a JWKS document from url and caches the parsed key
124 // set for ttl, refetching only after it expires — "to avoid a JWKS fetch
125 // on every single verification" (handoff-03-auth.md v4). Supports at
126 // least two concurrently valid kids during a rotation overlap window by
127 // construction: it caches the WHOLE key set the issuer publishes, not
128 // just the most recent key, so an old and a new key both verify
129 // successfully for as long as the issuer's own JWKS response lists both.
130 type JWKSCache struct {
131 url string
132 ttl time.Duration
133 maxStaleness time.Duration
134 httpClient *http.Client
135 now func() time.Time
136
137 mu sync.Mutex
138 keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
139 fetchedAt time.Time // last SUCCESSFUL fetch
140 consecutiveFailures int
141 staleAlerted bool
142 lastUnknownKidRetry time.Time
143 }
144
145 // defaultJWKSClientTimeout backstops a hung fetch (a connection that
146 // accepts but never responds — not a hard refusal, which fails fast on
147 // its own) when no context deadline is shorter. Distinct from and
148 // independent of a per-request context deadline: this fires even for a
149 // call that somehow reaches fetch() with no deadline on its context at
150 // all, which the http.Client.Timeout field guards against regardless of
151 // context (Nolan Reyes, PR #30 review — the shipped wiring passed nil
152 // for httpClient, resolving to http.DefaultClient, whose zero-value
153 // Timeout means "none").
154 const defaultJWKSClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second
155
156 // NewJWKSCache constructs a cache fetching from url, refetching at most
157 // once per ttl (and, for an unrecognized kid specifically, at most once
158 // per jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval outside the normal TTL cycle). A nil
159 // httpClient constructs one with defaultJWKSClientTimeout — never
160 // http.DefaultClient, whose Timeout is unset (no bound at all) by
161 // default. maxStaleness is jwksMaxStalenessMultiple * ttl.
162 func NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {
163 if httpClient == nil {
164 httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: defaultJWKSClientTimeout}
165 }
166 return &JWKSCache{
167 url: url,
168 ttl: ttl,
169 maxStaleness: jwksMaxStalenessMultiple * ttl,
170 httpClient: httpClient,
171 now: time.Now,
172 }
173 }
174
175 // KeyForKid never holds c.mu across a network fetch (Nolan Reyes, PR #30
176 // review, finding #2): the prior shape held the lock for the whole
177 // function body, so one hung fetch stalled every other concurrent
178 // request through this same cache instance — i.e. every authenticated
179 // request the verifying Deployment was serving, not just the one that
180 // triggered the refresh. Concurrent callers that both decide a refresh
181 // is due may both fetch; that's cheap, occasional duplicate work, and far
182 // preferable to serializing the whole authenticated surface behind one
183 // goroutine's network call.
184 func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
185 c.mu.Lock()
186 needsRefresh := c.keys == nil || c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl
187 c.mu.Unlock()
188
189 if needsRefresh {
190 if err := c.refresh(ctx); err != nil {
191 return nil, err
192 }
193 }
194
195 if key, ok := c.lookupKey(kid); ok {
196 return key, nil
197 }
198
199 // Unknown kid: might be a key the issuer rotated in since the last
200 // TTL-driven refresh. One rate-limited out-of-band refetch before
201 // giving up, so a freshly-rotated key isn't rejected for up to a
202 // full TTL (Tomasz Wrede, 02 cold review). Best-effort: its error is
203 // deliberately ignored here — the outcome that matters is whether
204 // the retry populated the kid we're actually looking for, and a
205 // refresh() failure here has already been handled (logged / staleness
206 // tracked) inside refresh() itself.
207 if c.reserveUnknownKidRetry() {
208 _ = c.refresh(ctx)
209 if key, ok := c.lookupKey(kid); ok {
210 return key, nil
211 }
212 }
213
214 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: no key found for kid %q", kid)
215 }
216
217 func (c *JWKSCache) lookupKey(kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, bool) {
218 c.mu.Lock()
219 defer c.mu.Unlock()
220 k, ok := c.keys[kid]
221 return k, ok
222 }
223
224 // reserveUnknownKidRetry reports whether an unknown-kid-triggered refetch
225 // may proceed now, and if so atomically marks one as just having started
226 // — a caller enumerating unknown kids can trigger at most one extra
227 // fetch per jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval, not one per request.
228 func (c *JWKSCache) reserveUnknownKidRetry() bool {
229 c.mu.Lock()
230 defer c.mu.Unlock()
231 if c.now().Sub(c.lastUnknownKidRetry) < jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval {
232 return false
233 }
234 c.lastUnknownKidRetry = c.now()
235 return true
236 }
237
238 // refresh performs the network fetch (no lock held during it) and
239 // updates cache state. Returns an error only when the caller must fail
240 // the whole verification: no cache exists yet (cold start against an
241 // unreachable issuer), or the existing cache has exceeded maxStaleness —
242 // wrapped in ErrJWKSStale in the latter case specifically, so the
243 // middleware can log AuditJWKSUnavailable rather than an ordinary auth
244 // failure. A transient failure within the staleness bound returns nil:
245 // the stale cache is still good enough to use, per the resilience this
246 // mechanism exists for.
247 func (c *JWKSCache) refresh(ctx context.Context) error {
248 fresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)
249
250 c.mu.Lock()
251 defer c.mu.Unlock()
252
253 if err == nil {
254 c.keys = fresh
255 c.fetchedAt = c.now()
256 c.consecutiveFailures = 0
257 c.staleAlerted = false
258 return nil
259 }
260
261 c.consecutiveFailures++
262
263 if c.keys == nil {
264 return err
265 }
266
267 staleSince := c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt)
268 if staleSince > c.maxStaleness {
269 if !c.staleAlerted {
270 c.staleAlerted = true
271 // Log line for 04's alerting pipeline on a prolonged
272 // fetch-failure run — not a policy decision (AuditLogger is
273 // for those), an operational signal that this process's own
274 // key infrastructure is degraded.
275 log.Printf("api: JWKS unrefreshable for %s across %d consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness %s) — failing closed: %v",
276 staleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, c.maxStaleness, err)
277 }
278 return fmt.Errorf("%w: stale for %s across %d consecutive failures: %v", ErrJWKSStale, staleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, err)
279 }
280 return nil
281 }
282
283 func (c *JWKSCache) fetch(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
284 req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.url, nil)
285 if err != nil {
286 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: building JWKS request for %s: %w", c.url, err)
287 }
288 resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
289 if err != nil {
290 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: %w", c.url, err)
291 }
292 defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
293 if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
294 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: fetching JWKS from %s: status %d", c.url, resp.StatusCode)
295 }
296 // 1MiB ceiling — a JWKS response is a handful of RSA keys, never
297 // this large; capped so a misbehaving/compromised issuer endpoint
298 // can't force this process to buffer an unbounded response body.
299 body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
300 if err != nil {
301 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: reading JWKS response: %w", err)
302 }
303 return parseJWKS(body)
304 }
305 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "const (\n\tjwksMaxStalenessMultiple = 3\n\tjwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval = 30 * time.Second\n)",
"new_string": "const (\n\tjwksMaxStalenessMultiple = 3\n\tjwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval = 30 * time.Second\n\n\t// jwksMinRefreshRetryInterval floors how often a TTL-expired cache\n\t// with a just-failed refresh will attempt another real network\n\t// fetch. Without this, every single request during a sustained\n\t// issuer outage triggers its own fetch attempt for as long as the\n\t// outage lasts (up to maxStaleness) — the same \"don't hammer a\n\t// struggling dependency\" reasoning already applied to the\n\t// unknown-kid path, missing from the ordinary refresh path (Oren\n\t// Castellan, PR #30 re-review). Short relative to ttl/maxStaleness:\n\t// this only throttles retries during an active failure, it must not\n\t// delay picking up a healthy issuer again once it recovers.\n\tjwksMinRefreshRetryInterval = 5 * time.Second\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tkeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey\n\tfetchedAt time.Time // last SUCCESSFUL fetch\n\tconsecutiveFailures int\n\tstaleAlerted bool\n\tlastUnknownKidRetry time.Time\n}",
"new_string": "\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tkeys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey\n\tfetchedAt time.Time // last SUCCESSFUL fetch\n\tlastAttempt time.Time // last fetch ATTEMPT, success or failure\n\tconsecutiveFailures int\n\tstaleAlerted bool\n\tlastUnknownKidRetry time.Time\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tneedsRefresh := c.keys == nil || c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif needsRefresh {\n\t\tif err := c.refresh(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}",
"new_string": "func (c *JWKSCache) KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tneedsRefresh := c.keys == nil || c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt) >= c.ttl\n\tcanAttempt := c.now().Sub(c.lastAttempt) >= jwksMinRefreshRetryInterval\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif needsRefresh {\n\t\tif canAttempt {\n\t\t\tif err := c.refresh(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if err := c.enforceStaleness(); err != nil {\n\t\t\t// Backing off from a very recent failed attempt (see\n\t\t\t// jwksMinRefreshRetryInterval) — no new network call this\n\t\t\t// time, but the staleness ceiling must still be enforced\n\t\t\t// against the existing cache regardless of whether this\n\t\t\t// particular call was the one that tried to refresh it.\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go",
"old_string": "// refresh performs the network fetch (no lock held during it) and\n// updates cache state. Returns an error only when the caller must fail\n// the whole verification: no cache exists yet (cold start against an\n// unreachable issuer), or the existing cache has exceeded maxStaleness —\n// wrapped in ErrJWKSStale in the latter case specifically, so the\n// middleware can log AuditJWKSUnavailable rather than an ordinary auth\n// failure. A transient failure within the staleness bound returns nil:\n// the stale cache is still good enough to use, per the resilience this\n// mechanism exists for.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) refresh(ctx context.Context) error {\n\tfresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)\n\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\tc.keys = fresh\n\t\tc.fetchedAt = c.now()\n\t\tc.consecutiveFailures = 0\n\t\tc.staleAlerted = false\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tc.consecutiveFailures++\n\n\tif c.keys == nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tstaleSince := c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt)\n\tif staleSince > c.maxStaleness {\n\t\tif !c.staleAlerted {\n\t\t\tc.staleAlerted = true\n\t\t\t// Log line for 04's alerting pipeline on a prolonged\n\t\t\t// fetch-failure run — not a policy decision (AuditLogger is\n\t\t\t// for those), an operational signal that this process's own\n\t\t\t// key infrastructure is degraded.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api: JWKS unrefreshable for %s across %d consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness %s) — failing closed: %v\",\n\t\t\t\tstaleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, c.maxStaleness, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%w: stale for %s across %d consecutive failures: %v\", ErrJWKSStale, staleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, err)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}",
"new_string": "// refresh performs the network fetch (no lock held during it) and\n// updates cache state. Returns an error only when the caller must fail\n// the whole verification: no cache exists yet (cold start against an\n// unreachable issuer), or the existing cache has exceeded maxStaleness —\n// wrapped in ErrJWKSStale in the latter case specifically, so the\n// middleware can log AuditJWKSUnavailable rather than an ordinary auth\n// failure. A transient failure within the staleness bound returns nil:\n// the stale cache is still good enough to use, per the resilience this\n// mechanism exists for.\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) refresh(ctx context.Context) error {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tc.lastAttempt = c.now()\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tfresh, err := c.fetch(ctx)\n\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\tc.keys = fresh\n\t\tc.fetchedAt = c.now()\n\t\tc.consecutiveFailures = 0\n\t\tc.staleAlerted = false\n\t\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tc.consecutiveFailures++\n\tnoCache := c.keys == nil\n\tc.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tif noCache {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\treturn c.enforceStaleness()\n}\n\n// enforceStaleness checks the existing cache against maxStaleness and\n// fails closed (ErrJWKSStale) if it's been exceeded — factored out of\n// refresh() so the same check applies on a call that skips an actual\n// network attempt because jwksMinRefreshRetryInterval hasn't elapsed yet\n// (Oren Castellan, PR #30 re-review: without this, backing off from\n// hammering a struggling issuer would also silently suspend the\n// staleness ceiling for however long the backoff lasts).\nfunc (c *JWKSCache) enforceStaleness() error {\n\tc.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer c.mu.Unlock()\n\tif c.keys == nil {\n\t\treturn errors.New(\"api: JWKS cache not yet populated\")\n\t}\n\tstaleSince := c.now().Sub(c.fetchedAt)\n\tif staleSince > c.maxStaleness {\n\t\tif !c.staleAlerted {\n\t\t\tc.staleAlerted = true\n\t\t\t// Log line for 04's alerting pipeline on a prolonged\n\t\t\t// fetch-failure run — not a policy decision (AuditLogger is\n\t\t\t// for those), an operational signal that this process's own\n\t\t\t// key infrastructure is degraded.\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api: JWKS unrefreshable for %s across %d consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness %s) — failing closed\",\n\t\t\t\tstaleSince, c.consecutiveFailures, c.maxStaleness)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%w: stale for %s across %d consecutive failures\", ErrJWKSStale, staleSince, c.consecutiveFailures)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40/internal/api/jwks.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "grep -n \"jwks.json\\|well-known\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/backlog.md 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Check if a JWKS path convention is already documented anywhere"
}(Bash completed with no output)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go build ./... 2>&1 && echo BUILD_OK && go vet ./... 2>&1 && echo VET_OK",
"description": "Build and vet after the refresh-retry-floor fix"
}BUILD_OK VET_OK Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 && go test ./internal/api/... -run TestJWKS -v 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Confirm existing JWKS tests still pass"
}=== RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.04s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.04s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError (0.10s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.03s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness 2026/09/13 04:49:49 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 4m0s across 1 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness (0.04s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch (0.26s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited (0.06s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.900s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery