{
"command": "mkdir -p /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer",
"description": "Create migrations/issuer directory"
}(Bash completed with no output)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql",
"content": "-- +goose Up\n-- The token issuer's client store (LT-51), per Priya Nandakumar's (05)\n-- ruling on this story: a separate `issuer` database — same PostgreSQL\n-- instance as the main DAO's database, but a distinct database so a\n-- cross-database join to user_profile/user_credential is structurally\n-- impossible, not just policy-forbidden. Its own goose invocation\n-- (GOOSE_DBSTRING pointed at this database) and its own version table\n-- (goose_db_version_issuer), run as a third invocation alongside the\n-- existing backend-directory + shared/ pair (05-data-ops/\n-- migration-approach.md §\"Mechanism 04 needs\"). issuer_migrator/\n-- issuer_runtime roles carry over the same DDL-vs-DML privilege split\n-- LT-52's postgres-in-namespace.md already established for the main\n-- database — provisioning those roles is 04's manifest/runbook\n-- responsibility, not this file's.\n--\n-- oauth_client has no PII columns, ever (Priya's ruling) — client_id and\n-- name identify a machine client application, not a person, so there is\n-- no retention clock on this table (contrast user_profile/\n-- user_credential's retention sweep, dao.Repository.DeleteExpired).\n--\n-- secret_state mirrors user_credential.secret_state's own lesson (05's\n-- ruling, cited directly): three states (none/set/revoked) must be\n-- asserted explicitly by a named CHECK, never collapsed into an\n-- incidental \"hash IS NULL\" inference — a row can be `revoked` with a\n-- NULL hash for a reason distinct from `none` never having had one.\n--\n-- client_id's charset CHECK is this table's own identifier rule —\n-- 05-data-ops/multi-db-strategy.md amendment A4 (canonical UUID\n-- validation) is explicitly NOT applied here, since client_id is a\n-- human/CI-assigned slug (e.g. issued by the QA seeding runbook), not a\n-- generated UUID primary key like every other table in this project.\n--\n-- granted_scopes is TEXT[] — deliberately PostgreSQL-only, unlike the\n-- main DAO schema's portability requirement (05-data-ops/\n-- multi-db-strategy.md), since the issuer database has no SQLite/\n-- CockroachDB peer to stay portable against.\n--\n-- name and audience are additions beyond Priya's explicitly named column\n-- list (client_id, client_secret_hash/secret_state, granted_scopes,\n-- status, created_at/updated_at, no PII) — both operationally necessary\n-- (name: a human-readable label for which application a row is, for\n-- anyone reading this table directly; audience: LT-51's token claims\n-- need a per-client `aud` value, since idp-connector and api-service are\n-- different audiences) and neither is PII. Flagged explicitly for\n-- Priya's DDL review rather than assumed silently.\n\nCREATE TABLE oauth_client (\n\tclient_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tname TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tclient_secret_hash TEXT,\n\tsecret_state TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tgranted_scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL,\n\taudience TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tstatus TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tcreated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tupdated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tCONSTRAINT pk_oauth_client PRIMARY KEY (client_id),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_id_charset CHECK (client_id ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$'),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_name_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(name)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state_enum CHECK (secret_state IN ('none', 'set', 'revoked')),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state CHECK (\n\t\t(secret_state = 'set' AND client_secret_hash IS NOT NULL)\n\t\tOR\n\t\t(secret_state IN ('none', 'revoked') AND client_secret_hash IS NULL)\n\t),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_nonempty CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_audience_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(audience)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_status CHECK (status IN ('active', 'disabled'))\n);\n\n-- +goose Down\nDROP TABLE oauth_client;\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go"
}1 // Package config loads the env-var configuration surface published in root
2 // PLANNING.md's Service boundaries section. Both cmd/api-service and
3 // cmd/idp-connector load through this package so the surface is defined once.
4 package config
5
6 import (
7 "fmt"
8 "os"
9 "strings"
10 )
11
12 // Config holds every environment variable named in PLANNING.md's Service
13 // boundaries section. Fields unused by S1's stub handlers are still loaded
14 // here so later stories don't have to touch this package's shape again.
15 type Config struct {
16 AppMode string // "verifier" (default) | "issuer" — see LT-32
17 HTTPAddr string
18
19 // JWTSigningKeyPath is the file path to the JWT signing private key
20 // (handoff-04-secrets.md row #2 — "runtime-injected as a file, never
21 // an env var"). Only meaningful when AppMode == "issuer"; empty in
22 // verifier mode, since the verifying Deployment's pod spec never
23 // mounts this Secret at all (LT-32's physical-absence criterion) and
24 // therefore has no path set to point at.
25 JWTSigningKeyPath string
26
27 DBDriver string // postgres | cockroachdb | sqlite
28 DBDSN string // resolved value: DB_DSN_FILE content takes precedence over DB_DSN
29
30 AuthJWTIssuer string
31 AuthJWTAudience string
32 // AuthJWKSURL is the verifier's only path to public key material
33 // (LT-40, handoff-03-auth.md v4): the issuer Deployment's in-cluster
34 // ClusterIP Service JWKS endpoint, e.g.
35 // "http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local/.well-known/jwks.json".
36 // Never a mounted key file — JWKS survives rotation without a config
37 // change, since the verifier fetches by kid.
38 AuthJWKSURL string
39
40 // AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID seed the temporary,
41 // default-deny StopgapAuthorizer (internal/api) for LT-40/LT-51's
42 // joint live-URL review only — see StopgapAuthorizer's own doc
43 // comment for why a permissive default was explicitly ruled out.
44 // Both empty (the default) means the stand-in denies every
45 // profile:read:own request, the safe default until LT-51 seeds a
46 // real QA client credential and this is set to match it.
47 AuthzQASub string
48 AuthzQAAllowedProfileID string
49
50 // QAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/QAClientScope/QAClientAudience seed a
51 // single client credential into the issuer's in-process client store
52 // at startup (LT-51), for the PO's joint LT-34/LT-39/LT-40/LT-51
53 // live-URL review — the same out-of-band discipline as
54 // JWTSigningKeyPath (LT-32/handoff-04-secrets.md row #2): the raw
55 // secret is runtime-injected as a file, never an env var, and never
56 // applied through the CI-managed manifest set. All empty (the
57 // default) means no client is seeded — the issuer starts with an
58 // empty client store until this is set. QAClientAudience defaults to
59 // AuthJWTAudience if empty (the QA credential calls api-service, not
60 // idp-connector, unless the review specifically needs otherwise).
61 QAClientID string
62 QAClientSecretFile string
63 QAClientScope string
64 QAClientAudience string
65
66 ConnectorJWTAudience string
67 ConnectorClientID string
68 ConnectorClientSecret string
69
70 IDPABCBaseURL string
71 IDPABCClientID string
72 IDPABCClientSecret string
73 }
74
75 // Load reads the process environment into a Config. DB_DSN_FILE, when set,
76 // is read and its trimmed content used as DBDSN in preference to DB_DSN —
77 // DB_DSN is a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option, per
78 // handoff-04-secrets.md's S7 revision.
79 //
80 // APP_MODE is validated, not merely defaulted: an unrecognized value is a
81 // startup error rather than a silent fall-through to "verifier", because a
82 // typo'd issuer Deployment silently running as a verifier (or vice versa)
83 // is exactly the class of misconfiguration LT-32 exists to make loud
84 // instead of invisible.
85 //
86 // In issuer mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must be set and the file it names
87 // must actually be readable, checked here at startup rather than deferred
88 // to whatever first tries to use it. This is LT-32's defense-in-depth
89 // criterion: the verifying Deployment's pod spec never mounts this Secret
90 // at all (enforced on 04's side, by physical absence, not by this check),
91 // so if APP_MODE were ever misconfigured to "issuer" on that Deployment,
92 // this still fails startup rather than serving traffic in a half-issuer
93 // state with no actual path to the private key.
94 func Load() (Config, error) {
95 dsn, err := resolveDSN()
96 if err != nil {
97 return Config{}, err
98 }
99
100 appMode := os.Getenv("APP_MODE")
101 if appMode == "" {
102 appMode = "verifier"
103 }
104 if appMode != "verifier" && appMode != "issuer" {
105 return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE %q is not one of \"verifier\", \"issuer\"", appMode)
106 }
107
108 signingKeyPath, err := resolveSigningKeyPath(appMode)
109 if err != nil {
110 return Config{}, err
111 }
112
113 return Config{
114 AppMode: appMode,
115 JWTSigningKeyPath: signingKeyPath,
116 HTTPAddr: os.Getenv("HTTP_ADDR"),
117
118 DBDriver: os.Getenv("DB_DRIVER"),
119 DBDSN: dsn,
120
121 AuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"),
122 AuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
123 AuthJWKSURL: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL"),
124
125 AuthzQASub: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_SUB"),
126 AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID"),
127
128 QAClientID: os.Getenv("QA_CLIENT_ID"),
129 QAClientSecretFile: os.Getenv("QA_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE"),
130 QAClientScope: os.Getenv("QA_CLIENT_SCOPE"),
131 QAClientAudience: os.Getenv("QA_CLIENT_AUDIENCE"),
132
133 ConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
134 ConnectorClientID: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID"),
135 ConnectorClientSecret: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET"),
136
137 IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_BASE_URL"),
138 IDPABCClientID: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID"),
139 IDPABCClientSecret: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
140 }, nil
141 }
142
143 // resolveSigningKeyPath enforces LT-32's issuer-mode requirement: in
144 // "issuer" mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must name a regular file this
145 // process can actually read at least one byte of, checked now rather than
146 // left for whatever code first tries to sign a token — a startup failure
147 // here is the only thing that distinguishes "issuer mode with no key"
148 // from "issuer mode with a key", and the whole point of the
149 // physical-absence criterion is that those two must never be confused for
150 // one another. In "verifier" mode the variable is not read at all: the
151 // verifying binary has no legitimate use for a signing-key path, set or
152 // not.
153 //
154 // This checks openable-and-non-empty at startup, not "will still be a
155 // valid key when S7 reads it" — a Secret rotated to empty or a volume
156 // re-provisioned later isn't something a one-time startup check can see
157 // (Nolan Reyes, PR #18 review). That's S7's problem to solve when it
158 // exists, not this story's: LT-32 only owns making a *missing* key loud
159 // at startup, not monitoring a *present* key's ongoing validity.
160 func resolveSigningKeyPath(appMode string) (string, error) {
161 if appMode != "issuer" {
162 return "", nil
163 }
164 path := os.Getenv("JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE")
165 if path == "" {
166 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer requires JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE to be set")
167 }
168 fi, err := os.Stat(path)
169 if err != nil {
170 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not accessible: %w", path, err)
171 }
172 // os.Open succeeds on a directory as readily as on a regular file —
173 // no error, nothing distinguishing the two. JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE
174 // pointed at a mount directory instead of the file inside it (an easy
175 // Kubernetes subPath-vs-mount-root mistake, and exactly the class of
176 // misconfiguration this story exists to catch) would otherwise pass
177 // this check and only fail later, whenever S7's signing code first
178 // tries to read it — deferring the failure this check exists to make
179 // immediate (Oren Castellan, PR #18 review).
180 if fi.IsDir() {
181 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is a directory, not a file", path)
182 }
183 f, err := os.Open(path)
184 if err != nil {
185 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not readable: %w", path, err)
186 }
187 defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
188 // Read one byte rather than open-close: an empty file (a Secret
189 // mounted but never populated) opens without error and would
190 // otherwise pass silently.
191 var buf [1]byte
192 if _, err := f.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
193 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is empty or unreadable: %w", path, err)
194 }
195 return path, nil
196 }
197
198 func resolveDSN() (string, error) {
199 if path := os.Getenv("DB_DSN_FILE"); path != "" {
200 b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
201 if err != nil {
202 return "", fmt.Errorf("config: reading DB_DSN_FILE %q: %w", path, err)
203 }
204 return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
205 }
206 return os.Getenv("DB_DSN"), nil
207 }
208 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t// QAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/QAClientScope/QAClientAudience seed a\n\t// single client credential into the issuer's in-process client store\n\t// at startup (LT-51), for the PO's joint LT-34/LT-39/LT-40/LT-51\n\t// live-URL review — the same out-of-band discipline as\n\t// JWTSigningKeyPath (LT-32/handoff-04-secrets.md row #2): the raw\n\t// secret is runtime-injected as a file, never an env var, and never\n\t// applied through the CI-managed manifest set. All empty (the\n\t// default) means no client is seeded — the issuer starts with an\n\t// empty client store until this is set. QAClientAudience defaults to\n\t// AuthJWTAudience if empty (the QA credential calls api-service, not\n\t// idp-connector, unless the review specifically needs otherwise).\n\tQAClientID string\n\tQAClientSecretFile string\n\tQAClientScope string\n\tQAClientAudience string",
"new_string": "\t// IssuerDBDSN is the token issuer's own database connection string —\n\t// a separate PostgreSQL database (`issuer`, per Priya Nandakumar's\n\t// (05) ruling on LT-51: same instance as the main DAO's database, but\n\t// a distinct database so a cross-database join to user_profile is\n\t// structurally impossible), holding only oauth_client. Resolved the\n\t// same way DBDSN is (ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE takes precedence over\n\t// ISSUER_DB_DSN), matching handoff-04-secrets.md's discipline. Only\n\t// meaningful in issuer mode — empty in verifier mode, which has no\n\t// legitimate use for it. There is no ISSUER_DB_DRIVER: the issuer\n\t// database is always PostgreSQL (no SQLite/CockroachDB peer was ever\n\t// specified for oauth_client), so internal/api's client store dials\n\t// it directly via the \"pgx\" driver rather than routing through\n\t// dao.New's multi-backend factory.\n\tIssuerDBDSN string\n\n\t// QA client credential seeding is out-of-band (a runbook 04 owns\n\t// against the real oauth_client table), never application code or a\n\t// migration — Priya's explicit ruling on this story. There is\n\t// deliberately no QAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/etc. config surface\n\t// here for auto-seeding a client at startup; AuthzQASub above is the\n\t// only piece of QA-review config this track owns, and it's set to\n\t// match whatever client_id the runbook seeds, not the other way\n\t// around."
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "func Load() (Config, error) {\n\tdsn, err := resolveDSN()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}",
"new_string": "func Load() (Config, error) {\n\tdsn, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"DB_DSN_FILE\", \"DB_DSN\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}\n\n\tissuerDSN, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE\", \"ISSUER_DB_DSN\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\tDBDriver: os.Getenv(\"DB_DRIVER\"),\n\t\tDBDSN: dsn,",
"new_string": "\t\tDBDriver: os.Getenv(\"DB_DRIVER\"),\n\t\tDBDSN: dsn,\n\n\t\tIssuerDBDSN: issuerDSN,"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\tAuthzQASub: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_SUB\"),\n\t\tAuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID\"),\n\n\t\tQAClientID: os.Getenv(\"QA_CLIENT_ID\"),\n\t\tQAClientSecretFile: os.Getenv(\"QA_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE\"),\n\t\tQAClientScope: os.Getenv(\"QA_CLIENT_SCOPE\"),\n\t\tQAClientAudience: os.Getenv(\"QA_CLIENT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\n\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),",
"new_string": "\t\tAuthzQASub: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_SUB\"),\n\t\tAuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv(\"AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID\"),\n\n\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "func resolveDSN() (string, error) {\n\tif path := os.Getenv(\"DB_DSN_FILE\"); path != \"\" {\n\t\tb, err := os.ReadFile(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"config: reading DB_DSN_FILE %q: %w\", path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil\n\t}\n\treturn os.Getenv(\"DB_DSN\"), nil\n}",
"new_string": "// resolveDSNFrom implements the DB_DSN_FILE-takes-precedence-over-DB_DSN\n// pattern generically, parameterized by env var name so it serves both\n// the main DAO's DSN and IssuerDBDSN without duplicating the logic.\nfunc resolveDSNFrom(fileEnv, plainEnv string) (string, error) {\n\tif path := os.Getenv(fileEnv); path != \"\" {\n\t\tb, err := os.ReadFile(path)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"config: reading %s %q: %w\", fileEnv, path, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil\n\t}\n\treturn os.Getenv(plainEnv), nil\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -rn \"QAClient\\|QA_CLIENT\" internal/ cmd/ 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Find remaining references to removed QAClient config fields"
}internal/config/config.go:68: // deliberately no QAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/etc. config surface Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go"
}1 // clientstore.go implements the token-issuer's client store per
2 // handoff-03-auth.md v6/LT-51: client_id, name, an Argon2id-hashed
3 // secret (same floor as threat-model.md Asset 1's password hashing),
4 // granted scope, audience, and status. Lives in the issuer's own
5 // datastore per the F8 resolution (handoff-03-auth.md v3) — not
6 // 05-data-ops's schema, which was never assigned this table. An
7 // in-process implementation, consistent with every other component this
8 // track has built the same way (RateLimiter, TouchCounter, GrantLimiter)
9 // — the mechanism is this track's call; a persistent store behind the
10 // same interface is a drop-in replacement if this ever needs to survive
11 // a restart for real.
12 package api
13
14 import (
15 "context"
16 "crypto/rand"
17 "crypto/subtle"
18 "encoding/base64"
19 "fmt"
20 "strings"
21 "sync"
22
23 "golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
24 )
25
26 // Argon2id parameters — one fixed cost profile for every client secret
27 // (and the fixed dummy hash timing-parity depends on, below). Matches
28 // threat-home.md Asset 1's own floor: this is not a separate, weaker
29 // hashing decision for machine credentials, it's the same discipline
30 // applied to a second credential class.
31 const (
32 argon2Time = 1
33 argon2Memory = 64 * 1024 // 64 MiB
34 argon2Threads = 4
35 argon2KeyLen = 32
36 argon2SaltLen = 16
37 )
38
39 // hashSecret returns an Argon2id hash of secret, encoded as
40 // "<base64-salt>$<base64-hash>" — self-contained, no separate parameter
41 // storage needed since every hash in this store uses the same fixed
42 // profile above.
43 func hashSecret(secret string) (string, error) {
44 salt := make([]byte, argon2SaltLen)
45 if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
46 return "", fmt.Errorf("api: generating salt: %w", err)
47 }
48 hash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(secret), salt, argon2Time, argon2Memory, argon2Threads, argon2KeyLen)
49 return base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt) + "$" + base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(hash), nil
50 }
51
52 // verifySecret reports whether secret matches encodedHash, produced by
53 // hashSecret. Comparison is constant-time (crypto/subtle) — Argon2id's
54 // own cost already dominates timing versus a plain []byte equality, but
55 // there is no reason to reintroduce a length/byte-position side channel
56 // on top of it for free.
57 func verifySecret(secret, encodedHash string) bool {
58 parts := strings.SplitN(encodedHash, "$", 2)
59 if len(parts) != 2 {
60 return false
61 }
62 salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
63 if err != nil {
64 return false
65 }
66 want, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
67 if err != nil {
68 return false
69 }
70 got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(secret), salt, argon2Time, argon2Memory, argon2Threads, argon2KeyLen)
71 return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1
72 }
73
74 // dummyHash is computed once, at package init, from a fixed (not
75 // secret — its value doesn't matter, only that it's fixed and uses the
76 // SAME cost parameters as every real hash) salt and secret. The
77 // unknown-client_id path in the token handler runs verifySecret against
78 // this exact value before returning invalid_client, so an unknown
79 // client_id and a wrong-secret-for-a-known-client_id take
80 // statistically indistinguishable time (Tobias Lindqvist's objection,
81 // LT-51 refinement — RFC 6749 §5.2's identical-response-body
82 // requirement closes the content side channel; this closes the timing
83 // one, which the body requirement alone leaves wide open).
84 var dummyHash = mustHashSecret("dummy-fixed-secret-never-issued-to-any-real-client")
85
86 func mustHashSecret(secret string) string {
87 h, err := hashSecret(secret)
88 if err != nil {
89 // Only reachable if crypto/rand itself fails at process start —
90 // a condition this process cannot usefully continue past anyway
91 // (every real hashSecret call would fail identically).
92 panic(fmt.Sprintf("api: computing fixed dummy Argon2id hash: %v", err))
93 }
94 return h
95 }
96
97 // ClientRecord is one row in the client store.
98 type ClientRecord struct {
99 ClientID string
100 Name string // accountability — no shared credentials across a team
101 ClientSecretHash string // Argon2id, hashSecret's encoding
102 GrantedScope Scope // exactly one — see ClientStore's doc comment
103 Audience string // the JWT aud this client's tokens are minted for
104 Active bool
105 }
106
107 // ClientStore is the token-issuer's client datastore — client
108 // authentication and scope/audience lookup, keyed by client_id.
109 //
110 // GrantedScope is a single Scope, not a set, even though
111 // handoff-03-auth.md v6 describes "granted_scopes" as a provisioned
112 // subset of the four possible values: this project's own provisioning
113 // model (decisions/search-authz-scoping.md; LT-40's singleScope) commits
114 // to exactly one scope per credential — "a client is provisioned for the
115 // one use case its credential exists for" — and AuthContext (LT-39)
116 // carries exactly one Scope per token by the same design. A client
117 // record holding more than one granted scope would have no way to
118 // produce a token LT-40's verifier accepts (which rejects a multi-scope
119 // token outright, deliberately, not an oversight this story should route
120 // around). So provisioning is one client credential per scope a caller
121 // needs, not one client holding several — consistent with, not a
122 // deviation from, the system's existing single-scope-per-token
123 // commitment.
124 type ClientStore interface {
125 // Get returns the record for clientID, ok=false if no such client
126 // exists at all (a different outcome from an inactive client, which
127 // Get still returns — the token handler decides what "not usable"
128 // means, this interface only reports what's on file).
129 Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (rec ClientRecord, ok bool, err error)
130 }
131
132 // InProcessClientStore is an in-process, map-backed ClientStore.
133 type InProcessClientStore struct {
134 mu sync.RWMutex
135 records map[string]ClientRecord
136 }
137
138 // NewInProcessClientStore constructs an empty store — clients are seeded
139 // via Seed, not passed at construction, so cmd/api-service/main.go can
140 // seed the QA credential (or nothing at all) after checking config.
141 func NewInProcessClientStore() *InProcessClientStore {
142 return &InProcessClientStore{records: make(map[string]ClientRecord)}
143 }
144
145 // Seed adds or replaces a client record. Called by cmd/api-service/main.go
146 // for the out-of-band-provisioned QA credential (LT-51) — never through
147 // any HTTP path, since this store has no provisioning endpoint at all
148 // (an explicit non-goal: "no UI/API for self-service client
149 // provisioning").
150 func (s *InProcessClientStore) Seed(rec ClientRecord) {
151 s.mu.Lock()
152 defer s.mu.Unlock()
153 s.records[rec.ClientID] = rec
154 }
155
156 func (s *InProcessClientStore) Get(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {
157 s.mu.RLock()
158 defer s.mu.RUnlock()
159 rec, ok := s.records[clientID]
160 return rec, ok, nil
161 }
162
163 // Get deliberately does not distinguish "revoked" from "active" for its
164 // caller — the token handler enforces Active itself, using the same
165 // real-hash comparison path either way, so status never becomes a
166 // second timing signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash
167 // already closes above.
168 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql",
"old_string": "\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_nonempty CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) > 0),",
"new_string": "\t-- Exactly one scope, not merely a nonempty set: this project's\n\t-- provisioning model is one client credential per scope a caller\n\t-- needs (decisions/search-authz-scoping.md; LT-40's singleScope\n\t-- rejects a multi-scope token outright), so the DB-level invariant\n\t-- matches the Go-level one instead of merely allowing it.\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) = 1),"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "// clientstore.go implements the token-issuer's client store per\n// handoff-03-auth.md v6/LT-51: client_id, name, an Argon2id-hashed\n// secret (same floor as threat-model.md Asset 1's password hashing),\n// granted scope, audience, and status. Lives in the issuer's own\n// datastore per the F8 resolution (handoff-03-auth.md v3) — not\n// 05-data-ops's schema, which was never assigned this table. An\n// in-process implementation, consistent with every other component this\n// track has built the same way (RateLimiter, TouchCounter, GrantLimiter)\n// — the mechanism is this track's call; a persistent store behind the\n// same interface is a drop-in replacement if this ever needs to survive\n// a restart for real.\npackage api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/subtle\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2\"\n)",
"new_string": "// clientstore.go implements the token-issuer's client store per\n// handoff-03-auth.md v6/LT-51: client_id, name, an Argon2id-hashed\n// secret (same floor as threat-model.md Asset 1's password hashing),\n// granted scope, audience, and status.\n//\n// Backed by a real, persistent PostgreSQL database — a separate\n// \"issuer\" database (migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql), not\n// an in-process map — per Priya Nandakumar's (05) explicit ruling on\n// this story: unlike every other in-process component this track has\n// built (RateLimiter, TouchCounter, GrantLimiter), a client credential\n// has to survive a pod restart, and the QA client seeded for the PO's\n// live-URL review has to be seeded out-of-band (04's runbook), never by\n// this application's own code or a migration — \"migrations carry\n// reference data, never credentials.\" Lives in its own database, not\n// 05's main DAO schema, so a cross-database join to user_profile is\n// structurally impossible, not just policy-forbidden (F8 resolution,\n// handoff-03-auth.md v3).\npackage api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/subtle\"\n\t\"database/sql\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "type ClientStore interface {\n\t// Get returns the record for clientID, ok=false if no such client\n\t// exists at all (a different outcome from an inactive client, which\n\t// Get still returns — the token handler decides what \"not usable\"\n\t// means, this interface only reports what's on file).\n\tGet(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (rec ClientRecord, ok bool, err error)\n}\n\n// InProcessClientStore is an in-process, map-backed ClientStore.\ntype InProcessClientStore struct {\n\tmu sync.RWMutex\n\trecords map[string]ClientRecord\n}\n\n// NewInProcessClientStore constructs an empty store — clients are seeded\n// via Seed, not passed at construction, so cmd/api-service/main.go can\n// seed the QA credential (or nothing at all) after checking config.\nfunc NewInProcessClientStore() *InProcessClientStore {\n\treturn &InProcessClientStore{records: make(map[string]ClientRecord)}\n}\n\n// Seed adds or replaces a client record. Called by cmd/api-service/main.go\n// for the out-of-band-provisioned QA credential (LT-51) — never through\n// any HTTP path, since this store has no provisioning endpoint at all\n// (an explicit non-goal: \"no UI/API for self-service client\n// provisioning\").\nfunc (s *InProcessClientStore) Seed(rec ClientRecord) {\n\ts.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer s.mu.Unlock()\n\ts.records[rec.ClientID] = rec\n}\n\nfunc (s *InProcessClientStore) Get(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {\n\ts.mu.RLock()\n\tdefer s.mu.RUnlock()\n\trec, ok := s.records[clientID]\n\treturn rec, ok, nil\n}\n\n// Get deliberately does not distinguish \"revoked\" from \"active\" for its\n// caller — the token handler enforces Active itself, using the same\n// real-hash comparison path either way, so status never becomes a\n// second timing signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash\n// already closes above.",
"new_string": "type ClientStore interface {\n\t// Get returns the record for clientID, ok=false if no such client\n\t// exists at all (a different outcome from an inactive client, which\n\t// Get still returns — the token handler decides what \"not usable\"\n\t// means, this interface only reports what's on file).\n\tGet(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (rec ClientRecord, ok bool, err error)\n}\n\n// PostgresClientStore is a real, persistent ClientStore backed by the\n// issuer database's oauth_client table (migrations/issuer/\n// 00001_initial_schema.sql). Constructed once at startup from a *sql.DB\n// dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — always the \"pgx\" driver,\n// since the issuer database has no SQLite/CockroachDB peer to abstract\n// over (unlike 05's main DAO schema), so this reaches for\n// database/sql directly rather than routing through dao.New's\n// multi-backend factory, which was never asked to know about this\n// table.\ntype PostgresClientStore struct {\n\tdb *sql.DB\n}\n\n// NewPostgresClientStore wraps an already-opened *sql.DB. Opening (and\n// its lifetime) is cmd/api-service/main.go's responsibility, same\n// pattern as LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle — this type never\n// calls sql.Open itself.\nfunc NewPostgresClientStore(db *sql.DB) *PostgresClientStore {\n\treturn &PostgresClientStore{db: db}\n}\n\n// Get deliberately does not distinguish \"no such client_id\",\n// \"provisioned but secret_state != 'set'\", or \"status = 'disabled'\" in\n// its ok/err results — all three come back as ok=true with whatever's\n// on file (or ok=false only for a genuinely absent row), and it's\n// tokenhandler.go's job to decide what counts as usable. This keeps\n// every one of those states on the same code path through\n// verifySecret/dummyHash, so none of them becomes a second timing\n// signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash already closes.\nfunc (s *PostgresClientStore) Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {\n\tvar rec ClientRecord\n\tvar secretHash sql.NullString\n\tvar scopes []string\n\tvar status string\n\n\trow := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `\n\t\tSELECT client_id, name, client_secret_hash, granted_scopes, audience, status\n\t\tFROM oauth_client\n\t\tWHERE client_id = $1\n\t`, clientID)\n\terr := row.Scan(&rec.ClientID, &rec.Name, &secretHash, pqStringArray{&scopes}, &rec.Audience, &status)\n\tif errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, nil\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"api: querying oauth_client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(scopes) != 1 {\n\t\t// The migration's own CHECK (ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single)\n\t\t// makes this unreachable in practice — surfaced as an error rather\n\t\t// than silently taking scopes[0] of an empty slice, in case that\n\t\t// constraint is ever relaxed without this code being revisited.\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"api: oauth_client row %q has %d granted scopes, want exactly 1\", clientID, len(scopes))\n\t}\n\n\trec.ClientSecretHash = secretHash.String // \"\" when NULL (secret_state != \"set\")\n\trec.GrantedScope = Scope(scopes[0])\n\trec.Active = status == \"active\"\n\treturn rec, true, nil\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"pgx\\|lib/pq\" go.mod",
"description": "Check available postgres driver deps for array scanning"
}8: github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.11.0 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "\tvar rec ClientRecord\n\tvar secretHash sql.NullString\n\tvar scopes []string\n\tvar status string\n\n\trow := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `\n\t\tSELECT client_id, name, client_secret_hash, granted_scopes, audience, status\n\t\tFROM oauth_client\n\t\tWHERE client_id = $1\n\t`, clientID)\n\terr := row.Scan(&rec.ClientID, &rec.Name, &secretHash, pqStringArray{&scopes}, &rec.Audience, &status)\n\tif errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, nil\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"api: querying oauth_client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(scopes) != 1 {",
"new_string": "\tvar rec ClientRecord\n\tvar secretHash sql.NullString\n\tvar scopesRaw string\n\tvar status string\n\n\trow := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `\n\t\tSELECT client_id, name, client_secret_hash, granted_scopes, audience, status\n\t\tFROM oauth_client\n\t\tWHERE client_id = $1\n\t`, clientID)\n\terr := row.Scan(&rec.ClientID, &rec.Name, &secretHash, &scopesRaw, &rec.Audience, &status)\n\tif errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, nil\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"api: querying oauth_client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tscopes, err := parsePostgresTextArray(scopesRaw)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, fmt.Errorf(\"api: parsing granted_scopes for %q: %w\", clientID, err)\n\t}\n\tif len(scopes) != 1 {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "\trec.ClientSecretHash = secretHash.String // \"\" when NULL (secret_state != \"set\")\n\trec.GrantedScope = Scope(scopes[0])\n\trec.Active = status == \"active\"\n\treturn rec, true, nil\n}",
"new_string": "\trec.ClientSecretHash = secretHash.String // \"\" when NULL (secret_state != \"set\")\n\trec.GrantedScope = Scope(scopes[0])\n\trec.Active = status == \"active\"\n\treturn rec, true, nil\n}\n\n// parsePostgresTextArray decodes Postgres's default text output format\n// for a TEXT[] column (e.g. \"{profile:search}\") into its elements. This\n// project's own scope values are plain identifiers — letters, digits,\n// \":\" — never containing a comma, brace, backslash, or double quote, so\n// this deliberately does not implement the general Postgres array\n// literal grammar (quoted elements, backslash escaping, NULL elements):\n// pgx/v5's stdlib driver has no built-in database/sql Scanner for array\n// types, and a hand-rolled general parser would be untested complexity\n// this table's actual value domain never exercises. Any input outside\n// that domain is an error, not a best-effort guess.\nfunc parsePostgresTextArray(raw string) ([]string, error) {\n\tif len(raw) < 2 || raw[0] != '{' || raw[len(raw)-1] != '}' {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"not a Postgres array literal: %q\", raw)\n\t}\n\tinner := raw[1 : len(raw)-1]\n\tif inner == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, nil\n\t}\n\telems := strings.Split(inner, \",\")\n\tfor _, e := range elems {\n\t\tif e == \"\" || strings.ContainsAny(e, `{}\"\\`) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported array element %q in %q — only plain unquoted values are supported\", e, raw)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn elems, nil\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/google/uuid\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/google/uuid\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "// jsonEncode is a one-line indirection so this file doesn't need its own\n// \"encoding/json\" import solely for two call sites — kept trivial and\n// named for clarity rather than inlined at each call site.\nfunc jsonEncode(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) error {\n\treturn newJSONEncoder(w).Encode(v)\n}",
"new_string": "// jsonEncode is a one-line indirection kept trivial and named for\n// clarity rather than inlined at each of this file's two call sites.\nfunc jsonEncode(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) error {\n\treturn json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "\t\t// Both branches run the SAME Argon2id comparison at the SAME\n\t\t// cost before deciding anything — the found-but-wrong-secret\n\t\t// path compares against the client's own real hash; the\n\t\t// not-found path compares against the fixed dummyHash instead\n\t\t// of skipping the comparison entirely. Whichever branch runs,\n\t\t// exactly one verifySecret call happens before the outcome is\n\t\t// known, so an unknown client_id and a wrong secret for a known\n\t\t// one take statistically indistinguishable time (Tobias\n\t\t// Lindqvist's objection, LT-51 refinement) — closing the timing\n\t\t// side-channel the identical response body alone leaves open.\n\t\tvar secretOK bool\n\t\tif found {\n\t\t\tsecretOK = verifySecret(clientSecret, rec.ClientSecretHash)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t_ = verifySecret(clientSecret, dummyHash)\n\t\t\tsecretOK = false\n\t\t}",
"new_string": "\t\t// Both branches run the SAME Argon2id comparison at the SAME\n\t\t// cost before deciding anything — a found client with a real\n\t\t// secret on file (secret_state = \"set\") compares against its own\n\t\t// hash; every other case (client_id not found at all, OR found\n\t\t// but secret_state is \"none\"/\"revoked\" and ClientSecretHash is\n\t\t// empty) compares against the fixed dummyHash instead of\n\t\t// skipping the comparison or short-circuiting on a malformed\n\t\t// hash. Whichever branch runs, exactly one verifySecret call\n\t\t// happens before the outcome is known, so an unknown client_id,\n\t\t// a not-yet-secreted or revoked client, and a wrong secret for a\n\t\t// fully provisioned one all take statistically indistinguishable\n\t\t// time (Tobias Lindqvist's objection, LT-51 refinement) —\n\t\t// closing the timing side-channel the identical response body\n\t\t// alone leaves open.\n\t\tvar secretOK bool\n\t\tif found && rec.ClientSecretHash != \"\" {\n\t\t\tsecretOK = verifySecret(clientSecret, rec.ClientSecretHash)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t_ = verifySecret(clientSecret, dummyHash)\n\t\t\tsecretOK = false\n\t\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && ls internal/api/ | grep -E \"signingkey|jwksendpoint|tokenhandler|clientstore\" && cat internal/api/signingkey.go | head -5",
"description": "Confirm untracked files survived rebase"
}clientstore.go jwksendpoint.go signingkey.go tokenhandler.go // signingkey.go loads the issuer's RSA private key (LT-32's // JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE) and derives its kid — the one piece both the // token-minting handler and the JWKS-serving handler need. Nothing in // this package outside this file (and the two handlers that hold a // *SigningKey by value) ever touches private-key material — the Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -80",
"description": "Build LT-51 worktree"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"GrantLimiter\\b\" internal/api/grantlimiter.go | head -10",
"description": "Check GrantLimiter constructor name"
}9:// GrantLimiter enforces the token-issuing endpoint's own failed-grant
30:type GrantLimiter interface {
56:// InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with
70:type InProcessGrantLimiter struct {
93:// NewInProcessGrantLimiter constructs a limiter with exponential backoff
98:func NewInProcessGrantLimiter(baseBackoff, maxBackoff time.Duration, alertThreshold int, alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)) *InProcessGrantLimiter {
99: return &InProcessGrantLimiter{
110:func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {
122:func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) sweepLocked(now time.Time) {
143:func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordFailure(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -rn \"NewInProcessGrantLimiter(\" --include=*.go . | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Check non-test call sites for GrantLimiter defaults"
}(eval):1: no matches found: --include=*.go
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -rln \"NewInProcessGrantLimiter(\" . | grep -v '\\.git'",
"description": "Find all call sites of NewInProcessGrantLimiter"
}internal/api/grantlimiter_test.go internal/api/grantlimiter.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/grantlimiter.go"
}1 package api
2
3 import (
4 "context"
5 "sync"
6 "time"
7 )
8
9 // GrantLimiter enforces the token-issuing endpoint's own failed-grant
10 // rate limiting and progressive backoff — handoff-03-auth.md v3:
11 // "Token-endpoint brute-force protection, separate from the resource-API
12 // rate limits ... failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per
13 // client_id and per source IP on the token-issuing endpoint itself, plus
14 // alerting on a sustained run of failed grants against one client_id."
15 //
16 // This is genuinely separate from RateLimiter (ratelimit.go): that type
17 // gates the resource API by an already-authenticated sub, at a fixed
18 // per-minute rate; this one gates the endpoint that issues the
19 // credential in the first place, keyed independently by client_id AND
20 // by source IP — a distributed brute force (many IPs, one client_id)
21 // and a single-source credential-stuffing run (one IP, many client_ids)
22 // are both attack shapes this is meant to slow down, and either key
23 // exceeding its own backoff blocks the attempt.
24 //
25 // Not wired to a live endpoint by this story: /auth/token's real grant
26 // logic is LT-51's scope (this story's non-goals). This is the
27 // ready-to-use component LT-51 constructs and calls from the real
28 // handler — building it now, tested in isolation, means LT-51 doesn't
29 // also have to design a backoff/alerting scheme under its own deadline.
30 type GrantLimiter interface {
31 // Allow reports whether a grant attempt for clientID from sourceIP
32 // may proceed right now — false while either key is in backoff.
33 Allow(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error)
34 // RecordFailure records a failed grant attempt for both clientID and
35 // sourceIP, advancing each key's backoff state independently.
36 // Crossing the alert threshold for a given client_id (not source IP
37 // — the requirement names client_id specifically) fires alert
38 // exactly once per crossing, not once per subsequent failure.
39 RecordFailure(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)
40 // RecordSuccess clears backoff state for both clientID and
41 // sourceIP — a successful grant resets the count, standard
42 // exponential-backoff practice: this deters sustained brute force,
43 // it does not permanently degrade a legitimate client that mistyped
44 // a secret once.
45 RecordSuccess(ctx context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string)
46 }
47
48 // grantBackoffState is one key's (a client_id's, or a source IP's)
49 // consecutive-failure bookkeeping.
50 type grantBackoffState struct {
51 consecutiveFailures int
52 blockedUntil time.Time
53 alerted bool
54 }
55
56 // InProcessGrantLimiter is an in-process implementation. As with
57 // RateLimiter/TouchCounter's in-process implementations, a shared store
58 // is the multi-instance replacement behind the same interface — the
59 // mechanism is this track's call, per handoff-03-auth.md v3.
60 //
61 // Both maps are swept periodically (see sweepLocked) rather than left to
62 // grow forever: this component's own doc comment names "a distributed
63 // brute force (many IPs, one client_id)" as a defended attack shape, and
64 // that is exactly the traffic pattern that would otherwise grow
65 // bySourceIP without bound — every distinct attacking IP earns a
66 // permanent entry that only a matching RecordSuccess would remove, which
67 // an attacking IP by definition never triggers (Nolan Reyes, PR #30
68 // review — the same unbounded-growth shape an earlier PR's TouchCounter
69 // review already found and fixed once).
70 type InProcessGrantLimiter struct {
71 mu sync.Mutex
72 byClientID map[string]*grantBackoffState
73 bySourceIP map[string]*grantBackoffState
74 baseBackoff time.Duration
75 maxBackoff time.Duration
76 alertThreshold int
77 alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)
78 now func() time.Time
79 lastSweep time.Time
80 }
81
82 // grantSweepInterval and grantEntryTTL bound how long a key's state
83 // survives with no further failures against it. A blocked key is never
84 // swept before its own backoff has elapsed (sweeping mid-block would
85 // silently un-block it early); grantEntryTTL is generous past any
86 // realistic maxBackoff so a legitimately still-escalating attacker isn't
87 // reset early either.
88 const (
89 grantSweepInterval = time.Minute
90 grantEntryTTL = time.Hour
91 )
92
93 // NewInProcessGrantLimiter constructs a limiter with exponential backoff
94 // starting at baseBackoff (doubling per consecutive failure, capped at
95 // maxBackoff) and alertFn called once per client_id crossing
96 // alertThreshold consecutive failures. alertFn may be nil (no alerting —
97 // tests use this; production wiring passes a real sink).
98 func NewInProcessGrantLimiter(baseBackoff, maxBackoff time.Duration, alertThreshold int, alertFn func(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int)) *InProcessGrantLimiter {
99 return &InProcessGrantLimiter{
100 byClientID: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),
101 bySourceIP: make(map[string]*grantBackoffState),
102 baseBackoff: baseBackoff,
103 maxBackoff: maxBackoff,
104 alertThreshold: alertThreshold,
105 alertFn: alertFn,
106 now: time.Now,
107 }
108 }
109
110 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {
111 l.mu.Lock()
112 defer l.mu.Unlock()
113 now := l.now()
114 l.sweepLocked(now)
115 return !isBlocked(l.byClientID[clientID], now) && !isBlocked(l.bySourceIP[sourceIP], now), nil
116 }
117
118 // sweepLocked drops any entry whose blockedUntil is at least
119 // grantEntryTTL in the past — called with l.mu already held, at most
120 // once per grantSweepInterval, so it adds no per-call cost beyond a
121 // single time comparison on every other call.
122 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) sweepLocked(now time.Time) {
123 if now.Sub(l.lastSweep) < grantSweepInterval {
124 return
125 }
126 l.lastSweep = now
127 sweepMap(l.byClientID, now)
128 sweepMap(l.bySourceIP, now)
129 }
130
131 func sweepMap(m map[string]*grantBackoffState, now time.Time) {
132 for key, s := range m {
133 if now.Sub(s.blockedUntil) >= grantEntryTTL {
134 delete(m, key)
135 }
136 }
137 }
138
139 func isBlocked(s *grantBackoffState, now time.Time) bool {
140 return s != nil && now.Before(s.blockedUntil)
141 }
142
143 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordFailure(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {
144 l.mu.Lock()
145 defer l.mu.Unlock()
146 now := l.now()
147
148 cs := l.advance(l.byClientID, clientID, now)
149 l.advance(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP, now)
150
151 if cs.consecutiveFailures >= l.alertThreshold && !cs.alerted {
152 cs.alerted = true
153 if l.alertFn != nil {
154 l.alertFn(clientID, cs.consecutiveFailures)
155 }
156 }
157 }
158
159 // advance increments key's consecutive-failure count and sets its
160 // exponential backoff window, creating the state entry if this is its
161 // first failure.
162 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) advance(m map[string]*grantBackoffState, key string, now time.Time) *grantBackoffState {
163 s, ok := m[key]
164 if !ok {
165 s = &grantBackoffState{}
166 m[key] = s
167 }
168 s.consecutiveFailures++
169 backoff := l.baseBackoff << uint(s.consecutiveFailures-1) // 2^(n-1) * base
170 if backoff > l.maxBackoff || backoff <= 0 { // overflow guard: a left-shifted duration can wrap negative
171 backoff = l.maxBackoff
172 }
173 s.blockedUntil = now.Add(backoff)
174 return s
175 }
176
177 func (l *InProcessGrantLimiter) RecordSuccess(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {
178 l.mu.Lock()
179 defer l.mu.Unlock()
180 delete(l.byClientID, clientID)
181 delete(l.bySourceIP, sourceIP)
182 }
183 {
"command": "grep -n -i \"backoff\\|alert threshold\\|consecutive failure\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Search for any ruled backoff numeric values"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md:14:- `internal/api.GrantLimiter` (PR #30) — the failed-grant rate-limiting/backoff interface, keyed independently by `client_id` and source IP, with alerting on a sustained run against one `client_id`. This story constructs a real implementation instance (or reuses `InProcessGrantLimiter`) and calls `Allow`/`RecordFailure`/`RecordSuccess` around the actual grant attempt — it does not design a new backoff scheme. /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md:21:**Response, errors (RFC 6749 §5.2, never distinguishing *why* in body or status):** `invalid_client` (401, `WWW-Authenticate: Basic`) for any client-authentication failure — unknown `client_id` and wrong `client_secret` get the **identical** response, same user-enumeration discipline already required elsewhere in this document; `invalid_scope` (400) if the requested scope isn't a subset of the client's granted scopes; `unsupported_grant_type` (400) for anything but `client_credentials`. Token-endpoint brute-force protection (rate limit + backoff per `client_id`/IP, already specified above) applies here, at this exact endpoint. /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md:44:- **Token-endpoint brute-force protection**, separate from the resource-API rate limits below: failed-grant rate limiting and progressive backoff per `client_id` and per source IP on the token-issuing endpoint itself, plus alerting on a sustained run of failed grants against one `client_id`. This protects the endpoint where a caller presents `client_id`/`client_secret`, which none of the resource-API limits below cover.
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"AuthJWTIssuer\\|AuthJWTAudience\\|JWTSigningKeyPath\" internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Confirm config fields for issuer used already"
}19: // JWTSigningKeyPath is the file path to the JWT signing private key
25: JWTSigningKeyPath string
30: AuthJWTIssuer string
31: AuthJWTAudience string
128: JWTSigningKeyPath: signingKeyPath,
136: AuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"),
137: AuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && sed -n '1,80p' internal/api/audit.go",
"description": "Inspect audit.go for existing event kinds"
}package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"time"
)
// AuditEventKind names a policy decision for the audit trail —
// handoff-03-auth.md v3's audit-log field list requires "policy decision
// (allow/deny, and if deny, whether it was a scope failure or an
// authorize() policy denial — these are distinct signals for detection)"
// on every search/retrieve call. The client-visible response body is
// deliberately identical for AuditScopeFailure and AuditPolicyDenial
// (decisions/error-semantics.md F7) — this is the ONLY place that
// distinction is allowed to exist.
type AuditEventKind string
const (
AuditAuthnFailure AuditEventKind = "authn_failure"
AuditScopeFailure AuditEventKind = "scope_failure"
AuditPolicyDenial AuditEventKind = "authorize_denial"
AuditRateLimited AuditEventKind = "rate_limited"
AuditCapExceeded AuditEventKind = "cumulative_cap_exceeded"
AuditRequestFailed AuditEventKind = "request_failed" // a DAO/internal error, not a policy decision
AuditSuccess AuditEventKind = "success"
// AuditJWKSUnavailable is LT-40's distinct signal for the JWKS
// fail-closed case (Tomasz Wrede, 02 cold review, PM ruling): the
// cached key set exceeded its max-staleness bound with no successful
// refresh, and the verifier refused every token rather than trust
// keys that old — a token-infrastructure degradation, not an
// ordinary bad-credential attempt, and worth distinguishing from
// AuditAuthnFailure for exactly that reason.
AuditJWKSUnavailable AuditEventKind = "jwks_unavailable"
)
// AuditEvent carries exactly the fields handoff-03-auth.md v3's audit-log
// section names, and only those — RecordIDs are opaque ids, never PII
// field values; ReasonCode is empty unless the request was
// ScopeReadAny. Never add a field here without checking
// handoff-04-secrets.md's never-log list first (see AuditEvent's own
// logger implementations for the enforcement site).
type AuditEvent struct {
Sub string
Scope Scope
Kind AuditEventKind
RecordIDs []string
ReasonCode ReasonCode
Timestamp time.Time
}
// AuditLogger is the seam this story wires (Ingrid Solano's PR #26
// review, ruled by the PM as an unmet acceptance criterion, not a
// follow-up story): handoff-03-auth.md v3 requires reason_code and the
// scope/authorize() distinction to be "logged with the audit record" —
// this interface is what every handler decision point calls, regardless
// of which real sink backs it. A structured-stdout implementation is
// sufficient for this story; 04's retention/RBAC-separated log pipeline
// is a separate, infrastructure-side concern this interface doesn't
// depend on.
type AuditLogger interface {
Log(ctx context.Context, event AuditEvent)
}
// StdoutAuditLogger writes one JSON line per event to the process's
// standard logger. Real production wiring (a shipped log pipeline with
// the RBAC separation handoff-04-secrets.md requires between Secret
// access and audit-log access) is 04's infrastructure work; this
// satisfies "events are actually emitted somewhere real" for this story
// without waiting on that pipeline to exist.
type StdoutAuditLogger struct{}
func (StdoutAuditLogger) Log(_ context.Context, event AuditEvent) {
if event.Timestamp.IsZero() {
event.Timestamp = time.Now().UTC()
}
b, err := json.Marshal(event)
if err != nil {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/app/issuer_router.go",
"content": "package app\n\nimport (\n\t\"database/sql\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n)\n\n// grantLimiterBaseBackoff/maxBackoff/alertThreshold are this story's own\n// engineering defaults for api.GrantLimiter (handoff-03-auth.md v3\n// requires the mechanism — failed-grant rate limiting/backoff per\n// client_id and per source IP, plus alerting on a sustained run against\n// one client_id — but names no specific numbers, unlike LT-40's\n// touch-cap and JWKS-staleness constants, which 02 ruled explicitly).\n// Doubling from 1s, capped at 5m, mirrors this codebase's other\n// exponential-backoff component (InProcessRateLimiter's own doc\n// comment); alerting after 5 consecutive failures against one client_id\n// is a deliberately low bar — a real client mistyping a secret twice is\n// not the failure mode this exists to catch, five in a row without an\n// intervening success is. Flagged for 02's review rather than treated\n// as a closed decision.\nconst (\n\tgrantLimiterBaseBackoff = 1 * time.Second\n\tgrantLimiterMaxBackoff = 5 * time.Minute\n\tgrantLimiterAlertThreshold = 5\n)\n\n// NewIssuerRouter builds api-service's issuer-mode router — LT-51's real\n// token-issuance handler and JWKS-serving endpoint, replacing the plain\n// NewRouter's placeholder /auth/token (LT-32) on this Deployment only.\n// The verifier Deployment never calls this — it has no signing key, no\n// client store, and no legitimate use for either (LT-32's\n// physical-absence criterion).\n//\n// key must be non-nil (cmd/api-service/main.go's config.Load already\n// fails startup in issuer mode if JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE is missing or\n// unreadable — see resolveSigningKeyPath's own doc comment — so by the\n// time this function runs, a missing key is a startup bug, not a\n// runtime condition this router needs to degrade gracefully for).\n//\n// issuerDB is the *sql.DB dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — may\n// be nil if IssuerDBDSN was never configured, in which case /auth/token\n// fails every grant closed with server_error rather than panicking on a\n// nil ClientStore, the same fail-closed shape NewVerifierRouter uses for\n// a nil dao.Repository.\nfunc NewIssuerRouter(cfg config.Config, key *api.SigningKey, issuerDB *sql.DB) http.Handler {\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/healthz\", healthHandler(\"api-service\"))\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/.well-known/jwks.json\", api.NewJWKSHandler(key))\n\n\tlimiter := api.NewInProcessGrantLimiter(\n\t\tgrantLimiterBaseBackoff, grantLimiterMaxBackoff, grantLimiterAlertThreshold,\n\t\tfunc(clientID string, consecutiveFailures int) {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: ALERT sustained failed grants against client_id=%s (%d consecutive)\", clientID, consecutiveFailures)\n\t\t},\n\t)\n\n\tvar store api.ClientStore\n\tif issuerDB != nil {\n\t\tstore = api.NewPostgresClientStore(issuerDB)\n\t}\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /auth/token\", api.NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer))\n\n\treturn mux\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/app/issuer_router.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"offset": 60,
"limit": 30
}60
61 // NewTokenHandler implements POST /auth/token. deps bundles the
62 // collaborators this handler wires to rather than reimplements per
63 // refinement/LT-51.md's explicit instruction: store is the client
64 // datastore (this story's own, new); limiter is PR #30's already-built
65 // GrantLimiter, called exactly as its own doc comment specifies (Allow
66 // before authentication, RecordFailure/RecordSuccess after); key is the
67 // loaded signing key this story mints tokens with.
68 func NewTokenHandler(store ClientStore, limiter GrantLimiter, key *SigningKey, issuer string) http.HandlerFunc {
69 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
70 ctx := r.Context()
71
72 // RFC 6749 §4.4: form-encoded, not JSON. r.ParseForm reads the
73 // body as application/x-www-form-urlencoded regardless of a
74 // caller's declared Content-Type, which is deliberately
75 // permissive here — this handler's job is accepting the one wire
76 // format the spec names, not policing a header a legitimate
77 // client-credentials implementation might send inconsistently.
78 if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
79 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request")
80 return
81 }
82 if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "client_credentials" {
83 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type")
84 return
85 }
86
87 clientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()
88 if !hasBasicAuth {
89 // No Authorization header at all: reject before ever{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "func NewTokenHandler(store ClientStore, limiter GrantLimiter, key *SigningKey, issuer string) http.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\t\t// RFC 6749 §4.4: form-encoded, not JSON. r.ParseForm reads the",
"new_string": "func NewTokenHandler(store ClientStore, limiter GrantLimiter, key *SigningKey, issuer string) http.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tctx := r.Context()\n\n\t\t// store is nil when the issuer database was never configured\n\t\t// (config.Config.IssuerDBDSN empty) — fail every grant closed\n\t\t// with server_error rather than panic on a nil ClientStore, the\n\t\t// same fail-closed shape NewVerifierRouter uses for a nil\n\t\t// dao.Repository. This deliberately runs before ParseForm/\n\t\t// BasicAuth so a misconfigured issuer fails identically for\n\t\t// every request shape, not just the ones that get far enough to\n\t\t// reach store.Get.\n\t\tif store == nil {\n\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, \"server_error\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// RFC 6749 §4.4: form-encoded, not JSON. r.ParseForm reads the"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "log"
9 "net/http"
10
11 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
12 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
13 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
14
15 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres" // registers "postgres" and "cockroachdb"
16 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite" // registers "sqlite"
17 )
18
19 func main() {
20 cfg, err := config.Load()
21 if err != nil {
22 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
23 }
24
25 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
26 if addr == "" {
27 addr = ":8080"
28 }
29
30 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
31
32 var handler http.Handler
33 switch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {
34 case app.ModeVerifier:
35 // The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the
36 // database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer
37 // Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it
38 // only mints tokens.
39 //
40 // A failure here does NOT Fatal: on a cluster where the database
41 // doesn't exist yet (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured — e.g. before
42 // PR #29's Postgres StatefulSet lands), or DB_DRIVER is simply
43 // misconfigured, this process must still come up and serve
44 // /healthz rather than crash-loop the whole verifying Deployment
45 // over a dependency only two of its routes need. repo stays nil;
46 // NewVerifierRouter fails those two routes closed with 503
47 // instead of panicking on a nil Repository.
48 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
49 if err != nil {
50 log.Printf("api-service: opening DAO repository: %v — /profiles/search and /profiles/{id} will return 503 until this is resolved", err)
51 repo = nil
52 }
53 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)
54 default:
55 // ModeIssuer (and the unrecognized-mode fallback, which
56 // NewRouter itself already logs loudly and treats as verifier —
57 // see app.NewRouter's own doc comment) don't need the full
58 // verifier stack; NewRouter's existing /auth/token placeholder
59 // (LT-32) and /healthz cover both.
60 handler = app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))
61 }
62
63 if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, handler); err != nil {
64 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
65 }
66 }
67 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres\" // registers \"postgres\" and \"cockroachdb\"\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite\" // registers \"sqlite\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"database/sql\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres\" // registers \"postgres\" and \"cockroachdb\"\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite\" // registers \"sqlite\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib\" // registers \"pgx\" — the issuer database's driver\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres\" // registers \"postgres\" and \"cockroachdb\"\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite\" // registers \"sqlite\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib\" // registers \"pgx\" — the issuer database's driver\n)",
"new_string": "\t// internal/dao/postgres's own blank import of pgx/v5/stdlib already\n\t// registers the \"pgx\" database/sql driver this file uses directly\n\t// for the issuer database below — Go dedupes an import by package\n\t// path, so this isn't a second registration, and no separate blank\n\t// import of that package is needed here.\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres\" // registers \"postgres\" and \"cockroachdb\"\n\t_ \"loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite\" // registers \"sqlite\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)\n\tdefault:\n\t\t// ModeIssuer (and the unrecognized-mode fallback, which\n\t\t// NewRouter itself already logs loudly and treats as verifier —\n\t\t// see app.NewRouter's own doc comment) don't need the full\n\t\t// verifier stack; NewRouter's existing /auth/token placeholder\n\t\t// (LT-32) and /healthz cover both.\n\t\thandler = app.NewRouter(\"api-service\", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))\n\t}",
"new_string": "\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)\n\tcase app.ModeIssuer:\n\t\t// config.Load already fails startup if JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE is\n\t\t// missing/unreadable in issuer mode (resolveSigningKeyPath) —\n\t\t// LoadSigningKey failing here means the file is readable but not\n\t\t// a valid RSA private key, a genuine misconfiguration this\n\t\t// process cannot usefully run past (there is no \"serve /healthz,\n\t\t// fail closed\" story for a router with no key at all: both of\n\t\t// its routes need one). Fatal, not degrade — unlike the DAO\n\t\t// repository above, which has a real story for \"not there yet.\"\n\t\tkey, err := api.LoadSigningKey(cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"api-service: loading JWT signing key: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// issuerDB, like the verifier's pingDB, is opened independently\n\t\t// of whether it can be reached yet — sql.Open never dials. Empty\n\t\t// IssuerDBDSN (not configured yet) leaves issuerDB nil;\n\t\t// NewIssuerRouter's /auth/token then fails every grant closed\n\t\t// with server_error rather than panicking on a nil ClientStore.\n\t\tvar issuerDB *sql.DB\n\t\tif cfg.IssuerDBDSN != \"\" {\n\t\t\tissuerDB, err = sql.Open(\"pgx\", cfg.IssuerDBDSN)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: opening issuer database: %v — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved\", err)\n\t\t\t\tissuerDB = nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: ISSUER_DB_DSN/ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE not set — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thandler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)\n\tdefault:\n\t\t// The unrecognized-mode fallback (NewRouter itself already logs\n\t\t// loudly and treats it as verifier — see app.NewRouter's own doc\n\t\t// comment) doesn't need the full verifier stack; NewRouter's\n\t\t// /healthz alone covers it, matching the safer of the two route\n\t\t// sets.\n\t\thandler = app.NewRouter(\"api-service\", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -80",
"description": "Build LT-51 with issuer router wiring"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Vet and run full test suite"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 1.651s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.432s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.301s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao 0.261s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 0.379s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 0.342s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 1.406s ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && cat internal/dao/postgres/testutil_test.go",
"description": "Check existing postgres test harness pattern"
}package postgres
import (
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// migrationSQL reads a goose-format migration file and returns just the Up
// section's SQL — the real deliverable in migrations/{shared,postgres}/,
// not a duplicated copy of the schema. Applying the actual migration files
// in tests is what keeps this test harness honest: if the migrations
// drift from what the Go code expects, the integration tests fail, not
// just a hand-maintained fixture.
func migrationSQL(t *testing.T, path string) string {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reading migration %s: %v", path, err)
}
content := string(b)
upStart := strings.Index(content, "-- +goose Up")
downStart := strings.Index(content, "-- +goose Down")
if upStart == -1 || downStart == -1 {
t.Fatalf("migration %s missing +goose Up/Down markers", path)
}
return content[upStart+len("-- +goose Up") : downStart]
}
// splitSQLStatements splits a migration's Up section into individual
// statements on ";" — used only for migrations that must NOT run as one
// multi-statement transaction (see the 00002 phone-CHECK migration's own
// comment). "--" comment lines are stripped first: this file's own
// prose comments use ordinary English semicolons ("...split; see the
// cockroachdb migration's own comment."), which a naive split-on-";"
// would otherwise cut mid-sentence and misidentify as a statement
// boundary. None of the actual SQL statements' string literals contain a
// ";", so splitting the comment-free text is safe — this is not a
// general-purpose SQL parser.
func splitSQLStatements(sqlText string) []string {
var codeOnly strings.Builder
for _, line := range strings.Split(sqlText, "\n") {
if idx := strings.Index(line, "--"); idx != -1 {
line = line[:idx]
}
codeOnly.WriteString(line)
codeOnly.WriteString("\n")
}
var out []string
for _, stmt := range strings.Split(codeOnly.String(), ";") {
if strings.TrimSpace(stmt) == "" {
continue
}
out = append(out, stmt)
}
return out
}
// setupDB connects to TEST_POSTGRES_DSN (skipping the test if unset — real
// Postgres/CockroachDB verification is this package's own responsibility;
// LT-38's cross-backend suite proves behavior matches SQLite, not that
// this package can reach a database at all), applies the real migration
// files into a fresh, uniquely-named schema, and tears the schema down on
// test cleanup so tests never collide with each other.
func setupDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
dsn := os.Getenv("TEST_POSTGRES_DSN")
if dsn == "" {
t.Skip("TEST_POSTGRES_DSN not set — skipping Postgres integration test (see refinement/LT-36-LT-37.md: real-backend verification is this package's responsibility, run manually or in CI once wired)")
}
db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("opening TEST_POSTGRES_DSN: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
// Cap the pool at one connection BEFORE anything session-scoped
// (SET search_path) runs — otherwise the migration or a later test
// query can land on a different pooled connection that never saw the
// SET, and silently falls back to the default search_path.
db.SetMaxOpenConns(1)
schemaName := fmt.Sprintf("test_%d", rand.Int63())
if _, err := db.Exec("CREATE SCHEMA " + schemaName); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating test schema: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = db.Exec("DROP SCHEMA " + schemaName + " CASCADE")
})
// Include "public" on the path: pg_trgm's CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT
// EXISTS in the migration is a no-op after the first test schema
// creates it, and an extension's objects (gin_trgm_ops) live in
// whichever schema was current at creation time — later test schemas
// need "public" on their path to see it, not just their own name.
if _, err := db.Exec("SET search_path TO " + schemaName + ", public"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setting search_path: %v", err)
}
repoRoot := repoRootFromThisFile(t)
postgresMigration := migrationSQL(t, filepath.Join(repoRoot, "migrations", "postgres", "00001_initial_schema.sql"))
if _, err := db.Exec(postgresMigration); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applying postgres migration: %v", err)
}
// 00002: contract amendment A6's phone CHECK narrowing — a real goose
// migration, applied here the same way the real pipeline would apply
// it in sequence, not folded back into 00001's text (that would be a
// no-op against any database that already applied 00001). Applied
// statement-by-statement, not as one multi-statement Exec: CockroachDB
// rejects an ADD CONSTRAINT reusing a name a DROP CONSTRAINT removed
// earlier in the same implicit transaction ("duplicate constraint
// name"), so each ALTER needs to commit before the next one runs —
// the migration file itself carries a matching "-- +goose NO
// TRANSACTION" directive for when goose (not this harness) applies it
// for real.
phoneNarrowing := migrationSQL(t, filepath.Join(repoRoot, "migrations", "postgres", "00002_phone_e164_narrow_range.sql"))
for _, stmt := range splitSQLStatements(phoneNarrowing) {
if _, err := db.Exec(stmt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applying postgres migration 00002 statement %q: %v", stmt, err)
}
}
sharedSeed := migrationSQL(t, filepath.Join(repoRoot, "migrations", "shared", "00001_seed_auth_method.sql"))
if _, err := db.Exec(sharedSeed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applying shared seed migration: %v", err)
}
return db
}
func repoRootFromThisFile(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
wd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
// this package: <repoRoot>/internal/dao/postgres
return filepath.Join(wd, "..", "..", "..")
}
// seedAuthMethodID returns the id of the 'password' method seeded by the
// shared migration, for tests that need a valid method_id FK target.
func seedAuthMethodID(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB) string {
t.Helper()
var id string
if err := db.QueryRow("SELECT id FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password'").Scan(&id); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("looking up seeded auth_method: %v", err)
}
return id
}
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && ls internal/api/*_test.go | xargs -n1 basename",
"description": "List existing test files in internal/api"
}cursor_test.go fakes_test.go grantlimiter_test.go handlers_test.go jwks_test.go jwtmiddleware_test.go masking_test.go ratelimit_test.go stopgap_authorizer_test.go touchcounter_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && sed -n '1,50p' internal/api/fakes_test.go",
"description": "Check fakes_test.go conventions for style"
}package api
import (
"context"
"time"
"loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
"loginid-takehome/internal/model"
)
// Hand-written fakes, per decisions/test-double-strategy.md: any change
// to Repository or its three sub-interfaces must update the corresponding
// fake in the same PR — a review-checklist item, not codegen.
// fakeRepository implements dao.Repository. Only Profiles() is exercised
// by this package's handlers; the rest panic if ever called, so a test
// that reaches them fails loudly instead of silently zero-valuing.
type fakeRepository struct {
profiles fakeProfileRepository
}
func (f *fakeRepository) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return &f.profiles }
func (f *fakeRepository) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { panic("not used by internal/api") }
func (f *fakeRepository) Methods() dao.AuthMethodRepository { panic("not used by internal/api") }
func (f *fakeRepository) CreateProfileWithCredential(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile, c *model.UserCredential) (*model.UserProfile, *model.UserCredential, error) {
panic("not used by internal/api")
}
func (f *fakeRepository) DeleteExpired(ctx context.Context, class dao.RetentionClass, olderThan time.Time, maxRows int) (dao.SweepResult, error) {
panic("not used by internal/api")
}
func (f *fakeRepository) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, externalRef *string) error {
panic("not used by internal/api")
}
func (f *fakeRepository) Close() error { return nil }
// fakeProfileRepository implements dao.ProfileRepository with
// configurable funcs per test, per the ruled test-double strategy.
type fakeProfileRepository struct {
getFn func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.UserProfile, error)
searchFn func(ctx context.Context, q dao.ProfileQuery) ([]model.UserProfile, int, error)
}
func (f *fakeProfileRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
return f.getFn(ctx, id)
}
func (f *fakeProfileRepository) Search(ctx context.Context, q dao.ProfileQuery) ([]model.UserProfile, int, error) {
return f.searchFn(ctx, q)
}
func (f *fakeProfileRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
panic("not used by internal/api")
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)\n\n// fakeClientStore implements ClientStore, per decisions/test-double-strategy.md.\ntype fakeClientStore struct {\n\trecords map[string]ClientRecord\n\tgetErr error\n\tgotIDs []string // records every clientID Get was called with, for call-shape assertions\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeClientStore) Get(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {\n\tf.gotIDs = append(f.gotIDs, clientID)\n\tif f.getErr != nil {\n\t\treturn ClientRecord{}, false, f.getErr\n\t}\n\trec, ok := f.records[clientID]\n\treturn rec, ok, nil\n}\n\n// fakeGrantLimiter implements GrantLimiter.\ntype fakeGrantLimiter struct {\n\tallow bool\n\tallowErr error\n\tfailedClientIDs []string\n\tsucceededIDs []string\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeGrantLimiter) Allow(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) (bool, error) {\n\treturn f.allow, f.allowErr\n}\nfunc (f *fakeGrantLimiter) RecordFailure(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {\n\tf.failedClientIDs = append(f.failedClientIDs, clientID)\n}\nfunc (f *fakeGrantLimiter) RecordSuccess(_ context.Context, clientID, sourceIP string) {\n\tf.succeededIDs = append(f.succeededIDs, clientID)\n}\n\nfunc testSigningKey(t *testing.T) *SigningKey {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rsaTestRandReader(t), 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating RSA key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn &SigningKey{Private: priv, Kid: \"test-kid\"}\n}\n\n// rsaTestRandReader is crypto/rand.Reader, indirected only so this file\n// doesn't need a second import alias — kept for readability at the one\n// call site above.\nfunc rsaTestRandReader(t *testing.T) io.Reader {\n\tt.Helper()\n\treturn cryptoRandReader\n}\n\nfunc postToken(t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc, form url.Values, clientID, clientSecret string, setBasicAuth bool) *http.Response {\n\tt.Helper()\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/auth/token\", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\tif setBasicAuth {\n\t\treq.SetBasicAuth(clientID, clientSecret)\n\t}\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\th.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\treturn w.Result()\n}\n\nfunc decodeTokenError(t *testing.T, resp *http.Response) tokenErrorResponse {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tvar body tokenErrorResponse\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding error body: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn body\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_MissingGrantType_UnsupportedGrantType(t *testing.T) {\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, url.Values{}, \"any\", \"any\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 400\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif body := decodeTokenError(t, resp); body.Error != \"unsupported_grant_type\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want unsupported_grant_type\", body.Error)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_InvalidClient401(t *testing.T) {\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"\", \"\", false)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 401\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif got := resp.Header.Get(\"WWW-Authenticate\"); !strings.HasPrefix(got, \"Basic\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"WWW-Authenticate = %q, want a Basic challenge\", got)\n\t}\n\tif len(store.gotIDs) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"store.Get called %d times, want 0 — no client_id exists yet to key by\", len(store.gotIDs))\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses\n// is RFC 6749 §5.2's own requirement plus Tobias Lindqvist's timing-oracle\n// objection (LT-51 refinement): an unknown client_id and a wrong secret\n// for a known client_id must be indistinguishable to the caller — same\n// status, same body — and internally must run the same real Argon2id\n// comparison exactly once, never short-circuiting one path cheaper than\n// the other.\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses(t *testing.T) {\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"correct-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"known-client\": {ClientID: \"known-client\", Name: \"Known\", ClientSecretHash: hash, GrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"), Audience: \"aud\", Active: true},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\n\trespUnknown := postToken(t, h, form, \"does-not-exist\", \"whatever\", true)\n\tbodyUnknown, _ := io.ReadAll(respUnknown.Body)\n\n\trespWrongSecret := postToken(t, h, form, \"known-client\", \"wrong-secret\", true)\n\tbodyWrongSecret, _ := io.ReadAll(respWrongSecret.Body)\n\n\tif respUnknown.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized || respWrongSecret.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status codes = %d, %d, want both 401\", respUnknown.StatusCode, respWrongSecret.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif string(bodyUnknown) != string(bodyWrongSecret) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"response bodies differ: unknown-client=%q wrong-secret=%q — must be byte-identical\", bodyUnknown, bodyWrongSecret)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(limiter.failedClientIDs) != 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"RecordFailure called %d times, want 2 (once per failed attempt)\", len(limiter.failedClientIDs))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_FoundButNoSecretSet_TreatedSameAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {\n\t// secret_state = \"none\"/\"revoked\" rows have an empty ClientSecretHash\n\t// (the migration's own CHECK ties the two together) — this must run\n\t// the dummyHash comparison, not a malformed-hash short-circuit, per\n\t// the same timing-parity reasoning as the unknown-client_id case.\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"provisioned-no-secret\": {ClientID: \"provisioned-no-secret\", Name: \"No Secret Yet\", ClientSecretHash: \"\", GrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"), Audience: \"aud\", Active: true},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"provisioned-no-secret\", \"anything\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 401\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif body := decodeTokenError(t, resp); body.Error != \"invalid_client\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want invalid_client\", body.Error)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_CorrectCredentials_IssuesValidToken(t *testing.T) {\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tkey := testSigningKey(t)\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"known-client\": {ClientID: \"known-client\", Name: \"Known\", ClientSecretHash: hash, GrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"), Audience: \"loginid-api-service\", Active: true},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"known-client\", \"s3cr3t\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tbody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 200, body=%s\", resp.StatusCode, body)\n\t}\n\tif got := resp.Header.Get(\"Cache-Control\"); got != \"no-store\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Cache-Control = %q, want no-store (RFC 6749 §5.1)\", got)\n\t}\n\n\tvar body tokenResponse\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding success body: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif body.TokenType != \"Bearer\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"token_type = %q, want Bearer\", body.TokenType)\n\t}\n\tif body.Scope != \"profile:search\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"scope = %q, want profile:search\", body.Scope)\n\t}\n\n\tparsed, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(body.AccessToken, &claims{}, func(tok *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n\t\treturn &key.Private.PublicKey, nil\n\t}, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{\"RS256\"}))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parsing/verifying minted token: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tc := parsed.Claims.(*claims)\n\tif c.Subject != \"known-client\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"sub = %q, want known-client\", c.Subject)\n\t}\n\tif c.Issuer != \"https://issuer.test\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"iss = %q, want https://issuer.test\", c.Issuer)\n\t}\n\tif len(c.Audience) != 1 || c.Audience[0] != \"loginid-api-service\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"aud = %v, want [loginid-api-service]\", c.Audience)\n\t}\n\tif c.Scope != \"profile:search\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"scope claim = %q, want profile:search\", c.Scope)\n\t}\n\tif parsed.Header[\"kid\"] != key.Kid {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"kid header = %v, want %q\", parsed.Header[\"kid\"], key.Kid)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(limiter.succeededIDs) != 1 || limiter.succeededIDs[0] != \"known-client\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"RecordSuccess calls = %v, want exactly one for known-client\", limiter.succeededIDs)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_ScopeMismatch_InvalidScope(t *testing.T) {\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"known-client\": {ClientID: \"known-client\", Name: \"Known\", ClientSecretHash: hash, GrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"), Audience: \"aud\", Active: true},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}, \"scope\": {\"profile:read:any\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"known-client\", \"s3cr3t\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 400\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif body := decodeTokenError(t, resp); body.Error != \"invalid_scope\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want invalid_scope\", body.Error)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_InactiveClient_InvalidClient401(t *testing.T) {\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"disabled-client\": {ClientID: \"disabled-client\", Name: \"Disabled\", ClientSecretHash: hash, GrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"), Audience: \"aud\", Active: false},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"disabled-client\", \"s3cr3t\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 401 (disabled status must still reject even with the correct secret)\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_LimiterDenies_SlowDown429(t *testing.T) {\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: false}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"whoever\", \"whatever\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 429\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif len(store.gotIDs) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"store.Get called %d times, want 0 — the limiter must gate before touching the store\", len(store.gotIDs))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_NilStore_ServerError(t *testing.T) {\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\th := NewTokenHandler(nil, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"whoever\", \"whatever\", true)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 500 (nil ClientStore must fail closed, not panic)\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif body := decodeTokenError(t, resp); body.Error != \"server_error\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want server_error\", body.Error)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go",
"old_string": "func testSigningKey(t *testing.T) *SigningKey {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rsaTestRandReader(t), 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating RSA key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn &SigningKey{Private: priv, Kid: \"test-kid\"}\n}\n\n// rsaTestRandReader is crypto/rand.Reader, indirected only so this file\n// doesn't need a second import alias — kept for readability at the one\n// call site above.\nfunc rsaTestRandReader(t *testing.T) io.Reader {\n\tt.Helper()\n\treturn cryptoRandReader\n}",
"new_string": "func testSigningKey(t *testing.T) *SigningKey {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating RSA key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn &SigningKey{Private: priv, Kid: \"test-kid\"}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/signingkey_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/pem\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc writeTestKeyFile(t *testing.T, der []byte, pemType string) string {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tdir := t.TempDir()\n\tpath := filepath.Join(dir, \"key.pem\")\n\tblock := &pem.Block{Type: pemType, Bytes: der}\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(path, pem.EncodeToMemory(block), 0o600); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"writing test key file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn path\n}\n\nfunc TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS1(t *testing.T) {\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tpath := writeTestKeyFile(t, x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(priv), \"RSA PRIVATE KEY\")\n\n\tkey, err := LoadSigningKey(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"LoadSigningKey: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif key.Private.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"loaded key's modulus doesn't match the original\")\n\t}\n\tif key.Kid == \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Kid must be non-empty\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS8(t *testing.T) {\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tder, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(priv)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling PKCS8: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tpath := writeTestKeyFile(t, der, \"PRIVATE KEY\")\n\n\tkey, err := LoadSigningKey(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"LoadSigningKey: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif key.Private.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"loaded key's modulus doesn't match the original\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestLoadSigningKey_KidStableAcrossReloads(t *testing.T) {\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tpath := writeTestKeyFile(t, x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(priv), \"RSA PRIVATE KEY\")\n\n\tkey1, err := LoadSigningKey(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"first LoadSigningKey: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tkey2, err := LoadSigningKey(path)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"second LoadSigningKey: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif key1.Kid != key2.Kid {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"kid changed across reloads of the same key: %q vs %q — a restart would break every cached verifier's kid lookup\", key1.Kid, key2.Kid)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestLoadSigningKey_NotPEM(t *testing.T) {\n\tdir := t.TempDir()\n\tpath := filepath.Join(dir, \"key.pem\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(\"not a pem file\"), 0o600); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"writing test file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, err := LoadSigningKey(path); err == nil {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected an error loading a non-PEM file, got nil\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestSigningKey_JWKS_RoundTripsPublicKey(t *testing.T) {\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tkey := &SigningKey{Private: priv, Kid: \"kid-123\"}\n\n\tdoc := key.JWKS()\n\tif len(doc.Keys) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"JWKS has %d keys, want 1\", len(doc.Keys))\n\t}\n\tk := doc.Keys[0]\n\tif k.Kid != \"kid-123\" || k.Kty != \"RSA\" || k.Alg != \"RS256\" || k.Use != \"sig\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"unexpected JWK fields: %+v\", k)\n\t}\n\n\tnBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding n: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\teBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding e: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tn := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)\n\te := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)\n\tif n.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"JWKS modulus doesn't match the signing key's public modulus\")\n\t}\n\tif int(e.Int64()) != priv.E {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"JWKS exponent = %d, want %d\", e.Int64(), priv.E)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/signingkey_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"type jwk \\|type jwksResponse\\|Kty\\|Kid\\|Alg\\|Use \\|N \\|E \" internal/api/jwks.go | head -20",
"description": "Check jwk struct field names"
}1:// jwks.go implements a minimal RFC 7517 JSON Web Key Set client: fetch,
28:// unmarshaled; unknown fields in the source JSON are not an error.
29:type jwk struct {
30: Kty string `json:"kty"`
31: Kid string `json:"kid"`
32: Alg string `json:"alg"`
33: Use string `json:"use"`
34: N string `json:"n"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA modulus
35: E string `json:"e"` // base64url, unpadded — the RSA public exponent
38:type jwksResponse struct {
42:// parseJWKS decodes a JWKS JSON document into a map of kid -> public key.
45:// verification of tokens signed with the RSA keys that ARE present.
53: if k.Kty != "RSA" {
56: if k.Kid == "" {
61: return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: JWKS key %q: %w", k.Kid, err)
63: keys[k.Kid] = pub
88:// KeyForKid's real implementation must bound its network I/O by it, not
93: KeyForKid(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)
96:// ErrJWKSStale is returned by JWKSCache.KeyForKid when the cached key set
104:// jwksMaxStalenessMultiple and jwksUnknownKidRefetchInterval are the
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/jwksendpoint_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestNewJWKSHandler_ServesKeyJWKS(t *testing.T) {\n\tpriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tkey := &SigningKey{Private: priv, Kid: \"kid-abc\"}\n\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(NewJWKSHandler(key))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\tresp, err := http.Get(srv.URL + \"/.well-known/jwks.json\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"GET: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 200\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\tif ct := resp.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"); ct != \"application/json\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Content-Type = %q, want application/json\", ct)\n\t}\n\n\tvar doc jwksResponse\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&doc); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding response: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(doc.Keys) != 1 || doc.Keys[0].Kid != \"kid-abc\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"unexpected JWKS document: %+v\", doc)\n\t}\n\n\t// The verifier side (internal/api/jwks.go's parseJWKS) must be able\n\t// to actually consume this response — proving the two sides agree on\n\t// shape, not just that this handler emits *some* JSON.\n\tkeys, err := parseJWKS(mustMarshal(t, doc))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"parseJWKS rejected NewJWKSHandler's own output: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, ok := keys[\"kid-abc\"]; !ok {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"parseJWKS didn't find kid-abc in the round-tripped document\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc mustMarshal(t *testing.T, v any) []byte {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tb, err := json.Marshal(v)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshaling: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn b\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/jwksendpoint_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"func parseJWKS\" internal/api/jwks.go",
"description": "Check parseJWKS signature"
}46:func parseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport \"testing\"\n\nfunc TestHashSecret_VerifySecret_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"correct horse battery staple\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashSecret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !verifySecret(\"correct horse battery staple\", hash) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"verifySecret rejected the correct secret\")\n\t}\n\tif verifySecret(\"wrong secret\", hash) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"verifySecret accepted an incorrect secret\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestHashSecret_DistinctSaltsPerCall(t *testing.T) {\n\th1, err := hashSecret(\"same-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashSecret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\th2, err := hashSecret(\"same-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashSecret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif h1 == h2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"two hashes of the same secret are identical — salt isn't varying\")\n\t}\n\tif !verifySecret(\"same-secret\", h1) || !verifySecret(\"same-secret\", h2) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"both independently-salted hashes must still verify the same secret\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestVerifySecret_MalformedHash_RejectsWithoutPanic(t *testing.T) {\n\tfor _, malformed := range []string{\"\", \"no-dollar-sign\", \"$\", \"not-base64$also-not-base64\"} {\n\t\tif verifySecret(\"anything\", malformed) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"verifySecret(%q) = true, want false for a malformed hash\", malformed)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestDummyHash_IsStableAndValidArgon2idHash(t *testing.T) {\n\tif dummyHash == \"\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"dummyHash must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\t// dummyHash must itself be verifiable (i.e. it's a real, well-formed\n\t// Argon2id hash at the same cost profile as every other hash in this\n\t// store) — the whole point of comparing against it is that it costs\n\t// the same as a real comparison would.\n\tif !verifySecret(\"dummy-fixed-secret-never-issued-to-any-real-client\", dummyHash) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"dummyHash doesn't verify against its own known plaintext\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestParsePostgresTextArray(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\traw string\n\t\twant []string\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{raw: \"{profile:search}\", want: []string{\"profile:search\"}},\n\t\t{raw: \"{profile:search,profile:read:any}\", want: []string{\"profile:search\", \"profile:read:any\"}},\n\t\t{raw: \"{}\", want: nil},\n\t\t{raw: \"not-an-array\", wantErr: true},\n\t\t{raw: `{quoted \"value\"}`, wantErr: true},\n\t\t{raw: \"{}extra\", wantErr: true},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tgot, err := parsePostgresTextArray(c.raw)\n\t\tif c.wantErr {\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"parsePostgresTextArray(%q) = %v, want an error\", c.raw, got)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"parsePostgresTextArray(%q) unexpected error: %v\", c.raw, err)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(got) != len(c.want) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"parsePostgresTextArray(%q) = %v, want %v\", c.raw, got, c.want)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor i := range got {\n\t\t\tif got[i] != c.want[i] {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"parsePostgresTextArray(%q) = %v, want %v\", c.raw, got, c.want)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"database/sql\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"math/rand\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib\"\n)\n\n// setupIssuerDB connects to TEST_POSTGRES_DSN (skipping the test if\n// unset, same discipline as internal/dao/postgres's own setupDB — real\n// Postgres verification is this file's responsibility, not something a\n// hand-written fake could ever exercise), applies the real\n// migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql into a fresh, uniquely-named\n// schema, and tears it down on cleanup.\nfunc setupIssuerDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tdsn := os.Getenv(\"TEST_POSTGRES_DSN\")\n\tif dsn == \"\" {\n\t\tt.Skip(\"TEST_POSTGRES_DSN not set — skipping issuer-database integration test\")\n\t}\n\n\tdb, err := sql.Open(\"pgx\", dsn)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"opening TEST_POSTGRES_DSN: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tt.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })\n\tdb.SetMaxOpenConns(1)\n\n\tschemaName := fmt.Sprintf(\"test_issuer_%d\", rand.Int63())\n\tif _, err := db.Exec(\"CREATE SCHEMA \" + schemaName); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"creating test schema: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tt.Cleanup(func() {\n\t\t_, _ = db.Exec(\"DROP SCHEMA \" + schemaName + \" CASCADE\")\n\t})\n\tif _, err := db.Exec(\"SET search_path TO \" + schemaName); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"setting search_path: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\twd, err := os.Getwd()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"getwd: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\trepoRoot := filepath.Join(wd, \"..\", \"..\") // this package: <repoRoot>/internal/api\n\tmigrationPath := filepath.Join(repoRoot, \"migrations\", \"issuer\", \"00001_initial_schema.sql\")\n\tb, err := os.ReadFile(migrationPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"reading migration %s: %v\", migrationPath, err)\n\t}\n\tcontent := string(b)\n\tupStart := strings.Index(content, \"-- +goose Up\")\n\tdownStart := strings.Index(content, \"-- +goose Down\")\n\tif upStart == -1 || downStart == -1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"migration missing +goose Up/Down markers\")\n\t}\n\tupSQL := content[upStart+len(\"-- +goose Up\") : downStart]\n\tif _, err := db.Exec(upSQL); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"applying issuer migration: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn db\n}\n\nfunc insertOAuthClient(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, clientID, name string, secretHash *string, secretState string, scopes []string, audience, status string) {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tscopeLiteral := \"{\" + strings.Join(scopes, \",\") + \"}\"\n\t_, err := db.Exec(`\n\t\tINSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status)\n\t\tVALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)\n\t`, clientID, name, secretHash, secretState, scopeLiteral, audience, status)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"inserting oauth_client row: %v\", err)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestPostgresClientStore_Get_Found(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tinsertOAuthClient(t, db, \"qa-review-client\", \"QA Review Client\", &hash, \"set\", []string{\"profile:search\"}, \"loginid-api-service\", \"active\")\n\n\tstore := NewPostgresClientStore(db)\n\trec, ok, err := store.Get(context.Background(), \"qa-review-client\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get returned ok=false for a row that exists\")\n\t}\n\tif rec.Name != \"QA Review Client\" || rec.Audience != \"loginid-api-service\" || rec.GrantedScope != Scope(\"profile:search\") || !rec.Active {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"unexpected record: %+v\", rec)\n\t}\n\tif !verifySecret(\"s3cr3t\", rec.ClientSecretHash) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"stored hash doesn't verify against the secret it was created with\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestPostgresClientStore_Get_NotFound(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\tstore := NewPostgresClientStore(db)\n\n\t_, ok, err := store.Get(context.Background(), \"does-not-exist\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif ok {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Get returned ok=true for a client_id that was never inserted\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestPostgresClientStore_Get_SecretStateNone_EmptyHash(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\tinsertOAuthClient(t, db, \"not-yet-secreted\", \"No Secret Yet\", nil, \"none\", []string{\"profile:read:any\"}, \"loginid-api-service\", \"active\")\n\n\tstore := NewPostgresClientStore(db)\n\trec, ok, err := store.Get(context.Background(), \"not-yet-secreted\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get returned ok=false for a row that exists\")\n\t}\n\tif rec.ClientSecretHash != \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"ClientSecretHash = %q, want empty for secret_state=none\", rec.ClientSecretHash)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestPostgresClientStore_Get_DisabledStatus(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tinsertOAuthClient(t, db, \"disabled-client\", \"Disabled\", &hash, \"set\", []string{\"profile:search\"}, \"loginid-api-service\", \"disabled\")\n\n\tstore := NewPostgresClientStore(db)\n\trec, ok, err := store.Get(context.Background(), \"disabled-client\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !ok {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Get returned ok=false for a row that exists\")\n\t}\n\tif rec.Active {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Active = true for status=disabled\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints exercises the migration's own CHECK\n// constraints directly against a real Postgres — the DDL is the actual\n// enforcement site for these invariants, not application code, so the\n// test belongs here rather than only asserted in prose.\nfunc TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tsql string\n\t\targs []any\n\t}{\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"client_id too short fails the charset CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ($1, 'x', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t\targs: []any{\"short\"},\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"secret_state=set with NULL hash violates the tying CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', NULL, 'set', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"secret_state=none with a non-NULL hash violates the tying CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'somehash', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"multiple granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search,profile:read:any}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"unrecognized status violates the status enum CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'pending')`,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\t_, err := db.Exec(c.sql, c.args...)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected a CHECK-constraint violation, got no error\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -100",
"description": "Build after adding new test files"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go vet ./... 2>&1 | head -100 && go test ./internal/api/... -v 2>&1 | tail -150",
"description": "Vet and run internal/api tests verbosely"
}=== RUN TestSearchHandler_RateLimited_429 --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_RateLimited_429 (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_TouchCapExceeded_429NotServed --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_TouchCapExceeded_429NotServed (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_AuthorizeDenied_403 --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_AuthorizeDenied_403 (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DAOError_NeverLeaksRawMessage (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_Success (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_RequiresValidReasonCode (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadAny_ValidReasonCodeStillHitsTouchCap (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ScopeFailureAndAuthorizeDenial_IdenticalBody (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_ReadOwn_DoesNotHitTouchCap (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_RejectsUnknownField (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_SuccessAuditsWithRecordIDs (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_DeniedRequestReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400 --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_MissingID_400 (0.00s) === RUN TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound --- PASS: TestGetProfileHandler_NotFound (0.00s) === RUN TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation --- PASS: TestSearchHandler_PanicStillReleasesTouchReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip (0.05s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_SkipsNonRSAKeys (0.00s) === RUN TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError --- PASS: TestParseJWKS_MissingKidIsError (0.00s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FetchesAndCaches (0.07s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_RefetchesAfterTTLExpires (0.06s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidWithNoStaleCacheIsError (0.02s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StaleCacheSurvivesTransientFetchFailure (0.02s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness 2026/09/13 05:26:03 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 4m0s across 1 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailsClosedPastMaxStaleness (0.01s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidTriggersOneRateLimitedRefetch (0.05s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidRefetchIsRateLimited (0.06s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_FailedRefreshDoesNotHammerIssuer --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_FailedRefreshDoesNotHammerIssuer (0.02s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_StalenessEnforcedEvenWhenBackingOffFromRetry 2026/09/13 05:26:04 api: JWKS unrefreshable for 5m1s across 2 consecutive failures (exceeds max staleness 3m0s) — failing closed --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_StalenessEnforcedEvenWhenBackingOffFromRetry (0.06s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidReservationIsPerKidNotGlobal --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidReservationIsPerKidNotGlobal (0.06s) === RUN TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidReservationCapsDistinctKids --- PASS: TestJWKSCache_UnknownKidReservationCapsDistinctKids (0.05s) === RUN TestNewJWKSHandler_ServesKeyJWKS --- PASS: TestNewJWKSHandler_ServesKeyJWKS (0.04s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ValidTokenPopulatesAuthContext (0.10s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MissingToken_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_ExpiredToken_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongAudience_401 (0.05s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongIssuer_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_AlgNone_401 (0.00s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_HMACConfusionWithPublicKeyAsSecret_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_KidRotation_BothKeysVerify (0.05s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_UnknownKid_401 (0.10s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_WrongKeyForKid_401 (0.10s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoScopeClaim_401 (0.04s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_MultipleScopes_401 (0.01s) === RUN TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 --- PASS: TestJWTMiddleware_NoSubClaim_401 (0.03s) === RUN TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline --- PASS: TestDeadlineMiddleware_AppliesDeadline (0.00s) === RUN TestMaskPhone --- PASS: TestMaskPhone (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_AllowsUpToLimit (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_KeyedPerSubAndScope (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets --- PASS: TestInProcessRateLimiter_WindowResets (0.00s) === RUN TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS1 --- PASS: TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS1 (0.02s) === RUN TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS8 --- PASS: TestLoadSigningKey_PKCS8 (0.01s) === RUN TestLoadSigningKey_KidStableAcrossReloads --- PASS: TestLoadSigningKey_KidStableAcrossReloads (0.05s) === RUN TestLoadSigningKey_NotPEM --- PASS: TestLoadSigningKey_NotPEM (0.00s) === RUN TestSigningKey_JWKS_RoundTripsPublicKey --- PASS: TestSigningKey_JWKS_RoundTripsPublicKey (0.05s) === RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied --- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied (0.00s) === RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything --- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_EmptyMapDeniesEverything (0.00s) === RUN TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadAnyAndSearch_AlwaysAllowed --- PASS: TestStopgapAuthorizer_ReadAnyAndSearch_AlwaysAllowed (0.00s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_MissingGrantType_UnsupportedGrantType --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_MissingGrantType_UnsupportedGrantType (0.03s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_InvalidClient401 --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_InvalidClient401 (0.04s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses (0.10s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_FoundButNoSecretSet_TreatedSameAsNotFound --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_FoundButNoSecretSet_TreatedSameAsNotFound (0.02s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_CorrectCredentials_IssuesValidToken --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_CorrectCredentials_IssuesValidToken (0.05s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_ScopeMismatch_InvalidScope --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_ScopeMismatch_InvalidScope (0.07s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_InactiveClient_InvalidClient401 --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_InactiveClient_InvalidClient401 (0.04s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_LimiterDenies_SlowDown429 --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_LimiterDenies_SlowDown429 (0.10s) === RUN TestNewTokenHandler_NilStore_ServerError --- PASS: TestNewTokenHandler_NilStore_ServerError (0.02s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_CountsDistinctRecordsOnly (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ReserveBooksBudgetBeforeSettle (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_ConcurrentReservesNeverExceedCap (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SettleReleasesUnusedReservation (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_HardDeniesAfterCrossingCap (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_WindowResets (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_KeyedPerSub (0.00s) === RUN TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows --- PASS: TestInProcessTouchCounter_SweepEvictsStaleWindows (0.00s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.235s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "which pg_ctlcluster postgres pg_ctl 2>/dev/null; docker ps 2>&1 | head -5; command -v docker",
"description": "Check for local Postgres/docker availability for integration test run"
}pg_ctlcluster not found postgres not found pg_ctl not found CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES 17480b608275 9d7cf3f00742 "/docker-entrypoint.…" 8 hours ago Up 8 hours k8s_frontend_aiea-frontend-86cdfd5f49-d9zcr_aiea-local_080d60d5-705c-49fa-b869-a16c2322107c_17 5cbbb950df80 82c63d1e58d4 "uvicorn main_uscis_…" 8 hours ago Up 8 hours k8s_backend_aiea-backend-546f4f84bb-tclwl_aiea-local_4d24510d-9775-4c75-b853-6d253b48d566_8 c779e5c1069f fe0737ba566a "docker-entrypoint.s…" 8 hours ago Up 8 hours k8s_postgres_postgres-755fcb79f5-rmkrc_aiea-local_bcd644fa-45d4-42de-afb0-671d0d98ddb3_8 /usr/local/bin/docker
{
"command": "docker run --rm -d --name lt51-test-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=testpass -e POSTGRES_DB=testdb -p 55432:5432 postgres:16-alpine >/tmp/lt51pg.log 2>&1; sleep 3; docker ps --filter name=lt51-test-pg",
"description": "Start a throwaway Postgres container for integration test run"
}CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES 1ef1f0c13670 postgres:16-alpine "docker-entrypoint.s…" 3 seconds ago Up 3 seconds 0.0.0.0:55432->5432/tcp, [::]:55432->5432/tcp lt51-test-pg
{
"command": "for i in $(seq 1 15); do docker exec lt51-test-pg pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 1; done\ncd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && TEST_POSTGRES_DSN=\"postgres://postgres:«REDACTED»@localhost:55432/testdb?sslmode=disable\" go test ./internal/api/... -run \"TestPostgresClientStore|TestOAuthClient\" -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run real-Postgres integration tests for the client store"
}=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_Found
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_Found (0.06s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_NotFound
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_NotFound (0.02s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_SecretStateNone_EmptyHash
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_SecretStateNone_EmptyHash (0.02s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_DisabledStatus
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_DisabledStatus (0.02s)
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/client_id_too_short_fails_the_charset_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=set_with_NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=none_with_a_non-NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/multiple_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/unrecognized_status_violates_the_status_enum_CHECK
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints (0.01s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/client_id_too_short_fails_the_charset_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=set_with_NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=none_with_a_non-NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/multiple_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/unrecognized_status_violates_the_status_enum_CHECK (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.290s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "docker stop lt51-test-pg >/dev/null",
"description": "Stop the throwaway Postgres container"
}(Bash completed with no output)
{
"command": "cat /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/postgres/00002_phone_e164_narrow_range.sql",
"description": "Check exact phone CHECK narrowing for Theo's demo data"
}-- +goose NO TRANSACTION
-- Each statement below commits independently rather than all three
-- running inside goose's default per-file transaction — required on
-- CockroachDB (see the cockroachdb migration's identical directive and
-- comment: it rejects an ADD CONSTRAINT reusing a name a DROP CONSTRAINT
-- removed earlier in the same transaction) and harmless here, since
-- NOT VALID + VALIDATE CONSTRAINT's whole point is letting the
-- table-scan half take a lighter lock than a single ADD CONSTRAINT would.
-- +goose Up
-- Contract amendment A6: the original ck_user_profile_phone_e164 accepted
-- 2-15 total digits after '+' ('^\+[1-9][0-9]{1,14}$'), while SQLite's own
-- phone CHECK accepts 7-15 (length BETWEEN 8 AND 16, including the '+').
-- "+1234" (5 digits) passed here and failed there — a profile writable on
-- one backend and rejected on the other, from the same input. Narrowed to
-- 7-15 digits ('^\+[1-9][0-9]{6,14}$'), matching SQLite exactly.
--
-- Editing 00001's CHECK text in place would have been a no-op against any
-- database that already applied it — goose tracks applied version
-- numbers, not file content, and does not re-run a migration once
-- recorded (migration-approach.md: "goose will not re-run an applied
-- migration anyway"). This is a real ALTER, applied through the normal
-- goose pipeline like any other schema change (Nolan Reyes, PR #24
-- review — caught before this shipped as a migration file nobody's
-- database would ever actually run).
--
-- ADD CONSTRAINT ... NOT VALID + a separate VALIDATE CONSTRAINT, not a
-- single ADD CONSTRAINT: on Postgres, a plain ADD CONSTRAINT CHECK takes
-- an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock for the full duration of the table scan that
-- validates every existing row: NOT VALID skips that scan up front (a
-- brief metadata-only lock instead), and VALIDATE CONSTRAINT then checks
-- existing rows with a lock level that doesn't block ordinary reads/
-- writes. This table has no production data behind this take-home, but
-- the pattern is the one to use regardless (Nolan Reyes, PR #24 review).
-- CockroachDB's schema changes are online by default and don't need the
-- same two-step split; see the cockroachdb migration's own comment.
ALTER TABLE user_profile DROP CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164;
ALTER TABLE user_profile ADD CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164
CHECK (phone IS NULL OR phone ~ '^\+[1-9][0-9]{6,14}$') NOT VALID;
ALTER TABLE user_profile VALIDATE CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164;
-- +goose Down
ALTER TABLE user_profile DROP CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164;
ALTER TABLE user_profile ADD CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164
CHECK (phone IS NULL OR phone ~ '^\+[1-9][0-9]{1,14}$') NOT VALID;
ALTER TABLE user_profile VALIDATE CONSTRAINT ck_user_profile_phone_e164;{
"to": "04-infra-devops-47",
"summary": "Exact user_profile/user_credential columns and CHECKs for demo data",
"message": "Exact schema from migrations/postgres/00001_initial_schema.sql + 00002 (narrowing):\n\nuser_profile:\n- id UUID DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() (PK) — omit it in your INSERT, let it generate\n- name TEXT COLLATE \"C\" NOT NULL — CHECK: length(trim(name)) > 0\n- phone TEXT (nullable) — CHECK (current, post-00002): phone IS NULL OR phone ~ '^\\+[1-9][0-9]{6,14}$' — i.e. E.164, 7-15 total digits after the leading '+', first digit 1-9. Example: +14155551234\n- street_address TEXT (nullable) — CHECK: NULL or length(trim(x)) > 0\n- locality TEXT (nullable) — same nonempty-if-present CHECK\n- region TEXT (nullable) — same\n- postal_code TEXT (nullable) — same\n- country TEXT (nullable) — CHECK: country = upper(country) AND length(country) = 2 (upper-case alpha-2, e.g. 'US')\n- source TEXT NOT NULL — CHECK: source IN ('direct','idp_cache') — use 'direct' for hand-authored demo rows\n- created_at/updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now() — omit, let default apply\n\nuser_credential:\n- id UUID DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() (PK) — omit\n- user_id UUID NOT NULL — FK to user_profile(id) ON DELETE CASCADE — must reference a row you just inserted\n- username TEXT NOT NULL — UNIQUE index is on LOWER(username), so case-insensitive uniqueness\n- method_id UUID NOT NULL — FK to auth_method(id); the seeded 'password' method's id: SELECT id FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password'\n- secret BYTEA (nullable)\n- secret_state TEXT NOT NULL — CHECK enum: IN ('none','set','revoked')\n- hash_algo TEXT (nullable)\n- hash_cost INTEGER (nullable)\n- Tying CHECK: secret_state='set' requires secret, hash_algo, hash_cost ALL NOT NULL; secret_state IN ('none','revoked') requires all three NULL. Since you're seeding secret_state='none' rows, leave secret/hash_algo/hash_cost all NULL — do not set any of the three or the CHECK will fail.\n- created_at/updated_at — omit, defaults apply\n\nOne thing to double check on your end: user_profile has no unique constraint of its own beyond the PK, so ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING needs a real conflict target — if you don't have a natural unique key to conflict on for user_profile, you may need to key idempotency differently there (e.g. check existence by a fixed known id, or use a unique constraint you add just for this seed data). user_credential's ON CONFLICT (username) DO NOTHING will work fine given the LOWER(username) unique index — just make sure your ON CONFLICT target matches that index's expression, not a plain username equality target.\n\nPing me if any INSERT hits a CHECK I didn't cover here.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "04-infra-devops-47",
"content": "Exact schema from migrations/postgres/00001_initi…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“Exact user_profile/user_credential columns and CHECKs for demo data” → 04-infra-devops-47 (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"af64a969-9f1e-4b02-9f14-c10e60868d25"}{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && sed -n '1,30p' internal/app/verifier_router_test.go",
"description": "Recheck verifier_router_test.go imports/helpers for reuse"
}package app
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"loginid-takehome/internal/config"
"loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
"loginid-takehome/internal/model"
)
// fakeRepo is a minimal dao.Repository — only Profiles().Search is
// exercised by this file's tests; everything else panics, so a test
// that reaches an unexpected method fails loudly rather than silently
// zero-valuing (mirrors internal/api's own hand-written fakes,
// decisions/test-double-strategy.md).
type fakeRepo struct{ profiles fakeProfiles }
func (f *fakeRepo) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return &f.profiles }
func (f *fakeRepo) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { panic("not used") }
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"func NewJWKSCache\\|func NewJWTMiddleware\\|func AuthContextFromContext\\|type StdoutAuditLogger\" internal/api/*.go",
"description": "Check exact constructor signatures needed for the integration test"
}internal/api/auth.go:60:func AuthContextFromContext(ctx context.Context) (AuthContext, bool) {
internal/api/audit.go:73:type StdoutAuditLogger struct{}
internal/api/jwks.go:205:func NewJWKSCache(url string, ttl time.Duration, httpClient *http.Client) *JWKSCache {
internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go:163:func NewJWTMiddleware(keys KeySource, issuer, audience string, audit AuditLogger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go",
"content": "package api\n\nimport (\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// TestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware is LT-51's own\n// integration proof: a token minted by NewTokenHandler (this story) is\n// accepted by NewJWTMiddleware (LT-40, PR #30) fetching the signing\n// key's public half over a real HTTP JWKS endpoint (NewJWKSHandler, this\n// story) — not two components tested in isolation and assumed to agree,\n// the actual mint-then-verify path end to end, using the real JWKS\n// cache and its real HTTP fetch, not a fake KeySource.\nfunc TestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey := testSigningKey(t)\n\n\tjwksSrv := httptest.NewServer(NewJWKSHandler(key))\n\tdefer jwksSrv.Close()\n\n\thash, err := hashSecret(\"s3cr3t\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"hashing secret: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{\n\t\t\"integration-client\": {\n\t\t\tClientID: \"integration-client\",\n\t\t\tName: \"Integration Test Client\",\n\t\t\tClientSecretHash: hash,\n\t\t\tGrantedScope: Scope(\"profile:search\"),\n\t\t\tAudience: \"loginid-api-service\",\n\t\t\tActive: true,\n\t\t},\n\t}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}\n\ttokenHandler := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\ttokenReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/auth/token\", nil)\n\ttokenReq.Method = http.MethodPost\n\ttokenReq.Form = map[string][]string{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\ttokenReq.PostForm = tokenReq.Form\n\ttokenReq.SetBasicAuth(\"integration-client\", \"s3cr3t\")\n\ttokenW := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\ttokenHandler(tokenW, tokenReq)\n\tif tokenW.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"minting token: status = %d, body=%s\", tokenW.Code, tokenW.Body.String())\n\t}\n\tvar tokenBody tokenResponse\n\tif err := decodeJSON(t, tokenW.Body.Bytes(), &tokenBody); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding token response: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tkeys := NewJWKSCache(jwksSrv.URL, 15*time.Minute, nil)\n\tverify := NewJWTMiddleware(keys, \"https://issuer.test\", \"loginid-api-service\", StdoutAuditLogger{})\n\n\tvar gotAuthContext AuthContext\n\tvar gotOK bool\n\tprotected := verify(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tgotAuthContext, gotOK = AuthContextFromContext(r.Context())\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t}))\n\n\tverifyReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/profiles/search\", nil)\n\tverifyReq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+tokenBody.AccessToken)\n\tverifyW := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\tprotected.ServeHTTP(verifyW, verifyReq)\n\n\tif verifyW.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"verifying minted token: status = %d, want 200 (mint-then-verify must round-trip through the real JWKS-over-HTTP path)\", verifyW.Code)\n\t}\n\tif !gotOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"AuthContext was never populated in the protected handler\")\n\t}\n\tif gotAuthContext.Sub != \"integration-client\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"AuthContext.Sub = %q, want integration-client\", gotAuthContext.Sub)\n\t}\n\tif gotAuthContext.Scope != Scope(\"profile:search\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"AuthContext.Scope = %q, want profile:search\", gotAuthContext.Scope)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc decodeJSON(t *testing.T, b []byte, v any) error {\n\tt.Helper()\n\treturn jsonUnmarshalHelper(b, v)\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go",
"old_string": "\tvar tokenBody tokenResponse\n\tif err := decodeJSON(t, tokenW.Body.Bytes(), &tokenBody); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding token response: %v\", err)\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tvar tokenBody tokenResponse\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(tokenW.Body.Bytes(), &tokenBody); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"decoding token response: %v\", err)\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go",
"old_string": "\nfunc decodeJSON(t *testing.T, b []byte, v any) error {\n\tt.Helper()\n\treturn jsonUnmarshalHelper(b, v)\n}\n",
"new_string": "\n"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -60",
"description": "Build after fixing integration test file"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go test ./internal/api/... -run \"TestMintThenVerify\" -v 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Run the mint-then-verify integration test"
}=== RUN TestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware --- PASS: TestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware (0.08s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.473s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "grep -rln \"ErrInvalidCredential\\|VerifyPassword\\|CompareSecret\\|verifyPassword\\|ComparePassword\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal 2>/dev/null",
"description": "Search for existing password comparison helper in DAO layer"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/errors.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/integration_test.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/errors_test.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/conformance_test.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/errors.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/integration_test.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/errors.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/conformance/conformance_test.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/errors.go
{
"command": "grep -n \"ErrInvalidCredential\\|VerifyPassword\\|CompareSecret\\|verifyPassword\\|ComparePassword\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/errors.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go",
"description": "Find exact location of credential verification logic"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/errors.go:27: ErrInvalidCredential = errors.New("dao: credential violates secret-state rules")
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go:94: return dao.ErrInvalidCredential
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go:85: return dao.ErrInvalidCredential{
"command": "grep -rn \"\\.Secret\\b\\|bcrypt\\|CompareHashAndPassword\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal --include=\"*.go\" 2>/dev/null | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Search for any code path comparing user_credential.secret"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/composite.go:56: credentialID, profileID, c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost, now, now); err != nil {
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go:23: err := scan(&c.ID, &c.UserID, &c.Username, &c.MethodID, &c.Secret, &c.SecretState, &c.HashAlgo, &c.HashCost, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go:122: id, c.UserID, c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost, now, now)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/sqlite/credentials.go:146: c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost, now, c.ID)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/composite.go:54: gotProfile.ID, c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go:18: err := scan(&c.ID, &c.UserID, &c.Username, &c.MethodID, &c.Secret, &c.SecretState, &c.HashAlgo, &c.HashCost, &c.CreatedAt, &c.UpdatedAt)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go:107: c.UserID, c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost)
/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/dao/postgres/credentials.go:140: c.Username, c.MethodID, c.Secret, c.SecretState, c.HashAlgo, c.HashCost, c.ID){
"to": "project manager",
"summary": "No password-comparison helper exists yet in this codebase",
"message": "Re: Priya's nil-secret-comparison finding — checked the actual code before doing anything. There is no password/secret comparison function anywhere in this codebase today. user_credential is pure DAO storage (Create/Update/Get/ListByUserID in internal/dao/{postgres,sqlite}/credentials.go) — nothing reads c.Secret back and compares it against a caller-supplied password. Q2's REST API (LT-39/LT-40) authenticates callers via JWT bearer tokens only, never a username/password check against user_credential. So there's no existing behavior to test or fix — this isn't a live bug, it's a correctness requirement for a comparison helper that hasn't been built yet (nothing in the current 11-story backlog builds one either).\n\nBefore I write a new function and a cross-backend conformance test for it: is this something Priya/the PM wants added now as new, unrequested scope (a `VerifyCredential`-shaped helper plus the nil/none-state test), or is this meant as a forward-looking requirement to record (e.g. in multi-db-strategy.md or a decision doc) for whenever a story actually adds password-based login? I don't want to invent an unasked-for auth path this late, but I also don't want to sit on a real finding — your call on scope.\n\nSeparately: LT-51 is nearly done on my end — client store rebuilt as real Postgres (migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql, exact schema per Priya's ruling plus name/audience columns flagged for her review), NewIssuerRouter wired (/auth/token, /.well-known/jwks.json), full test suite including a real-Postgres integration run (spun up a throwaway container locally, migration + CHECK constraints + PostgresClientStore.Get all verified) and a mint-then-verify test that mints a real token and pushes it through LT-40's actual JWT middleware over a real JWKS HTTP fetch. Writing up the PR now, will tag Oren/Nolan and route a 02 cold review before opening it.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "project manager",
"content": "Re: Priya's nil-secret-comparison finding — check…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“No password-comparison helper exists yet in this codebase” → project manager (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"8652723b-9e0f-48bf-85f7-b8c117c79883"}{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Final full build/vet/test pass for LT-51"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.372s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git config --worktree user.name \"Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery lead, Claude Sonnet 5)\" && git config --worktree user.email \"renata-cole@agents.loginid-takehome.invalid\" && git status --short",
"description": "Set git identity and check status"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M go.mod M go.sum M internal/config/config.go ?? internal/api/clientstore.go ?? internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go ?? internal/api/clientstore_test.go ?? internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go ?? internal/api/jwksendpoint.go ?? internal/api/jwksendpoint_test.go ?? internal/api/signingkey.go ?? internal/api/signingkey_test.go ?? internal/api/tokenhandler.go ?? internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go ?? internal/app/issuer_router.go ?? migrations/issuer/ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git add -A && git status --short",
"description": "Stage all LT-51 changes"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M go.mod M go.sum A internal/api/clientstore.go A internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go A internal/api/clientstore_test.go A internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go A internal/api/jwksendpoint.go A internal/api/jwksendpoint_test.go A internal/api/signingkey.go A internal/api/signingkey_test.go A internal/api/tokenhandler.go A internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go A internal/app/issuer_router.go M internal/config/config.go A migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nLT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store\n\nPOST /auth/token (RFC 6749 §4.4) validated against a real, persistent\noauth_client table in a separate `issuer` PostgreSQL database\n(migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql), per Priya Nandakumar's\n(05) ruling that superseded an earlier in-process design: HTTP Basic\nclient auth, Argon2id-hashed secrets, byte-identical invalid_client\nresponses for unknown-client_id/wrong-secret/not-yet-secreted/disabled,\nand Tobias Lindqvist's timing-oracle criterion (a fixed dummy hash run\nthrough the same Argon2id comparison on every non-match path, so none\nof those cases is a timing signal). Wires PR #30's already-built\nGrantLimiter (Allow/RecordFailure/RecordSuccess) around the grant\nattempt without rebuilding it, per refinement/LT-51.md's explicit\ninstruction. GET /.well-known/jwks.json (handoff-03-auth.md v6) serves\nthe signing key's public half from the same RSA private key\n(internal/api/signingkey.go) tokens are minted with.\n\nNewIssuerRouter (internal/app) replaces the plain NewRouter's /auth/token\nplaceholder on the issuer Deployment only; cmd/api-service/main.go loads\nthe signing key (fatal on a genuinely malformed key — config.Load\nalready fails startup on a missing/unreadable one) and opens a second\n*sql.DB against the new IssuerDBDSN config surface (ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE\nprecedence over ISSUER_DB_DSN, same pattern as DBDSN), failing\n/auth/token closed with server_error rather than panicking when the\nissuer database isn't configured yet.\n\nQA client credential seeding is explicitly NOT done here — Priya's\nruling: an out-of-band runbook (04) seeds the real oauth_client table\ndirectly, never a migration or this application's own code. The earlier\nQAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/etc. config-based auto-seeding approach is\nremoved.\n\nVerified against a real Postgres (not just the DDL read): applied the\nmigration into a scratch container, confirmed every CHECK constraint\n(charset, secret_state tying, single-granted-scope, status enum) rejects\nwhat it should, and ran PostgresClientStore.Get against real rows.\nTestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware mints a token with\nthis story's handler and verifies it through LT-40's real JWTMiddleware\nfetching the signing key over a real HTTP JWKS endpoint — not two\ncomponents tested in isolation.\n\nStory: LT-51\nWork-By: Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery lead)\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}[feature/LT-51 c9457ab] LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store 16 files changed, 1703 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/api/clientstore.go create mode 100644 internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/clientstore_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwksendpoint.go create mode 100644 internal/api/jwksendpoint_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/signingkey.go create mode 100644 internal/api/signingkey_test.go create mode 100644 internal/api/tokenhandler.go create mode 100644 internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go create mode 100644 internal/app/issuer_router.go create mode 100644 migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git push -u origin feature/LT-51 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Push LT-51 branch"
}remote: remote: Create a pull request for 'feature/LT-51' on GitHub by visiting: remote: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/new/feature/LT-51 remote: To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git * [new branch] feature/LT-51 -> feature/LT-51 branch 'feature/LT-51' set up to track 'origin/feature/LT-51'. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && gh pr create --title \"LT-51: OAuth2 client-credentials grant with a real Postgres-backed client store\" --body \"$(cat <<'EOF'\n## Summary\n- `POST /auth/token` (RFC 6749 §4.4 client-credentials grant): HTTP Basic client auth, form-encoded wire format, Argon2id-hashed secrets, byte-identical `invalid_client` bodies across unknown-`client_id`/wrong-secret/not-yet-secreted/disabled-client — and Tobias Lindqvist's timing-oracle criterion: every non-match path runs one Argon2id comparison (real hash or a fixed dummy hash) before deciding, so none of those cases is distinguishable by latency either.\n- `GET /.well-known/jwks.json`: serves the issuer's real RSA public key (`internal/api/signingkey.go` loads `JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE`, derives a stable `kid`), the same key `/auth/token` signs with.\n- Client store is a **real, persistent PostgreSQL database** — a separate `issuer` database (`migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql`), per Priya Nandakumar's (05) ruling that superseded my first pass (an in-process map, matching this track's other components — she ruled a client credential has to survive a restart and the store has to be reviewable DDL). `PostgresClientStore` replaces the removed `InProcessClientStore`.\n- Wires PR #30's already-built `GrantLimiter` (`Allow`/`RecordFailure`/`RecordSuccess`) around the grant attempt — did not rebuild it, per `refinement/LT-51.md`'s explicit instruction. Backoff/alert-threshold constants (`grantLimiterBaseBackoff`/`Max`/`AlertThreshold` in `internal/app/issuer_router.go`) are this story's own engineering defaults, not a 02-ruled number — flagged for review.\n- QA client seeding is **explicitly not done here**: an out-of-band runbook (04) seeds the real `oauth_client` table directly, per Priya's ruling — \"migrations carry reference data, never credentials.\" Removed the earlier `QAClientID`/`QAClientSecretFile`/etc. config-based auto-seed approach.\n- New config surface: `IssuerDBDSN` (`ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE` takes precedence over `ISSUER_DB_DSN`, mirroring `DBDSN`'s existing pattern).\n- `cmd/api-service/main.go`'s `ModeIssuer` branch now builds `app.NewIssuerRouter` instead of the placeholder-only `NewRouter`.\n\n## Flagged for Priya's DDL review\n`oauth_client`'s `name` and `audience` columns are additions beyond her explicitly ruled column list (`client_id`, `client_secret_hash`/`secret_state`, `granted_scopes`, `status`, `created_at`/`updated_at`, no PII) — both operationally necessary (a human-readable label; the per-client JWT `aud`) and neither is PII, but flagged explicitly as amendments rather than assumed silently. Also tightened `granted_scopes`'s CHECK to exactly one element (not just nonempty), matching this project's existing single-scope-per-credential commitment (`decisions/search-authz-scoping.md`, LT-40's `singleScope`).\n\n## Test plan\n- [x] `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, full `go test ./...` clean\n- [x] `internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go`: RFC 6749 wire-format compliance, HTTP Basic auth, byte-identical `invalid_client` bodies (unknown client vs. wrong secret), the not-yet-secreted/disabled-client cases, scope mismatch, limiter-deny, nil-store fail-closed\n- [x] `internal/api/signingkey_test.go`, `jwksendpoint_test.go`: PKCS1/PKCS8 key loading, stable `kid` across reloads, JWKS round-trips against the verifier's own `parseJWKS`\n- [x] `internal/api/clientstore_test.go`: Argon2id hash/verify round-trip, dummy-hash validity, Postgres text-array parsing\n- [x] `internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go`: **real-Postgres integration**, gated behind `TEST_POSTGRES_DSN` (same discipline as `internal/dao/postgres`'s own harness) — applies the actual migration file into a scratch schema, exercises `PostgresClientStore.Get` against real rows, and asserts every CHECK constraint (charset, secret_state tying, single-scope, status enum) actually rejects what it should. Ran manually against a throwaway `postgres:16-alpine` container — all green.\n- [x] `internal/api/issuer_verifier_integration_test.go`: `TestMintThenVerify_RealTokenThroughRealJWTMiddleware` — mints a token with this story's handler and verifies it through LT-40's **real** `JWTMiddleware`, fetching the signing key over a **real HTTP JWKS endpoint** — proves the two stories actually agree, not just that each passes its own tests in isolation.\n\n## Who did the work\n- Lead: Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery)\n- Refinement: Naomi Voss (01), with Tobias Lindqvist's (01) timing-oracle objection\n- Schema ruling: Priya Nandakumar (05)\n- Models: Claude Sonnet 5\n\nRefinement doc: `03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md`\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)\n\nhttps://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\" 2>&1"
}https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/34 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"description": "Oren review of PR #34 LT-51 token grant",
"subagent_type": "oren-castellan",
"prompt": "Review PR #34 on github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-51, for track 03-engineering-delivery. This implements LT-51: a real OAuth2 client-credentials grant (RFC 6749 §4.4) at POST /auth/token, a real GET /.well-known/jwks.json, and a Postgres-backed client store. The worktree is at /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 (branch feature/LT-51, based on origin/main).\n\nContext you need:\n- Refinement doc: 03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md — explicit instruction NOT to rebuild GrantLimiter, JWKS shape, or AuthContext handling (all built in LT-40/PR #30), only wire to them. Tobias Lindqvist (01) raised a timing-oracle objection: the byte-identical invalid_client response body closes the content channel but not timing, so the unknown-client_id path must still run an Argon2id comparison (against a fixed dummy hash) before returning invalid_client, at the same cost as a real comparison.\n- Priya Nandakumar (05) ruled mid-implementation that the client store must be a REAL persistent Postgres database — a separate `issuer` database, own migrations/issuer/ directory — not an in-process map (which is how every other component in this codebase, e.g. RateLimiter/TouchCounter/GrantLimiter, is deliberately built). QA client seeding is explicitly out-of-band (a runbook 04 owns), never migration or application code.\n\nFiles to review (new unless noted):\n- migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql — the oauth_client table DDL: client_id TEXT PK with a named charset CHECK (8-64 chars of [A-Za-z0-9._-]), name TEXT NOT NULL, client_secret_hash TEXT (nullable), secret_state TEXT NOT NULL with an enum CHECK plus a second CHECK tying secret_state to whether client_secret_hash is NULL, granted_scopes TEXT[] with a CHECK requiring exactly 1 element, audience TEXT NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL with an active/disabled enum CHECK, created_at/updated_at.\n- internal/api/clientstore.go — hashSecret/verifySecret (Argon2id via golang.org/x/crypto/argon2, constant-time comparison via crypto/subtle), a fixed dummyHash computed at package init, ClientRecord struct, ClientStore interface, and PostgresClientStore.Get — queries oauth_client by client_id via database/sql (pgx driver), scans granted_scopes (a Postgres TEXT[]) via a hand-rolled parsePostgresTextArray (deliberately only supports plain unquoted elements, since this project's scope values never contain commas/braces/quotes — check this reasoning holds).\n- internal/api/tokenhandler.go — NewTokenHandler: ParseForm, grant_type check, r.BasicAuth(), GrantLimiter.Allow before touching the store, store.Get, then `if found && rec.ClientSecretHash != \"\" { verifySecret(real hash) } else { _ = verifySecret(dummyHash); secretOK = false }`, RecordFailure/RecordSuccess, scope check (exact match only, since GrantedScope is singular), signs an RS256 JWT with jwt/v5, sets kid header, returns the RFC 6749 §5.1 response shape. Also check the store==nil fail-closed guard added at the top of the handler.\n- internal/api/signingkey.go — LoadSigningKey: PEM decode, tries PKCS1 then PKCS8 RSA private key parsing, derives kid as the first 16 chars of base64url(sha256(marshaled public key DER)).\n- internal/api/jwksendpoint.go — NewJWKSHandler: serves key.JWKS() as JSON with a Cache-Control header.\n- internal/app/issuer_router.go (new) — NewIssuerRouter: mounts /healthz, /.well-known/jwks.json, POST /auth/token; constructs InProcessGrantLimiter with hardcoded constants (grantLimiterBaseBackoff=1s, grantLimiterMaxBackoff=5m, grantLimiterAlertThreshold=5) that are NOT a 02-ruled number, just an engineering default — flagged in the PR description for review; builds PostgresClientStore only if issuerDB != nil, else store stays a nil interface (fails closed via tokenhandler.go's guard).\n- cmd/api-service/main.go — ModeIssuer branch now calls api.LoadSigningKey (Fatal on error — reasoning: config.Load already validates the key file is readable at startup in issuer mode, so a LoadSigningKey failure here means a genuinely malformed key, a startup bug not a runtime condition) and opens a second *sql.DB against the new IssuerDBDSN config field (sql.Open never dials, so this can't block startup even if the DSN is bad).\n- internal/config/config.go — new IssuerDBDSN field (ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE takes precedence over ISSUER_DB_DSN, generalized resolveDSNFrom helper replacing the old DB-specific resolveDSN); removed QAClientID/QAClientSecretFile/QAClientScope/QAClientAudience (the earlier auto-seed approach, now superseded by Priya's out-of-band-runbook ruling).\n- Tests: internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go, clientstore_test.go, clientstore_pg_test.go (real-Postgres integration, gated behind TEST_POSTGRES_DSN env var — I ran this manually against a throwaway postgres:16-alpine container and it passed), signingkey_test.go, jwksendpoint_test.go, issuer_verifier_integration_test.go (mints a token with NewTokenHandler and verifies it through LT-40's REAL NewJWTMiddleware fetching the signing key over a real HTTP JWKS endpoint via httptest.Server — not mocks on both sides).\n\nPlease actually run `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, and `go test ./...` yourself in that worktree first, then review for:\n1. Does the timing-parity claim actually hold in tokenhandler.go — is there any path where an unknown client_id, a found-but-secretless client, and a wrong-secret-for-a-known-client take genuinely different amounts of work before the outcome is decided (e.g. an extra map lookup, a different number of allocations, a short-circuit)?\n2. Is parsePostgresTextArray's restricted-grammar approach (plain unquoted elements only) actually safe given the CHECK-constrained value domain, or is there a way a legitimate row could still produce something it mis-parses or silently gets wrong (not just errors on)?\n3. LoadSigningKey's PEM/PKCS1-then-PKCS8 fallback and kid derivation — any correctness issue, or a way this could produce two different kids for what should be the same key (e.g. across a redeploy with the same key file)?\n4. The store==nil and issuerDB==nil fail-closed paths — actually safe, or any path to a nil-pointer panic instead of the intended server_error response?\n5. GrantLimiter wiring order (Allow -> store.Get -> verify -> RecordFailure/RecordSuccess) — correct per GrantLimiter's own doc comment (Allow before authentication, RecordFailure/RecordSuccess after)?\n6. Anything else a careful Go reviewer would flag: error handling, nullability, off-by-one, idiom, naming, doc-comment accuracy — this is explicitly your usual review lens for this track.\n\nReport your findings in plain prose to Renata Cole (03 lead), the way you'd normally report a review — not a formal template. If everything holds up, say so plainly; don't manufacture findings to seem thorough."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: aa63c0ce7b1ea5d53 (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'aa63c0ce7b1ea5d53', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/aa63c0ce7b1ea5d53.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"description": "Nolan review of PR #34 LT-51 token grant",
"subagent_type": "nolan-reyes",
"prompt": "Review PR #34 on github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome, branch feature/LT-51, for track 03-engineering-delivery, from your usual production-failure-mode/token-lifecycle lens. This implements LT-51: a real OAuth2 client-credentials grant (RFC 6749 §4.4) at POST /auth/token, a real GET /.well-known/jwks.json, and a Postgres-backed client store, replacing an earlier in-process design after Priya Nandakumar (05) ruled the client store must be a real, persistent Postgres database (a separate `issuer` database) — QA client seeding is explicitly out-of-band (a runbook 04 owns), never a migration or application code. The worktree is at /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 (branch feature/LT-51, based on origin/main).\n\nYou previously found real production bugs in this track's LT-40 work (JWKS fetch ignoring context/timeout, lock held during I/O, unbounded map growth, a per-kid rate-limit starvation vulnerability) — bring that same lens here.\n\nKey files (new unless noted):\n- migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql — oauth_client table: client_id PK with a charset CHECK, client_secret_hash nullable + secret_state (none/set/revoked) with a tying CHECK, granted_scopes TEXT[] constrained to exactly 1 element, audience, status (active/disabled), created_at/updated_at. No PII columns, no retention sweep on this table (deliberate — it's not a person's data).\n- internal/api/clientstore.go — Argon2id hashSecret/verifySecret (constant-time via crypto/subtle), a fixed dummyHash computed once at package init from a hardcoded plaintext, PostgresClientStore.Get querying via database/sql (pgx), with a hand-rolled parsePostgresTextArray for the TEXT[] column (deliberately restricted to plain unquoted elements — this project's scope values never contain commas/braces/quotes).\n- internal/api/tokenhandler.go — NewTokenHandler: GrantLimiter.Allow gates before ever touching the client store; store.Get; secret comparison branch is `if found && rec.ClientSecretHash != \"\" { verify against real hash } else { verify against dummyHash; fail }` — this covers unknown client_id, found-but-secret_state!=set, AND found-but-wrong-secret uniformly for timing purposes; RecordFailure/RecordSuccess after; mints an RS256 JWT via jwt/v5 with a 10-minute fixed TTL, no refresh tokens (by design — client re-authenticates with its own secret on expiry).\n- internal/api/signingkey.go — LoadSigningKey: reads a PEM file, tries PKCS1 then PKCS8, derives a kid deterministically from sha256(marshaled public key DER), so the kid should be stable across process restarts as long as the underlying key file doesn't change.\n- internal/app/issuer_router.go (new) — NewIssuerRouter: constructs a fresh InProcessGrantLimiter per process (in-process, not shared across replicas — same limitation the rest of this codebase's rate-limiting components have, by the same \"mechanism is this track's call\" reasoning) with hardcoded backoff constants (base 1s, max 5m, alert threshold 5 consecutive failures) that are an engineering default, not a 02-ruled number. Builds a PostgresClientStore over a *sql.DB that main.go opens once at process startup and keeps for the process's whole lifetime.\n- cmd/api-service/main.go — ModeIssuer: LoadSigningKey failure is Fatal (process won't start at all without a valid signing key — no partial-degraded story here, unlike the DB-repository nil-fallback pattern used elsewhere in this codebase); the issuer *sql.DB is opened once (sql.Open never dials) and handed to NewIssuerRouter — if the issuer database is down at that moment, or later goes down mid-process-lifetime, what actually happens to in-flight /auth/token requests?\n- Tests already added: tokenhandler_test.go (RFC 6749 shapes, byte-identical error bodies, GrantLimiter-deny-before-store-touch ordering, nil-store fail-closed), clientstore_pg_test.go (real Postgres via TEST_POSTGRES_DSN, migration + CHECK constraints + Get all verified against a real throwaway container already), signingkey_test.go (kid stability across reloads), issuer_verifier_integration_test.go (real mint through real LT-40 JWT middleware over a real JWKS HTTP fetch).\n\nPlease run `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, and `go test ./...` yourself in that worktree, then focus on:\n1. Token lifecycle/production-failure-mode concerns: what happens when the issuer's Postgres connection is lost mid-process (not at startup, but hours into running)? Does *sql.DB's own pooling/retry behavior make /auth/token degrade sanely (503-ish server_error per request) or is there a failure mode (goroutine pile-up, hung requests, connection exhaustion) this doesn't guard against? Compare against how LT-40 handles a similar DB-loss scenario for the verifier side (nil-repo fail-closed pattern) — is there an equivalent gap here for the issuer side that wasn't caught?\n2. GrantLimiter is in-process and per-replica (not shared) — is that a real production gap worth flagging now, or an acceptable, already-understood limitation given every other rate-limiting/backoff component in this codebase makes the same trade-off? Does the PR/code say so explicitly, or does it read as if backed by something more robust than it is?\n3. The 10-minute fixed token TTL with no refresh mechanism, no revocation beyond flipping oauth_client.status to 'disabled' or secret_state to 'revoked' at the row level — does the code correctly ensure a revoked/disabled client's ALREADY-ISSUED tokens still verify successfully until they expire (this is a deliberate design point per the refinement doc, not a bug) — confirm this is actually true given how AuthContext/JWTMiddleware works, since a naive implementation might accidentally check client status per-request somewhere it shouldn't.\n4. Does opening the issuer *sql.DB once at process start (not per-request) create any resource leak or connection-pool starvation risk over a long process lifetime, especially combined with the GrantLimiter's own in-memory backoff state also living for the process's full lifetime?\n5. Kid derivation and rotation: if the signing key file is ever rotated (new key deployed), does the kid change correctly, and is there any window where tokens signed with an old kid become unverifiable in a way that's worse than what LT-40's kid-rotation support already handles gracefully (LT-40 supports multiple kids in the JWKS response simultaneously) — or is this entirely outside this PR's scope because JWKS serving here only ever serves ONE key at a time (single-key issuer, not multi-key)? If it's single-key-only, is that a real production gap (no zero-downtime key rotation possible) worth naming explicitly, even if out of scope to fix now?\n6. Anything else from your usual pattern-matching on production failure modes.\n\nReport your findings in plain prose to Renata Cole (03 lead), as you'd normally report a review. If everything holds up as a reasonable take-home-scope trade-off, say so plainly — distinguish \"this is a real bug\" from \"this is a known, acceptable scope limitation that should just be named explicitly,\" since those get different treatment."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: a4d8df4cad0580c2e (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'a4d8df4cad0580c2e', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/a4d8df4cad0580c2e.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"to": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"summary": "LT-51 PR #34 ready for 02 cold review",
"message": "LT-51 (OAuth2 client-credentials grant + Postgres-backed client store) is up as PR #34: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/34. Following the LT-40 pattern, requesting a 02 cold review (Tomasz or Ingrid, your call) once Oren/Nolan's internal review posts.\n\nWorth an adversarial look specifically at: (1) the timing-parity claim in tokenhandler.go — unknown client_id, found-but-no-secret-set, and wrong-secret-for-known-client all route through the same single Argon2id comparison (real hash or fixed dummyHash) before deciding invalid_client, per Tobias's objection in the refinement doc; (2) the GrantLimiter wiring order (Allow gates before the store is ever touched); (3) whether a disabled/revoked client's already-issued tokens correctly keep verifying until natural expiry (deliberate design per the refinement doc's non-goals — no revocation beyond TTL — want a second pair of eyes confirming nothing accidentally re-checks status per-request against LT-40's JWTMiddleware). Oren/Nolan reviews are running now; will ping again once posted.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "02-ai-security-architecture-a2",
"content": "LT-51 (OAuth2 client-credentials grant + Postgres…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“LT-51 PR #34 ready for 02 cold review” → 02-ai-security-architecture-a2 (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"8fef31cd-5402-4171-a2ba-17412598e2fd"}{
"to": "data-ops-planning-phase",
"summary": "LT-51 DDL up for your review — name/audience columns beyond your ruling",
"message": "LT-51's oauth_client DDL is up in PR #34 (https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/34), migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql. Built to your ruling: separate issuer database, client_id charset CHECK (A4 not applied), secret_state (none/set/revoked) with a CHECK tying it to whether client_secret_hash is NULL, granted_scopes TEXT[], status (active/disabled), no PII, created_at/updated_at.\n\nTwo additions beyond what you explicitly named, flagging as amendments rather than assuming they're fine:\n1. `name TEXT NOT NULL` — a human-readable label for the client application, for anyone reading the table directly. Not PII (identifies an app, not a person).\n2. `audience TEXT NOT NULL` — needed per-client because idp-connector and api-service are different JWT audiences; without it there's no way to know which `aud` claim a given client's tokens should carry.\n\nAlso tightened granted_scopes's CHECK to require exactly 1 element (not just nonempty), matching this project's existing single-scope-per-credential commitment.\n\nWould appreciate your review against the universal half of ddl-review-checklist.md whenever convenient — this is the last piece before LT-51 can go through Oren/Nolan/02 review and merge. QA seeding is untouched by application code, per your ruling — Theo's runbook owns that.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "data-ops-planning-phase",
"content": "LT-51's oauth_client DDL is up in PR #34 (https:/…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“LT-51 DDL up for your review — name/audience columns beyond your ruling” → data-ops-planning-phase (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"4093b82f-dd23-4aa2-bba5-9ec1dea41852"}{
"command": "gh pr view 33 --json state,mergedAt 2>&1",
"description": "Check PR #33 merge status"
}{"mergedAt":"2026-09-13T12:19:38Z","state":"MERGED"}{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"offset": 130,
"limit": 30
}130 // commitment.
131 type ClientStore interface {
132 // Get returns the record for clientID, ok=false if no such client
133 // exists at all (a different outcome from an inactive client, which
134 // Get still returns — the token handler decides what "not usable"
135 // means, this interface only reports what's on file).
136 Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (rec ClientRecord, ok bool, err error)
137 }
138
139 // PostgresClientStore is a real, persistent ClientStore backed by the
140 // issuer database's oauth_client table (migrations/issuer/
141 // 00001_initial_schema.sql). Constructed once at startup from a *sql.DB
142 // dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — always the "pgx" driver,
143 // since the issuer database has no SQLite/CockroachDB peer to abstract
144 // over (unlike 05's main DAO schema), so this reaches for
145 // database/sql directly rather than routing through dao.New's
146 // multi-backend factory, which was never asked to know about this
147 // table.
148 type PostgresClientStore struct {
149 db *sql.DB
150 }
151
152 // NewPostgresClientStore wraps an already-opened *sql.DB. Opening (and
153 // its lifetime) is cmd/api-service/main.go's responsibility, same
154 // pattern as LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle — this type never
155 // calls sql.Open itself.
156 func NewPostgresClientStore(db *sql.DB) *PostgresClientStore {
157 return &PostgresClientStore{db: db}
158 }
159 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "// PostgresClientStore is a real, persistent ClientStore backed by the\n// issuer database's oauth_client table (migrations/issuer/\n// 00001_initial_schema.sql). Constructed once at startup from a *sql.DB\n// dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — always the \"pgx\" driver,\n// since the issuer database has no SQLite/CockroachDB peer to abstract\n// over (unlike 05's main DAO schema), so this reaches for\n// database/sql directly rather than routing through dao.New's\n// multi-backend factory, which was never asked to know about this\n// table.\ntype PostgresClientStore struct {\n\tdb *sql.DB\n}",
"new_string": "// clientStoreQueryTimeout bounds every Get call against the issuer\n// database independently of whatever's left on the caller's context —\n// Nolan Reyes's review of this story: an issuer database that goes away\n// mid-process-lifetime (not just \"absent at startup\", which is the\n// case NewIssuerRouter's nil-store fail-closed path already covers)\n// must not leave /auth/token requests blocked indefinitely on a dial or\n// query against a dead connection. This is the query-side half of that\n// fix; NewPostgresClientStore's *sql.DB pool bounds (set by\n// cmd/api-service/main.go) are the other half.\nconst clientStoreQueryTimeout = 3 * time.Second\n\n// PostgresClientStore is a real, persistent ClientStore backed by the\n// issuer database's oauth_client table (migrations/issuer/\n// 00001_initial_schema.sql). Constructed once at startup from a *sql.DB\n// dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — always the \"pgx\" driver,\n// since the issuer database has no SQLite/CockroachDB peer to abstract\n// over (unlike 05's main DAO schema), so this reaches for\n// database/sql directly rather than routing through dao.New's\n// multi-backend factory, which was never asked to know about this\n// table.\ntype PostgresClientStore struct {\n\tdb *sql.DB\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"^import\\|\\\"strings\\\"\\|\\\"errors\\\"\" internal/api/clientstore.go | head -5",
"description": "Check current imports in clientstore.go"
}20:import ( 26: "errors" 28: "strings" Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"",
"new_string": "\t\"errors\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\""
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"offset": 160,
"limit": 30
}160 type PostgresClientStore struct {
161 db *sql.DB
162 }
163
164 // NewPostgresClientStore wraps an already-opened *sql.DB. Opening (and
165 // its lifetime) is cmd/api-service/main.go's responsibility, same
166 // pattern as LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle — this type never
167 // calls sql.Open itself.
168 func NewPostgresClientStore(db *sql.DB) *PostgresClientStore {
169 return &PostgresClientStore{db: db}
170 }
171
172 // Get deliberately does not distinguish "no such client_id",
173 // "provisioned but secret_state != 'set'", or "status = 'disabled'" in
174 // its ok/err results — all three come back as ok=true with whatever's
175 // on file (or ok=false only for a genuinely absent row), and it's
176 // tokenhandler.go's job to decide what counts as usable. This keeps
177 // every one of those states on the same code path through
178 // verifySecret/dummyHash, so none of them becomes a second timing
179 // signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash already closes.
180 func (s *PostgresClientStore) Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {
181 var rec ClientRecord
182 var secretHash sql.NullString
183 var scopesRaw string
184 var status string
185
186 row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
187 SELECT client_id, name, client_secret_hash, granted_scopes, audience, status
188 FROM oauth_client
189 WHERE client_id = $1{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "func (s *PostgresClientStore) Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {\n\tvar rec ClientRecord\n\tvar secretHash sql.NullString\n\tvar scopesRaw string\n\tvar status string\n\n\trow := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `",
"new_string": "func (s *PostgresClientStore) Get(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRecord, bool, error) {\n\tvar rec ClientRecord\n\tvar secretHash sql.NullString\n\tvar scopesRaw string\n\tvar status string\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, clientStoreQueryTimeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\trow := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go",
"old_string": "// Get deliberately does not distinguish \"no such client_id\",\n// \"provisioned but secret_state != 'set'\", or \"status = 'disabled'\" in\n// its ok/err results — all three come back as ok=true with whatever's\n// on file (or ok=false only for a genuinely absent row), and it's\n// tokenhandler.go's job to decide what counts as usable. This keeps\n// every one of those states on the same code path through\n// verifySecret/dummyHash, so none of them becomes a second timing\n// signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash already closes.",
"new_string": "// Get deliberately does not distinguish \"no such client_id\",\n// \"provisioned but secret_state != 'set'\", or \"status = 'disabled'\" in\n// its ok/err results — all three come back as ok=true with whatever's\n// on file (or ok=false only for a genuinely absent row), and it's\n// tokenhandler.go's job to decide what counts as usable. This keeps\n// every one of those states on the same code path through\n// verifySecret/dummyHash, so none of them becomes a second timing\n// signal alongside the unknown-client_id one dummyHash already closes.\n//\n// This method's own internal work is NOT perfectly symmetric between a\n// found and not-found row (a found row does a full Scan plus\n// parsePostgresTextArray; sql.ErrNoRows returns immediately) — negligible\n// today only by construction, since Argon2id's ~64 MiB cost in\n// verifySecret dwarfs a single indexed lookup and parsing a few bytes\n// (Oren Castellan, PR #34 review). If Get ever grows real additional\n// work on the found path (e.g. a join), re-examine whether that gap is\n// still negligible before assuming the timing-parity invariant still\n// holds on tokenhandler.go's say-so alone."
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"var store api.ClientStore\" -A4 internal/app/issuer_router.go",
"description": "Locate nil-store construction site"
}62: var store api.ClientStore
63- if issuerDB != nil {
64- store = api.NewPostgresClientStore(issuerDB)
65- }
66- mux.Handle("POST /auth/token", api.NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer))
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/app/issuer_router.go",
"old_string": "\tvar store api.ClientStore\n\tif issuerDB != nil {\n\t\tstore = api.NewPostgresClientStore(issuerDB)\n\t}\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /auth/token\", api.NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer))",
"new_string": "\t// store MUST stay a genuinely nil interface value when issuerDB is\n\t// nil, not a typed nil *PostgresClientStore boxed into a non-nil\n\t// ClientStore — tokenhandler.go's `store == nil` fail-closed check\n\t// only works because of exactly this construction (Oren Castellan,\n\t// PR #34 review). Do not \"simplify\" this to an unconditional\n\t// api.NewPostgresClientStore(issuerDB) call — that would silently\n\t// defeat the nil check with a non-nil interface wrapping a nil *sql.DB.\n\tvar store api.ClientStore\n\tif issuerDB != nil {\n\t\tstore = api.NewPostgresClientStore(issuerDB)\n\t}\n\tmux.Handle(\"POST /auth/token\", api.NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, key, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer))"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/app/issuer_router.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"Scope(\" internal/api/auth.go | head -10",
"description": "Find the 4 canonical scope literal values"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"Scope\\b\" internal/api/auth.go | head -20",
"description": "Find Scope type definition and constants"
}16:// Scope is the token's authorized action, from handoff-03-auth.md v3's 17:// closed vocabulary (§ "Scope vocabulary"). A typed string rather than a 20:type Scope string 26: ScopeReadOwn Scope = "profile:read:own" 30: ScopeReadAny Scope = "profile:read:any" 33: ScopeSearch Scope = "profile:search" 39:// claim); Scope is the single scope this request is being made under — 41:// disambiguated per-request, so one request carries exactly one Scope. 44: Scope Scope 102: Authorize(ctx context.Context, sub string, scope Scope, target string) (bool, error) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "grep -n -A15 \"Scope vocabulary\\|scope vocabulary\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md | head -30",
"description": "Find full closed scope vocabulary from handoff doc"
}57:## Scope vocabulary (final, from S4 — `decisions/search-authz-scoping.md`) 58- 59-| Scope | Authorizes | Does not authorize | Object-level check | 60-|---|---|---|---| 61-| `profile:read:own` | Retrieve a single record by id the caller already holds a legitimate reference to (e.g., a partner resolving a referred user) | Search/query by name or phone fragment; retrieval of a record outside the caller's referral relationship | `target.id` checked against the `caller_referral` mapping (see "Where `caller_referral` and the caller-role table live," below); out-of-set → reject, logged as a policy denial, distinct from an auth failure | 62-| `profile:read:any` | Retrieve a single record by id, no referral constraint | Search/query by fragment | Requires a `reason_code` from a closed enum (below) on every request, logged with the audit record | 63-| `profile:search` | Query by name/phone fragment across the table | — (this is the broadest scope; there is no broader one) | Result cap enforced; a query that would exceed it unconstrained (e.g., bare wildcard) is rejected outright, not truncated | 64- 65-`reason_code` enum for `profile:read:any` (closed, versioned — adding a value is a documented change, not a runtime config toggle): `support_ticket`, `fraud_review`, `kyc_reverification`, `legal_hold`. 66- 67-**Object-level policy hook implementation shape:** a function `authorize(sub, scope, target) -> allow|deny`, called after scope validation, before the handler executes the query/retrieve. This is a second check, not a replacement for the scope check — a valid `profile:read:own` token can still fail `authorize()` if the target isn't in the caller's referral set. **Confirmed placement (per your reply): an explicit call inside each handler right after parsing the request and before the DAO call, not a second middleware** — correct, since `authorize()` needs the parsed target id, which a pre-routing middleware doesn't have. **Enforcement site for the `profile:search` result cap: the same in-handler call site, checked before the query is built** — a query that would exceed the cap unconstrained is rejected there, not truncated after the DAO returns rows. 68- 69-**Where `caller_referral` and the caller-role table live (resolves F8 — this data was previously asserted as "owned by `../05-data-ops/`" without 05 ever having received that assignment; 05's schema has no such table and shouldn't grow one for this).** Both live in the token-issuing authorization server's own datastore (the same one that holds the hashed `client_secret`s per `handoff-04-secrets.md` row #4), not in `05-data-ops`'s `user_profile`/`user_credential` schema. This is authorization-provisioning data — who a client credential is allowed to act on behalf of — not subject data, and keeping it out of 05's schema also keeps it out of that schema's PII-governance/retention rules, which don't apply to it. 05 owns nothing here; this hand-off's earlier wording was wrong to say otherwise. 70- 71-**Response shape and masking (resolves F6 — 01's product requirement had no mechanism to bind to).** `profile:search` responses carry masked PII fields by default (e.g., a phone shown as `***-***-1234`, an address reduced to `locality`/`region` only) — unmasked, full-field detail is obtained only by a follow-up call under `profile:read:own` or `profile:read:any` against the specific record id returned by the search, which is its own separately-audited call per the audit-log section below. This uses scopes that already exist rather than inventing a fourth "expand" concept: masking is a `profile:search`-response property, not a per-call flag, and "tighter than search" is satisfied structurally because `read:own`/`read:any` are already narrower-provisioned scopes than `search`. 72- -- 101:- **Scope vocabulary and provisioning bars** — decided in S4 (`decisions/search-authz-scoping.md`); if a real implementation constraint makes one of these unworkable, flag it back to me rather than adjusting it unilaterally. 102-- **The `DB_DSN_FILE` convention** — per `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s S7 revision, this track is asking you to add a file-based alternative to `DB_DSN` (env var becomes a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option), because a DSN's embedded password is exposed by `kubectl describe`/crash dumps/child-process environment the same as any other secret in that inventory. This is a request into your config surface, not a unilateral change on my part — you decide the exact mechanism (a `_FILE` suffix convention or otherwise), I'm asserting the requirement. 103-- **Password/client-secret hashing** — Argon2id, decided in `threat-model.md` Asset 1; not this hand-off's concern beyond noting it exists. 104-- **PII retention/caching duration for anything the API returns** — `../05-data-ops/CLAUDE.md`'s call, not this track's or yours. 105-- **Whether `read:any` ever gets issued to a real caller** — per S4, the scope stays defined but unissued unless a caller clears the provisioning bar (caller-role table entry, named approver). Don't wire a default grant "just in case." 106- 107-## Open question back to you 108- 109-Nothing blocking. One thing worth a quick confirm when convenient: does your `internal/api/` middleware layer have a natural place to run the object-level `authorize()` check as a distinct step from scope validation (e.g., a second middleware or an explicit call inside each handler before the DAO call), or would you rather this track propose a specific Go interface shape for it? Either is fine — say which you'd find more useful and I'll adjust. 110- 111---- 112-Model: sonnet (Marcus Ilori, lead — compiled directly from S4's ruling, no new debate). Turns consumed: 0 hire turns (synthesis of already-ruled decisions per `PLAN.md` S6).
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"offset": 68,
"limit": 50
}68 func NewTokenHandler(store ClientStore, limiter GrantLimiter, key *SigningKey, issuer string) http.HandlerFunc {
69 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
70 ctx := r.Context()
71
72 // store is nil when the issuer database was never configured
73 // (config.Config.IssuerDBDSN empty) — fail every grant closed
74 // with server_error rather than panic on a nil ClientStore, the
75 // same fail-closed shape NewVerifierRouter uses for a nil
76 // dao.Repository. This deliberately runs before ParseForm/
77 // BasicAuth so a misconfigured issuer fails identically for
78 // every request shape, not just the ones that get far enough to
79 // reach store.Get.
80 if store == nil {
81 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
82 return
83 }
84
85 // RFC 6749 §4.4: form-encoded, not JSON. r.ParseForm reads the
86 // body as application/x-www-form-urlencoded regardless of a
87 // caller's declared Content-Type, which is deliberately
88 // permissive here — this handler's job is accepting the one wire
89 // format the spec names, not policing a header a legitimate
90 // client-credentials implementation might send inconsistently.
91 if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
92 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request")
93 return
94 }
95 if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "client_credentials" {
96 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type")
97 return
98 }
99
100 clientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()
101 if !hasBasicAuth {
102 // No Authorization header at all: reject before ever
103 // touching the client store or GrantLimiter — there is no
104 // client_id yet to key either by.
105 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client")
106 return
107 }
108
109 sourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)
110
111 allowed, err := limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
112 if err != nil {
113 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
114 return
115 }
116 if !allowed {
117 // RFC 6749 doesn't name a status for endpoint-level{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "\t\tclientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()\n\t\tif !hasBasicAuth {\n\t\t\t// No Authorization header at all: reject before ever\n\t\t\t// touching the client store or GrantLimiter — there is no\n\t\t\t// client_id yet to key either by.\n\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, \"invalid_client\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)\n\n\t\tallowed, err := limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, \"server_error\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !allowed {",
"new_string": "\t\tclientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()\n\t\tsourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)\n\n\t\t// GrantLimiter gates BEFORE the hasBasicAuth check, not after —\n\t\t// sourceIP is available regardless of whether a caller sent any\n\t\t// credentials at all, and a request with no Authorization header\n\t\t// is exactly as capable of flooding this endpoint as one with a\n\t\t// wrong client_id (Helena Marsh, 02 review of PR #34). clientID\n\t\t// is \"\" on this path; GrantLimiter treats it as an ordinary\n\t\t// (empty) key like any other, and the per-source-IP half of the\n\t\t// gate is what actually matters here since there's no client_id\n\t\t// yet to distinguish attempts by.\n\t\tallowed, err := limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, \"server_error\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif !allowed {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"offset": 109,
"limit": 45
}109 // (empty) key like any other, and the per-source-IP half of the
110 // gate is what actually matters here since there's no client_id
111 // yet to distinguish attempts by.
112 allowed, err := limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
113 if err != nil {
114 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
115 return
116 }
117 if !allowed {
118 // RFC 6749 doesn't name a status for endpoint-level
119 // throttling (it's a brute-force control this project adds
120 // on top of the spec, not part of it) — 429 matches this
121 // API's own convention elsewhere (internal/api/ratelimit.go,
122 // internal/api/touchcounter.go) for the same class of
123 // decision.
124 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "slow_down")
125 return
126 }
127
128 rec, found, err := store.Get(ctx, clientID)
129 if err != nil {
130 writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
131 return
132 }
133
134 // Both branches run the SAME Argon2id comparison at the SAME
135 // cost before deciding anything — a found client with a real
136 // secret on file (secret_state = "set") compares against its own
137 // hash; every other case (client_id not found at all, OR found
138 // but secret_state is "none"/"revoked" and ClientSecretHash is
139 // empty) compares against the fixed dummyHash instead of
140 // skipping the comparison or short-circuiting on a malformed
141 // hash. Whichever branch runs, exactly one verifySecret call
142 // happens before the outcome is known, so an unknown client_id,
143 // a not-yet-secreted or revoked client, and a wrong secret for a
144 // fully provisioned one all take statistically indistinguishable
145 // time (Tobias Lindqvist's objection, LT-51 refinement) —
146 // closing the timing side-channel the identical response body
147 // alone leaves open.
148 var secretOK bool
149 if found && rec.ClientSecretHash != "" {
150 secretOK = verifySecret(clientSecret, rec.ClientSecretHash)
151 } else {
152 _ = verifySecret(clientSecret, dummyHash)
153 secretOK = false{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"old_string": "\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, \"slow_down\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trec, found, err := store.Get(ctx, clientID)",
"new_string": "\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, \"slow_down\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif !hasBasicAuth {\n\t\t\t// No Authorization header at all: reject before ever\n\t\t\t// touching the client store — there is no client_id to key\n\t\t\t// a store lookup by. RecordFailure still fires (keyed by\n\t\t\t// sourceIP; clientID is \"\") so repeated no-credential\n\t\t\t// requests still advance that source IP's backoff, same as\n\t\t\t// any other failed attempt.\n\t\t\tlimiter.RecordFailure(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)\n\t\t\twriteTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, \"invalid_client\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\trec, found, err := store.Get(ctx, clientID)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Build/vet/test after applying all four review fixes"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.130s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.487s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "gh pr view 34 --comments 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Check PR #34 comments including Priya's DDL review"
}author: wtvamp
association: owner
edited: false
status: none
--
## 05 Data Ops — DDL review, LT-51 `oauth_client`
Reviewed against the universal half of `ddl-review-checklist.md` and the LT-51 ruling. **One real defect, one design gap, two notes.** Everything else is right, and the constraint naming here is more thorough than my own schema's — every constraint including the primary key is named.
### 1. `ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single` does not do what it says — please fix
```sql
CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) = 1)
```
**`array_length('{}'::text[], 1)` returns NULL**, not 0 — an empty array has no dimension 1. And a CHECK constraint fails only on FALSE; **NULL passes.** So `granted_scopes = '{}'` satisfies this constraint, and a client with *no* scope is insertable by exactly the rule written to prevent it.
The comment says the intent is "exactly one scope, not merely a nonempty set." As written it is neither: it rejects two or more, and admits zero.
```sql
CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single
CHECK (cardinality(granted_scopes) = 1
AND granted_scopes[1] IS NOT NULL
AND length(trim(granted_scopes[1])) > 0)
```
`cardinality` returns 0 for the empty array, so `0 = 1` is FALSE and the row is rejected. The two extra clauses close the neighbouring hole: `ARRAY[NULL]::text[]` and `ARRAY['']::text[]` both have cardinality 1 and would otherwise pass, giving a client one scope that is not a scope.
This is the A6 rule landing on a new table: **the accepted set is what the expression accepts, not what the comment says it accepts.** Worth checking by insertion rather than by reading — `INSERT … granted_scopes = '{}'` is a two-line test.
### 2. `updated_at` has no mechanism to ever update
Defaulted to `now()` and never touched again by anything in this DDL — no trigger, and unlike the main DAO, no contract clause making the writing layer responsible. Secret rotation and disabling are the two things that will happen to these rows, and both are exactly what `updated_at` exists to record. As it stands it will equal `created_at` for the lifetime of every row, which is worse than not having the column: a reader will reasonably believe it means something.
Either a `BEFORE UPDATE` trigger setting `updated_at = now()`, or an explicit statement that the issuer's write path sets it — with the second recorded somewhere the issuer's author will see it. I don't mind which; I mind that neither exists.
### 3. `name` was already in the ruling — not an amendment
Flagging it was the right instinct, but my LT-51 message specified `name TEXT NOT NULL, non-empty CHECK`. Nothing to approve; it is implemented as ruled.
### 4. `audience` — accepted, with the asymmetry noted
Correct addition and correctly reasoned: `idp-connector` and `api-service` are different audiences, and without a per-client value there is nothing to put in `aud`. Not PII. Approved as an amendment.
One thing to record rather than change: **`granted_scopes` is an array constrained to exactly one element, while `audience` is a scalar** — both are "exactly one," expressed two different ways. That is defensible (scope is conceptually a set that may later admit more; audience is not), but if the single-scope commitment ever relaxes, the scope CHECK is the thing that changes and `audience` is the thing someone will forget to reconsider. A line in the comment naming that would help.
### 5. `client_id` is case-sensitive — say so
`TEXT` primary key with a charset CHECK, so `Client-A` and `client-a` are **distinct rows**. That is normal for OAuth client identifiers and I am not asking for a change — but `user_credential.username` in the main schema is case-*folded* for uniqueness, so a reader moving between the two schemas has every reason to assume the same rule applies here. One comment line prevents someone "fixing" the inconsistency later.
### Passes
Separate `issuer` database with its own version table and DSN, as ruled — the structural-impossibility argument for the cross-database join is recorded accurately. Every constraint named. `secret_state` present with a tying CHECK, and correctly simpler than `user_credential`'s since an Argon2id PHC string is self-describing and needs no `hash_algo`/`hash_cost`. `client_id` charset matches the ruling, and A4 is correctly *not* applied, with the reason stated. `TEXT[]` deliberately PostgreSQL-only, reason recorded. No PII columns, no retention clock, and the contrast with the main schema is written down. `goose Down` present. No `NO TRANSACTION` needed — this is a fresh `CREATE TABLE`, not a `DROP`+`ADD`.
**Verdict:** fix finding 1, resolve finding 2 either way, add the two comment lines, and this is approved from 05.
---
**Work-By:** Priya Nandakumar (05 Data Ops lead, Claude Opus 5) — DDL review against the universal checklist items and the LT-51 ruling.
--
author: wtvamp
association: owner
edited: false
status: none
--
## Independent review — PR #34 (LT-51: OAuth2 client-credentials token handler + Postgres client store)
**1. Timing-parity for `invalid_client` — confirmed in code, not just claimed.** After the `grant_type`/Basic-Auth-presence gate (unrelated to the three named cases — those all require *some* client_id to be supplied) and after `limiter.Allow`, `store.Get` runs unconditionally, and the branch that follows is the load-bearing one:
```go
if found && rec.ClientSecretHash != "" {
secretOK = verifySecret(clientSecret, rec.ClientSecretHash)
} else {
_ = verifySecret(clientSecret, dummyHash)
secretOK = false
}
```
There is no early return based on `found` before this block — unknown `client_id`, found-but-`secret_state=none`, and found-with-wrong-secret all reach exactly one `verifySecret` call, against the real hash or the fixed-cost `dummyHash`, before the shared `invalid_client` response is written. `TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses` asserts byte-identical bodies for two of the three; `TestNewTokenHandler_FoundButNoSecretSet_TreatedSameAsNotFound` covers the third reaching the same terminal branch. `dummyHash` is verified to use the same Argon2id cost profile as real hashes, which is the actual thing that makes the comparison cost equal, not merely its presence. This closes RFC 6749 §5.2's content side-channel and the timing one Tobias's objection named. Confirmed, no gap.
**2. `GrantLimiter` wiring order — confirmed correct.** `limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)` runs before `store.Get`, and `TestNewTokenHandler_LimiterDenies_SlowDown429` proves it directly (`store.gotIDs` stays empty when the limiter denies). Rate limiting gates before the store and before any Argon2id comparison — both the DoS control and the timing-signal concern are addressed together, as intended.
**3. Revoked-client tokens verify until natural TTL expiry — confirmed as designed, no accidental coupling.** This PR introduces `ClientStore` but never wires it into `JWTMiddleware`; the integration test constructs `NewJWTMiddleware(keys, issuer, audience, auditLogger)` with no `ClientStore` argument at all — the constructor's own signature makes a per-request store lookup structurally impossible, not merely unexercised in this diff. The TTL-only revocation design stands, and the `jti` claim is explicitly commented as audit-correlation only, never denylist-checked. Correct.
**Two additional findings from my own read:**
- **A no-Basic-Auth request never reaches `limiter.Allow`.** The handler returns 401 before computing `sourceIP` or touching the limiter at all when `hasBasicAuth` is false. `sourceIP` doesn't require a `client_id` to key by — an attacker sending zero Authorization headers can flood `/auth/token` at line rate, paying only a `ParseForm` + JSON-encode cost, entirely outside this endpoint's own rate limiter. Recommend counting this against the per-source-IP limiter before returning, since IP is available at that point regardless of whether Basic Auth was supplied.
- **`NewInProcessGrantLimiter` is per-pod state.** Fine for a single issuer replica; if the issuer Deployment ever scales beyond one pod, per-`client_id`/per-IP backoff is trivially bypassed by round-robining across pods. Flagged in the code itself as "for 02's review" — I'm ruling it acceptable for this take-home's single-replica lab scope, but it should be named as a scaling caveat rather than silently assumed to hold at any replica count.
No blocking findings on the three questions asked. Approve, with the two additional notes above as follow-ups, not blockers.
---
Independent review: Helena Marsh (02 Principled Architect) — approve. Timing-parity for `invalid_client` (unknown client_id / no-secret-set / wrong-secret) confirmed by code inspection and test (`TestNewTokenHandler_UnknownClient_And_WrongSecret_ByteIdenticalResponses`): no early-return branch skips the Argon2id comparison, `dummyHash` shares the real cost profile. `GrantLimiter.Allow` confirmed gating before the client store and before any comparison (`TestNewTokenHandler_LimiterDenies_SlowDown429`). Revoked-client-tokens-verify-until-TTL confirmed structurally, not just by omission — `NewJWTMiddleware`'s constructor takes no `ClientStore`, so a per-request status recheck is impossible, not merely unwired. Two non-blocking follow-ups: (1) requests with no Authorization header bypass `GrantLimiter` entirely since `sourceIP`/`Allow` are only reached after the Basic-Auth-presence check — recommend counting these against the per-IP limiter too; (2) `NewInProcessGrantLimiter` is per-pod state, fine at one issuer replica, bypassable by round-robin at more than one — should be named as a scaling caveat if the issuer Deployment is ever scaled out.
--{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql"
}1 -- +goose Up
2 -- The token issuer's client store (LT-51), per Priya Nandakumar's (05)
3 -- ruling on this story: a separate `issuer` database — same PostgreSQL
4 -- instance as the main DAO's database, but a distinct database so a
5 -- cross-database join to user_profile/user_credential is structurally
6 -- impossible, not just policy-forbidden. Its own goose invocation
7 -- (GOOSE_DBSTRING pointed at this database) and its own version table
8 -- (goose_db_version_issuer), run as a third invocation alongside the
9 -- existing backend-directory + shared/ pair (05-data-ops/
10 -- migration-approach.md §"Mechanism 04 needs"). issuer_migrator/
11 -- issuer_runtime roles carry over the same DDL-vs-DML privilege split
12 -- LT-52's postgres-in-namespace.md already established for the main
13 -- database — provisioning those roles is 04's manifest/runbook
14 -- responsibility, not this file's.
15 --
16 -- oauth_client has no PII columns, ever (Priya's ruling) — client_id and
17 -- name identify a machine client application, not a person, so there is
18 -- no retention clock on this table (contrast user_profile/
19 -- user_credential's retention sweep, dao.Repository.DeleteExpired).
20 --
21 -- secret_state mirrors user_credential.secret_state's own lesson (05's
22 -- ruling, cited directly): three states (none/set/revoked) must be
23 -- asserted explicitly by a named CHECK, never collapsed into an
24 -- incidental "hash IS NULL" inference — a row can be `revoked` with a
25 -- NULL hash for a reason distinct from `none` never having had one.
26 --
27 -- client_id's charset CHECK is this table's own identifier rule —
28 -- 05-data-ops/multi-db-strategy.md amendment A4 (canonical UUID
29 -- validation) is explicitly NOT applied here, since client_id is a
30 -- human/CI-assigned slug (e.g. issued by the QA seeding runbook), not a
31 -- generated UUID primary key like every other table in this project.
32 --
33 -- granted_scopes is TEXT[] — deliberately PostgreSQL-only, unlike the
34 -- main DAO schema's portability requirement (05-data-ops/
35 -- multi-db-strategy.md), since the issuer database has no SQLite/
36 -- CockroachDB peer to stay portable against.
37 --
38 -- name and audience are additions beyond Priya's explicitly named column
39 -- list (client_id, client_secret_hash/secret_state, granted_scopes,
40 -- status, created_at/updated_at, no PII) — both operationally necessary
41 -- (name: a human-readable label for which application a row is, for
42 -- anyone reading this table directly; audience: LT-51's token claims
43 -- need a per-client `aud` value, since idp-connector and api-service are
44 -- different audiences) and neither is PII. Flagged explicitly for
45 -- Priya's DDL review rather than assumed silently.
46
47 CREATE TABLE oauth_client (
48 client_id TEXT NOT NULL,
49 name TEXT NOT NULL,
50 client_secret_hash TEXT,
51 secret_state TEXT NOT NULL,
52 granted_scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL,
53 audience TEXT NOT NULL,
54 status TEXT NOT NULL,
55 created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
56 updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
57 CONSTRAINT pk_oauth_client PRIMARY KEY (client_id),
58 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_id_charset CHECK (client_id ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$'),
59 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_name_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(name)) > 0),
60 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state_enum CHECK (secret_state IN ('none', 'set', 'revoked')),
61 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state CHECK (
62 (secret_state = 'set' AND client_secret_hash IS NOT NULL)
63 OR
64 (secret_state IN ('none', 'revoked') AND client_secret_hash IS NULL)
65 ),
66 -- Exactly one scope, not merely a nonempty set: this project's
67 -- provisioning model is one client credential per scope a caller
68 -- needs (decisions/search-authz-scoping.md; LT-40's singleScope
69 -- rejects a multi-scope token outright), so the DB-level invariant
70 -- matches the Go-level one instead of merely allowing it.
71 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) = 1),
72 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_audience_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(audience)) > 0),
73 CONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_status CHECK (status IN ('active', 'disabled'))
74 );
75
76 -- +goose Down
77 DROP TABLE oauth_client;
78 {
"command": "grep -n -i \"trigger\\|updated_at\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/postgres/00001_initial_schema.sql",
"description": "Check if main schema has an updated_at trigger convention already"
}36: updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), 63: updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql",
"old_string": "-- name and audience are additions beyond Priya's explicitly named column\n-- list (client_id, client_secret_hash/secret_state, granted_scopes,\n-- status, created_at/updated_at, no PII) — both operationally necessary\n-- (name: a human-readable label for which application a row is, for\n-- anyone reading this table directly; audience: LT-51's token claims\n-- need a per-client `aud` value, since idp-connector and api-service are\n-- different audiences) and neither is PII. Flagged explicitly for\n-- Priya's DDL review rather than assumed silently.\n\nCREATE TABLE oauth_client (\n\tclient_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tname TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tclient_secret_hash TEXT,\n\tsecret_state TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tgranted_scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL,\n\taudience TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tstatus TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tcreated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tupdated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tCONSTRAINT pk_oauth_client PRIMARY KEY (client_id),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_id_charset CHECK (client_id ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$'),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_name_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(name)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state_enum CHECK (secret_state IN ('none', 'set', 'revoked')),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state CHECK (\n\t\t(secret_state = 'set' AND client_secret_hash IS NOT NULL)\n\t\tOR\n\t\t(secret_state IN ('none', 'revoked') AND client_secret_hash IS NULL)\n\t),\n\t-- Exactly one scope, not merely a nonempty set: this project's\n\t-- provisioning model is one client credential per scope a caller\n\t-- needs (decisions/search-authz-scoping.md; LT-40's singleScope\n\t-- rejects a multi-scope token outright), so the DB-level invariant\n\t-- matches the Go-level one instead of merely allowing it.\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single CHECK (array_length(granted_scopes, 1) = 1),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_audience_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(audience)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_status CHECK (status IN ('active', 'disabled'))\n);\n\n-- +goose Down\nDROP TABLE oauth_client;",
"new_string": "-- name and audience are additions beyond Priya's explicitly named column\n-- list (client_id, client_secret_hash/secret_state, granted_scopes,\n-- status, created_at/updated_at, no PII) — both operationally necessary\n-- (name: a human-readable label for which application a row is, for\n-- anyone reading this table directly; audience: LT-51's token claims\n-- need a per-client `aud` value, since idp-connector and api-service are\n-- different audiences) and neither is PII. Flagged explicitly for\n-- Priya's DDL review rather than assumed silently — she confirmed `name`\n-- was already implicit in her ruling and approved `audience` as a real\n-- amendment (PR #34 review).\n--\n-- client_id is case-SENSITIVE (a plain TEXT primary key, no folding) —\n-- unlike user_credential.username in the main schema, which is\n-- case-folded for uniqueness (its unique index is on LOWER(username)).\n-- Deliberately different, not an inconsistency to \"fix\" later: OAuth2\n-- client identifiers are conventionally case-sensitive, usernames in\n-- this project are not (Priya's review, PR #34).\n--\n-- granted_scopes (an array constrained to exactly one element) and\n-- audience (a scalar) both express the same \"exactly one\" invariant two\n-- different ways — defensible today (scope is conceptually a set that\n-- may later admit more than one; audience conceptually isn't), but if\n-- the single-scope-per-credential commitment (decisions/\n-- search-authz-scoping.md) ever relaxes, ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single\n-- is what changes and audience's own singularity is easy to forget to\n-- reconsider alongside it (Priya's review, PR #34).\n\nCREATE TABLE oauth_client (\n\tclient_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tname TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tclient_secret_hash TEXT,\n\tsecret_state TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tgranted_scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL,\n\taudience TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tstatus TEXT NOT NULL,\n\tcreated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tupdated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n\tCONSTRAINT pk_oauth_client PRIMARY KEY (client_id),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_id_charset CHECK (client_id ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$'),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_name_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(name)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state_enum CHECK (secret_state IN ('none', 'set', 'revoked')),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_secret_state CHECK (\n\t\t(secret_state = 'set' AND client_secret_hash IS NOT NULL)\n\t\tOR\n\t\t(secret_state IN ('none', 'revoked') AND client_secret_hash IS NULL)\n\t),\n\t-- Exactly one scope, not merely a nonempty set: this project's\n\t-- provisioning model is one client credential per scope a caller\n\t-- needs (decisions/search-authz-scoping.md; LT-40's singleScope\n\t-- rejects a multi-scope token outright), so the DB-level invariant\n\t-- matches the Go-level one instead of merely allowing it.\n\t--\n\t-- cardinality(), not array_length(granted_scopes, 1): array_length\n\t-- returns NULL (not 0) for an empty array, and a CHECK passes on\n\t-- NULL — '{}' would have satisfied the original\n\t-- `array_length(granted_scopes, 1) = 1` text despite having zero\n\t-- elements (Priya Nandakumar's review, PR #34: \"the accepted set is\n\t-- what the expression accepts, not what the comment says it\n\t-- accepts\"). The two extra clauses close the neighboring holes\n\t-- cardinality alone wouldn't: ARRAY[NULL]::text[] and ARRAY['']::text[]\n\t-- both have cardinality 1.\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single CHECK (\n\t\tcardinality(granted_scopes) = 1\n\t\tAND granted_scopes[1] IS NOT NULL\n\t\tAND length(trim(granted_scopes[1])) > 0\n\t),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_audience_nonempty CHECK (length(trim(audience)) > 0),\n\tCONSTRAINT ck_oauth_client_status CHECK (status IN ('active', 'disabled'))\n);\n\n-- updated_at has no writing-layer contract to rely on (unlike the main\n-- DAO schema, whose Go Update methods pass now() explicitly) since this\n-- table is written only by 04's out-of-band seeding/rotation runbook,\n-- never application code — a trigger is the only mechanism that can't be\n-- forgotten by whichever runbook step runs next (Priya Nandakumar's\n-- review, PR #34).\nCREATE FUNCTION oauth_client_set_updated_at() RETURNS trigger AS $$\nBEGIN\n\tNEW.updated_at := now();\n\tRETURN NEW;\nEND;\n$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;\n\nCREATE TRIGGER trg_oauth_client_set_updated_at\n\tBEFORE UPDATE ON oauth_client\n\tFOR EACH ROW\n\tEXECUTE FUNCTION oauth_client_set_updated_at();\n\n-- +goose Down\nDROP TRIGGER trg_oauth_client_set_updated_at ON oauth_client;\nDROP FUNCTION oauth_client_set_updated_at();\nDROP TABLE oauth_client;"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"multiple granted_scopes\" internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"description": "Locate the granted_scopes CHECK test case to extend"
}184: name: "multiple granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK", Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"offset": 180,
"limit": 20
}180 name: "secret_state=none with a non-NULL hash violates the tying CHECK",
181 sql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'somehash', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'active')`,
182 },
183 {
184 name: "multiple granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK",
185 sql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search,profile:read:any}', 'aud', 'active')`,
186 },
187 {
188 name: "unrecognized status violates the status enum CHECK",
189 sql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'pending')`,
190 },
191 }
192 for _, c := range cases {
193 t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
194 _, err := db.Exec(c.sql, c.args...)
195 if err == nil {
196 t.Errorf("expected a CHECK-constraint violation, got no error")
197 }
198 })
199 }{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"old_string": "\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"multiple granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search,profile:read:any}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"unrecognized status violates the status enum CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'pending')`,\n\t\t},\n\t}",
"new_string": "\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"multiple granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search,profile:read:any}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// array_length(x, 1) returns NULL (not 0) for an empty array,\n\t\t\t// and a CHECK passes on NULL — this insert is exactly what\n\t\t\t// the original (broken) CHECK text would have silently\n\t\t\t// admitted (Priya Nandakumar's review, PR #34).\n\t\t\tname: \"empty granted_scopes violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{}', 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"a NULL granted_scopes element violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', ARRAY[NULL]::text[], 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"an empty-string granted_scopes element violates the single-scope CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', ARRAY['']::text[], 'aud', 'active')`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"unrecognized status violates the status enum CHECK\",\n\t\t\tsql: `INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status) VALUES ('valid-client-id', 'x', 'none', '{profile:search}', 'aud', 'pending')`,\n\t\t},\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"old_string": "\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\t_, err := db.Exec(c.sql, c.args...)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected a CHECK-constraint violation, got no error\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\t_, err := db.Exec(c.sql, c.args...)\n\t\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected a CHECK-constraint violation, got no error\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestOAuthClient_UpdatedAtTrigger proves the BEFORE UPDATE trigger\n// actually advances updated_at — the enforcement site is the trigger\n// firing on a real UPDATE, not the migration text alone (Priya\n// Nandakumar's review, PR #34: this table has no application-code\n// writing layer to rely on for setting updated_at, unlike the main DAO\n// schema, so the trigger is the only thing that can't be forgotten).\nfunc TestOAuthClient_UpdatedAtTrigger(t *testing.T) {\n\tdb := setupIssuerDB(t)\n\tinsertOAuthClient(t, db, \"trigger-test-client\", \"Trigger Test\", nil, \"none\", []string{\"profile:search\"}, \"aud\", \"active\")\n\n\tvar createdAt, updatedAtBefore time.Time\n\tif err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT created_at, updated_at FROM oauth_client WHERE client_id = $1`, \"trigger-test-client\").Scan(&createdAt, &updatedAtBefore); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"querying initial row: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !createdAt.Equal(updatedAtBefore) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"precondition failed: created_at (%v) and updated_at (%v) should start equal\", createdAt, updatedAtBefore)\n\t}\n\n\ttime.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) // ensure now() advances past the default's own now()\n\tif _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE oauth_client SET status = 'disabled' WHERE client_id = $1`, \"trigger-test-client\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"updating row: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tvar updatedAtAfter time.Time\n\tif err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT updated_at FROM oauth_client WHERE client_id = $1`, \"trigger-test-client\").Scan(&updatedAtAfter); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"querying updated row: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !updatedAtAfter.After(updatedAtBefore) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"updated_at did not advance after UPDATE: before=%v after=%v\", updatedAtBefore, updatedAtAfter)\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && head -20 internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"description": "Check imports in clientstore_pg_test.go"
}package api import ( "context" "database/sql" "fmt" "math/rand" "os" "path/filepath" "strings" "testing" _ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib" ) // setupIssuerDB connects to TEST_POSTGRES_DSN (skipping the test if // unset, same discipline as internal/dao/postgres's own setupDB — real // Postgres verification is this file's responsibility, not something a // hand-written fake could ever exercise), applies the real // migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql into a fresh, uniquely-named Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go",
"old_string": "\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib\"\n)",
"new_string": "\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth\" -A15 internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go",
"description": "Locate existing no-basic-auth test to extend"
}96:func TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_InvalidClient401(t *testing.T) {
97- store := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{}}
98- limiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}
99- h := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), "https://issuer.test")
100-
101- form := url.Values{"grant_type": {"client_credentials"}}
102- resp := postToken(t, h, form, "", "", false)
103- if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
104- t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode)
105- }
106- if got := resp.Header.Get("WWW-Authenticate"); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "Basic") {
107- t.Errorf("WWW-Authenticate = %q, want a Basic challenge", got)
108- }
109- if len(store.gotIDs) != 0 {
110- t.Errorf("store.Get called %d times, want 0 — no client_id exists yet to key by", len(store.gotIDs))
111- }
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go",
"old_string": "\tif len(store.gotIDs) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"store.Get called %d times, want 0 — no client_id exists yet to key by\", len(store.gotIDs))\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\tif len(store.gotIDs) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"store.Get called %d times, want 0 — no client_id exists yet to key by\", len(store.gotIDs))\n\t}\n\tif len(limiter.failedClientIDs) != 1 || limiter.failedClientIDs[0] != \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"RecordFailure calls = %v, want exactly one call with clientID \\\"\\\" — a no-Authorization-header request must still advance the per-source-IP backoff (Helena Marsh, PR #34 review)\", limiter.failedClientIDs)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_StillGatedByLimiter is Helena Marsh's\n// (02) review finding on PR #34: a request with no Authorization header\n// at all must not bypass GrantLimiter entirely — sourceIP is available\n// regardless of whether any credentials were sent, so it must still be\n// checked before the missing-Basic-Auth 401 is returned.\nfunc TestNewTokenHandler_NoBasicAuth_StillGatedByLimiter(t *testing.T) {\n\tstore := &fakeClientStore{records: map[string]ClientRecord{}}\n\tlimiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: false} // simulate: this source IP is already backed off\n\th := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), \"https://issuer.test\")\n\n\tform := url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}\n\tresp := postToken(t, h, form, \"\", \"\", false)\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 429 — a no-Authorization-header request must still be rejected by an already-tripped limiter, not fall through to 401\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Build/vet/test after DDL and no-auth-header fixes"
}? loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service [no test files] ? loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.767s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "docker run --rm -d --name lt51-test-pg2 -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=testpass -e POSTGRES_DB=testdb -p 55433:5432 postgres:16-alpine >/tmp/lt51pg2.log 2>&1\nfor i in $(seq 1 15); do docker exec lt51-test-pg2 pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 1; done\ncd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && TEST_POSTGRES_DSN=\"postgres://postgres:«REDACTED»@localhost:55433/testdb?sslmode=disable\" go test ./internal/api/... -run \"TestPostgresClientStore|TestOAuthClient\" -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run real-Postgres integration tests including new trigger/CHECK cases"
}=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_Found
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_Found (0.06s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_NotFound
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_NotFound (0.01s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_SecretStateNone_EmptyHash
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_SecretStateNone_EmptyHash (0.01s)
=== RUN TestPostgresClientStore_Get_DisabledStatus
--- PASS: TestPostgresClientStore_Get_DisabledStatus (0.02s)
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/client_id_too_short_fails_the_charset_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=set_with_NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=none_with_a_non-NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/multiple_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/empty_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/a_NULL_granted_scopes_element_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/an_empty-string_granted_scopes_element_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/unrecognized_status_violates_the_status_enum_CHECK
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints (0.01s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/client_id_too_short_fails_the_charset_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=set_with_NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/secret_state=none_with_a_non-NULL_hash_violates_the_tying_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/multiple_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/empty_granted_scopes_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/a_NULL_granted_scopes_element_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/an_empty-string_granted_scopes_element_violates_the_single-scope_CHECK (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_SchemaConstraints/unrecognized_status_violates_the_status_enum_CHECK (0.00s)
=== RUN TestOAuthClient_UpdatedAtTrigger
--- PASS: TestOAuthClient_UpdatedAtTrigger (0.03s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.378s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "docker stop lt51-test-pg2 >/dev/null",
"description": "Stop second throwaway Postgres container"
}(Bash completed with no output)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git status --short",
"description": "Check status before committing fixups"
}M internal/api/clientstore.go M internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go M internal/api/tokenhandler.go M internal/api/tokenhandler_test.go M internal/app/issuer_router.go M migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git add -A && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nLT-51: fix review findings (Priya, Nolan, Oren, Helena)\n\n- oauth_client's granted_scopes CHECK used array_length(x,1)=1, which\n passes on NULL for an empty array — '{}' would have satisfied a CHECK\n written to require exactly one scope. Replaced with\n cardinality(granted_scopes)=1 plus explicit non-NULL/non-empty checks\n on the one element, closing ARRAY[NULL] and ARRAY[''] too\n (Priya Nandakumar, 05 DDL review).\n- Added a BEFORE UPDATE trigger setting updated_at — this table has no\n application-code writing layer to rely on (it's runbook-seeded, not\n Go-written), so a trigger is the only mechanism that can't be\n forgotten (Priya Nandakumar).\n- Documented client_id's deliberate case-sensitivity and the\n granted_scopes-vs-audience \"exactly one, expressed two ways\" asymmetry\n inline, per Priya's review.\n- Bounded PostgresClientStore.Get with a 3s query timeout independent of\n the caller's context — the issuer database going away mid-process\n (not just absent at startup) previously left /auth/token requests\n blocked on a dead connection with no bound (Nolan Reyes review).\n- Guarded against the nil-interface-boxing trap at NewIssuerRouter's\n ClientStore construction site with an explicit comment (Oren\n Castellan review); documented store.Get's own found/not-found timing\n asymmetry as negligible-by-construction rather than by design.\n- GrantLimiter now gates a no-Authorization-header request too — sourceIP\n is available before Basic Auth is checked, and a request with zero\n credentials was previously able to flood /auth/token entirely outside\n this endpoint's own rate limiter (Helena Marsh, 02 review).\n\nAll fixes re-verified against a real Postgres container, not just read\nback from the migration text.\n\nStory: LT-51\nWork-By: Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery lead); Priya Nandakumar (05, DDL review); Nolan Reyes, Oren Castellan (03, code review); Helena Marsh (02, independent review)\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}[feature/LT-51 3141ea3] LT-51: fix review findings (Priya, Nolan, Oren, Helena) 6 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git push 2>&1 | tail -10 && echo --- && git fetch origin >/dev/null 2>&1 && git log --oneline feature/LT-51..origin/main",
"description": "Push fixup commit and check for main drift"
}To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git c9457ab..3141ea3 feature/LT-51 -> feature/LT-51 --- cb9e123 Merge PR #35: deploy/demo-data/001-review-profiles.sql — fictional review rows, runbook-applied, never a migration 98f2be5 Address Priya's review: rename to avoid migration-series suggestion, clarify runbook 9603ca9 Refinement records: LT-41 (connector) handed off, LT-40/LT-51 review script corrected, /identity timing ruling 7857a2f Add review demo-data SQL, per Priya's ruling 5323975 LT-52 Done; LT-40 fail-closed verified live; LOG c1fb69d Merge PR #33: /healthz reports db ok/down via bounded ping, no DSN or driver text (LT-52 criterion 5) 91bf00d LT-52 criterion 5: /healthz reports DB connectivity as a boolean Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && git rebase origin/main 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Rebase LT-51 onto latest main"
}Rebasing (1/2) Auto-merging cmd/api-service/main.go CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in cmd/api-service/main.go error: could not apply c9457ab... LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store hint: Resolve all conflicts manually, mark them as resolved with hint: "git add/rm <conflicted_files>", then run "git rebase --continue". hint: You can instead skip this commit: run "git rebase --skip". hint: To abort and get back to the state before "git rebase", run "git rebase --abort". hint: Disable this message with "git config set advice.mergeConflict false" Could not apply c9457ab... # LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "database/sql"
9 "log"
10 "net/http"
11
12 "loginid-takehome/internal/api"
13 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
14 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
15 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
16
17 // internal/dao/postgres's own blank import of pgx/v5/stdlib already
18 // registers the "pgx" database/sql driver this file uses directly
19 // for the issuer database below — Go dedupes an import by package
20 // path, so this isn't a second registration, and no separate blank
21 // import of that package is needed here.
22 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres" // registers "postgres" and "cockroachdb"
23 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite" // registers "sqlite"
24 )
25
26 // sqlDriverNameFor maps cfg.DBDriver ("postgres"/"cockroachdb"/"sqlite" —
27 // dao.Register's driver names, per dao/factory.go) to the underlying
28 // database/sql driver name each backend package registers itself under
29 // (internal/dao/postgres/postgres.go: "pgx"; internal/dao/sqlite/sqlite.go:
30 // "sqlite") — needed only for LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle, since
31 // dao.Repository itself exposes no Ping and this is a thin sql.Open, not a
32 // second copy of either backend's connection logic.
33 func sqlDriverNameFor(daoDriver string) string {
34 switch daoDriver {
35 case "postgres", "cockroachdb":
36 return "pgx"
37 case "sqlite":
38 return "sqlite"
39 default:
40 return ""
41 }
42 }
43
44 func main() {
45 cfg, err := config.Load()
46 if err != nil {
47 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
48 }
49
50 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
51 if addr == "" {
52 addr = ":8080"
53 }
54
55 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
56
57 var handler http.Handler
58 switch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {
59 case app.ModeVerifier:
60 // The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the
61 // database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer
62 // Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it
63 // only mints tokens.
64 //
65 // A failure here does NOT Fatal: on a cluster where the database
66 // doesn't exist yet (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured — e.g. before
67 // PR #29's Postgres StatefulSet lands), or DB_DRIVER is simply
68 // misconfigured, this process must still come up and serve
69 // /healthz rather than crash-loop the whole verifying Deployment
70 // over a dependency only two of its routes need. repo stays nil;
71 // NewVerifierRouter fails those two routes closed with 503
72 // instead of panicking on a nil Repository.
73 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
74 if err != nil {
75 log.Printf("api-service: opening DAO repository: %v — /profiles/search and /profiles/{id} will return 503 until this is resolved", err)
76 repo = nil
77 }
78 <<<<<<< HEAD
79
80 // A second, independent *sql.DB purely for /healthz's bounded
81 // connectivity probe (LT-52 criterion 5) — sql.Open never dials,
82 // it only validates the driver/DSN, so this never blocks
83 // startup; PingContext at request time is what actually checks
84 // connectivity, bounded to dbPingTimeout. Deliberately separate
85 // from repo above rather than routed through dao.Repository,
86 // which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping through.
87 var pingDB *sql.DB
88 if driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != "" {
89 pingDB, err = sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)
90 if err != nil {
91 log.Printf("api-service: opening /healthz DB ping handle: %v — /healthz will report db=down", err)
92 pingDB = nil
93 }
94 }
95
96 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)
97 ||||||| parent of c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store)
98 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)
99 =======
100 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)
101 case app.ModeIssuer:
102 // config.Load already fails startup if JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE is
103 // missing/unreadable in issuer mode (resolveSigningKeyPath) —
104 // LoadSigningKey failing here means the file is readable but not
105 // a valid RSA private key, a genuine misconfiguration this
106 // process cannot usefully run past (there is no "serve /healthz,
107 // fail closed" story for a router with no key at all: both of
108 // its routes need one). Fatal, not degrade — unlike the DAO
109 // repository above, which has a real story for "not there yet."
110 key, err := api.LoadSigningKey(cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)
111 if err != nil {
112 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading JWT signing key: %v", err)
113 }
114
115 // issuerDB, like the verifier's pingDB, is opened independently
116 // of whether it can be reached yet — sql.Open never dials. Empty
117 // IssuerDBDSN (not configured yet) leaves issuerDB nil;
118 // NewIssuerRouter's /auth/token then fails every grant closed
119 // with server_error rather than panicking on a nil ClientStore.
120 var issuerDB *sql.DB
121 if cfg.IssuerDBDSN != "" {
122 issuerDB, err = sql.Open("pgx", cfg.IssuerDBDSN)
123 if err != nil {
124 log.Printf("api-service: opening issuer database: %v — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved", err)
125 issuerDB = nil
126 }
127 } else {
128 log.Printf("api-service: ISSUER_DB_DSN/ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE not set — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved")
129 }
130
131 handler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)
132 >>>>>>> c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store)
133 default:
134 // The unrecognized-mode fallback (NewRouter itself already logs
135 // loudly and treats it as verifier — see app.NewRouter's own doc
136 // comment) doesn't need the full verifier stack; NewRouter's
137 // /healthz alone covers it, matching the safer of the two route
138 // sets.
139 handler = app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))
140 }
141
142 if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, handler); err != nil {
143 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
144 }
145 }
146 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "<<<<<<< HEAD\n\n\t\t// A second, independent *sql.DB purely for /healthz's bounded\n\t\t// connectivity probe (LT-52 criterion 5) — sql.Open never dials,\n\t\t// it only validates the driver/DSN, so this never blocks\n\t\t// startup; PingContext at request time is what actually checks\n\t\t// connectivity, bounded to dbPingTimeout. Deliberately separate\n\t\t// from repo above rather than routed through dao.Repository,\n\t\t// which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping through.\n\t\tvar pingDB *sql.DB\n\t\tif driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != \"\" {\n\t\t\tpingDB, err = sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: opening /healthz DB ping handle: %v — /healthz will report db=down\", err)\n\t\t\t\tpingDB = nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)\n||||||| parent of c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store)\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)\n=======\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo)\n\tcase app.ModeIssuer:",
"new_string": "\n\t\t// A second, independent *sql.DB purely for /healthz's bounded\n\t\t// connectivity probe (LT-52 criterion 5) — sql.Open never dials,\n\t\t// it only validates the driver/DSN, so this never blocks\n\t\t// startup; PingContext at request time is what actually checks\n\t\t// connectivity, bounded to dbPingTimeout. Deliberately separate\n\t\t// from repo above rather than routed through dao.Repository,\n\t\t// which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping through.\n\t\tvar pingDB *sql.DB\n\t\tif driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != \"\" {\n\t\t\tpingDB, err = sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: opening /healthz DB ping handle: %v — /healthz will report db=down\", err)\n\t\t\t\tpingDB = nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)\n\tcase app.ModeIssuer:"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 && grep -n \"<<<<<<<\\|=======\\|>>>>>>>\" cmd/api-service/main.go",
"description": "Confirm no remaining conflict markers"
}127:>>>>>>> c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"offset": 120,
"limit": 15
}120 issuerDB = nil
121 }
122 } else {
123 log.Printf("api-service: ISSUER_DB_DSN/ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE not set — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved")
124 }
125
126 handler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)
127 >>>>>>> c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store)
128 default:
129 // The unrecognized-mode fallback (NewRouter itself already logs
130 // loudly and treats it as verifier — see app.NewRouter's own doc
131 // comment) doesn't need the full verifier stack; NewRouter's
132 // /healthz alone covers it, matching the safer of the two route
133 // sets.
134 handler = app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode)){
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\t\thandler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)\n>>>>>>> c9457ab (LT-51: real OAuth2 client-credentials grant, Postgres-backed client store)\n\tdefault:",
"new_string": "\t\thandler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)\n\tdefault:"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)