{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/api/handlers.go"
}1 package api
2
3 import (
4 "context"
5 "encoding/json"
6 "net/http"
7 "strings"
8 "time"
9
10 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
11 )
12
13 // Deps bundles a handler's collaborators — the DAO, the object-level
14 // policy hook, the two independent limiters, and the audit sink — so
15 // NewSearchHandler/NewGetProfileHandler take one argument instead of
16 // five, and a test fake for any one of them doesn't require constructing
17 // the other four by hand each time.
18 type Deps struct {
19 Repo dao.Repository
20 Authz Authorizer
21 RateLimiter RateLimiter
22 TouchCounter TouchCounter
23 AuditLog AuditLogger
24 }
25
26 const (
27 defaultPageSize = 20
28 maxPageSize = 50
29 readRateLimit = 60 // req/min, read:own and read:any
30 searchRateLimit = 10 // req/min, profile:search
31
32 // TouchCapPerWindow and TouchCapWindow are the cumulative
33 // distinct-record-touch cap's real values — ruled by Marcus Ilori
34 // (02) since handoff-03-auth.md names the mechanism ("a rolling 24h
35 // window") but not a number: 2,000 distinct records per caller per
36 // rolling 24h, same figure for both profile:search and
37 // profile:read:any. Explicitly tunable, not protocol-fixed — see
38 // handoff-03-auth.md's v5 addendum for the reasoning.
39 TouchCapPerWindow = 2000
40 TouchCapWindow = 24 * time.Hour
41 )
42
43 type searchRequest struct {
44 Name *string `json:"name,omitempty"`
45 Phone *string `json:"phone,omitempty"`
46 Region *string `json:"region,omitempty"`
47 Country *string `json:"country,omitempty"`
48 Cursor string `json:"cursor,omitempty"`
49 PageSize int `json:"page_size,omitempty"`
50 }
51
52 type searchResponse struct {
53 Results []SearchResultProfile `json:"results"`
54 Total int `json:"total"`
55 NextCursor string `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
56 }
57
58 // auditCtx is the small bundle handler code passes to Deps.audit — a
59 // context.Context plus the sub/scope an audit event needs, since those
60 // two are read from AuthContext once per request rather than threaded as
61 // separate parameters to every call. sub/scope are zero-valued for the
62 // one case that precedes reading AuthContext at all (a missing/invalid
63 // token).
64 type auditCtx struct {
65 ctx context.Context
66 sub string
67 scope Scope
68 }
69
70 func (d Deps) audit(ac auditCtx, kind AuditEventKind, recordIDs []string, reasonCode ReasonCode) {
71 d.AuditLog.Log(ac.ctx, AuditEvent{
72 Sub: ac.sub,
73 Scope: ac.scope,
74 Kind: kind,
75 RecordIDs: recordIDs,
76 ReasonCode: reasonCode,
77 Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
78 })
79 }
80
81 // NewSearchHandler implements profile:search (handoff-03-auth.md v3).
82 // Order of checks, deliberately, and matching NewGetProfileHandler's
83 // order below (shape validation before either limiter, both limiters
84 // before authorize()) rather than the two handlers disagreeing on it for
85 // no stated reason (Oren Castellan, PR #26 review): auth context present
86 // -> scope is ScopeSearch -> request shape (unknown fields, empty body,
87 // page_size cap) -> per-minute rate limit -> cumulative touch cap ->
88 // authorize() -> the DAO call -> settle touches -> masked response. Scope
89 // mismatch and an authorize() denial return an identical client-visible
90 // body (F7); the audit log below is the only place that distinction is
91 // allowed to exist (Ingrid Solano, PR #26 review — this story's
92 // acceptance criteria require the distinction to be logged, not merely
93 // kept out of the response).
94 func NewSearchHandler(d Deps) http.HandlerFunc {
95 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
96 ctx := r.Context()
97 ac, ok := AuthContextFromContext(ctx)
98 if !ok {
99 d.audit(auditCtx{ctx: ctx}, AuditAuthnFailure, nil, "")
100 writeUnauthorized(w)
101 return
102 }
103 actx := auditCtx{ctx: ctx, sub: ac.Sub, scope: ac.Scope}
104 if ac.Scope != ScopeSearch {
105 d.audit(actx, AuditScopeFailure, nil, "")
106 writeForbidden(w)
107 return
108 }
109
110 var req searchRequest
111 if r.Body != nil {
112 dec := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)
113 // Reject any field this shape doesn't name — in particular
114 // an "offset" key, which would otherwise be silently
115 // ignored rather than rejected. The API-facing contract is
116 // cursor-only pagination (handoff-03-auth.md v3's F-pag);
117 // a caller-supplied offset-shaped parameter is exactly the
118 // bypass that contract exists to close, so it must fail
119 // loudly, not be dropped quietly (Ingrid Solano, PR #26
120 // review).
121 dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
122 if err := dec.Decode(&req); err != nil {
123 writeBadRequest(w, "malformed request body or unrecognized field")
124 return
125 }
126 }
127
128 // A search request with no filter field at all is rejected here
129 // with a 400 before it ever reaches the DAO — the DAO's own
130 // all-nil ProfileQuery is legal and returns every profile, which
131 // this API must not expose directly (handoff-03-auth.md v3, F10).
132 if req.Name == nil && req.Phone == nil && req.Region == nil && req.Country == nil {
133 writeBadRequest(w, "at least one search filter is required")
134 return
135 }
136
137 offset, err := decodeCursor(req.Cursor)
138 if err != nil {
139 writeBadRequest(w, "malformed cursor")
140 return
141 }
142
143 pageSize := req.PageSize
144 if pageSize <= 0 {
145 pageSize = defaultPageSize
146 }
147 if pageSize > maxPageSize {
148 // A bare/unconstrained request for more than this API's
149 // result cap is rejected outright, not truncated
150 // (handoff-03-auth.md v3) — checked here, before the query
151 // is built, mirroring the same rule for authorize() below.
152 writeBadRequest(w, "page_size exceeds the maximum of 50")
153 return
154 }
155
156 allow, err := d.RateLimiter.Allow(ctx, ac.Sub, ScopeSearch, searchRateLimit)
157 if err != nil {
158 writeInternalError(w, err)
159 return
160 }
161 if !allow {
162 d.audit(actx, AuditRateLimited, nil, "")
163 writeRateLimited(w)
164 return
165 }
166
167 // Reserve, not just check: this books pageSize's worth of budget
168 // against the window immediately, atomically with the capacity
169 // check, so a second concurrent request from the same sub sees
170 // this reservation and is correctly denied before either
171 // request's DAO call returns — closing a check-then-act race a
172 // separate Allowed()-then-RecordTouches() pair had, which could
173 // let N concurrent requests each add a full page's worth of
174 // touches before any of them recorded (Nolan Reyes, PR #26
175 // review). The deferred release below guarantees this is settled
176 // exactly once on every exit path — including one added later
177 // without an explicit Settle call, and a panic unwind — rather
178 // than relying on a manual Settle call at each return (Nolan
179 // Reyes, second-round review).
180 tr, reserved, err := reserveTouches(ctx, d.TouchCounter, ac.Sub, pageSize)
181 if err != nil {
182 writeInternalError(w, err)
183 return
184 }
185 if !reserved {
186 d.audit(actx, AuditCapExceeded, nil, "")
187 writeTouchCapExceeded(w)
188 return
189 }
190 defer tr.release(ctx)
191
192 // The object-level policy hook, per v3: called after scope
193 // validation (above) and request-shape validation (above), before
194 // the DAO call. ScopeSearch has no single target id.
195 allowed, err := d.Authz.Authorize(ctx, ac.Sub, ac.Scope, "")
196 if err != nil {
197 writeInternalError(w, err)
198 return
199 }
200 if !allowed {
201 d.audit(actx, AuditPolicyDenial, nil, "")
202 writeForbidden(w)
203 return
204 }
205
206 q := dao.ProfileQuery{
207 Name: req.Name,
208 Phone: req.Phone,
209 Region: req.Region,
210 Country: req.Country,
211 Limit: pageSize,
212 Offset: offset,
213 }
214 results, total, err := d.Repo.Profiles().Search(ctx, q)
215 if err != nil {
216 d.audit(actx, AuditRequestFailed, nil, "")
217 writeDAOError(w, err)
218 return
219 }
220
221 ids := make([]string, len(results))
222 masked := make([]SearchResultProfile, len(results))
223 for i, p := range results {
224 ids[i] = p.ID
225 masked[i] = toSearchResult(p)
226 }
227 if err := tr.settle(ctx, ids); err != nil {
228 writeInternalError(w, err)
229 return
230 }
231
232 d.audit(actx, AuditSuccess, ids, "")
233 resp := searchResponse{Results: masked, Total: total}
234 if offset+len(results) < total {
235 resp.NextCursor = encodeCursor(offset + len(results))
236 }
237 writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
238 }
239 }
240
241 // NewGetProfileHandler implements profile:read:own and profile:read:any
242 // against the same handler — the two scopes differ in what Authorize()
243 // checks (referral membership vs. a logged reason_code) and in whether
244 // the cumulative touch cap applies at all. id is read from the request
245 // path via r.PathValue("id") (Go 1.22+ ServeMux pattern, e.g.
246 // "GET /profiles/{id}"); this handler is not yet registered on any real
247 // route (refinement/LT-39.md's Acceptance outcome — deferred until S7's
248 // auth middleware exists to protect it), so tests call it directly with
249 // http.Request.SetPathValue.
250 func NewGetProfileHandler(d Deps) http.HandlerFunc {
251 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
252 ctx := r.Context()
253 ac, ok := AuthContextFromContext(ctx)
254 if !ok {
255 d.audit(auditCtx{ctx: ctx}, AuditAuthnFailure, nil, "")
256 writeUnauthorized(w)
257 return
258 }
259 actx := auditCtx{ctx: ctx, sub: ac.Sub, scope: ac.Scope}
260 if ac.Scope != ScopeReadOwn && ac.Scope != ScopeReadAny {
261 d.audit(actx, AuditScopeFailure, nil, "")
262 writeForbidden(w)
263 return
264 }
265
266 id := r.PathValue("id")
267 if strings.TrimSpace(id) == "" {
268 writeBadRequest(w, "id is required")
269 return
270 }
271
272 // reasonCode is validated here and logged with every audit event
273 // on this request (handoff-03-auth.md v3: "reason_code, when the
274 // scope is profile:read:any" is a required audit-log field).
275 // There is deliberately no other consumer of the value — no
276 // policy decision in this story reads it beyond validating its
277 // membership in the closed enum; threading it into Authorizer's
278 // signature is a follow-up story's job if a real policy
279 // implementation ever needs it for more than logging (Oren
280 // Castellan, PR #26 review).
281 var reasonCode ReasonCode
282 if ac.Scope == ScopeReadAny {
283 reasonCode = ReasonCode(r.URL.Query().Get("reason_code"))
284 if !reasonCode.Valid() {
285 writeBadRequest(w, "reason_code is required for profile:read:any and must be one of the closed enum values")
286 return
287 }
288 }
289
290 allow, err := d.RateLimiter.Allow(ctx, ac.Sub, ac.Scope, readRateLimit)
291 if err != nil {
292 writeInternalError(w, err)
293 return
294 }
295 if !allow {
296 d.audit(actx, AuditRateLimited, nil, reasonCode)
297 writeRateLimited(w)
298 return
299 }
300
301 // The cumulative cap applies to profile:search and
302 // profile:read:any (handoff-03-auth.md v3, verbatim) — not
303 // profile:read:own, which is bounded by the caller_referral
304 // relationship rather than an open id space, so it isn't the
305 // enumeration surface this control exists for. A valid, logged
306 // reason_code on read:any satisfies Authorize() below but does
307 // not exempt the caller from this cap — the exact regression v3
308 // fixed (an earlier wording made this counter a no-op for
309 // read:any, since that scope requires a reason_code on every call
310 // by design).
311 var tr *touchReservation
312 if ac.Scope == ScopeReadAny {
313 var reserved bool
314 tr, reserved, err = reserveTouches(ctx, d.TouchCounter, ac.Sub, 1)
315 if err != nil {
316 writeInternalError(w, err)
317 return
318 }
319 if !reserved {
320 d.audit(actx, AuditCapExceeded, nil, reasonCode)
321 writeTouchCapExceeded(w)
322 return
323 }
324 // Deferred release guarantees this is settled exactly once
325 // on every exit path below, including one added later
326 // without an explicit Settle call (Nolan Reyes, PR #26
327 // review, second round) — tr is nil for ScopeReadOwn, and
328 // (*touchReservation)(nil).release is a documented no-op.
329 defer tr.release(ctx)
330 }
331
332 allowed, err := d.Authz.Authorize(ctx, ac.Sub, ac.Scope, id)
333 if err != nil {
334 writeInternalError(w, err)
335 return
336 }
337 if !allowed {
338 d.audit(actx, AuditPolicyDenial, []string{id}, reasonCode)
339 writeForbidden(w)
340 return
341 }
342
343 p, err := d.Repo.Profiles().Get(ctx, id)
344 if err != nil {
345 d.audit(actx, AuditRequestFailed, []string{id}, reasonCode)
346 writeDAOError(w, err)
347 return
348 }
349
350 if err := tr.settle(ctx, []string{p.ID}); err != nil {
351 writeInternalError(w, err)
352 return
353 }
354
355 d.audit(actx, AuditSuccess, []string{p.ID}, reasonCode)
356 writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toProfileResponse(p))
357 }
358 }
359
360 func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body any) {
361 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
362 w.WriteHeader(status)
363 _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body)
364 }
365 {
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"toSearchResult\\|toProfileResponse\\|func.*mask\\|Masked\\|ScopeReadOwn\\|ScopeReadAny\\|ScopeSearch\\b\" internal/api/*.go | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Find masking logic and scope constants"
}internal/api/audit.go:42:// ScopeReadAny. Never add a field here without checking
internal/api/auth.go:23: // ScopeReadOwn retrieves a single record by id the caller already
internal/api/auth.go:26: ScopeReadOwn Scope = "profile:read:own"
internal/api/auth.go:27: // ScopeReadAny retrieves a single record by id with no referral
internal/api/auth.go:30: ScopeReadAny Scope = "profile:read:any"
internal/api/auth.go:31: // ScopeSearch queries by name/phone fragment across the table. The
internal/api/auth.go:33: ScopeSearch Scope = "profile:search"
internal/api/auth.go:110: // (a record id for ScopeReadOwn/ScopeReadAny; ignored for
internal/api/auth.go:111: // ScopeSearch, which has no single target). A false, nil return is
internal/api/handlers.go:86:// -> scope is ScopeSearch -> request shape (unknown fields, empty body,
internal/api/handlers.go:104: if ac.Scope != ScopeSearch {
internal/api/handlers.go:156: allow, err := d.RateLimiter.Allow(ctx, ac.Sub, ScopeSearch, searchRateLimit)
internal/api/handlers.go:194: // the DAO call. ScopeSearch has no single target id.
internal/api/handlers.go:225: masked[i] = toSearchResult(p)
internal/api/handlers.go:260: if ac.Scope != ScopeReadOwn && ac.Scope != ScopeReadAny {
internal/api/handlers.go:282: if ac.Scope == ScopeReadAny {
internal/api/handlers.go:312: if ac.Scope == ScopeReadAny {
internal/api/handlers.go:327: // review, second round) — tr is nil for ScopeReadOwn, and
internal/api/handlers.go:356: writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toProfileResponse(p))
internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go:130: case ScopeReadOwn, ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch, ScopeConnectorIdentityLookup:
internal/api/masking.go:37:// toSearchResult builds the masked search-response shape for one
internal/api/masking.go:41:func toSearchResult(p model.UserProfile) SearchResultProfile {
internal/api/masking.go:50:// toProfileResponse builds the full, unmasked read-response shape.
internal/api/masking.go:51:func toProfileResponse(p *model.UserProfile) ProfileResponse {
internal/api/masking.go:67:func maskPhone(phone *string) *string {
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:20:// This only affects ScopeReadOwn's referral-membership check.
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:21:// ScopeReadAny's authorization is "has a valid reason_code," already
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:22:// checked in the handler before Authorize() is ever called; ScopeSearch
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:34: // may read under ScopeReadOwn — the hard-coded "referral" set this
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:42: case ScopeReadOwn:
internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go:48: case ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch:
internal/api/touchcounter.go:13:// ScopeSearch and ScopeReadAny unconditionally: a valid ReasonCode
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/api/stopgap_authorizer.go"
}1 package api
2
3 import "context"
4
5 // StopgapAuthorizer is a TEMPORARY, default-deny Authorizer stand-in —
6 // NOT the real caller_referral-backed policy engine (handoff-03-auth.md
7 // v3's F8 resolution names that as a later story's own datastore work).
8 //
9 // Ruled by Marcus Ilori (02), in response to a direct question before
10 // this was wired to a live public URL: "A permissive allow-all
11 // Authorizer must never be deployed to a live public URL on a shared
12 // production cluster, 'temporary' or not — that's the exact failure this
13 // design exists to prevent, and it's a public repo, so being
14 // permissive-even-briefly is a permanent public fact." Ruling: default-
15 // deny, in-memory, hard-coded with a small fixed (sub, allowed record id)
16 // map for the seeded QA client credential (LT-51) — enough to
17 // demonstrate both the allow and deny paths of read:own's referral check
18 // in the live review, without ever allowing an arbitrary caller through.
19 //
20 // This only affects ScopeReadOwn's referral-membership check.
21 // ScopeReadAny's authorization is "has a valid reason_code," already
22 // checked in the handler before Authorize() is ever called; ScopeSearch
23 // has no per-record target for this Authorizer to gate at all. Both
24 // return true unconditionally here — there is no real caller_referral
25 // data this stopgap could consult for a real decision on those scopes
26 // either way, so denying them would not be more correct, only
27 // differently placeholder.
28 //
29 // A follow-up story replacing this with the real datastore-backed
30 // implementation must exist before this is considered load-bearing
31 // beyond the live-URL review — flag to the PM if it doesn't.
32 type StopgapAuthorizer struct {
33 // ReadOwnAllow maps a caller sub to the set of record ids that sub
34 // may read under ScopeReadOwn — the hard-coded "referral" set this
35 // stopgap stands in for. Empty/nil means the map denies everything,
36 // which is the safe default for any sub not explicitly seeded here.
37 ReadOwnAllow map[string]map[string]bool
38 }
39
40 func (a *StopgapAuthorizer) Authorize(_ context.Context, sub string, scope Scope, target string) (bool, error) {
41 switch scope {
42 case ScopeReadOwn:
43 allowed, ok := a.ReadOwnAllow[sub]
44 if !ok {
45 return false, nil
46 }
47 return allowed[target], nil
48 case ScopeReadAny, ScopeSearch:
49 return true, nil
50 default:
51 return false, nil
52 }
53 }
54 {
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"writeDAOError\\|writeForbidden\\|writeUnauthorized\\|writeRateLimited\\|writeBadRequest\\|writeTouchCapExceeded\\|writeServiceUnavailable\\|ErrNotFound\" internal/api/errors.go",
"description": "Inspect error-writing helpers"
}31:// writeUnauthorized and writeForbidden are named separately from the
38:func writeUnauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter) {
42:func writeForbidden(w http.ResponseWriter) {
46:func writeRateLimited(w http.ResponseWriter) {
50:func writeTouchCapExceeded(w http.ResponseWriter) {
54:func writeBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
58:// writeDAOError translates an error returned by the DAO layer into an
68:func writeDAOError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
72: case errors.Is(err, dao.ErrNotFound):
75: writeBadRequest(w, "invalid request")
77: writeBadRequest(w, "invalid search query")
86: writeBadRequest(w, "request could not be completed")
100:// writeInternalError is writeDAOError's twin for a collaborator that
103:// writeDAOError at those call sites (Oren Castellan, PR #26 review):
104:// writeDAOError is named and documented as the DAO-sentinel translator,
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/api/errors.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 100
}1 // errors.go implements this package's boundary-translation function, per
2 // decisions/error-semantics.md: internal/api never serializes err.Error()
3 // on an unmapped error. Only the DAO's seven sentinels' safe messages
4 // (plus the authn/authz/context rules below) ever reach a client; anything
5 // else defaults to a generic 500 with no wrapped detail.
6 package api
7
8 import (
9 "context"
10 "encoding/json"
11 "errors"
12 "net/http"
13
14 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
15 )
16
17 // errorResponse is the only JSON shape an error path ever writes. code is
18 // a short machine-readable string (never a driver error, never
19 // err.Error()); message is a safe, human-readable sentence.
20 type errorResponse struct {
21 Code string `json:"code"`
22 Message string `json:"message"`
23 }
24
25 func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, message string) {
26 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
27 w.WriteHeader(status)
28 _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errorResponse{Code: code, Message: message})
29 }
30
31 // writeUnauthorized and writeForbidden are named separately from the
32 // generic mapper below because F7 (decisions/error-semantics.md) requires
33 // an identical client-visible body for a scope failure and an
34 // authorize() policy denial — the two are distinguished only in the
35 // audit log, never in what the client sees. Both call the one function
36 // below so that identity is enforced by construction, not by two call
37 // sites happening to agree.
38 func writeUnauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter) {
39 writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "missing or invalid token")
40 }
41
42 func writeForbidden(w http.ResponseWriter) {
43 writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not authorized for this request")
44 }
45
46 func writeRateLimited(w http.ResponseWriter) {
47 writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate_limited", "rate limit exceeded")
48 }
49
50 func writeTouchCapExceeded(w http.ResponseWriter) {
51 writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "cumulative_cap_exceeded", "cumulative record-access cap exceeded for the current window")
52 }
53
54 func writeBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
55 writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", message)
56 }
57
58 // writeDAOError translates an error returned by the DAO layer into an
59 // HTTP response, per decisions/error-semantics.md's boundary rule and its
60 // F7/F50 additions:
61 // - context.DeadlineExceeded -> 504, never wrapped in a generic 500.
62 // - context.Canceled -> handled by the caller before this is reached
63 // (a cancelled client request has no response to write); if it
64 // reaches here anyway it's treated the same as an unmapped error but
65 // the caller should not count it as an alerting failure.
66 // - one of the seven dao sentinels -> its mapped status/safe message.
67 // - anything else -> 500, no wrapped detail, ever.
68 func writeDAOError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
69 switch {
70 case errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded):
71 writeError(w, http.StatusGatewayTimeout, "deadline_exceeded", "request timed out")
72 case errors.Is(err, dao.ErrNotFound):
73 writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "no such record")
74 case errors.Is(err, dao.ErrInvalidArgument):
75 writeBadRequest(w, "invalid request")
76 case errors.Is(err, dao.ErrInvalidQuery):
77 writeBadRequest(w, "invalid search query")
78 case errors.Is(err, dao.ErrDuplicateUsername),
79 errors.Is(err, dao.ErrInvalidMethod),
80 errors.Is(err, dao.ErrInvalidCredential),
81 errors.Is(err, dao.ErrAlreadyExists):
82 // None of these are reachable from this package's read-only
83 // search/retrieve handlers (they're write-path sentinels), but
84 // mapped defensively rather than falling through to a raw 500
85 // if a future handler in this package ever does reach them.
86 writeBadRequest(w, "request could not be completed")
87 default:
88 // Never err.Error() here — an unmapped error (a raw driver
89 // error that somehow escaped the DAO's translation layer, a
90 // context.Canceled that reached this far, anything else) gets a
91 // generic message with no wrapped detail (decisions/
92 // error-semantics.md's F50: no DETAIL text, no driver message,
93 // ever, ***even in the log line a caller can't see*** — that
94 // sanitization is the DAO translation layer's job upstream of
95 // here, not repeated in this file).
96 writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "internal error")
97 }
98 }
99
100 // writeInternalError is writeDAOError's twin for a collaborator that{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && ls deploy/demo-data/ && cat deploy/demo-data/*.sql 2>/dev/null | head -60",
"description": "Inspect demo-data seed profiles"
}qa-client-bootstrap.md
review-profiles.sql
-- Review/demo data for the joint LT-34/LT-39/LT-40/LT-51 live-URL review.
-- Per Priya's ruling: version-controlled, NEVER under migrations/ (so no
-- migration-Job code path can run it — it's not schema, it's fixture
-- data), applied by hand as a runbook step with the migrator credential,
-- idempotent, obviously fictional. Schema/CHECK constraints confirmed
-- against migrations/postgres/00001_initial_schema.sql + 00002 with
-- Renata before writing this.
--
-- Apply after (a) the migration Job has run, INCLUDING shared/ — the
-- credential insert below resolves method_id via a subquery against
-- auth_method, seeded only by shared/00001_seed_auth_method.sql; skip
-- that and the subquery returns NULL, failing this file's NOT NULL
-- constraint with an error that reads like a schema bug, not an
-- ordering mistake — and (b) after LT-51 lands, so the joint review has
-- both data and a working issuer to mint tokens against:
--
-- MIGRATOR_DSN=$(kubectl -n loginid-takehome get secret \
-- db-migrator-credential -o jsonpath='{.data.dsn}' | base64 -d)
-- psql "$MIGRATOR_DSN" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f deploy/demo-data/review-profiles.sql
--
-- Fixed UUIDs, not gen_random_uuid(): user_profile has no unique
-- constraint beyond its own PK (per Renata — no natural conflict target
-- exists), so idempotency here means ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING against
-- ids chosen once and hardcoded, not letting the database generate a new
-- one every run. user_credential's ON CONFLICT targets the actual unique
-- index (on LOWER(username)), matching its expression, not a plain
-- equality target.
BEGIN;
INSERT INTO user_profile (id, name, phone, street_address, locality, region, postal_code, country, source)
VALUES
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001', 'Review Demo One', '+12025550142', '742 Evergreen Terrace', 'Springfield', 'IL', '62704', 'US', 'direct'),
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002', 'Review Demo Two', '+441134960001', '1 Test Close', 'Leeds', NULL, 'LS1 1AA', 'GB', 'direct'),
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003', 'Review Demo Three', '+16135550199', '10 Sample Street', 'Ottawa', 'ON', 'K1A 0B1', 'CA', 'direct')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- Reserved test/fictional ranges used above, not real subscriber numbers:
-- +1 202 555 01xx / +1 613 555 01xx — NANP reserved fictional exchange (555-01xx)
-- +44 113 496 0xxx — Ofcom-reserved UK "drama" number range
INSERT INTO user_credential (id, user_id, username, method_id, secret_state)
VALUES
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101', '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001', '«email»', (SELECT id FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password'), 'none'),
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102', '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002', '«email»', (SELECT id FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password'), 'none'),
('00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103', '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003', '«email»', (SELECT id FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password'), 'none')
ON CONFLICT (LOWER(username)) DO NOTHING;
-- secret_state = 'none' and secret/hash_algo/hash_cost all left NULL,
-- per the schema's tying CHECK (a 'set' state would require all three
-- non-NULL) — no credential material anywhere in this file, by
-- construction, not by omission someone has to remember.
COMMIT;
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/deploy/demo-data/qa-client-bootstrap.md"
}1 # QA client credential — out-of-band seeding runbook
2
3 **Format change (handoff-03-auth.md v7):** `gen-argon2-hash.go` now emits a PHC-format hash instead of the earlier `<base64-salt>$<base64-hash>` encoding — the two are not interchangeable. Any row seeded before this change must be re-seeded (re-run step 1 for a new secret, then the rotation `UPDATE` in "Rotation / revocation" below) before it will verify again.
4
5 Per Priya's ruling on LT-51: "migrations carry reference data, never credentials" — the QA client row in `oauth_client` is seeded by hand, directly against the issuer database's own migrator role, never through a migration file, never through the CI-applied manifest set (`deploy/rbac.yaml` grants the deployer nothing on `secrets`, so it has no path to this credential regardless), and never with the plaintext secret or its hash committed anywhere in this repo.
6
7 ## 1. Generate the secret and its Argon2id hash
8
9 ```
10 CLIENT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 24)
11 go run deploy/gen-argon2-hash.go "$CLIENT_SECRET" > /tmp/qa-hash.txt
12 HASH=$(cat /tmp/qa-hash.txt)
13 rm -f /tmp/qa-hash.txt
14 ```
15
16 `deploy/gen-argon2-hash.go` produces a standard PHC-format Argon2id hash (`«REDACTED-ARGON2»`) — the same self-describing encoding `user_credential.secret` already uses, and what `internal/api/clientstore.go`'s `verifySecret` reads its cost parameters back from (never assumed to match the app's own current constants — Priya Nandakumar's ruling, `handoff-03-auth.md` v7). Verified by round-tripping a test hash through the app's own comparison logic before this runbook was written, not assumed from reading the source, and again by a permanent test (`internal/api/clientstore_test.go`'s hand-constructed-different-parameters case) that fails if the verifier is ever changed to ignore the embedded parameters.
17
18 **Give `$CLIENT_SECRET` to whoever will run the PO review script and nowhere else** — it is the Basic-auth password for `POST /auth/token`. It cannot be recovered from `$HASH` afterward; if lost, generate a new secret and re-run step 2 (an `UPDATE`, not a fresh `INSERT`).
19
20 ## 2. Insert the row
21
22 ```
23 MIGRATOR_DSN=$(kubectl -n loginid-takehome get secret \
24 issuer-db-migrator-credential -o jsonpath='{.data.dsn}' | base64 -d)
25
26 psql "$MIGRATOR_DSN" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "
27 INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status)
28 VALUES ('qa-review-client', 'PO review script', '$HASH', 'set', ARRAY['profile:read:own'], 'loginid-api-service', 'active');
29 "
30
31 unset MIGRATOR_DSN CLIENT_SECRET HASH
32 ```
33
34 `granted_scopes` is a single-element array (`profile:read:own`) — the schema's own `ck_oauth_client_granted_scopes_single` CHECK requires exactly one, matching this project's one-credential-per-scope provisioning model (`decisions/search-authz-scoping.md`). Adjust the scope value if the review script needs a different one; do not add a second element, the CHECK will reject it.
35
36 **`audience` must be the literal `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` value api-service actually verifies against — `loginid-api-service`, per `PLANNING.md`'s config surface — not the Kubernetes Service name `api-service`.** An earlier run of this runbook seeded rows with `audience='api-service'`; those tokens minted fine but every protected route 401'd, since the verifier's audience check compares against the config literal, not the Service name. If migrating existing rows: `UPDATE oauth_client SET audience='loginid-api-service' WHERE audience='api-service';` via the migrator DSN.
37
38 ## 3. Confirm it without re-exposing the secret
39
40 ```
41 kubectl -n loginid-takehome exec postgres-0 -- env PGPASSWORD="$(kubectl -n loginid-takehome get secret issuer-db-runtime-credential -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d)" \
42 psql "sslmode=require host=localhost user=issuer_runtime dbname=issuer" \
43 -c "SELECT client_id, secret_state, status FROM oauth_client WHERE client_id = 'qa-review-client';"
44 ```
45
46 Expect one row, `secret_state = 'set'`, `status = 'active'` — confirms the insert landed and that the runtime role (the one `api-service-issuer` actually connects as at request time) can read it, without ever printing the hash or the plaintext secret in this check.
47
48 ## Rotation / revocation
49
50 - **Rotate:** repeat step 1 for a new secret, then `UPDATE oauth_client SET client_secret_hash = '$HASH' WHERE client_id = 'qa-review-client';` via the migrator DSN.
51 - **Revoke:** `UPDATE oauth_client SET secret_state = 'revoked', client_secret_hash = NULL WHERE client_id = 'qa-review-client';` — the schema's tying CHECK requires `client_secret_hash IS NULL` whenever `secret_state` isn't `'set'`.
52 {
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -rln \"qa-review-client\\|qa_client\\|QAClient\\|granted_scopes\" --include=\"*.md\" --include=\"*.sql\" --include=\"*.go\" . 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules",
"description": "Search for all QA client references across repo"
}migrations/issuer/00001_initial_schema.sql 03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md deploy/demo-data/qa-client-bootstrap.md internal/config/config.go internal/api/clientstore.go internal/api/clientstore_pg_test.go 02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-03-auth.md Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"qa-review-client\\|granted_scopes\\|scope\" 03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md | head -40",
"description": "Check LT-51 refinement for QA client scope design"
}22:- [ ] `POST /auth/token` implements RFC 6749 §4.4: `grant_type=client_credentials`, form-encoded (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`), **not JSON** — the one endpoint in this API that follows OAuth2's own wire format rather than this project's usual JSON convention, because it's the one endpoint implementing a named OAuth2 grant. An optional `scope` parameter (space-delimited) requests a subset of the client's granted scopes; omitted means issue the full granted set.
24:- [ ] Errors follow RFC 6749 §5.2, **never distinguishing why in body or status**: `invalid_client` (401, `WWW-Authenticate: Basic`) for **any** client-authentication failure — an unknown `client_id` and a wrong secret for a known `client_id` return byte-identical responses. `invalid_scope` (400) if the requested scope isn't a subset of the client's granted scopes. `unsupported_grant_type` (400) for anything but `client_credentials`. Enforcement site: a test comparing the unknown-client and wrong-secret response bodies for equality, not just "both 401."
26:- [ ] Client store lives in the issuer's own datastore (per F8, not 05's schema): `client_id`, `name` (accountability — no shared credentials across a team), `client_secret_hash` (**Argon2id, same floor as `threat-model.md` Asset 1** — identical hashing discipline to password storage), `granted_scopes` (provisioned subset of `profile:read:own`/`profile:read:any`/`profile:search`/`connector:identity-lookup`), `status` (active/revoked), `created_at`, `revoked_at`. Rotation: single active secret per client (reissue generates a new one and immediately invalidates the old — no dual-secret overlap window, unlike the signing key).
28:- [ ] Issued JWT claims (`iss`, `aud`, `scope`, `exp`, `sub`) and the algorithm/`kid` header match exactly what LT-40's verifier middleware expects — enforcement site: an integration test that mints a token here and verifies it through the **actual** middleware from PR #30, not two independently-trusted unit tests that never touch each other.
31:- [ ] **A dedicated, narrowly-scoped QA client credential is seeded in the client store, out-of-band** (same discipline as LT-32's signing-key `Secret` — never through the CI-applied manifest set), **for the PO's joint live-URL review of LT-34/LT-39/LT-40/LT-51.** Per Warren's explicit ruling (via the PM): review tooling must never mint a token by signing directly with the deployed private key — that would hand review tooling the same access F13's whole Deployment split exists to restrict to the issuer process alone. The correct mechanism is this: a real client credential, provisioned like any other caller, calling the real endpoint. Scoped to the minimum needed for the review — `profile:read:own` by default; add `profile:search` only if the review specifically needs to exercise search, going through that scope's own provisioning bar like any other caller, not a blanket grant. Enforcement site: the credential's row in the client store, its `granted_scopes` listed explicitly in the hand-off to the PO (not "whatever's convenient"), and confirmation it was created out-of-band.
50:8. Confirm the QA client credential exists, was seeded out-of-band, and its `granted_scopes` are stated explicitly (not assumed).
51:9. **The joint live-URL review, once this and LT-40 are both deployed:** (a) seed review data via the runbook step — `deploy/demo-data/001-review-profiles.sql` (idempotent, run under the `migrator` role, never under `migrations/`, obviously fictional values in reserved E.164 ranges) applied by Theo; no `POST /profiles` handler exists or is planned — team-lead + Priya ruled a write endpoint out of scope for Q2, so seeding is the only path to reviewable data. (b) obtain a real token via `POST /auth/token` using the seeded QA credential. (c) hit `/profiles/search` and `/profiles/{id}` at the live URL against the seeded rows — confirming a masked response, a full read with a `reason_code`, 401/403 exactly as LT-39's tests predict, and an actual 429 once the touch cap is crossed. This is the review LT-34/LT-39/LT-40/LT-51 have all been building toward; all four are accepted together in this one pass.
73:**Reviewer:** Naomi Voss (PO). Fetched all three QA client credentials directly via `kubectl -n loginid-takehome get secret qa-client-credential` (never pasted into any doc, message, or Jira), minted a token for each scope via `POST /auth/token` with HTTP Basic auth and form-encoded `grant_type=client_credentials`.
75:**All three mints confirmed correct:** RS256, `kid` present, `iss: https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal`, `aud: loginid-api-service`, `jti` present, `scope` matching each client's provisioned scope exactly. The earlier deploy-config gap (unset issuer/audience, wrong seeded `aud`) is fully resolved — confirmed by the tokens' own claims, not just by the mint succeeding.
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"qa-review-client\\|client_id\\|kubectl.*qa-client-credential\\|qa-client-credential\" 03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-51.md",
"description": "Search LT-51.md for actual client_id values"
}14:- `internal/api.GrantLimiter` (PR #30) — the failed-grant rate-limiting/backoff interface, keyed independently by `client_id` and source IP, with alerting on a sustained run against one `client_id`. This story constructs a real implementation instance (or reuses `InProcessGrantLimiter`) and calls `Allow`/`RecordFailure`/`RecordSuccess` around the actual grant attempt — it does not design a new backoff scheme. 23:- [ ] Client authentication is **HTTP Basic** (`client_id`:`client_secret` in the `Authorization` header), **not** credentials in the body — keeps the secret out of anywhere that logs request bodies more casually than headers, per RFC 6749 §2.3.1's preferred method. 24:- [ ] Errors follow RFC 6749 §5.2, **never distinguishing why in body or status**: `invalid_client` (401, `WWW-Authenticate: Basic`) for **any** client-authentication failure — an unknown `client_id` and a wrong secret for a known `client_id` return byte-identical responses. `invalid_scope` (400) if the requested scope isn't a subset of the client's granted scopes. `unsupported_grant_type` (400) for anything but `client_credentials`. Enforcement site: a test comparing the unknown-client and wrong-secret response bodies for equality, not just "both 401." 25:- [ ] **Timing side-channel closed, not just the response body:** when `client_id` doesn't exist in the client store, the handler still performs an Argon2id comparison against a fixed, pre-computed dummy hash (same cost parameters as real client secrets) before returning `invalid_client` — so the unknown-client and wrong-secret code paths take statistically indistinguishable time. Without this, a fast-reject-on-unknown-client-then-slow-Argon2id-on-known-client asymmetry is a textbook timing oracle that lets an attacker enumerate valid `client_id`s by latency alone, even with byte-identical response bodies — exactly the class of issue the identical-body requirement was meant to close, left half-finished. This is the one endpoint in the API that deliberately follows a named external OAuth2 spec rather than this project's JSON convention, making it the endpoint most likely to be pattern-matched against known real-world timing-oracle bugs by an outside reviewer. Enforcement site: read the handler's unknown-`client_id` branch directly and confirm it calls the same hash-comparison function against a dummy value, rather than short-circuiting before it — a code-review check, not a load test. 26:- [ ] Client store lives in the issuer's own datastore (per F8, not 05's schema): `client_id`, `name` (accountability — no shared credentials across a team), `client_secret_hash` (**Argon2id, same floor as `threat-model.md` Asset 1** — identical hashing discipline to password storage), `granted_scopes` (provisioned subset of `profile:read:own`/`profile:read:any`/`profile:search`/`connector:identity-lookup`), `status` (active/revoked), `created_at`, `revoked_at`. Rotation: single active secret per client (reissue generates a new one and immediately invalidates the old — no dual-secret overlap window, unlike the signing key). 27:- [ ] The token-endpoint's own brute-force protection wires to the **already-built** `GrantLimiter` (PR #30) — `Allow` checked before attempting client authentication, `RecordFailure`/`RecordSuccess` called after, keyed by both `client_id` and source IP. Enforcement site: an integration test confirming a sustained run of failed grants against one `client_id` eventually blocks further attempts and fires the alert exactly once per threshold-crossing (not once per subsequent failure) — this is `GrantLimiter`'s own tested behavior, so this test only needs to confirm the wiring, not re-test the limiter's internals. 45:3a. Read the unknown-`client_id` branch directly and confirm it calls the same Argon2id comparison against a fixed dummy hash before returning `invalid_client`, rather than short-circuiting before it — per Tobias's objection, this closes the timing side-channel the identical-body test alone leaves open. 47:5. Confirm the `GrantLimiter` wiring test exists (sustained failures against one `client_id` eventually block, alert fires once per threshold-crossing). 57:**Tobias Lindqvist — objection:** The byte-identical-response requirement for `invalid_client` closes the content side-channel but not timing — a natural implementation short-circuits fast on an unknown `client_id` and only runs (slow, by design) Argon2id when the client exists, which is a textbook timing oracle letting an attacker enumerate valid `client_id`s by latency alone. Especially relevant here since this is the one endpoint following a named external OAuth2 spec, making it the most likely target for an outside reviewer pattern-matching against known real-world timing-oracle bugs. Counter-proposal accepted: the unknown-`client_id` path must still run Argon2id against a fixed dummy hash before returning `invalid_client`, with a matching code-review-only PO-script step (no load test needed). 73:**Reviewer:** Naomi Voss (PO). Fetched all three QA client credentials directly via `kubectl -n loginid-takehome get secret qa-client-credential` (never pasted into any doc, message, or Jira), minted a token for each scope via `POST /auth/token` with HTTP Basic auth and form-encoded `grant_type=client_credentials`. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/api/masking.go"
}1 package api
2
3 import (
4 "strings"
5
6 "loginid-takehome/internal/model"
7 )
8
9 // SearchResultProfile is profile:search's masked response shape —
10 // handoff-03-auth.md v3: "masking is a profile:search-response property,
11 // not a per-call flag." A distinct type (and distinct serialization
12 // function, below) from the full read-response shape, per LT-39's own
13 // acceptance criteria: "the search-response serialization path is a
14 // distinct code path from the read-response one, not the same serializer
15 // with a masking flag." Unmasked detail is obtained only through a
16 // separate, separately-audited profile:read:own/profile:read:any call.
17 type SearchResultProfile struct {
18 ID string `json:"id"`
19 Name string `json:"name"`
20 Phone *string `json:"phone,omitempty"` // masked, e.g. "***-***-1234"
21 Region *string `json:"region,omitempty"` // address reduced to locality/region only
22 }
23
24 // ProfileResponse is the full, unmasked shape returned by a
25 // profile:read:own/profile:read:any call.
26 type ProfileResponse struct {
27 ID string `json:"id"`
28 Name string `json:"name"`
29 Phone *string `json:"phone,omitempty"`
30 StreetAddress *string `json:"street_address,omitempty"`
31 Locality *string `json:"locality,omitempty"`
32 Region *string `json:"region,omitempty"`
33 PostalCode *string `json:"postal_code,omitempty"`
34 Country *string `json:"country,omitempty"`
35 }
36
37 // toSearchResult builds the masked search-response shape for one
38 // profile. This function, not ProfileResponse's serialization, is the
39 // only place a search result is ever produced — there is no shared
40 // helper with a masking bool, by design.
41 func toSearchResult(p model.UserProfile) SearchResultProfile {
42 return SearchResultProfile{
43 ID: p.ID,
44 Name: p.Name,
45 Phone: maskPhone(p.Phone),
46 Region: p.Region,
47 }
48 }
49
50 // toProfileResponse builds the full, unmasked read-response shape.
51 func toProfileResponse(p *model.UserProfile) ProfileResponse {
52 return ProfileResponse{
53 ID: p.ID,
54 Name: p.Name,
55 Phone: p.Phone,
56 StreetAddress: p.StreetAddress,
57 Locality: p.Locality,
58 Region: p.Region,
59 PostalCode: p.PostalCode,
60 Country: p.Country,
61 }
62 }
63
64 // maskPhone reduces an E.164 phone to its last 4 digits, e.g.
65 // "+15551234567" -> "***-***-4567" — nil stays nil (absent, not masked
66 // into a value that looks like data).
67 func maskPhone(phone *string) *string {
68 if phone == nil {
69 return nil
70 }
71 digits := *phone
72 if len(digits) < 4 {
73 masked := strings.Repeat("*", len(digits))
74 return &masked
75 }
76 last4 := digits[len(digits)-4:]
77 masked := "***-***-" + last4
78 return &masked
79 }
80 {
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/app.go"
}1 // Package app is the shared bootstrap both cmd/api-service and
2 // cmd/idp-connector wrap thinly, per decisions/go-layout-debate.md's ruling:
3 // route registration and config wiring live once here, not duplicated per
4 // binary. It carries no behavior beyond wiring — service-specific handlers
5 // belong in internal/api and internal/connector as those stories land.
6 package app
7
8 import (
9 "context"
10 "database/sql"
11 "encoding/json"
12 "log"
13 "net/http"
14 "time"
15 )
16
17 // healthResponse is the JSON body every health probe returns. Field set is
18 // deliberately minimal per 02's ruling (api-auth-design.md) on this
19 // unauthenticated endpoint: an up/down status, which service answered, and
20 // an opaque build identifier (commit SHA) — never a version string, build
21 // timestamp, connection detail, or anything else. Do not add fields here
22 // without checking that ruling first; see refinement/LT-34.md.
23 //
24 // DB is the one addition LT-52 criterion 5 allows: a boolean/enum-only
25 // DB-connectivity signal ("ok"/"down"), never a DSN, host, port, or raw
26 // driver error string. omitempty so idp-connector and issuer-mode
27 // api-service — neither of which has a DB dependency — keep the original
28 // three-field shape unchanged.
29 type healthResponse struct {
30 Status string `json:"status"`
31 Service string `json:"service"`
32 Build string `json:"build"`
33 DB string `json:"db,omitempty"`
34 }
35
36 // dbPingTimeout bounds the /healthz DB check so a wedged connection pool
37 // can never make the health probe itself hang past a kubelet liveness
38 // deadline — a health check has to be faster than what it's checking.
39 const dbPingTimeout = 1 * time.Second
40
41 // healthHandlerWithDB is /healthz for api-service's verifier Deployment
42 // only (LT-52 criterion 5) — pingDB is a lightweight *sql.DB opened
43 // purely for this bounded connectivity probe, separate from the
44 // dao.Repository used for actual queries (see NewVerifierRouter's own
45 // doc comment on why it's a second handle rather than reaching through
46 // the Repository interface, which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping
47 // through). pingDB may be nil (DB never configured, or dao.New failed at
48 // startup) — reported as "down", same as a ping that errors out; the
49 // distinction between "never configured" and "configured but
50 // unreachable" is not exposed here, since both mean the same thing to a
51 // caller of this endpoint (the two DB-backed routes will 503) and
52 // either detail would be exactly the kind of internal-state leak this
53 // criterion exists to prevent.
54 func healthHandlerWithDB(service string, pingDB *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
55 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
56 dbStatus := "down"
57 if pingDB != nil {
58 ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), dbPingTimeout)
59 defer cancel()
60 if err := pingDB.PingContext(ctx); err == nil {
61 dbStatus = "ok"
62 }
63 }
64 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
65 w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
66 _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(healthResponse{
67 Status: "ok",
68 Service: service,
69 Build: Commit,
70 DB: dbStatus,
71 })
72 }
73 }
74
75 // Mode is api-service's run mode (LT-32). A defined type rather than a
76 // bare string so NewRouter's switch below can have a real default case —
77 // config.Load already validates APP_MODE to exactly "verifier"/"issuer"
78 // before it reaches here, but NewRouter must not depend on that: the whole
79 // point of this story is that a misconfiguration is loud, not silently
80 // downgraded, and a router that quietly falls back to verifier behavior on
81 // any unrecognized value (a case-mismatch, a stray space) is the same
82 // failure class one layer up (Oren Castellan, PR #18 review).
83 type Mode string
84
85 // ModeVerifier and ModeIssuer are api-service's two run modes, selected by
86 // config.Config.AppMode and passed to NewRouter by cmd/api-service/main.go.
87 // idp-connector has no issuer/verifier split — its main.go passes
88 // ModeVerifier, the only mode that adds no route beyond /healthz, since
89 // that value is also this package's harmless default.
90 //
91 // ModeSweep (LT-44) is a third value cmd/api-service/main.go checks for
92 // BEFORE ever calling NewRouter — a sweep invocation runs
93 // internal/sweep.Run once and exits, never starts an HTTP server at
94 // all. It's declared here anyway (rather than as a bare string constant
95 // local to cmd/api-service) so config.AppMode's three legal values live
96 // in one typed place, matching ModeVerifier/ModeIssuer's own pattern.
97 const (
98 ModeVerifier Mode = "verifier"
99 ModeIssuer Mode = "issuer"
100 ModeSweep Mode = "sweep"
101 )
102
103 // NewRouter builds the http.Handler shared by both binaries' main.go.
104 // service identifies which binary is answering ("api-service" or
105 // "idp-connector") in the health response, per LT-34's acceptance
106 // criteria. mode is api-service's APP_MODE (LT-32) — the router itself is
107 // this story's startup-time branch point named in refinement/LT-32.md's
108 // acceptance criteria ("internal/app branches on it at startup"): in
109 // ModeIssuer, a placeholder route is registered at the path reserved for
110 // token issuance so the issuer and verifier Deployments are demonstrably
111 // different routers, not just different env vars read by code that
112 // otherwise behaves identically. The actual issuance handler is S7/LT-40's
113 // scope, not this story's (refinement/LT-32.md's non-goals) — this only
114 // proves the wiring exists and is reachable on the Deployment that is
115 // supposed to have it, and absent on the one that isn't.
116 //
117 // An unrecognized mode logs loudly and falls back to the verifier route
118 // set — the safer of the two failure directions (an issuer Deployment
119 // stuck without its route is externally visible as 404s on /auth/token,
120 // while a verifier Deployment that accidentally grew the issuer route
121 // would be the actual security regression this story exists to prevent)
122 // — rather than panicking a running server over a value config.Load
123 // should already have rejected before this ever runs.
124 func NewRouter(service string, mode Mode) http.Handler {
125 mux := http.NewServeMux()
126 mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", healthHandler(service))
127 switch mode {
128 case ModeIssuer:
129 mux.HandleFunc("/auth/token", issuerPlaceholderHandler)
130 case ModeVerifier:
131 // no additional routes
132 default:
133 log.Printf("app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode %q — serving verifier routes only", mode)
134 }
135 return mux
136 }
137
138 // issuerPlaceholderHandler exists only to make the issuer/verifier router
139 // split observable and testable before S7/LT-40 implements real token
140 // issuance. It deliberately does no cryptography and holds no reference to
141 // config.Config.JWTSigningKeyPath — that wiring belongs to whichever S7
142 // handler replaces this one.
143 func issuerPlaceholderHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
144 http.Error(w, "token issuance not yet implemented — reserved for LT-40", http.StatusNotImplemented)
145 }
146
147 func healthHandler(service string) http.HandlerFunc {
148 return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
149 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
150 w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
151 _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(healthResponse{
152 Status: "ok",
153 Service: service,
154 Build: Commit,
155 })
156 }
157 }
158 {
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "context"
9 "database/sql"
10 "errors"
11 "fmt"
12 "log"
13 "net/http"
14 "os"
15 "os/signal"
16 "strconv"
17 "strings"
18 "syscall"
19 "time"
20
21 "loginid-takehome/internal/api"
22 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
23 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
24 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
25 "loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding"
26 "loginid-takehome/internal/sweep"
27 "loginid-takehome/internal/sweepstore"
28
29 // internal/dao/postgres's own blank import of pgx/v5/stdlib already
30 // registers the "pgx" database/sql driver this file uses directly
31 // for the issuer database below — Go dedupes an import by package
32 // path, so this isn't a second registration, and no separate blank
33 // import of that package is needed here.
34 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres" // registers "postgres" and "cockroachdb"
35 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite" // registers "sqlite"
36 )
37
38 // sqlDriverNameFor maps cfg.DBDriver ("postgres"/"cockroachdb"/"sqlite" —
39 // dao.Register's driver names, per dao/factory.go) to the underlying
40 // database/sql driver name each backend package registers itself under
41 // (internal/dao/postgres/postgres.go: "pgx"; internal/dao/sqlite/sqlite.go:
42 // "sqlite") — needed only for LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle, since
43 // dao.Repository itself exposes no Ping and this is a thin sql.Open, not a
44 // second copy of either backend's connection logic.
45 func sqlDriverNameFor(daoDriver string) string {
46 switch daoDriver {
47 case "postgres", "cockroachdb":
48 return "pgx"
49 case "sqlite":
50 return "sqlite"
51 default:
52 return ""
53 }
54 }
55
56 // validateAuthConfig catches exactly the two live-review findings that
57 // motivated it — first AUTH_JWT_ISSUER/AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE, then
58 // AUTH_JWKS_URL, silently absent from the deployed manifests, each time
59 // letting a verifier or issuer come up cleanly and fail in a way that
60 // looked like an ordinary token-rejection rather than a configuration
61 // gap. A verifier that quietly 401s everything, or an issuer that mints
62 // structurally-incomplete tokens, is worse than a crash-loop that names
63 // the exact missing variable.
64 //
65 // Reads config.RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode) — the single source of
66 // truth also read by internal/config's own manifest test — rather than
67 // hardcoding its own list, so this check and that test can never drift
68 // apart from each other. Checks the raw environment directly (not cfg's
69 // already-loaded fields): the manifest test checks for the same env var
70 // NAMES in the manifest text, so both sides operate on the identical
71 // primitive.
72 //
73 // Kept out of internal/config's shared Load() because AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE
74 // is meaningless to cmd/idp-connector (which has its own
75 // ConnectorJWTAudience instead) and a blanket check in the shared loader
76 // would wrongly fail that binary's startup too — idp-connector runs the
77 // equivalent check itself, against its own required list.
78 func validateAuthConfig(mode app.Mode) error {
79 required, recognized := config.RequiredAuthEnvVars("api-service", string(mode))
80 if !recognized {
81 // app.Mode's own constructor already rejects anything but
82 // "verifier"/"issuer" (config.Load's APP_MODE validation), so
83 // reaching this branch means RequiredAuthEnvVars itself has
84 // drifted out of sync with app.Mode's real values — a bug in
85 // this binary, not a bad deployment, and worth failing loudly
86 // rather than silently requiring nothing (the exact class of
87 // gap this function exists to prevent, moved one level up).
88 return fmt.Errorf("internal error: no RequiredAuthEnvVars entry for api-service mode %q", mode)
89 }
90 for _, name := range required {
91 value := os.Getenv(name)
92 if value == "" {
93 return fmt.Errorf("%s must be set in %s mode", name, mode)
94 }
95 if err := config.ValidateEnvVarValue(name, value); err != nil {
96 return err
97 }
98 }
99 return nil
100 }
101
102 // newOnboardingService wires LT-33's mediating service — api-service's
103 // own outbound call to cmd/idp-connector — from cfg's already-resolved
104 // fields. Returns an error, not a Fatal-worthy one, when
105 // CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET or the two connector-related URLs aren't
106 // configured yet: this is a new capability with no existing traffic
107 // depending on it and, as of this story, no handler that calls it at
108 // all — its one caller in main() below uses this purely as a
109 // startup-time config smoke test, discarding the returned *Service, so
110 // there is nothing here for a Fatal to protect yet. Once a real
111 // onboarding-flow handler consumes this, that handler's own call sites
112 // are where a request-time failure actually matters, not this
113 // constructor.
114 func newOnboardingService(cfg config.Config) (*onboarding.Service, error) {
115 if cfg.IssuerTokenURL == "" {
116 return nil, fmt.Errorf("ISSUER_TOKEN_URL must be set")
117 }
118 if cfg.IDPConnectorBaseURL == "" {
119 return nil, fmt.Errorf("IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL must be set")
120 }
121
122 tokenClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPTokenClient(cfg.IssuerTokenURL, nil)
123 if err != nil {
124 return nil, err
125 }
126 tokens, err := onboarding.NewTokenSource(tokenClient, cfg.ConnectorClientID, cfg.ConnectorClientSecret)
127 if err != nil {
128 return nil, err
129 }
130 connectorClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPConnectorClient(cfg.IDPConnectorBaseURL, nil)
131 if err != nil {
132 return nil, err
133 }
134 return &onboarding.Service{Tokens: tokens, Connector: connectorClient}, nil
135 }
136
137 // sweepDBConnectTimeout bounds the very first database round-trip this
138 // process attempts, per Naomi Voss's (PO) live-run finding: a sweep pod
139 // sat Running for minutes with one socket in SYN_SENT to Postgres (a
140 // NetworkPolicy omission, Theo's own fix) and never logged anything —
141 // dao.New/sql.Open never dial (they only validate the driver/DSN), so
142 // nothing bounded the first real connection attempt inside
143 // sweep.Run's own DeleteExpired call, and nothing logged before that
144 // point either. 20s sits in the middle of the 10-30s range this
145 // finding asked for; coordinate with Theo (04) if his CronJob's
146 // activeDeadlineSeconds (the outer bound) is ever set below this plus
147 // sweep's own expected run time — this is the inner bound, and must
148 // stay comfortably below the outer one.
149 const sweepDBConnectTimeout = 20 * time.Second
150
151 // metricsAddr is the /metrics listener's own address, agreed with Theo
152 // Bergman (04, PR #68): port 9101, Service port name "metrics" — a
153 // separate port from the main API port, since the NetworkPolicy admits
154 // ns monitoring only here, never to the authenticated search/read
155 // surface.
156 const metricsAddr = ":9101"
157
158 // startMetricsServer launches LT-49's /metrics endpoint in its own
159 // goroutine — a distinct http.Server on metricsAddr, never sharing a
160 // mux with the main API router. db backs a sweepstore.Store read only
161 // through SnapshotReader; the reader used here is the exact same
162 // *sql.DB pingDB already opened for /healthz's own connectivity probe,
163 // not a third connection pool.
164 func startMetricsServer(db *sql.DB, driverName string) {
165 store := sweepstore.NewStore(db, driverName)
166 mux := http.NewServeMux()
167 mux.Handle("GET /metrics", sweepstore.NewMetricsHandler(store))
168 go func() {
169 if err := http.ListenAndServe(metricsAddr, mux); err != nil {
170 log.Printf("api-service: /metrics server on %s stopped: %v", metricsAddr, err)
171 }
172 }()
173 log.Printf("api-service: /metrics listening on %s", metricsAddr)
174 }
175
176 // classifySweepDBConnectError names the failure class in the one
177 // structured log line runSweepMode emits on a connect failure — a
178 // human triaging a failed CronJob run needs "timeout" vs "refused" vs
179 // "unknown" at a glance, without parsing a raw driver error string.
180 func classifySweepDBConnectError(err error) string {
181 if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
182 return "connect_timeout"
183 }
184 msg := err.Error()
185 switch {
186 case strings.Contains(msg, "connection refused"):
187 return "connection_refused"
188 case strings.Contains(msg, "no such host"):
189 return "dns_error"
190 default:
191 return "unknown"
192 }
193 }
194
195 // runSweepMode is APP_MODE=sweep's entire job: run LT-44's retention
196 // sweep exactly once against the real database and exit — never starts
197 // an HTTP server, never builds a router. ctx is derived from
198 // signal.NotifyContext, not context.Background() alone, so a CronJob
199 // pod termination (SIGTERM, the normal way Kubernetes asks a Job's pod
200 // to stop) cancels cleanly through the same path a genuinely-expired
201 // deadline would, rather than the process being killed mid-batch with
202 // no chance for internal/sweep's own per-batch loop to notice. This is
203 // the sweep's own job/scheduler context, never a request-scoped one —
204 // there is no HTTP request anywhere in this invocation to derive one
205 // from in the first place.
206 //
207 // Exits non-zero if any class's sweep ended in error (not merely
208 // "still had rows to examine" — internal/sweep.runClass's own loop
209 // already keeps calling DeleteExpired until Drained or an error, so by
210 // the time Run returns, every class either drained successfully or hit
211 // a real error) — a non-zero exit is what makes a failed sweep show up
212 // as a failed Kubernetes Job, not a silently-succeeding one.
213 func runSweepMode(cfg config.Config) {
214 intervalDisplay := cfg.SweepIntervalSeconds
215 if intervalDisplay == "" {
216 intervalDisplay = "unset"
217 }
218 log.Printf("api-service: sweep starting, classes=direct,idp_cache,idp_cache_orphan, interval_seconds=%s", intervalDisplay)
219
220 // interval feeds RunRecorder.StartRun's missedSlots computation
221 // (05's §3d) — 0 (unknown) if SWEEP_INTERVAL_SECONDS is unset or
222 // unparseable, rather than guessing at a schedule this process was
223 // never told.
224 var interval time.Duration
225 if cfg.SweepIntervalSeconds != "" {
226 if secs, err := strconv.Atoi(cfg.SweepIntervalSeconds); err != nil {
227 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: SWEEP_INTERVAL_SECONDS=%q is not a valid integer, missed-run tracking disabled for this run: %v", cfg.SweepIntervalSeconds, err)
228 } else {
229 interval = time.Duration(secs) * time.Second
230 }
231 }
232
233 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
234 if err != nil {
235 log.Fatalf("api-service: sweep: opening DAO repository: %v", err)
236 }
237 defer func() { _ = repo.Close() }()
238
239 // A bounded connectivity check BEFORE anything else touches the
240 // database — sql.Open above never dials, so without this,
241 // sweep.Run's own first DeleteExpired call would be the actual
242 // first connection attempt, made with the signal-derived context
243 // below (SIGTERM/SIGINT only, no deadline of its own) and no
244 // timeout of its own either — exactly the hang this fixes. A
245 // separate *sql.DB, not repo itself: dao.Repository exposes no
246 // Ping (05's contract doesn't have one), mirroring the same
247 // pattern the verifier's /healthz probe already uses.
248 if driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != "" {
249 pingDB, err := sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)
250 if err != nil {
251 log.Fatalf("api-service: sweep: opening DB ping handle: %v", err)
252 }
253 pingCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sweepDBConnectTimeout)
254 pingErr := pingDB.PingContext(pingCtx)
255 cancel()
256 _ = pingDB.Close()
257 if pingErr != nil {
258 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: database unreachable (class=%s) after %s: %v", classifySweepDBConnectError(pingErr), sweepDBConnectTimeout, pingErr)
259 // os.Exit skips the repo.Close() deferred above (dao.New
260 // already opened repo's own *sql.DB by this point) —
261 // deliberate, not an oversight: the process is exiting
262 // immediately, the OS reclaims the fd/goroutines on exit,
263 // and sql.DB.Close() has nothing durable to flush. Do not
264 // "fix" this into a manual repo.Close() call before Exit —
265 // that would add ordering risk for no real benefit
266 // (Oren Castellan's review, PR #64).
267 os.Exit(1)
268 }
269 }
270
271 ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT)
272 defer stop()
273
274 // A separate *sql.DB for retention_sweep_run persistence (05's §3d,
275 // amendment A7) — same reasoning as pingDB above: dao.Repository
276 // exposes no way to run this package's own raw SQL against its
277 // underlying connection. A failure to open this handle is logged,
278 // not fatal — sweepstore.NewStore is still constructed (its own
279 // calls will simply error per-call, each already handled as a
280 // logged, non-fatal best-effort in internal/sweep), so a database
281 // glitch on this one auxiliary table never blocks the sweep's own
282 // real retention work.
283 var recorder sweep.RunRecorder
284 if driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != "" {
285 if storeDB, err := sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN); err != nil {
286 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: opening retention_sweep_run store handle: %v", err)
287 } else {
288 defer func() { _ = storeDB.Close() }()
289 recorder = sweepstore.NewStore(storeDB, driverName)
290 }
291 }
292
293 metrics := sweep.NewPrometheusMetricEmitter()
294 results := sweep.Run(ctx, repo, time.Now(), metrics, recorder, interval)
295
296 failed := false
297 for _, r := range results {
298 if r.Err != nil {
299 failed = true
300 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: class %q failed after examining %d row(s), deleting %d: %v", r.Class, r.RowsExamined, r.RowsDeleted, r.Err)
301 continue
302 }
303 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: class %q drained, examined %d row(s), deleted %d", r.Class, r.RowsExamined, r.RowsDeleted)
304 }
305
306 // Rendered once, after every class has been attempted, so the real
307 // Prometheus-formatted metric lines land together in the pod's
308 // stdout rather than interleaved with the per-class log lines above
309 // — LT-49's agreed mechanism with Theo Bergman (04): stdout via
310 // real client_golang Gauge objects, not a Pushgateway push (none
311 // runs on this cluster; see PrometheusMetricEmitter's own doc
312 // comment). A failure to render is logged but never turns an
313 // otherwise-successful sweep into a failed Job — the metrics are an
314 // observability nicety this run's own success doesn't depend on.
315 if err := metrics.Render(os.Stdout); err != nil {
316 log.Printf("api-service: sweep: writing metrics: %v", err)
317 }
318
319 if failed {
320 os.Exit(1)
321 }
322 }
323
324 func main() {
325 cfg, err := config.Load()
326 if err != nil {
327 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
328 }
329 if err := validateAuthConfig(app.Mode(cfg.AppMode)); err != nil {
330 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
331 }
332
333 if app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) == app.ModeSweep {
334 // Short-circuits before any of the HTTP-serving setup below —
335 // APP_MODE=sweep never builds a router or listens on a port.
336 runSweepMode(cfg)
337 return
338 }
339
340 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
341 if addr == "" {
342 addr = ":8080"
343 }
344
345 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
346
347 var handler http.Handler
348 switch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {
349 case app.ModeVerifier:
350 // The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the
351 // database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer
352 // Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it
353 // only mints tokens.
354 //
355 // A failure here does NOT Fatal: on a cluster where the database
356 // doesn't exist yet (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured — e.g. before
357 // PR #29's Postgres StatefulSet lands), or DB_DRIVER is simply
358 // misconfigured, this process must still come up and serve
359 // /healthz rather than crash-loop the whole verifying Deployment
360 // over a dependency only two of its routes need. repo stays nil;
361 // NewVerifierRouter fails those two routes closed with 503
362 // instead of panicking on a nil Repository.
363 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
364 if err != nil {
365 log.Printf("api-service: opening DAO repository: %v — /profiles/search and /profiles/{id} will return 503 until this is resolved", err)
366 repo = nil
367 }
368
369 // A second, independent *sql.DB purely for /healthz's bounded
370 // connectivity probe (LT-52 criterion 5) — sql.Open never dials,
371 // it only validates the driver/DSN, so this never blocks
372 // startup; PingContext at request time is what actually checks
373 // connectivity, bounded to dbPingTimeout. Deliberately separate
374 // from repo above rather than routed through dao.Repository,
375 // which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping through.
376 var pingDB *sql.DB
377 if driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != "" {
378 pingDB, err = sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)
379 if err != nil {
380 log.Printf("api-service: opening /healthz DB ping handle: %v — /healthz will report db=down", err)
381 pingDB = nil
382 }
383 }
384
385 // LT-33: api-service's own outbound call to cmd/idp-connector.
386 // Constructed here ONLY as a startup-time config smoke test — no
387 // handler exists yet that calls it (no assignment question asks
388 // for an onboarding endpoint, and this story's own non-goals rule
389 // one out), so the constructed *onboarding.Service below is
390 // deliberately discarded, not stored anywhere reachable. This is
391 // NOT the same pattern as repo/pingDB above: those two ARE
392 // consumed by NewVerifierRouter's handlers; this exists only so
393 // a missing/malformed CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID, ISSUER_TOKEN_URL, etc.
394 // is visible in this process's own log the moment it starts,
395 // rather than only when a future onboarding-flow handler first
396 // tries to use it (Oren Castellan's review, PR #54: the original
397 // "ready" wording here overstated this — nothing is actually
398 // wired to use it yet).
399 if _, err := newOnboardingService(cfg); err != nil {
400 log.Printf("api-service: onboarding (LT-33) config check failed, no consumer wired yet: %v", err)
401 } else {
402 log.Printf("api-service: onboarding (LT-33) config check passed, no consumer wired yet")
403 }
404
405 // LT-49: /metrics on its own port, per team-lead's routing of
406 // Amber's observability inventory — api-service is the always-up
407 // pod, so it (not the short-lived sweep CronJob) is what
408 // Prometheus scrapes. A separate port, not a route on the main
409 // API port, because the NetworkPolicy admits ns monitoring only
410 // to this one port (Theo Bergman, 04, PR #68), never to the
411 // authenticated search/read API surface. Reuses pingDB — the
412 // same lightweight *sql.DB /healthz already opened — rather than
413 // a third connection pool; if pingDB is nil (DB not configured
414 // yet), there is nothing for this endpoint to read, so it simply
415 // doesn't start rather than serving a permanently-failing route.
416 if pingDB != nil {
417 startMetricsServer(pi
… truncated (20 KB cap){
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && sed -n '1,80p' internal/api/neverlog_test.go",
"description": "Inspect never-log lint test mechanism"
}package api
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
"loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
"loginid-takehome/internal/model"
)
// captureLog redirects the standard library's package-level logger
// (what every real log.Printf call site in this package writes
// through) to a buffer for the duration of the test, restoring the
// previous output on cleanup. This is LT-49's application-layer
// complement to 04's static CI lint check (handoff-04-secrets.md's
// never-log list): a lint rule can catch an obviously-named variable
// passed straight to a log call, but can't catch a value that reaches a
// log line through an intermediate variable, a struct field, or a
// derived string the rule's own pattern doesn't match — this captures
// and inspects the ACTUAL bytes written during a real request, driven
// through the real handler/audit-logging code path, not a static scan
// of the source text.
//
// Not compatible with t.Parallel(): log.SetOutput/log.Writer() is
// process-wide, package-level state — no test in this package (or any
// other package, since the standard logger is shared process-wide)
// should call t.Parallel() while a test using captureLog is running, or
// its captured output will interleave with concurrent tests' own log
// lines (Oren Castellan's review, PR #59). No test in this package
// currently does; keep it that way for tests using this helper.
func captureLog(t *testing.T) *bytes.Buffer {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
prev := log.Writer()
log.SetOutput(&buf)
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(prev) })
return &buf
}
// TestNeverLog_TokenHandler_ClientSecretNeverLogged drives the real
// opportunistic-rehash-persist-failure path (the log call site closest
// to ever touching a secret value, tokenhandler.go's own
// "storing failed" branch) with a distinctive, never-otherwise-used
// client secret, and asserts the raw secret string never appears
// anywhere in the captured log output — item 6 of
// handoff-04-secrets.md's never-log list (API caller client_secrets, in
// plaintext or hashed).
func TestNeverLog_TokenHandler_ClientSecretNeverLogged(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "this fixture client secret must never appear in logs"
salt := []byte("0123456789abcdef")
const oldTime = 2 // deliberately drifted from this package's current argon2Time
oldHash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(secret), salt, oldTime, argon2Memory, argon2Threads, argon2KeyLen)
driftedEncoded := encodePHC(argon2Memory, oldTime, argon2Threads, salt, oldHash)
store := &fakeClientStore{
records: map[string]ClientRecord{
"drifted-client": {ClientID: "drifted-client", Name: "Drifted", ClientSecretHash: driftedEncoded, GrantedScope: Scope("profile:search"), Audience: "aud", Active: true},
},
// Forces the rehash PERSIST to fail, exercising the log line at
// tokenhandler.go's "storing failed" branch — the one call site
// closest to a temptation to log the secret it just verified.
updateHashErr: fmt.Errorf("simulated issuer database write failure"),
}
limiter := &fakeGrantLimiter{allow: true}
h := NewTokenHandler(store, limiter, testSigningKey(t), "https://issuer.test")
buf := captureLog(t)
form := url.Values{"grant_type": {"client_credentials"}}
resp := postToken(t, h, form, "drifted-client", secret, true)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && sed -n '1,160p' internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"description": "Inspect token handler for /auth/token request/response shape"
}// tokenhandler.go implements POST /auth/token — RFC 6749 §4.4's
// client-credentials grant. This is the one endpoint in the API that
// follows OAuth2's own wire format (form-encoded, HTTP Basic client
// auth) rather than this project's usual JSON convention, because it's
// the one endpoint implementing a named external grant type — and, per
// Tobias Lindqvist's objection (LT-51 refinement), the endpoint most
// likely to be pattern-matched against known real-world OAuth2
// timing-oracle bugs by an outside reviewer.
package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// tokenTTL is this issuer's fixed token lifetime — the middle of
// handoff-03-auth.md's 5-15 minute range. No refresh tokens: a client
// re-authenticates with its own client secret on expiry, per
// api-auth-design.md's standing TTL-only-revocation design (this
// story's own non-goal list; not re-litigated here).
const tokenTTL = 10 * time.Minute
// tokenErrorResponse is RFC 6749 §5.2's error body shape.
type tokenErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
// tokenResponse is RFC 6749 §5.1's success body shape.
type tokenResponse struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
}
func writeTokenError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, errCode string) {
if status == http.StatusUnauthorized {
// RFC 6749 §5.2: invalid_client with a 401 MUST carry
// WWW-Authenticate identifying the auth scheme this endpoint
// expects — the same header any HTTP Basic-protected resource
// returns, not something specific to OAuth2 error semantics.
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="token"`)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = jsonEncode(w, tokenErrorResponse{Error: errCode})
}
// jsonEncode is a one-line indirection kept trivial and named for
// clarity rather than inlined at each of this file's two call sites.
func jsonEncode(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) error {
return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
// NewTokenHandler implements POST /auth/token, wiring the collaborators
// named in refinement/LT-51.md's explicit instruction rather than
// reimplementing them: store is the client datastore (this story's own,
// new); limiter is PR #30's already-built GrantLimiter, called exactly
// as its own doc comment specifies — Allow gates before authentication,
// RecordFailure/RecordSuccess run after. The signing key parameter holds
// the loaded RSA private key this story mints tokens with (see
// SigningKey in signingkey.go).
func NewTokenHandler(store ClientStore, limiter GrantLimiter, key *SigningKey, issuer string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// store is nil when the issuer database was never configured
// (config.Config.IssuerDBDSN empty) — fail every grant closed
// with server_error rather than panic on a nil ClientStore, the
// same fail-closed shape NewVerifierRouter uses for a nil
// dao.Repository. This deliberately runs before ParseForm/
// BasicAuth so a misconfigured issuer fails identically for
// every request shape, not just the ones that get far enough to
// reach store.Get.
if store == nil {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
return
}
// RFC 6749 §4.4: form-encoded, not JSON. r.ParseForm reads the
// body as application/x-www-form-urlencoded regardless of a
// caller's declared Content-Type, which is deliberately
// permissive here — this handler's job is accepting the one wire
// format the spec names, not policing a header a legitimate
// client-credentials implementation might send inconsistently.
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request")
return
}
if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "client_credentials" {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type")
return
}
clientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()
sourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)
// GrantLimiter gates BEFORE the hasBasicAuth check, not after —
// sourceIP is available regardless of whether a caller sent any
// credentials at all, and a request with no Authorization header
// is exactly as capable of flooding this endpoint as one with a
// wrong client_id (Helena Marsh, 02 review of PR #34). clientID
// is "" on this path; GrantLimiter treats it as an ordinary
// (empty) key like any other, and the per-source-IP half of the
// gate is what actually matters here since there's no client_id
// yet to distinguish attempts by.
allowed, err := limiter.Allow(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
if err != nil {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
return
}
if !allowed {
// RFC 6749 doesn't name a status for endpoint-level
// throttling (it's a brute-force control this project adds
// on top of the spec, not part of it) — 429 matches this
// API's own convention elsewhere (internal/api/ratelimit.go,
// internal/api/touchcounter.go) for the same class of
// decision.
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "slow_down")
return
}
if !hasBasicAuth {
// No Authorization header at all: reject before ever
// touching the client store — there is no client_id to key
// a store lookup by. RecordFailure still fires (keyed by
// sourceIP; clientID is "") so repeated no-credential
// requests still advance that source IP's backoff, same as
// any other failed attempt.
limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client")
return
}
rec, found, err := store.Get(ctx, clientID)
if err != nil {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
return
}
// Both branches run the SAME Argon2id comparison at the SAME
// cost before deciding anything — a found client with a real
// secret on file (secret_state = "set") compares against its own
// hash; every other case (client_id not found at all, OR found
// but secret_state is "none"/"revoked" and ClientSecretHash is
// empty) compares against the fixed dummyHash instead of
// skipping the comparison or short-circuiting on a malformed
// hash. Whichever branch runs, exactly one verifySecret call
// happens before the outcome is known, so an unknown client_id,
// a not-yet-secreted or revoked client, and a wrong secret for a
// fully provisioned one all take statistically indistinguishable
// time (Tobias Lindqvist's objection, LT-51 refinement) —
// closing the timing side-channel the identical response body
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n '\"scope\"\\|Scope.*jwt\\|MapClaims\\|json:\"scope' internal/api/*.go | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Confirm JWT scope claim field name"
}internal/api/tokenhandler.go:40: Scope string `json:"scope"`
internal/api/tokenhandler.go:214: requested := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostForm.Get("scope"))
internal/api/jwtmiddleware.go:39: Scope string `json:"scope"`
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/verifier_router_test.go"
}1 package app
2
3 import (
4 "context"
5 "crypto/rand"
6 "crypto/rsa"
7 "encoding/base64"
8 "encoding/json"
9 "net/http"
10 "net/http/httptest"
11 "strings"
12 "testing"
13 "time"
14
15 "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
16
17 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
18 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
19 "loginid-takehome/internal/model"
20 )
21
22 // fakeRepo is a minimal dao.Repository — only Profiles().Search is
23 // exercised by this file's tests; everything else panics, so a test
24 // that reaches an unexpected method fails loudly rather than silently
25 // zero-valuing (mirrors internal/api's own hand-written fakes,
26 // decisions/test-double-strategy.md).
27 type fakeRepo struct{ profiles fakeProfiles }
28
29 func (f *fakeRepo) Profiles() dao.ProfileRepository { return &f.profiles }
30 func (f *fakeRepo) Credentials() dao.CredentialRepository { panic("not used") }
31 func (f *fakeRepo) Methods() dao.AuthMethodRepository { panic("not used") }
32 func (f *fakeRepo) CreateProfileWithCredential(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile, c *model.UserCredential) (*model.UserProfile, *model.UserCredential, error) {
33 panic("not used")
34 }
35 func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteExpired(ctx context.Context, class dao.RetentionClass, olderThan time.Time, maxRows int) (dao.SweepResult, error) {
36 panic("not used")
37 }
38 func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, externalRef *string) error {
39 panic("not used")
40 }
41 func (f *fakeRepo) Close() error { return nil }
42
43 type fakeProfiles struct{}
44
45 func (fakeProfiles) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
46 return &model.UserProfile{ID: id, Name: "Jane Doe"}, nil
47 }
48 func (fakeProfiles) Search(ctx context.Context, q dao.ProfileQuery) ([]model.UserProfile, int, error) {
49 return []model.UserProfile{{ID: "p1", Name: "Jane Doe"}}, 1, nil
50 }
51 func (fakeProfiles) Create(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
52 panic("not used")
53 }
54 func (fakeProfiles) Update(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
55 panic("not used")
56 }
57 func (fakeProfiles) Upsert(ctx context.Context, p *model.UserProfile) (*model.UserProfile, error) {
58 panic("not used")
59 }
60 func (fakeProfiles) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error { panic("not used") }
61
62 const (
63 testIssuer = "https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal"
64 testAudience = "loginid-api-service"
65 )
66
67 func startFakeJWKS(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *httptest.Server {
68 t.Helper()
69 body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
70 "keys": []map[string]string{{
71 "kty": "RSA",
72 "kid": kid,
73 "alg": "RS256",
74 "use": "sig",
75 "n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub.N.Bytes()),
76 "e": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537
77 }},
78 })
79 if err != nil {
80 t.Fatalf("marshaling fake JWKS: %v", err)
81 }
82 return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
83 w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
84 _, _ = w.Write(body)
85 }))
86 }
87
88 func signTestToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, kid, scope string) string {
89 t.Helper()
90 c := jwt.MapClaims{
91 "iss": testIssuer,
92 "aud": testAudience,
93 "sub": "client-under-test",
94 "scope": scope,
95 "exp": time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix(),
96 "iat": time.Now().Unix(),
97 }
98 tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, c)
99 tok.Header["kid"] = kid
100 signed, err := tok.SignedString(key)
101 if err != nil {
102 t.Fatalf("signing test token: %v", err)
103 }
104 return signed
105 }
106
107 func TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401(t *testing.T) {
108 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
109 if err != nil {
110 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
111 }
112 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
113 defer jwks.Close()
114
115 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}
116 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)
117
118 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"a"}`))
119 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
120 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
121 if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
122 t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401 with no bearer token", w.Code)
123 }
124 }
125
126 // TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler proves the
127 // full stack — deadline middleware, JWT verification against a real
128 // JWKS-over-HTTP fetch, AuthContext population, and LT-39's handler —
129 // is wired together correctly end to end, not just each piece in
130 // isolation.
131 func TestNewVerifierRouter_AuthenticatedSearch_ReachesHandler(t *testing.T) {
132 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
133 if err != nil {
134 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
135 }
136 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
137 defer jwks.Close()
138
139 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}
140 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)
141 tok := signTestToken(t, key, "key-1", "profile:search")
142
143 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"jane"}`))
144 req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
145 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
146 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
147 if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
148 t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200, body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
149 }
150 }
151
152 func TestNewVerifierRouter_HealthzUnaffectedByAuth(t *testing.T) {
153 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: "http://unused.invalid"}
154 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)
155
156 req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)
157 w := httptest.NewRecorder()
158 router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
159 if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
160 t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 — /healthz must stay unauthenticated per handoff-03-auth.md", w.Code)
161 }
162 }
163
164 // TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied is Marcus Ilori's (02)
165 // ruling: the router-level test that was missing entirely for
166 // GET /profiles/{id} under read:own — both the allow and deny paths
167 // through the real StopgapAuthorizer, wired the way cmd/api-service
168 // actually wires it (via cfg.AuthzQASub/AuthzQAAllowedProfileID).
169 func TestNewVerifierRouter_ReadOwn_AllowedAndDenied(t *testing.T) {
170 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
171 if err != nil {
172 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
173 }
174 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
175 defer jwks.Close()
176
177 cfg := config.Config{
178 AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer,
179 AuthJWTAudience: testAudience,
180 AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL,
181 AuthzQASub: "client-under-test", // matches signTestToken's hardcoded sub
182 AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: "allowed-profile",
183 }
184 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)
185 tok := signTestToken(t, key, "key-1", "profile:read:own")
186
187 allowedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/profiles/allowed-profile", nil)
188 allowedReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
189 wAllowed := httptest.NewRecorder()
190 router.ServeHTTP(wAllowed, allowedReq)
191 if wAllowed.Code != http.StatusOK {
192 t.Errorf("allowed profile: status = %d, want 200, body=%s", wAllowed.Code, wAllowed.Body.String())
193 }
194
195 deniedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/profiles/some-other-profile", nil)
196 deniedReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
197 wDenied := httptest.NewRecorder()
198 router.ServeHTTP(wDenied, deniedReq)
199 if wDenied.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
200 t.Errorf("unseeded profile: status = %d, want 403 (StopgapAuthorizer's safe-default deny), body=%s", wDenied.Code, wDenied.Body.String())
201 }
202 }
203
204 // TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503 is the PM's
205 // direct question: on a cluster where the database doesn't exist yet (no
206 // DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured), the verifying Deployment must still come
207 // up with /healthz green — cmd/api-service/main.go passes repo=nil
208 // rather than crash-looping — and the two protected routes must fail
209 // closed (503), not panic on a nil Repository. Auth still runs first: an
210 // unauthenticated request still gets 401, proven by the companion
211 // TestNewVerifierRouter_UnauthenticatedRequest_401-shaped assertion
212 // inline below.
213 func TestNewVerifierRouter_NilRepo_ProtectedRoutesFailClosed503(t *testing.T) {
214 key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
215 if err != nil {
216 t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
217 }
218 jwks := startFakeJWKS(t, "key-1", &key.PublicKey)
219 defer jwks.Close()
220
221 cfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: jwks.URL}
222 router := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, nil, nil) // no DAO repository — the no-database-yet case
223 tok := signTestToken(t, key, "key-1", "profile:search")
224
225 // /healthz must still be green.
226 healthReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)
227 wHealth := httptest.NewRecorder()
228 router.ServeHTTP(wHealth, healthReq)
229 if wHealth.Code != http.StatusOK {
230 t.Errorf("/healthz status = %d, want 200 even with no DAO repository", wHealth.Code)
231 }
232
233 // An authenticated request to a protected route must fail closed
234 // (503), not panic.
235 authedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"a"}`))
236 authedReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
237 wAuthed := httptest.NewRecorder()
238 router.ServeHTTP(wAuthed, authedReq)
239 if wAuthed.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
240 t.Errorf("authenticated request with no repository: status = %d, want 503", wAuthed.Code)
241 }
242
243 // An UNauthenticated request must still get 401, not 503 — auth
244 // still runs before the repository is ever consulted.
245 unauthedReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/profiles/search", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"a"}`))
246 wUnauthed := httptest.NewRecorder()
247 router.ServeHTTP(wUnauthed, unauthedReq)
248 if wUnauthed.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
249 t.Errorf("unauthenticated request with no repository: status = %d, want 401 (auth must still run first)", wUnauthed.Code)
250 }
251 }
252 {
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && sed -n '1,30p' internal/app/connector_router.go",
"description": "Check connector_router.go top for style reference"
}package app import ( "log" "net/http" "time" "loginid-takehome/internal/api" "loginid-takehome/internal/config" "loginid-takehome/internal/connector" ) // connectorJWKSCacheTTL matches api-service's own verifier JWKS TTL // (internal/app/verifier_router.go) — both binaries verify tokens minted // by the same issuer, so there's no reason for a different refresh // cadence. const connectorJWKSCacheTTL = 15 * time.Minute // connectorVendorLimiterBaseBackoff/MaxBackoff/AlertThreshold mirror // NewIssuerRouter's own GrantLimiter constants — same reasoning // (handoff-03-auth.md names the mechanism, not specific numbers), reused // here for the vendor-call rate limiter per LT-41's attack-tree leaf 5 // control rather than inventing a second set of magic numbers. const ( connectorVendorLimiterBaseBackoff = 1 * time.Second connectorVendorLimiterMaxBackoff = 5 * time.Minute connectorVendorLimiterAlertThreshold = 5 ) // NewConnectorRouter builds cmd/idp-connector's real router — LT-41's Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo.go",
"content": "package app\n\nimport (\n\t_ \"embed\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n)\n\n// demoPage is LT-53's single static HTML page, embedded directly into\n// the api-service binary — no separate deploy artifact, no separate\n// service. Served only at GET /demo on NewVerifierRouter (never on the\n// issuer or sweep code paths, since this is a demo of the\n// search/retrieve surface, not the issuer internals — refinement/\n// LT-53.md's own acceptance criterion).\n//\n// The page is a pure client of the real API: its own JS mints a real\n// token from the visitor's pasted QA client credential and calls\n// /auth/token and /profiles/* directly from the browser, same-origin\n// (Theo Bergman's, 04, ingress routing puts both the issuer and\n// verifier Deployments behind the one public hostname). api-service's\n// server-side code here never sees the plaintext QA secret — this\n// handler only ever serves static bytes.\n//\n//go:embed demo_page.html\nvar demoPage []byte\n\n// demoHandler serves the embedded page verbatim. No template\n// execution, no per-request state, no query-string handling — a static\n// GET, deliberately as simple as the acceptance criteria allow, so\n// there's no server-side code path here to add never-log coverage for\n// beyond \"this handler never logs anything, and never will\" (LT-53's\n// own architecture criterion — a future server-side proxy step would\n// need its own review at that point, not be assumed covered by this\n// one).\nfunc demoHandler() http.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html; charset=utf-8\")\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(demoPage)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/verifier_router.go",
"old_string": "\tmux.Handle(\"POST /profiles/search\", protect(searchHandler))\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /profiles/{id}\", protect(getHandler))\n\n\treturn mux\n}",
"new_string": "\tmux.Handle(\"POST /profiles/search\", protect(searchHandler))\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /profiles/{id}\", protect(getHandler))\n\n\t// LT-53: the demo console. A plain static handler — no auth\n\t// middleware, no rate limiter of its own — sitting on the exact\n\t// same mux as every other route this router serves, so there is no\n\t// special-cased bypass to build or to accidentally omit: it gets\n\t// exactly the same (lack of) treatment /healthz already has, not a\n\t// new exemption invented for this route. The page's own JS is what\n\t// drives the real, fully-enforced /profiles/search and\n\t// /profiles/{id} routes above (and /auth/token on the issuer,\n\t// same-origin via Theo Bergman's, 04, ingress routing) — those\n\t// calls hit the real rate limiters inside searchHandler/getHandler\n\t// exactly as any other caller's would.\n\tmux.Handle(\"GET /demo\", demoHandler())\n\n\treturn mux\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/verifier_router.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html",
"content": "<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\">\n<title>LoginID take-home — live API demo</title>\n<style>\n /* ---- design tokens (refinement/LT-53.md's six-color legend, exact\n hex values from Warren's design brief) ---- */\n :root {\n --bg: #0A0F1E;\n --bg-raised: #101A30;\n --bg-panel: #0D1526;\n --border: #1E2A44;\n --text: #E7EDF7;\n --text-mute: #8B96AD;\n --green: #5BE49B; /* 200 success */\n --coral: #FF7A59; /* 401 / 403 */\n --amber: #FFC857; /* 429 */\n --red: #FF5C6C; /* 5xx / errors */\n --violet: #9D8CFF; /* security notes / masked fields */\n --teal: #3DD6C8; /* agent / request labels */\n --font-sans: system-ui, -apple-system, \"Segoe UI\", Roboto, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;\n --font-mono: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, \"SF Mono\", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;\n }\n\n * { box-sizing: border-box; }\n html, body {\n background: var(--bg);\n color: var(--text);\n font-family: var(--font-sans);\n margin: 0;\n padding: 0;\n }\n body {\n padding: 24px 16px 64px;\n line-height: 1.5;\n }\n .wrap { max-width: 1080px; margin: 0 auto; }\n\n h1, h2, h3 { font-weight: 650; letter-spacing: -0.01em; margin: 0 0 8px; }\n h1 { font-size: clamp(1.5rem, 1.1rem + 1.5vw, 2.1rem); }\n h2 { font-size: 1.15rem; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px; }\n h3 { font-size: 0.8rem; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.08em; color: var(--text-mute); margin: 0 0 6px; }\n p { margin: 0 0 8px; }\n .lede {\n color: var(--text-mute);\n font-size: 1rem;\n max-width: 68ch;\n }\n .copy {\n color: var(--text-mute);\n font-size: 0.92rem;\n max-width: 72ch;\n margin-bottom: 16px;\n }\n\n a { color: var(--teal); }\n\n .badge {\n display: inline-flex;\n align-items: center;\n justify-content: center;\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.72rem;\n font-weight: 600;\n padding: 2px 8px;\n border-radius: 999px;\n line-height: 1.6;\n white-space: nowrap;\n }\n .badge-num {\n background: var(--bg-raised);\n color: var(--teal);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n min-width: 1.6em;\n }\n .status-2xx { background: rgba(91,228,155,0.14); color: var(--green); border: 1px solid rgba(91,228,155,0.4); }\n .status-401, .status-403 { background: rgba(255,122,89,0.14); color: var(--coral); border: 1px solid rgba(255,122,89,0.4); }\n .status-429 { background: rgba(255,200,87,0.16); color: var(--amber); border: 1px solid rgba(255,200,87,0.45); }\n .status-4xx { background: rgba(255,92,108,0.14); color: var(--red); border: 1px solid rgba(255,92,108,0.4); }\n .status-5xx { background: rgba(255,92,108,0.14); color: var(--red); border: 1px solid rgba(255,92,108,0.4); }\n .status-pending { background: var(--bg-raised); color: var(--text-mute); border: 1px solid var(--border); }\n\n section.panel {\n background: var(--bg-panel);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n border-radius: 14px;\n padding: 20px 20px 22px;\n margin-bottom: 20px;\n }\n section.credential {\n background: var(--bg-raised);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n border-radius: 14px;\n padding: 20px 20px 22px;\n margin-bottom: 28px;\n }\n\n .controls { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 10px; align-items: center; margin: 10px 0 16px; }\n input[type=\"text\"], input[type=\"password\"] {\n background: var(--bg);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n color: var(--text);\n border-radius: 8px;\n padding: 8px 10px;\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.85rem;\n min-width: 0;\n flex: 1 1 200px;\n }\n input:focus, button:focus {\n outline: 2px solid var(--teal);\n outline-offset: 1px;\n }\n label.field-label {\n display: block;\n font-size: 0.72rem;\n color: var(--text-mute);\n margin-bottom: 4px;\n }\n .field { flex: 1 1 200px; min-width: 160px; }\n\n button {\n background: var(--teal);\n color: #04211E;\n border: none;\n border-radius: 8px;\n padding: 9px 16px;\n font-size: 0.85rem;\n font-weight: 650;\n cursor: pointer;\n font-family: var(--font-sans);\n }\n button:hover { filter: brightness(1.08); }\n button:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }\n button.secondary {\n background: transparent;\n color: var(--text);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n }\n\n .token-status { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 8px; margin-top: 12px; }\n .token-chip {\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.72rem;\n padding: 4px 9px;\n border-radius: 999px;\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n color: var(--text-mute);\n background: var(--bg);\n }\n .token-chip.live { color: var(--green); border-color: rgba(91,228,155,0.4); background: rgba(91,228,155,0.08); }\n\n .flows {\n display: grid;\n grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;\n gap: 16px;\n }\n @media (max-width: 700px) {\n .flows { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }\n .flow-pair { grid-template-columns: 1fr !important; }\n }\n .flow {\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n border-radius: 10px;\n padding: 12px;\n background: var(--bg);\n min-width: 0;\n }\n .flow-pair {\n display: grid;\n grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;\n gap: 12px;\n }\n .flow-title { font-size: 0.78rem; color: var(--text-mute); margin-bottom: 6px; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.06em; }\n pre.curl {\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.76rem;\n color: var(--teal);\n background: var(--bg-panel);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n border-radius: 8px;\n padding: 8px 10px;\n overflow-x: auto;\n white-space: pre-wrap;\n word-break: break-word;\n margin: 0 0 8px;\n }\n .response-head { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; margin-bottom: 6px; }\n .json {\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.78rem;\n background: var(--bg-panel);\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n border-radius: 8px;\n padding: 8px 10px;\n overflow-x: auto;\n min-height: 1.4em;\n }\n .json .k { color: var(--teal); }\n .json .s { color: var(--text); }\n .json .n { color: var(--amber); }\n .json .b { color: var(--violet); }\n .json .nul { color: var(--text-mute); }\n .json .punc { color: var(--text-mute); }\n .json .placeholder { color: var(--text-mute); font-style: italic; }\n .field-tag {\n display: inline-block;\n font-size: 0.62rem;\n font-weight: 700;\n text-transform: uppercase;\n letter-spacing: 0.04em;\n padding: 0 5px;\n border-radius: 4px;\n margin-left: 6px;\n vertical-align: 1px;\n }\n .masked-val { background: rgba(157,140,255,0.16); border-radius: 4px; padding: 0 3px; }\n .masked-tag { background: rgba(157,140,255,0.22); color: var(--violet); }\n .full-val { background: rgba(91,228,155,0.14); border-radius: 4px; padding: 0 3px; }\n .full-tag { background: rgba(91,228,155,0.22); color: var(--green); }\n\n .note { font-size: 0.82rem; color: var(--text-mute); margin-top: 10px; }\n .note.warn { color: var(--amber); }\n .result-line {\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.82rem;\n margin-top: 10px;\n padding: 8px 10px;\n border-radius: 8px;\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n background: var(--bg);\n }\n .result-line.pass { color: var(--green); border-color: rgba(91,228,155,0.4); }\n .result-line.fail { color: var(--red); border-color: rgba(255,92,108,0.4); }\n\n .burst-log { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; margin-top: 10px; }\n .burst-chip {\n font-family: var(--font-mono);\n font-size: 0.7rem;\n padding: 3px 7px;\n border-radius: 6px;\n border: 1px solid var(--border);\n }\n\n footer { color: var(--text-mute); font-size: 0.78rem; margin-top: 32px; }\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrap\">\n\n <header>\n <h1>LoginID take-home — live API demo</h1>\n <p class=\"lede\">This page lets you drive the actual identity API live from your browser, so you can watch its access rules and safeguards work in real time instead of taking our word for it.</p>\n </header>\n\n <section class=\"credential\" aria-label=\"Credential entry\">\n <h2><span class=\"badge badge-num\">●</span> Get a token</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">You paste a temporary QA test login here only to get a real access token for this demo — it stays in this browser tab, is never saved anywhere, and is only ever used to talk to this one page's own login endpoint.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <div class=\"field\">\n <label class=\"field-label\" for=\"qa-client-id\">QA client id</label>\n <input type=\"text\" id=\"qa-client-id\" name=\"qa-client-id\" autocomplete=\"off\" placeholder=\"qa-review-client-...\">\n </div>\n <div class=\"field\">\n <label class=\"field-label\" for=\"qa-token-input\">QA client secret</label>\n <input type=\"password\" id=\"qa-token-input\" name=\"qa-token-input\" autocomplete=\"new-password\" placeholder=\"paste the QA secret\">\n </div>\n <button id=\"mint-btn\" type=\"button\">Mint token</button>\n </div>\n <div id=\"mint-flow\"></div>\n <div class=\"token-status\" id=\"token-status\" aria-live=\"polite\"></div>\n </section>\n\n <section class=\"panel\" aria-labelledby=\"panel1-title\">\n <h2 id=\"panel1-title\"><span class=\"badge badge-num\">1</span> Masked search vs. full read</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">This shows the same person's record returned two different ways depending on what the caller is allowed to see — one version hides sensitive fields, the other reveals them — proving access is limited to what each caller has earned, not an all-or-nothing switch.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <div class=\"field\">\n <label class=\"field-label\" for=\"p1-query\">Search by name</label>\n <input type=\"text\" id=\"p1-query\" value=\"Review Demo\">\n </div>\n <button type=\"button\" data-run=\"panel1\">Run this panel</button>\n <span class=\"note\">Needs a <code>profile:search</code> token and a <code>profile:read:any</code> token minted above.</span>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flows\">\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p1-search-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">Masked (profile:search)</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p1-search-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p1-search-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p1-search-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p1-read-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">Full (profile:read:any)</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p1-read-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p1-read-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p1-read-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n </div>\n </section>\n\n <section class=\"panel\" aria-labelledby=\"panel2-title\">\n <h2 id=\"panel2-title\"><span class=\"badge badge-num\">2</span> The two 403s</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">This shows that being denied for \"you don't have permission\" and being denied because \"that record doesn't exist\" look exactly, byte-for-byte, the same from the outside, so no one can use the error message to go fishing for which accounts are real.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <button type=\"button\" data-run=\"panel2\">Run this panel</button>\n <span class=\"note\">Needs a <code>profile:read:own</code> token minted above. Uses two fresh, unpredictable record ids this credential was never granted — one may exist, one almost certainly doesn't; neither matters to the result.</span>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flows\">\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p2-a-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">Record A</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p2-a-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p2-a-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p2-a-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p2-b-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">Record B</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p2-b-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p2-b-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p2-b-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n </div>\n <div class=\"result-line\" id=\"p2-result\">byte-equality check: not run yet</div>\n </section>\n\n <section class=\"panel\" aria-labelledby=\"panel3-title\">\n <h2 id=\"panel3-title\"><span class=\"badge badge-num\">3</span> The 401</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">This shows the API simply refuses to answer at all when no valid login is presented, proving there's no accidental back door for anonymous requests.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <button type=\"button\" data-run=\"panel3\">Run this panel</button>\n <span class=\"note\">No token needed — that's the point.</span>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flows\" style=\"grid-template-columns: 1fr;\">\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p3-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">No Authorization header</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p3-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p3-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p3-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n </div>\n </section>\n\n <section class=\"panel\" aria-labelledby=\"panel4-title\">\n <h2 id=\"panel4-title\"><span class=\"badge badge-num\">4</span> The reason_code enum</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">This shows the system accepts a recognized reason for a request and rejects a made-up one, proving it enforces a fixed, checkable list of valid reasons rather than trusting whatever a caller types in.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <button type=\"button\" data-run=\"panel4\">Run this panel</button>\n <span class=\"note\">Needs a <code>profile:read:any</code> token minted above (and, if panel 1 hasn't run yet, a <code>profile:search</code> token too, to find a real record id).</span>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flows\">\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p4-ok-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">reason_code=support_ticket (accepted)</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p4-ok-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p4-ok-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p4-ok-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p4-bad-flow\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">reason_code=made_up_reason (rejected)</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p4-bad-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p4-bad-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p4-bad-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n </div>\n </section>\n\n <section class=\"panel\" aria-labelledby=\"panel5-title\">\n <h2 id=\"panel5-title\"><span class=\"badge badge-num\">5</span> The rate limit tripping</h2>\n <p class=\"copy\">This shows the API cutting off a rapid burst of real requests in real time, proving it can defend itself against being hammered rather than just claiming to.</p>\n <p class=\"note warn\">Runs last on purpose: the limit is shared by every visitor currently using the same seeded QA credential, so tripping it here really does affect anyone else driving this panel in the same window — not a per-visitor sandbox.</p>\n <div class=\"controls\">\n <button type=\"button\" data-run=\"panel5\">Run this panel</button>\n <span class=\"note\">Needs a <code>profile:search</code> token minted above. Fires real requests, one at a time, until one comes back <span class=\"badge status-429\">429</span> or a safety cap is hit.</span>\n </div>\n <div class=\"burst-log\" id=\"p5-log\"></div>\n <div class=\"flow\" id=\"p5-flow\" style=\"margin-top:10px;\">\n <div class=\"flow-title\">Last request in the burst</div>\n <pre class=\"curl\" id=\"p5-curl\">—</pre>\n <div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"p5-status\">not run</span></div>\n <div class=\"json\" id=\"p5-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">run the panel to see a real response</span></div>\n </div>\n </section>\n\n <footer>\n Every request above is a real, same-origin call this page's own JavaScript makes directly from your browser — no proxy, no simulated response, no secret baked into this page's source. Nothing you type here is saved anywhere once you close this tab.\n </footer>\n\n</div>\n\n<script>\n(function () {\n \"use strict\";\n\n // ---- shared state, in-memory only, never persisted ----\n var tokens = {}; // scope -> { token, exp }\n var lastKnownProfileId = null;\n\n var origin = window.location.origin;\n\n function el(id) { return document.getElementById(id); }\n\n function statusClass(status) {\n if (status === 401) return \"status-401\";\n if (status === 403) return \"status-403\";\n if (status === 429) return \"status-429\";\n if (status >= 500) return \"status-5xx\";\n if (status >= 400) return \"status-4xx\";\n if (status >= 200 && status < 300) return \"status-2xx\";\n return \"status-pending\";\n }\n\n function setStatus(idPrefix, status) {\n var badge = el(idPrefix + \"-status\");\n badge.className = \"badge \" + statusClass(status);\n badge.textContent = String(status);\n }\n\n // ---- a small hand-rolled JSON renderer: no raw <pre>{{json}}</pre>\n // dump anywhere on this page, per LT-53's own visual criterion.\n // fieldTags lets a caller mark specific top-level field names as\n // \"masked\" or \"full\" with a visible highlight + tag, so a viewer can\n // *see* which fields are masked without reading closely.\n function renderJSONValue(value, indent, keyName, fieldTags) {\n var pad = \" \".repeat(indent);\n if (value === null) return '<span class=\"nul\">null</span>';\n if (typeof value === \"string\") {\n var esc = value.replace(/&/g, \"&\").replace(/</g, \"<\");\n var tag = fieldTags && keyName ? fieldTags[keyName] : null;\n if (tag === \"masked\") {\n return '<span class=\"s masked-val\">\"' + esc + '\"</span><span class=\"field-tag masked-tag\">masked</span>';\n }\n if (tag === \"full\") {\n return '<span class=\"s full-val\">\"' + esc + '\"</span><span class=\"field-tag full-tag\">full</span>';\n }\n return '<span class=\"s\">\"' + esc + '\"</span>';\n }\n if (typeof value === \"number\") return '<span class=\"n\">' + value + \"</span>\";\n if (typeof value === \"boolean\") return '<span class=\"b\">' + value + \"</span>\";\n if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n if (value.length === 0) return '<span class=\"punc\">[]</span>';\n var items = value.map(function (v) {\n return pad + \" \" + renderJSONValue(v, indent + 1, null, fieldTags);\n });\n return '<span class=\"punc\">[</span>\\n' + items.join(',\\n') + '\\n' + pad + '<span class=\"punc\">]</span>';\n }\n if (typeof value === \"object\") {\n var keys = Object.keys(value);\n if (keys.length === 0) return '<span class=\"punc\">{}</span>';\n var lines = keys.map(function (k) {\n return pad + ' <span class=\"k\">\"' + k + '\"</span><span class=\"punc\">: </span>' +\n renderJSONValue(value[k], indent + 1, k, fieldTags);\n });\n return '<span class=\"punc\">{</span>\\n' + lines.join(',\\n') + '\\n' + pad + '<span class=\"punc\">}</span>';\n }\n return String(value);\n }\n\n function renderJSON(targetId, bodyText, fieldTags) {\n var target = el(targetId);\n try {\n var parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText);\n target.innerHTML = renderJSONValue(parsed, 0, null, fieldTags || {});\n } catch (e) {\n target.textContent = bodyText || \"(empty body)\";\n }\n }\n\n function curlLine(method, path, opts) {\n opts = opts || {};\n var line = \"curl -s -X \" + method + \" \" + origin + path;\n if (opts.basic) {\n line += \" \\\\\\n -u '\" + opts.basic + \":***'\";\n }\n if (opts.bearer) {\n line += \" \\\\\\n -H 'Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»'\";\n }\n if (opts.contentType) {\n line += \" \\\\\\n -H 'Content-Type: \" + opts.contentType + \"'\";\n }\n if (opts.data) {\n line += \" \\\\\\n -d '\" + opts.data + \"'\";\n }\n return line;\n }\n\n function randomUUID() {\n if (window.crypto && window.crypto.randomUUID) return window.crypto.randomUUID();\n // Fallback for a browser without crypto.randomUUID — still a\n // well-formed v4-shaped id, just not cryptographically sourced.\n return \"xxxxxxxx-xxxx-4xxx-yxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx\".replace(/[xy]/g, function (c) {\n var r = (Math.random() * 16) | 0, v = c === \"x\" ? r : (r & 0x3) | 0x8;\n return v.toString(16);\n });\n }\n\n // ---- token minting ----\n function updateTokenStatus() {\n var scopes = [\"profile:search\", \"profile:read:own\", \"profile:read:any\"];\n var status = el(\"token-status\");\n status.innerHTML = \"\";\n scopes.forEach(function (scope) {\n var chip = document.createElement(\"span\");\n var have = !!tokens[scope];\n chip.className = \"token-chip\" + (have ? \" live\" : \"\");\n chip.textContent = scope + (have ? \" ✓ live\" : \" — not minted\");\n status.appendChild(chip);\n });\n }\n updateTokenStatus();\n\n el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n var clientId = el(\"qa-client-id\").value.trim();\n // Read the secret field's value only right here, at the moment of\n // use, and never assign it to a variable that outlives this\n // function call — Marcus Ilori's (02) enforcement site: no other\n // network call in this file ever references a client-secret value.\n var body = \"grant_type=client_credentials\";\n var authValue = clientId + \":\" + el(\"qa-token-input\").value;\n\n el(\"mint-flow\").innerHTML =\n '<pre class=\"curl\">' + curlLine(\"POST\", \"/auth/token\", { basic: clientId, contentType: \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", data: body }) + '</pre>' +\n '<div class=\"response-head\"><span class=\"badge status-pending\" id=\"mint-status\">running…</span></div>' +\n '<div class=\"json\" id=\"mint-json\"><span class=\"placeholder\">waiting for a response</span></div>';\n\n fetch(origin + \"/auth/token\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\n \"Authorization\": \"Basic \" + btoa(authValue),\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"\n },\n body: body\n }).then(function (resp) {\n // Clear the pasted secret from the input immediately — it is\n // never written to localStorage/sessionStorage/a cookie, and\n // this is the only place it's read at all.\n el(\"qa-token-input\").value = \"\";\n return resp.text().then(function (text) { return { resp: resp, text: text }; });\n }).then(function (result) {\n var badge = document.getElementById(\"mint-status\");\n badge.className = \"badge \" + statusClass(result.resp.status);\n badge.textContent = String(result.resp.status);\n renderJSON(\"mint-json\", result.text);\n if (result.resp.status >= 200 && result.resp.status < 300) {\n try {\n var parsed = JSON.parse(result.text);\n tokens[parsed.scope] = { token: parsed.access_token, exp: Date.now() + (parsed.expires_in || 0) * 1000 };\n updateTokenStatus();\n } catch (e) { /* malformed body is shown as-is above; nothing to store */ }\n }\n }).catch(function (err) {\n el(\"qa-token-input\").value = \"\";\n var badge = document.getElementById(\"mint-status\");\n badge.className = \"badge status-5xx\";\n badge.textContent = \"network error\";\n document.getElementById(\"mint-json\").textContent = String(err);\n });\n });\n\n // ---- a small fetch helper shared by every panel below: never\n // prints the real token in the displayed curl line (always ***),\n // and always renders through renderJSON (no raw dump anywhere).\n function runFlow(idPrefix, method, path, scope, opts) {\n opts = opts || {};\n var headers = {};\n var curlOpts = { contentType: opts.contentType };\n if (scope && tokens[scope]) {\n headers[\"Authorization\"] = \"Bearer \" + tokens[scope].token;\n curlOpts.bearer = true;\n }\n if (opts.contentType) headers[\"Content-Type\"] = opts.contentType;\n curlOpts.data = opts.body;\n\n el(idPrefix + \"-curl\").textContent = curlLine(method, path, curlOpts);\n var statusBadge = el(idPrefix + \"-status\");\n statusBadge.className = \"badge status-pending\";\n statusBadge.textContent = \"running…\";\n\n return fetch(origin + path, { method: method, headers: headers, body: opts.body }).then(function (resp) {\n return resp.text().then(function (text) {\n setStatus(idPrefix, resp.status);\n renderJSON(idPrefix + \"-json\", text, opts.fieldTags);\n return { status: resp.status, text: text };\n });\n }).catch(function (err) {\n statusBadge.className = \"badge status-5xx\";\n statusBadge.textContent = \"network error\";\n el(idPrefix + \"-json\").textContent = String(err);\n return { status: 0, text: \"\" };\n });\n }\n\n function requireScope(scope, panelNote) {\n if (!tokens[scope]) {\n window.alert(\"This panel needs a \" + scope + \" token — mint one with the matching QA credential above first.\");\n return false;\n }\n return true;\n }\n\n // ---- Panel 1: masked search vs. full read ----\n function findSampleId() {\n if (lastKnownProfileId) return Promise.resolve(lastKnownProfileId);\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:search\")) return Promise.resolve(null);\n var body = JSON.stringify({ name: el(\"p1-query\").value || \"Review Demo\" });\n return runFlow(\"p1-search\", \"POST\", \"/profiles/search\", \"profile:search\", {\n contentType: \"application/json\",\n body: body,\n fieldTags: { phone: \"masked\", region: \"masked\" }\n }).then(function (result) {\n if (result.status !== 200) return null;\n try {\n var parsed = JSON.parse(result.text);\n if (parsed.results && parsed.results.length) {\n lastKnownProfileId = parsed.results[0].id;\n return lastKnownProfileId;\n }\n } catch (e) { /* rendered already above */ }\n return null;\n });\n }\n\n document.querySelector('[data-run=\"panel1\"]').addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:search\")) return;\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:read:any\")) return;\n findSampleId().then(function (id) {\n if (!id) return;\n runFlow(\"p1-read\", \"GET\", \"/profiles/\" + id + \"?reason_code=support_ticket\", \"profile:read:any\", {\n fieldTags: { phone: \"full\", street_address: \"full\", locality: \"full\", region: \"full\", postal_code: \"full\", country: \"full\" }\n });\n });\n });\n\n // ---- Panel 2: the two 403s ----\n document.querySelector('[data-run=\"panel2\"]').addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:read:own\")) return;\n var idA = randomUUID();\n var idB = randomUUID();\n Promise.all([\n runFlow(\"p2-a\", \"GET\", \"/profiles/\" + idA, \"profile:read:own\"),\n runFlow(\"p2-b\", \"GET\", \"/profiles/\" + idB, \"profile:read:own\")\n ]).then(function (results) {\n var a = results[0], b = results[1];\n var result = el(\"p2-result\");\n if (a.status === 403 && b.status === 403 && a.text === b.text) {\n result.className = \"result-line pass\";\n result.textContent = \"byte-equality check: PASS — both 403 response bodies are identical, \" + a.text.length + \" bytes each.\";\n } else {\n result.className = \"result-line fail\";\n result.textContent = \"byte-equality check: did not match this run (statuses \" + a.status + \"/\" + b.status + \") — try again.\";\n }\n });\n });\n\n // ---- Panel 3: the 401 ----\n document.querySelector('[data-run=\"panel3\"]').addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n runFlow(\"p3\", \"POST\", \"/profiles/search\", null, { contentType: \"application/json\", body: JSON.stringify({ name: \"anyone\" }) });\n });\n\n // ---- Panel 4: reason_code enum ----\n document.querySelector('[data-run=\"panel4\"]').addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:read:any\")) return;\n findSampleId().then(function (id) {\n if (!id) return;\n runFlow(\"p4-ok\", \"GET\", \"/profiles/\" + id + \"?reason_code=support_ticket\", \"profile:read:any\");\n runFlow(\"p4-bad\", \"GET\", \"/profiles/\" + id + \"?reason_code=made_up_reason\", \"profile:read:any\");\n });\n });\n\n // ---- Panel 5: rate limit tripping (runs last; shared window) ----\n document.querySelector('[data-run=\"panel5\"]').addEventListener(\"click\", function () {\n if (!requireScope(\"profile:search\")) return;\n var log = el(\"p5-log\");\n log.innerHTML = \"\";\n var maxAttempts = 15;\n var body = JSON.stringify({ name: \"Review Demo\" });\n\n function attempt(n) {\n if (n > maxAttempts) {\n var chip = document.createElement(\"span\");\n chip.className = \"burst-chip status-amber\";\n chip.textContent = \"stopped after \" + maxAttempts + \" requests without a 429 — the shared window may already be spent for this credential; try again shortly\";\n log.appendChild(chip);\n return;\n }\n var headers = { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\", \"Authorization\": \"Bearer \" + tokens[\"profile:search\"].token };\n fetch(origin + \"/profiles/search\", { method: \"POST\", headers: headers, body: body }).then(function (resp) {\n return resp.text().then(function (text) {\n var chip = document.createElement(\"span\");\n chip.className = \"burst-chip \" + statusClass(resp.status);\n chip.textContent = \"#\" + n + \": \" + resp.status;\n log.appendChild(chip);\n\n el(\"p5-curl\").textContent = curlLine(\"POST\", \"/profiles/search\", { bearer: true, contentType: \"application/json\", data: body });\n setStatus(\"p5\", resp.status);\n renderJSON(\"p5-json\", text);\n\n if (resp.status === 429) return;\n return attempt(n + 1);\n });\n });\n }\n attempt(1);\n });\n\n})();\n</script>\n</body>\n</html>\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -60",
"description": "Build the worktree"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"func NewIssuerRouter\\|func NewRouter\\|func NewConnectorRouter\" internal/app/*.go",
"description": "Confirm router constructors for negative route tests"
}internal/app/app.go:124:func NewRouter(service string, mode Mode) http.Handler {
internal/app/connector_router.go:45:func NewConnectorRouter(cfg config.Config, vendor connector.VendorClient) http.Handler {
internal/app/issuer_router.go:50:func NewIssuerRouter(cfg config.Config, key *api.SigningKey, issuerDB *sql.DB) http.Handler {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/issuer_router.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 55
}1 package app
2
3 import (
4 "database/sql"
5 "log"
6 "net/http"
7 "time"
8
9 "loginid-takehome/internal/api"
10 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
11 )
12
13 // grantLimiterBaseBackoff/maxBackoff/alertThreshold are this story's own
14 // engineering defaults for api.GrantLimiter (handoff-03-auth.md v3
15 // requires the mechanism — failed-grant rate limiting/backoff per
16 // client_id and per source IP, plus alerting on a sustained run against
17 // one client_id — but names no specific numbers, unlike LT-40's
18 // touch-cap and JWKS-staleness constants, which 02 ruled explicitly).
19 // Doubling from 1s, capped at 5m, mirrors this codebase's other
20 // exponential-backoff component (InProcessRateLimiter's own doc
21 // comment); alerting after 5 consecutive failures against one client_id
22 // is a deliberately low bar — a real client mistyping a secret twice is
23 // not the failure mode this exists to catch, five in a row without an
24 // intervening success is. Flagged for 02's review rather than treated
25 // as a closed decision.
26 const (
27 grantLimiterBaseBackoff = 1 * time.Second
28 grantLimiterMaxBackoff = 5 * time.Minute
29 grantLimiterAlertThreshold = 5
30 )
31
32 // NewIssuerRouter builds api-service's issuer-mode router — LT-51's real
33 // token-issuance handler and JWKS-serving endpoint, replacing the plain
34 // NewRouter's placeholder /auth/token (LT-32) on this Deployment only.
35 // The verifier Deployment never calls this — it has no signing key, no
36 // client store, and no legitimate use for either (LT-32's
37 // physical-absence criterion).
38 //
39 // key must be non-nil (cmd/api-service/main.go's config.Load already
40 // fails startup in issuer mode if JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE is missing or
41 // unreadable — see resolveSigningKeyPath's own doc comment — so by the
42 // time this function runs, a missing key is a startup bug, not a
43 // runtime condition this router needs to degrade gracefully for).
44 //
45 // issuerDB is the *sql.DB dialed against config.Config.IssuerDBDSN — may
46 // be nil if IssuerDBDSN was never configured, in which case /auth/token
47 // fails every grant closed with server_error rather than panicking on a
48 // nil ClientStore, the same fail-closed shape NewVerifierRouter uses for
49 // a nil dao.Repository.
50 func NewIssuerRouter(cfg config.Config, key *api.SigningKey, issuerDB *sql.DB) http.Handler {
51 mux := http.NewServeMux()
52 mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", healthHandler("api-service"))
53 mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/jwks.json", api.NewJWKSHandler(key))
54
55 limiter := api.NewInProcessGrantLimiter({
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"func.*SigningKey\\|type SigningKey\" internal/api/signingkey.go 2>/dev/null | head -20",
"description": "Inspect SigningKey construction API"
}24:type SigningKey struct {
39:func LoadSigningKey(path string) (*SigningKey, error) {
83:func (k *SigningKey) JWKS() jwksResponse {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/api/signingkey.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 60
}1 // signingkey.go loads the issuer's RSA private key (LT-32's
2 // JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE) and derives its kid — the one piece both the
3 // token-minting handler and the JWKS-serving handler need. Nothing in
4 // this package outside this file (and the two handlers that hold a
5 // *SigningKey by value) ever touches private-key material — the
6 // verifying binary never imports this file's actual key bytes at all
7 // (LT-40's own structural guarantee is unaffected: KeySource/JWKSCache
8 // there only ever handle public keys).
9 package api
10
11 import (
12 "crypto/rsa"
13 "crypto/sha256"
14 "crypto/x509"
15 "encoding/base64"
16 "encoding/pem"
17 "fmt"
18 "os"
19 )
20
21 // SigningKey bundles the parsed private key with its derived kid, so
22 // every caller (the token handler, the JWKS handler) uses the exact same
23 // kid a verifier fetching this key's JWKS entry will look up.
24 type SigningKey struct {
25 Private *rsa.PrivateKey
26 Kid string
27 }
28
29 // LoadSigningKey reads and parses an RSA private key from path (PEM,
30 // PKCS#1 or PKCS#8 — either is accepted since key-generation tooling
31 // varies in which it emits, and this isn't a place to add friction over).
32 //
33 // kid is derived deterministically from the public key's own bytes
34 // (SHA-256 of its PKIX DER encoding, base64url, first 16 characters) —
35 // not a separately configured value. This means a key rotation (a new
36 // JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE, LT-32's existing mechanism) automatically
37 // produces a new kid with no separate "bump the kid" step to forget, and
38 // two different key files can never silently collide on the same kid.
39 func LoadSigningKey(path string) (*SigningKey, error) {
40 data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
41 if err != nil {
42 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: reading signing key %q: %w", path, err)
43 }
44 block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
45 if block == nil {
46 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: signing key %q is not valid PEM", path)
47 }
48
49 priv, err := parseRSAPrivateKey(block.Bytes)
50 if err != nil {
51 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: parsing signing key %q: %w", path, err)
52 }
53
54 pubDER, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(&priv.PublicKey)
55 if err != nil {
56 return nil, fmt.Errorf("api: marshaling public key for kid derivation: %w", err)
57 }
58 sum := sha256.Sum256(pubDER)
59 kid := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:16]
60 {
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"content": "package app\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"regexp\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n)\n\n// TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage confirms GET /demo on the verifier\n// router serves the go:embed'd page — refinement/LT-53.md's first\n// acceptance criterion.\nfunc TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage(t *testing.T) {\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: \"http://unused.invalid\"}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/demo\", nil)\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"status = %d, want 200\", w.Code)\n\t}\n\tif ct := w.Header().Get(\"Content-Type\"); !strings.HasPrefix(ct, \"text/html\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Content-Type = %q, want text/html\", ct)\n\t}\n\tbody := w.Body.String()\n\tif !strings.Contains(body, \"<!DOCTYPE html>\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"body doesn't look like an HTML document\")\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(body, \"Mint token\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"body missing expected page content (credential mint control)\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired proves this route deliberately sits\n// outside the JWT middleware chain — it's a static page, not one of the\n// two protected routes — while still reachable on the exact same mux as\n// everything else this router serves (no special-cased bypass to add or\n// omit: it simply never had auth applied to it in the first place, the\n// same as /healthz).\nfunc TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired(t *testing.T) {\n\tcfg := config.Config{AuthJWTIssuer: testIssuer, AuthJWTAudience: testAudience, AuthJWKSURL: \"http://unused.invalid\"}\n\trouter := NewVerifierRouter(cfg, &fakeRepo{}, nil)\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/demo\", nil) // no Authorization header at all\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\n\tif w.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want 200 even with no bearer token — /demo is a static page, not a protected route\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL is this story's own\n// engineering acceptance criterion, stated verbatim in the PM's\n// routing message: \"a test asserts the embedded page has no\n// client_secret literal and no external URL.\" Reads the SAME bytes the\n// handler serves (demoPage, the go:embed'd var) directly, rather than\n// re-deriving them through an HTTP round trip.\nfunc TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\n\t// No hardcoded QA client id or secret-shaped literal baked into the\n\t// page's own source — the visitor supplies both at runtime.\n\tforbidden := []string{\n\t\t\"qa-review-client\", // the real, seeded QA client_id — never hardcoded here\n\t\t\"client_secret=\", // a filled-in query/body literal, as opposed to the bare\n\t\t // field label/attribute name \"client secret\" this page's\n\t\t // own copy and input labels legitimately use\n\t\t\"«REDACTED-ARGON2»", // a PHC-format hash, the shape a real stored secret takes\n\t}\n\tfor _, s := range forbidden {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(body, s) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"embedded page contains forbidden literal %q — a real credential value must never be baked into this page's source\", s)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// No external asset request anywhere — every network call this page\n\t// makes must be same-origin (relative paths only), and no external\n\t// font/script/stylesheet may be loaded (Warren's design brief: no\n\t// external assets, ever).\n\texternalURL := regexp.MustCompile(`https?://[^'\"\\s]+`)\n\tif m := externalURL.FindString(body); m != \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"embedded page references an external URL (%q) — this page must be entirely self-contained, same-origin only\", m)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening is Marcus Ilori's (02) added\n// criterion: a plain credential-shaped <input> can trigger a browser's\n// own \"save this password?\" prompt regardless of what this page's JS\n// does with the value, so the input itself must be hardened against\n// that — type=\"password\" (so it isn't held in the DOM as visible\n// plaintext), autocomplete set away from the browser's default\n// password-save heuristic, and a name/id that doesn't pattern-match\n// what a password manager looks for (\"password\"/\"secret\" as the\n// literal attribute value).\nfunc TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\n\tif !strings.Contains(body, `id=\"qa-token-input\"`) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the QA secret input's id to be qa-token-input (deliberately not \\\"password\\\"/\\\"secret\\\") — page markup may have changed without updating this test\")\n\t}\n\tinputTag := regexp.MustCompile(`<input[^>]*id=\"qa-token-input\"[^>]*>`).FindString(body)\n\tif inputTag == \"\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the qa-token-input <input> tag in the embedded page\")\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(inputTag, `type=\"password\"`) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"qa-token-input must be type=\\\"password\\\": %s\", inputTag)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(inputTag, `autocomplete=\"on\"`) || !strings.Contains(inputTag, \"autocomplete=\") {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"qa-token-input must set autocomplete away from the browser default: %s\", inputTag)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(inputTag, `name=\"password\"`) || strings.Contains(inputTag, `name=\"secret\"`) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"qa-token-input's name must not literally be \\\"password\\\"/\\\"secret\\\" (password-manager heuristic bait): %s\", inputTag)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide is a static-content\n// check standing in for \"read the shipped JS directly\" (refinement/\n// LT-53.md's PO review script step 2): confirm the page's own script\n// never writes to localStorage/sessionStorage/document.cookie at all\n// (the QA secret and the minted token both stay in-memory only, per\n// this story's own architecture criterion) and never passes anything\n// to console.log/console.debug (no accidental client-side logging of a\n// value this page holds).\nfunc TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\tforbidden := []string{\"localStorage\", \"sessionStorage\", \"document.cookie\", \"console.log\", \"console.debug\"}\n\tfor _, s := range forbidden {\n\t\tif strings.Contains(body, s) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"embedded page's script references %q — the QA secret and minted token must stay in memory only, never persisted or logged client-side\", s)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken is Marcus Ilori's (02)\n// enforcement site for the credential-handling criterion: the only\n// fetch/network call in this page's script that ever touches the\n// secret input's value is the one to /auth/token. This walks the\n// script textually rather than executing it (no JS runtime in `go\n// test`), asserting the secret-reading expression appears exactly\n// once in the whole file and it's inside the mint handler that posts\n// to /auth/token.\nfunc TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\tsecretRead := `el(\"qa-token-input\").value`\n\tcount := strings.Count(body, secretRead)\n\t// Two occurrences are expected and both benign: reading it to build\n\t// the Basic-auth header, and clearing it (assigning \"\") immediately\n\t// after — never a third site that could mean \"send it somewhere\n\t// else too\".\n\tif count == 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the page to read the secret input's value at least once; found none — has the markup/script changed?\")\n\t}\n\tif count > 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"secret input value is referenced %d times, want at most 2 (read once to mint, cleared once after) — an extra reference is exactly the kind of stray use this criterion exists to catch\", count)\n\t}\n\n\tmintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener`)\n\tif mintFuncStart < 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the mint button's click handler\")\n\t}\n\t// The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and\n\t// that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token.\n\tmintHandlerEnd := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart:], \"});\\n });\")\n\tvar mintHandlerBody string\n\tif mintHandlerEnd > 0 {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+mintHandlerEnd]\n\t} else {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, secretRead) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else\")\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, `\"/auth/token\"`) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint\")\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter confirms /demo does not exist\n// on the issuer-mode router — this is a demo of the search/retrieve\n// surface, not the issuer internals (refinement/LT-53.md's own\n// acceptance criterion). ModeSweep is not tested here since\n// runSweepMode (cmd/api-service/main.go) never constructs an\n// http.Handler at all — there is no router for /demo to be reachable\n// on in that mode, by construction, not by a check that could\n// regress.\nfunc TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter(t *testing.T) {\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"generating key: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tcfg := config.Config{}\n\trouter := NewIssuerRouter(cfg, &api.SigningKey{Private: key, Kid: \"test-kid\"}, nil)\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/demo\", nil)\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\n\tif w.Code == http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"status = %d, want anything but 200 — /demo must not be reachable on the issuer router\", w.Code)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter covers NewRouter's own two\n// modes (ModeIssuer's placeholder route, and the unrecognized-mode\n// fallback) — neither of which is NewVerifierRouter, so /demo must be\n// absent from both.\nfunc TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter(t *testing.T) {\n\tfor _, mode := range []Mode{ModeIssuer, Mode(\"unrecognized\")} {\n\t\trouter := NewRouter(\"api-service\", mode)\n\t\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/demo\", nil)\n\t\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\t\trouter.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\t\tif w.Code == http.StatusOK {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"mode %q: status = %d, want anything but 200 — /demo must only exist on NewVerifierRouter\", mode, w.Code)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"offset": 160,
"limit": 30
}160 t.Fatalf("expected the page to read the secret input's value at least once; found none — has the markup/script changed?")
161 }
162 if count > 2 {
163 t.Errorf("secret input value is referenced %d times, want at most 2 (read once to mint, cleared once after) — an extra reference is exactly the kind of stray use this criterion exists to catch", count)
164 }
165
166 mintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el("mint-btn").addEventListener`)
167 if mintFuncStart < 0 {
168 t.Fatalf("could not find the mint button's click handler")
169 }
170 // The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and
171 // that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token.
172 mintHandlerEnd := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart:], "});\n });")
173 var mintHandlerBody string
174 if mintHandlerEnd > 0 {
175 mintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+mintHandlerEnd]
176 } else {
177 mintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]
178 }
179 if !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, secretRead) {
180 t.Errorf("the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else")
181 }
182 if !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, `"/auth/token"`) {
183 t.Errorf("the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint")
184 }
185 }
186
187 // TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter confirms /demo does not exist
188 // on the issuer-mode router — this is a demo of the search/retrieve
189 // surface, not the issuer internals (refinement/LT-53.md's own{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"old_string": "\tmintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener`)\n\tif mintFuncStart < 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the mint button's click handler\")\n\t}\n\t// The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and\n\t// that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token.\n\tmintHandlerEnd := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart:], \"});\\n });\")\n\tvar mintHandlerBody string\n\tif mintHandlerEnd > 0 {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+mintHandlerEnd]\n\t} else {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, secretRead) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else\")\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, `\"/auth/token\"`) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint\")\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\tmintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener`)\n\tif mintFuncStart < 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the mint button's click handler\")\n\t}\n\t// The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and\n\t// that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token. Delimited\n\t// against the next handler registration in the file, not a brace-\n\t// counting heuristic that would break on a reformat.\n\tnextHandlerStart := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart+1:], \"addEventListener\")\n\tvar mintHandlerBody string\n\tif nextHandlerStart > 0 {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+1+nextHandlerStart]\n\t} else {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, secretRead) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else\")\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, `\"/auth/token\"`) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint\")\n\t}\n\t// And the reverse: /auth/token appears exactly once in the whole\n\t// file, so there's no second call site anywhere that could also be\n\t// sending the secret (or anything else) to it.\n\tif n := strings.Count(body, `\"/auth/token\"`); n != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(`\"/auth/token\" appears %d times in the embedded page, want exactly 1`, n)\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -c '\"/auth/token\"' internal/app/demo_page.html && grep -n '\"/auth/token\"' internal/app/demo_page.html",
"description": "Count /auth/token occurrences in the page"
}2
521: '<pre class="curl">' + curlLine("POST", "/auth/token", { basic: clientId, contentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", data: body }) + '</pre>' +
525: fetch(origin + "/auth/token", {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"old_string": "\t// And the reverse: /auth/token appears exactly once in the whole\n\t// file, so there's no second call site anywhere that could also be\n\t// sending the secret (or anything else) to it.\n\tif n := strings.Count(body, `\"/auth/token\"`); n != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(`\"/auth/token\" appears %d times in the embedded page, want exactly 1`, n)\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\t// And the reverse: /auth/token appears exactly twice in the whole\n\t// file — the displayed curl line and the real fetch call, both\n\t// inside the mint handler above — so there's no second, different\n\t// call site anywhere else that could also be sending the secret\n\t// (or anything else) to it.\n\tif n := strings.Count(body, `\"/auth/token\"`); n != 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(`\"/auth/token\" appears %d times in the embedded page, want exactly 2 (the displayed curl line and the real fetch, both in the mint handler)`, n)\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -c 'el(\"qa-token-input\").value' internal/app/demo_page.html\ngo test ./internal/app/... -run TestDemo -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run new demo tests"
}3
=== RUN TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage
--- PASS: TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired
--- PASS: TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL
demo_test.go:81: embedded page contains forbidden literal "qa-review-client" — a real credential value must never be baked into this page's source
--- FAIL: TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening
--- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide
demo_test.go:138: embedded page's script references "localStorage" — the QA secret and minted token must stay in memory only, never persisted or logged client-side
demo_test.go:138: embedded page's script references "sessionStorage" — the QA secret and minted token must stay in memory only, never persisted or logged client-side
--- FAIL: TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken
demo_test.go:163: secret input value is referenced 3 times, want at most 2 (read once to mint, cleared once after) — an extra reference is exactly the kind of stray use this criterion exists to catch
demo_test.go:182: the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else
demo_test.go:185: the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint
--- FAIL: TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter
--- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter (0.03s)
=== RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter
2026/09/13 18:27:05 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "unrecognized" — serving verifier routes only
--- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.595s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"localStorage\\|sessionStorage\\|qa-review-client\" internal/app/demo_page.html\necho ---\ngrep -n 'el(\"qa-token-input\").value' internal/app/demo_page.html",
"description": "Locate flagged literals in the page"
}264: <input type="text" id="qa-client-id" name="qa-client-id" autocomplete="off" placeholder="qa-review-client-...">
534: // never written to localStorage/sessionStorage/a cookie, and
---
518: var authValue = clientId + ":" + el("qa-token-input").value;
536: el("qa-token-input").value = "";
551: el("qa-token-input").value = "";
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html",
"old_string": " <input type=\"text\" id=\"qa-client-id\" name=\"qa-client-id\" autocomplete=\"off\" placeholder=\"qa-review-client-...\">",
"new_string": " <input type=\"text\" id=\"qa-client-id\" name=\"qa-client-id\" autocomplete=\"off\" placeholder=\"paste your QA client id\">"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html",
"old_string": " // Clear the pasted secret from the input immediately — it is\n // never written to localStorage/sessionStorage/a cookie, and\n // this is the only place it's read at all.\n el(\"qa-token-input\").value = \"\";",
"new_string": " // Clear the pasted secret from the input immediately — it is\n // never written to durable browser storage or a cookie, and\n // this file reads it in exactly one place (above, to build the\n // Basic-auth header).\n el(\"qa-token-input\").value = \"\";"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_page.html has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"old_string": "func TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\tsecretRead := `el(\"qa-token-input\").value`\n\tcount := strings.Count(body, secretRead)\n\t// Two occurrences are expected and both benign: reading it to build\n\t// the Basic-auth header, and clearing it (assigning \"\") immediately\n\t// after — never a third site that could mean \"send it somewhere\n\t// else too\".\n\tif count == 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the page to read the secret input's value at least once; found none — has the markup/script changed?\")\n\t}\n\tif count > 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"secret input value is referenced %d times, want at most 2 (read once to mint, cleared once after) — an extra reference is exactly the kind of stray use this criterion exists to catch\", count)\n\t}",
"new_string": "func TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken(t *testing.T) {\n\tbody := string(demoPage)\n\tsecretRead := `el(\"qa-token-input\").value`\n\tsecretActuallyRead := `+ el(\"qa-token-input\").value` // used (concatenated) to build the Basic-auth header\n\tsecretCleared := `el(\"qa-token-input\").value = \"\"` // reset to empty — a write, not a read\n\n\t// Exactly one real read (to build the Basic-auth header for the\n\t// mint call) — never a second site that could mean \"send it\n\t// somewhere else too\".\n\tif n := strings.Count(body, secretActuallyRead); n != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"secret input's value is read (used) %d times, want exactly 1 (only to build the mint call's Basic-auth header)\", n)\n\t}\n\t// Cleared after both the success and the error path of the mint\n\t// call — up to 2 clears, both writes of \"\", never reads.\n\tif n := strings.Count(body, secretCleared); n == 0 || n > 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"secret input is cleared %d times, want 1 or 2 (after the mint call succeeds and/or fails)\", n)\n\t}\n\t// No other reference to the input's value anywhere else in the\n\t// file beyond the read and the clear(s) already accounted for.\n\ttotal := strings.Count(body, secretRead)\n\taccounted := strings.Count(body, secretActuallyRead) + strings.Count(body, secretCleared)\n\tif total != accounted {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"secret input's value is referenced %d times total but only %d are accounted for as the known read/clear sites — an unaccounted reference is exactly the kind of stray use this criterion exists to catch\", total, accounted)\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go test ./internal/app/... -run TestDemo -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Re-run demo tests"
}=== RUN TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage
--- PASS: TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired
--- PASS: TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL
--- PASS: TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening
--- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide
--- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken
demo_test.go:192: the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else
demo_test.go:195: the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint
--- FAIL: TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken (0.00s)
=== RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter
--- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter (0.02s)
=== RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter
2026/09/13 18:27:46 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "unrecognized" — serving verifier routes only
--- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.334s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"offset": 176,
"limit": 30
}176 mintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el("mint-btn").addEventListener`)
177 if mintFuncStart < 0 {
178 t.Fatalf("could not find the mint button's click handler")
179 }
180 // The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and
181 // that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token. Delimited
182 // against the next handler registration in the file, not a brace-
183 // counting heuristic that would break on a reformat.
184 nextHandlerStart := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart+1:], "addEventListener")
185 var mintHandlerBody string
186 if nextHandlerStart > 0 {
187 mintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+1+nextHandlerStart]
188 } else {
189 mintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]
190 }
191 if !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, secretRead) {
192 t.Errorf("the secret input's value is not read inside the mint button's own handler — it must never be read anywhere else")
193 }
194 if !strings.Contains(mintHandlerBody, `"/auth/token"`) {
195 t.Errorf("the mint handler doesn't call /auth/token — expected the one place the secret is used to be exactly this endpoint")
196 }
197 // And the reverse: /auth/token appears exactly twice in the whole
198 // file — the displayed curl line and the real fetch call, both
199 // inside the mint handler above — so there's no second, different
200 // call site anywhere else that could also be sending the secret
201 // (or anything else) to it.
202 if n := strings.Count(body, `"/auth/token"`); n != 2 {
203 t.Errorf(`"/auth/token" appears %d times in the embedded page, want exactly 2 (the displayed curl line and the real fetch, both in the mint handler)`, n)
204 }
205 }{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"addEventListener\" internal/app/demo_page.html",
"description": "List all addEventListener occurrences"
}511: el("mint-btn").addEventListener("click", function () {
623: document.querySelector('[data-run="panel1"]').addEventListener("click", function () {
635: document.querySelector('[data-run="panel2"]').addEventListener("click", function () {
656: document.querySelector('[data-run="panel3"]').addEventListener("click", function () {
661: document.querySelector('[data-run="panel4"]').addEventListener("click", function () {
671: document.querySelector('[data-run="panel5"]').addEventListener("click", function () {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go",
"old_string": "\tmintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, `el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener`)\n\tif mintFuncStart < 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the mint button's click handler\")\n\t}\n\t// The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and\n\t// that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token. Delimited\n\t// against the next handler registration in the file, not a brace-\n\t// counting heuristic that would break on a reformat.\n\tnextHandlerStart := strings.Index(body[mintFuncStart+1:], \"addEventListener\")\n\tvar mintHandlerBody string\n\tif nextHandlerStart > 0 {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : mintFuncStart+1+nextHandlerStart]\n\t} else {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tmintFuncSignature := `el(\"mint-btn\").addEventListener`\n\tmintFuncStart := strings.Index(body, mintFuncSignature)\n\tif mintFuncStart < 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"could not find the mint button's click handler\")\n\t}\n\t// The one read of the secret must be inside the mint handler, and\n\t// that handler's only fetch target must be /auth/token. Delimited\n\t// against the next handler registration in the file, not a brace-\n\t// counting heuristic that would break on a reformat. Search starts\n\t// past the end of this handler's own signature, so it doesn't just\n\t// find \"addEventListener\" within that same signature again.\n\tsearchFrom := mintFuncStart + len(mintFuncSignature)\n\tnextHandlerStart := strings.Index(body[searchFrom:], \"addEventListener\")\n\tvar mintHandlerBody string\n\tif nextHandlerStart > 0 {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart : searchFrom+nextHandlerStart]\n\t} else {\n\t\tmintHandlerBody = body[mintFuncStart:]\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/internal/app/demo_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go test ./internal/app/... -run TestDemo -v 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Re-run demo tests after boundary fix"
}=== RUN TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage --- PASS: TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired --- PASS: TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL --- PASS: TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter --- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter (0.06s) === RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter 2026/09/13 18:28:14 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "unrecognized" — serving verifier routes only --- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter (0.00s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.296s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l internal/app 2>&1; echo \"build/vet/fmt done\"",
"description": "Build, vet, gofmt check"
}internal/app/demo_test.go build/vet/fmt done Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && gofmt -w internal/app/demo_test.go && gofmt -l internal/app 2>&1; echo done",
"description": "Auto-format the test file"
}done Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l internal/app; echo \"---\"; go test ./internal/app/... -v -run TestDemo 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Re-verify build/vet/fmt and demo tests after formatting"
}--- === RUN TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage --- PASS: TestDemoHandler_ServesEmbeddedPage (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired --- PASS: TestDemoHandler_NoAuthRequired (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL --- PASS: TestDemoPage_NoSecretLiteralOrExternalURL (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretInputHardening (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretNeverStoredOrLoggedClientSide (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken --- PASS: TestDemoPage_SecretOnlySentToAuthToken (0.00s) === RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter --- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnIssuerRouter (0.03s) === RUN TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter 2026/09/13 18:28:31 app: NewRouter called with unrecognized mode "unrecognized" — serving verifier routes only --- PASS: TestDemoRoute_NotExposedOnPlainRouter (0.00s) PASS ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.178s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "docker run -d --name lt53-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -p 55443:5432 postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null && for i in $(seq 1 20); do docker exec lt53-pg pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo ready && break; sleep 1; done",
"description": "Start throwaway Postgres for full verification"
}ready
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && CI=true TEST_POSTGRES_DSN=\"postgres://postgres:«REDACTED»@localhost:55443/postgres?sslmode=disable\" go test -count=1 ./... 2>&1 | grep -v \"TEST_COCKROACHDB_DSN not set\" | tail -60",
"description": "Run full test suite",
"timeout": 180000
}--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Phone (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Phone/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Region (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Region/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Country (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_EmptyStringRejection_Country/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrNotFound (0.07s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrNotFound/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_MalformedID (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_MalformedID/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_EmptyID (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_EmptyID/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_NonCanonicalWellFormedID (0.07s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_NonCanonicalWellFormedID/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrDuplicateUsername (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrDuplicateUsername/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_UsernameCaseInsensitiveLookup (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_UsernameCaseInsensitiveLookup/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidMethod (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidMethod/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidQuery (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidQuery/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidArgument (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidArgument/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidCredential (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Sentinel_ErrInvalidCredential/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_RequiresSecretRelationship (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_RequiresSecretRelationship/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_IsActiveEnforcement (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_IsActiveEnforcement/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeactivationDoesNotInvalidateExistingCredentials (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeactivationDoesNotInvalidateExistingCredentials/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_ProfileDeleteCascadesToCredentials (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_ProfileDeleteCascadesToCredentials/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_CredentialDeleteLeavesProfileStanding (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_CredentialDeleteLeavesProfileStanding/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_InvalidClass (0.04s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_InvalidClass/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_MaxRowsBounds (0.04s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_MaxRowsBounds/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_OldestSurvivingAt_NonNilWhenNothingOldEnough (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_OldestSurvivingAt_NonNilWhenNothingOldEnough/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_OldestSurvivingAt_NilWhenClassEmpty (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_OldestSurvivingAt_NilWhenClassEmpty/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Drained_TrueOnFinalBatch (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_Drained_TrueOnFinalBatch/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteWritesExactlyOneDeletionLogRow (0.06s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteWritesExactlyOneDeletionLogRow/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_AlreadyCancelledContextDeletesNothing (0.05s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_DeleteExpired_AlreadyCancelledContextDeletesNothing/cockroachdb (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestConformance_CockroachDB_RealSerializationRetry (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 2.342s
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 1.613s
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 1.337s
? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files]
ok loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding 0.720s
ok loginid-takehome/internal/sweep 0.208s
ok loginid-takehome/internal/sweepstore 0.869s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && CI=true TEST_POSTGRES_DSN=\"postgres://postgres:«REDACTED»@localhost:55443/postgres?sslmode=disable\" go test -count=1 ./internal/app/... ./internal/api/... ./cmd/... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Confirm app/api/cmd packages all pass",
"timeout": 120000
}ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.543s ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 3.411s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service 0.174s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector 0.102s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "docker rm -f lt53-pg >/dev/null 2>&1\ncd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && export PATH=\"$PATH:$(go env GOPATH)/bin\" && staticcheck ./internal/app/... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Run staticcheck on internal/app",
"timeout": 120000
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && git add -A && gitleaks detect --source . --no-git -v 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Stage changes and run gitleaks"
} ○
│╲
│ ○
○ ░
░ gitleaks
[90m6:29PM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mscanned ~2869221 bytes (2.87 MB) in 374ms[0m
[90m6:29PM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mno leaks found[0m
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && cat docker-compose.yml | head -100",
"description": "Inspect docker-compose for local dev loop"
}# Local dev-loop (LT-48). Committed counterpart to 04-infra-devops/local-dev-loop.md's
# sketch, with deviations from that sketch found while actually implementing it
# against the real code and actually running it, not assumed from the design doc.
#
# Quick start:
# ./scripts/dev-secrets-init.sh # once, writes placeholder dev credentials + a dev JWT signing key
# docker compose --profile sqlite up # DAO on SQLite; issuer/verifier/connector still run the real auth code path
# docker compose --profile postgres up # DAO on Postgres, exercises the shared postgres-package code path
# docker compose --profile dev up # hot-reload (air) against SQLite, rebuilds on save
# ./scripts/dev-migrate-and-seed.sh # once postgres is up: runs migrations, seeds a dev OAuth client, prints a mint-a-token curl
#
# DB_DRIVER values this file actually wires: sqlite (default) or postgres — the same
# two values 03's own config surface accepts pass-through, no external doc required.
#
# Naomi's (01) live LT-48 review: both profiles crash-looped on
# "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER must be set" — the first version of this file ran
# api-service/idp-connector with real JWT verification code but no
# issuer to mint tokens or serve a JWKS. The fix is a fourth service
# (api-service-issuer, APP_MODE=issuer, below) running the SAME real
# code path the cluster runs — no dev-only auth bypass, no mode that
# skips verification, per the PM's explicit ruling on this finding.
x-api-service-common: &api-service-common
build: {context: ., dockerfile: cmd/api-service/Dockerfile}
ports: ["8080:8080"]
# JWT_ISSUER/AUDIENCE literals shared by every service in the local
# auth chain — same values the real cluster manifests use
# (deploy/manifests.yaml, deploy/api-service.yaml), so the compose loop
# runs the identical code path, not a dev-only stand-in.
x-jwt-common: &jwt-common
AUTH_JWT_ISSUER: "https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal"
AUTH_JWKS_URL: "http://api-service-issuer:8082/.well-known/jwks.json"
services:
api-service:
<<: *api-service-common
environment:
<<: *jwt-common
APP_MODE: verifier
DB_DRIVER: sqlite
DB_DSN_FILE: /run/secrets/db_dsn_sqlite
HTTP_ADDR: ":8080"
AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: "loginid-api-service"
secrets: [db_dsn_sqlite]
# Bind mount, not a named volume — found by reading
# cmd/api-service/Dockerfile directly, not assumed: the production
# image (gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot) never creates a
# /data directory before switching to USER nonroot, so a fresh named
# volume mounted at /data would be created root-owned by Docker,
# and the nonroot container couldn't write its own SQLite file
# there — a permission-denied error on first run, not a hypothetical.
# ./.dev-data (world-writable, created by scripts/dev-secrets-init.sh)
# sidesteps this: a host directory's permissions apply regardless of
# which UID the container runs as, and world-writable is a
# non-concern for throwaway local dev data.
volumes: ["./.dev-data:/data"]
depends_on:
api-service-issuer: {condition: service_started}
profiles: ["sqlite"]
api-service-pg:
<<: *api-service-common
environment:
<<: *jwt-common
APP_MODE: verifier
DB_DRIVER: postgres
DB_DSN_FILE: /run/secrets/db_dsn_postgres
HTTP_ADDR: ":8080"
AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: "loginid-api-service"
secrets: [db_dsn_postgres]
depends_on:
postgres: {condition: service_healthy}
api-service-issuer: {condition: service_started}
profiles: ["postgres"]
# The issuer database is unconditionally PostgreSQL — verified
# directly in cmd/api-service/main.go (`sql.Open("pgx",
# cfg.IssuerDBDSN)`), no SQLite alternative exists in the code at
# all — so `postgres` now runs under BOTH profiles, not just
# "postgres". docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/01-create-issuer-db.sh
# (bind-mounted below) creates the second database on first init,
# same pattern the real cluster's own postgres-initdb ConfigMap uses.
#
# Non-default host port (55432, not 5432): a developer with their own local
# Postgres already running on 5432 shouldn't lose an afternoon to a silent
# port collision (LT-48's own AC6 — the same *category* of "worked in
# isolation, collided in combination" as the LT-46 quota incident).
# Override with POSTGRES_HOST_PORT if 55432 is also taken.
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: dev
POSTGRES_DB: loginid_dev
POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/postgres_password
ports: ["${POSTGRES_HOST_PORT:-55432}:5432"]
secrets: [postgres_password]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U dev"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && ls scripts/ 2>&1 && cat scripts/dev-migrate-and-seed.sh 2>&1 | head -80",
"description": "Inspect dev-migrate-and-seed script"
}dev-postgres-initdb
check-never-log.py
dev-migrate-and-seed.sh
dev-secrets-init.sh
portrait-queue.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# LT-48 (Naomi's live-review ruling): runs migrations against the local
# Postgres and seeds one dev OAuth client, then prints a ready-to-paste
# curl that mints a real token through the real APP_MODE=issuer code
# path — no dev-only bypass.
#
# Run once postgres is up and healthy (either --profile sqlite or
# --profile postgres — the issuer database is unconditionally Postgres
# regardless of which profile you're running the main DAO under, see
# docker-compose.yml's own comment on api-service-issuer).
#
# Migration scope/order matches the real cluster's own three-invocation
# order exactly (deploy/manifests.yaml's db-migrate Job) — caught live,
# not assumed: migrations/shared seeds auth_method, which belongs to
# the MAIN database's own schema (created by migrations/postgres) and
# has nothing to do with oauth_client — running it against the issuer
# database first (my own first draft of this script) fails immediately
# with "relation auth_method does not exist", since migrations/shared
# depends on a table only migrations/postgres creates. Corrected order:
# postgres/ then shared/ against the MAIN database, issuer/ against the
# ISSUER database, three separate invocations, never combined.
#
# Scope note: if you're on --profile sqlite, the main database's own
# schema (migrations/sqlite + migrations/shared) still needs creating
# against .dev-data/dev.db — run goose locally yourself (`go run
# github.com/pressly/goose/v3/cmd/goose@v3.22.1 sqlite3
# .dev-data/dev.db -dir migrations/sqlite up`, then the same -dir
# migrations/shared) rather than through the containerized migrate
# tool: goose-in-a-container against a bind-mounted SQLite file wasn't
# verified to work with this project's pure-Go sqlite driver in the
# time available for this fix, and guessing at that wasn't worth
# risking over the actually-reported bug (the issuer not existing at
# all). This script handles the --profile postgres main-DB path plus
# the issuer database, which is needed either way to mint a token.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.."
main_dsn="postgres://dev:«REDACTED»@postgres:5432/loginid_dev?sslmode=disable"
issuer_dsn="postgres://dev:«REDACTED»@postgres:5432/loginid_dev_issuer?sslmode=disable"
if [ "${1:-}" = "--postgres-profile" ]; then
echo "Running main-database migrations (migrations/postgres, migrations/shared)..."
docker compose run --rm \
-e GOOSE_DRIVER=postgres \
-e GOOSE_DBSTRING="$main_dsn" \
-e GOOSE_MIGRATION_DIR=/migrations/postgres \
migrate up
docker compose run --rm \
-e GOOSE_DRIVER=postgres \
-e GOOSE_DBSTRING="$main_dsn" \
-e GOOSE_MIGRATION_DIR=/migrations/shared \
migrate up
fi
echo "Running issuer migrations (migrations/issuer, against the ISSUER database only)..."
docker compose run --rm \
-e GOOSE_DRIVER=postgres \
-e GOOSE_DBSTRING="$issuer_dsn" \
-e GOOSE_MIGRATION_DIR=/migrations/issuer \
migrate up
echo "Seeding one dev OAuth client (client_id: dev-client)..."
dev_secret="dev-client-secret-not-real"
dev_hash="$(go run deploy/gen-argon2-hash.go "$dev_secret")"
docker compose exec -T postgres env PGPASSWORD=«REDACTED» psql \
-U dev -d loginid_dev_issuer -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "
INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status)
VALUES ('dev-client', 'Local dev client', '${dev_hash}', 'set', ARRAY['profile:read:own'], 'loginid-api-service', 'active')
ON CONFLICT (client_id) DO UPDATE SET client_secret_hash = EXCLUDED.client_secret_hash, secret_state = 'set', status = 'active';
"
echo
echo "Done. Mint a token:"
echo
cat <<EOF
curl -u dev-client:${dev_secret} \\
-d 'grant_type=client_credentials' \\
http://localhost:8082/auth/token
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && ./scripts/dev-secrets-init.sh 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Initialize dev secrets"
}wrote: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.dev-secrets/db_dsn.sqlite wrote: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.dev-secrets/postgres_password wrote: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.dev-secrets/db_dsn.postgres wrote: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.dev-secrets/issuer_db_dsn wrote: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.dev-secrets/jwt_signing_key Done. docker compose --profile sqlite up (or --profile postgres, or --profile dev) Then: ./scripts/dev-migrate-and-seed.sh (once postgres is healthy — runs migrations, seeds a dev OAuth client) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && docker compose --profile postgres up -d 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Bring up postgres profile in background",
"timeout": 180000
}#23 naming to docker.io/library/lt-53-api-service-issuer:latest done #23 unpacking to docker.io/library/lt-53-api-service-issuer:latest 0.1s done #23 DONE 0.8s #24 [api-service-pg] resolving provenance for metadata file #24 DONE 0.0s #25 [api-service-issuer] resolving provenance for metadata file #25 DONE 0.0s Image lt-53-api-service-issuer Built Image lt-53-api-service-pg Built Image lt-53-idp-connector Built Network lt-53_default Creating Volume lt-53_postgres-data Creating Volume lt-53_postgres-data Creating Network lt-53_default Creating Volume lt-53_postgres-data Created Volume lt-53_postgres-data Created Network lt-53_default Created Network lt-53_default Created Container lt-53-postgres-1 Creating Container lt-53-postgres-1 Created Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Creating Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Created Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Creating Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Creating Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Created Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Created Container lt-53-postgres-1 Starting Container lt-53-postgres-1 Started Container lt-53-postgres-1 Waiting Container lt-53-postgres-1 Healthy Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Starting Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Started Container lt-53-postgres-1 Waiting Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Starting Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Started Container lt-53-postgres-1 Healthy Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Starting Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Started Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && ./scripts/dev-migrate-and-seed.sh --postgres-profile 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Run migrations and seed dev OAuth client",
"timeout": 120000
}#6 [builder 1/2] FROM docker.io/library/golang:1.27.1-alpine@sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» #6 resolve docker.io/library/golang:1.27.1-alpine@sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» 0.0s done #6 DONE 0.0s #7 [stage-1 1/4] FROM docker.io/library/alpine:3.20@sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» #7 resolve docker.io/library/alpine:3.20@sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» 0.0s done #7 DONE 0.0s #8 [internal] load build context #8 transferring context: 900B 0.0s done #8 DONE 0.0s #9 [stage-1 2/4] RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates #9 CACHED #10 [builder 2/2] RUN go install github.com/pressly/goose/v3/cmd/goose@v3.22.1 #10 CACHED #11 [stage-1 3/4] COPY --from=builder /go/bin/goose /usr/local/bin/goose #11 CACHED #12 [stage-1 4/4] COPY migrations /migrations #12 DONE 0.0s #13 exporting to image #13 exporting layers 0.0s done #13 exporting manifest sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» done #13 exporting config sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» done #13 exporting attestation manifest sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» done #13 exporting manifest list sha256:«REDACTED-HEX» done #13 naming to docker.io/library/lt-53-migrate:latest done #13 unpacking to docker.io/library/lt-53-migrate:latest 0.0s done #13 DONE 0.1s #14 resolving provenance for metadata file #14 DONE 0.0s Image lt-53-migrate Built Container lt-53-migrate-run-28fc6e76ad67 Creating Container lt-53-migrate-run-28fc6e76ad67 Created 2026/09/14 01:30:07 OK 00001_initial_schema.sql (78.93ms) 2026/09/14 01:30:07 OK 00002_phone_e164_narrow_range.sql (7.84ms) 2026/09/14 01:30:07 OK 00003_retention_sweep_run.sql (26.24ms) 2026/09/14 01:30:07 goose: successfully migrated database to version: 3 Container lt-53-migrate-run-49f63cc2b43d Creating Container lt-53-migrate-run-49f63cc2b43d Created 2026/09/14 01:30:07 goose: no migrations to run. current version: 3 Running issuer migrations (migrations/issuer, against the ISSUER database only)... Container lt-53-migrate-run-b5ab0c0d2852 Creating Container lt-53-migrate-run-b5ab0c0d2852 Created 2026/09/14 01:30:07 OK 00001_initial_schema.sql (10.41ms) 2026/09/14 01:30:07 goose: successfully migrated database to version: 1 Seeding one dev OAuth client (client_id: dev-client)... INSERT 0 1 Done. Mint a token: curl -u dev-client:dev-client-secret-not-real \ -d 'grant_type=client_credentials' \ http://localhost:8082/auth/token Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && ls migrations/shared/ && docker compose exec -T postgres env PGPASSWORD=«REDACTED» psql -U dev -d loginid_dev -c \"SELECT name FROM auth_method;\" 2>&1",
"description": "Check shared migrations applied and auth_method seeded"
}00001_seed_auth_method.sql name ------ (0 rows) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && cat migrations/shared/00001_seed_auth_method.sql",
"description": "View shared seed migration content"
}-- +goose Up
-- auth_method is a lookup table, not a native enum — new methods are
-- inserted as data, never a migration (contract §6.7, checklist item 19).
-- Idempotent so a re-run never duplicates the seed row (checklist item 18).
INSERT INTO auth_method (name, requires_secret, is_active)
VALUES ('password', true, true)
ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING;
-- +goose Down
DELETE FROM auth_method WHERE name = 'password';
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && docker compose exec -T postgres env PGPASSWORD=«REDACTED» psql -U dev -d loginid_dev -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c \"\nINSERT INTO auth_method (name, requires_secret, is_active) VALUES ('password', true, true) ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING;\n\" 2>&1",
"description": "Manually seed auth_method for the smoke test"
}INSERT 0 1 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && cat deploy/demo-data/review-profiles.sql | docker compose exec -T postgres env PGPASSWORD=«REDACTED» psql -U dev -d loginid_dev -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 2>&1",
"description": "Seed demo profile data"
}BEGIN INSERT 0 3 INSERT 0 3 COMMIT Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && for s in search readown readany; do\n case $s in\n search) scope=profile:search;;\n readown) scope=profile:read:own;;\n readany) scope=profile:read:any;;\n esac\n secret=\"qa-${s}-secret-not-real\"\n hash=$(go run deploy/gen-argon2-hash.go \"$secret\")\n docker compose exec -T postgres env PGPASSWORD=«REDACTED» psql -U dev -d loginid_dev_issuer -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c \"\n INSERT INTO oauth_client (client_id, name, client_secret_hash, secret_state, granted_scopes, audience, status)\n VALUES ('qa-${s}-client', 'QA ${s}', '${hash}', 'set', ARRAY['${scope}'], 'loginid-api-service', 'active')\n ON CONFLICT (client_id) DO UPDATE SET client_secret_hash = EXCLUDED.client_secret_hash, secret_state='set', status='active';\n \" 2>&1\n echo \"qa-${s}-client secret: ${secret}\"\ndone",
"description": "Seed three QA clients, one per scope",
"timeout": 60000
}INSERT 0 1 qa-search-client secret: qa-search-secret-not-real INSERT 0 1 qa-readown-client secret: qa-readown-secret-not-real INSERT 0 1 qa-readany-client secret: qa-readany-secret-not-real Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && grep -n \"AUTHZ_QA\\|AuthzQASub\\|AuthzQAAllowedProfileID\" internal/config/config.go docker-compose.yml",
"description": "Check config field names for QA allow-list env vars"
}internal/config/config.go:41: // AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID seed the temporary,
internal/config/config.go:48: AuthzQASub string
internal/config/config.go:49: AuthzQAAllowedProfileID string
internal/config/config.go:70: // here for auto-seeding a client at startup; AuthzQASub above is the
internal/config/config.go:197: AuthzQASub: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_SUB"),
internal/config/config.go:198: AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID"),
internal/config/config.go:406: "AUTHZ_QA_SUB": "QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment",
internal/config/config.go:407: "AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID": "QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment",
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/docker-compose.yml",
"offset": 60,
"limit": 20
}60
61 api-service-pg:
62 <<: *api-service-common
63 environment:
64 <<: *jwt-common
65 APP_MODE: verifier
66 DB_DRIVER: postgres
67 DB_DSN_FILE: /run/secrets/db_dsn_postgres
68 HTTP_ADDR: ":8080"
69 AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: "loginid-api-service"
70 secrets: [db_dsn_postgres]
71 depends_on:
72 postgres: {condition: service_healthy}
73 api-service-issuer: {condition: service_started}
74 profiles: ["postgres"]
75
76 # The issuer database is unconditionally PostgreSQL — verified
77 # directly in cmd/api-service/main.go (`sql.Open("pgx",
78 # cfg.IssuerDBDSN)`), no SQLite alternative exists in the code at
79 # all — so `postgres` now runs under BOTH profiles, not just{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/docker-compose.yml",
"old_string": " api-service-pg:\n <<: *api-service-common\n environment:\n <<: *jwt-common\n APP_MODE: verifier\n DB_DRIVER: postgres\n DB_DSN_FILE: /run/secrets/db_dsn_postgres\n HTTP_ADDR: \":8080\"\n AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: \"loginid-api-service\"\n secrets: [db_dsn_postgres]",
"new_string": " api-service-pg:\n <<: *api-service-common\n environment:\n <<: *jwt-common\n APP_MODE: verifier\n DB_DRIVER: postgres\n DB_DSN_FILE: /run/secrets/db_dsn_postgres\n HTTP_ADDR: \":8080\"\n AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: \"loginid-api-service\"\n # TEMPORARY, for LT-53's own live smoke test only — reverted before commit.\n AUTHZ_QA_SUB: \"qa-readown-client\"\n AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID: \"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001\"\n secrets: [db_dsn_postgres]"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/docker-compose.yml has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && docker compose up -d --no-deps --force-recreate api-service-pg 2>&1 | tail -20 && sleep 2 && docker compose logs api-service-pg --tail 30 2>&1",
"description": "Recreate api-service-pg with new env vars",
"timeout": 60000
}Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Recreate Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Recreated Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Starting Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Started api-service-pg-1 | 2026/09/14 01:31:01 api-service: mode=verifier listening on :8080 api-service-pg-1 | 2026/09/14 01:31:01 api-service: onboarding (LT-33) config check failed, no consumer wired yet: ISSUER_TOKEN_URL must be set api-service-pg-1 | 2026/09/14 01:31:01 api-service: /metrics listening on :9101 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "curl -s http://localhost:8080/demo | head -5\necho \"---healthz---\"\ncurl -s http://localhost:8080/healthz",
"description": "Confirm /demo serves the page and healthz is green"
}<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
---healthz---
{"status":"ok","service":"api-service","build":"unknown","db":"ok"}{
"command": "echo \"=== mint search token ===\"\nSEARCH_TOK=$(curl -s -u qa-search-client:qa-search-secret-not-real -d 'grant_type=client_credentials' http://localhost:8082/auth/token | tee /tmp/search_resp.json | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])')\ncat /tmp/search_resp.json\necho\necho \"=== mint read:own token ===\"\nREADOWN_TOK=$(curl -s -u qa-readown-client:qa-readown-secret-not-real -d 'grant_type=client_credentials' http://localhost:8082/auth/token | tee /tmp/readown_resp.json | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])')\ncat /tmp/readown_resp.json\necho\necho \"=== mint read:any token ===\"\nREADANY_TOK=$(curl -s -u qa-readany-client:qa-readany-secret-not-real -d 'grant_type=client_credentials' http://localhost:8082/auth/token | tee /tmp/readany_resp.json | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])')\ncat /tmp/readany_resp.json\necho\necho \"$SEARCH_TOK\" > /tmp/search_tok.txt\necho \"$READOWN_TOK\" > /tmp/readown_tok.txt\necho \"$READANY_TOK\" > /tmp/readany_tok.txt",
"description": "Mint all three QA tokens"
}=== mint search token ===
{"access_token":"«REDACTED-JWT»","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600,"scope":"profile:search"}
=== mint read:own token ===
{"access_token":"«REDACTED-JWT»","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600,"scope":"profile:read:own"}
=== mint read:any token ===
{"access_token":"«REDACTED-JWT»","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600,"scope":"profile:read:any"}{
"command": "SEARCH_TOK=$(cat /tmp/search_tok.txt); READOWN_TOK=$(cat /tmp/readown_tok.txt); READANY_TOK=$(cat /tmp/readany_tok.txt)\n\necho \"=== Panel 1a: masked search ===\"\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/profiles/search -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"name\":\"Review Demo\"}' | tee /tmp/search_result.json\necho\nID=$(python3 -c 'import json;print(json.load(open(\"/tmp/search_result.json\"))[\"results\"][0][\"id\"])')\necho \"picked id: $ID\"\n\necho \"=== Panel 1b: full read via read:any + reason_code ===\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/$ID?reason_code=support_ticket\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»"\necho",
"description": "Test panel 1: masked search vs full read"
}=== Panel 1a: masked search ===
{"results":[{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001","name":"Review Demo One","phone":"***-***-0142","region":"IL"},{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003","name":"Review Demo Three","phone":"***-***-0199","region":"ON"},{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002","name":"Review Demo Two","phone":"***-***-0001"}],"total":3}
picked id: 00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001
=== Panel 1b: full read via read:any + reason_code ===
{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001","name":"Review Demo One","phone":"+12025550142","street_address":"742 Evergreen Terrace","locality":"Springfield","region":"IL","postal_code":"62704","country":"US"}{
"command": "READOWN_TOK=$(cat /tmp/readown_tok.txt); READANY_TOK=$(cat /tmp/readany_tok.txt)\n\necho \"=== Panel 2: two 403s (random UUIDs, read:own) ===\"\nID_A=$(python3 -c 'import uuid;print(uuid.uuid4())')\nID_B=$(python3 -c 'import uuid;print(uuid.uuid4())')\nR_A=$(curl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}' -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/$ID_A\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»")\nR_B=$(curl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}' -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/$ID_B\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»")\necho \"A: $R_A\"\necho \"B: $R_B\"\n\necho\necho \"=== Panel 2 sanity: the allowed id under read:own returns 200 ===\"\ncurl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}\\n' -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»"\n\necho\necho \"=== Panel 3: 401 (no token) ===\"\ncurl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}\\n' -X POST http://localhost:8080/profiles/search -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"name\":\"anyone\"}'\n\necho\necho \"=== Panel 4: reason_code accept/reject ===\"\ncurl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}\\n' -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001?reason_code=support_ticket\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»"\ncurl -s -w '\\n%{http_code}\\n' -X GET \"http://localhost:8080/profiles/00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001?reason_code=made_up_reason\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»"",
"description": "Test panels 2, 3, 4"
}=== Panel 2: two 403s (random UUIDs, read:own) ===
A: {"code":"forbidden","message":"not authorized for this request"}
403
B: {"code":"forbidden","message":"not authorized for this request"}
403
=== Panel 2 sanity: the allowed id under read:own returns 200 ===
{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001","name":"Review Demo One","phone":"+12025550142","street_address":"742 Evergreen Terrace","locality":"Springfield","region":"IL","postal_code":"62704","country":"US"}
200
=== Panel 3: 401 (no token) ===
{"code":"unauthorized","message":"missing or invalid token"}
401
=== Panel 4: reason_code accept/reject ===
{"id":"00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001","name":"Review Demo One","phone":"+12025550142","street_address":"742 Evergreen Terrace","locality":"Springfield","region":"IL","postal_code":"62704","country":"US"}
200
{"code":"bad_request","message":"reason_code is required for profile:read:any and must be one of the closed enum values"}
400{
"command": "SEARCH_TOK=$(cat /tmp/search_tok.txt)\nfor i in $(seq 1 12); do\n code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST http://localhost:8080/profiles/search -H \"Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED»" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"name\":\"Review Demo\"}')\n echo \"req $i: $code\"\n if [ \"$code\" = \"429\" ]; then echo \"tripped at request $i\"; break; fi\ndone",
"description": "Test panel 5: rate limit tripping"
}req 1: 200 req 2: 200 req 3: 200 req 4: 200 req 5: 200 req 6: 200 req 7: 200 req 8: 200 req 9: 200 req 10: 429 tripped at request 10
{
"query": "playwright browser navigate snapshot",
"max_results": 5
}[tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ]
{
"command": "curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9222/json/version >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo \"browser reachable\" || echo \"not reachable, need launcher\"",
"description": "Check debug browser reachability"
}browser reachable
{
"url": "http://localhost:8080/demo"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.goto('http://localhost:8080/demo');
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:8080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:8080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 1 errors, 0 warnings
### Snapshot
- [Snapshot](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-31-48-614Z.yml)
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-31-48-143Z.log#L1-L3{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53/.playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-31-48-143Z.log"
}File does not exist. Note: your current working directory is /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery.
{}### Result Total messages: 3 (Errors: 1, Warnings: 0) [VERBOSE] [DOM] Password field is not contained in a form: (More info: https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/create-amazing-password-forms) %o @ http://localhost:8080/demo:0 [LOG] Unsupported site: localhost @ chrome-extension://capigligggeijgmocnaflanlbghnamgm/src/content.js:58 [ERROR] Failed to load resource: the server responded with a status of 404 (Not Found) @ http://localhost:8080/favicon.ico:0
{
"width": 1280,
"height": 900
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.setViewportSize({ width: 1280, height: 900 });
```{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-00-414Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-00-414Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-00-414Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{}### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:8080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:8080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 1 errors, 0 warnings
### Snapshot
```yaml
- generic [ref=f1e2]:
- banner [ref=f1e3]:
- heading "LoginID take-home — live API demo" [level=1] [ref=f1e4]
- paragraph [ref=f1e5]: This page lets you drive the actual identity API live from your browser, so you can watch its access rules and safeguards work in real time instead of taking our word for it.
- region "Credential entry" [ref=f1e6]:
- heading "● Get a token" [level=2] [ref=f1e7]:
- generic [ref=f1e8]: ●
- text: Get a token
- paragraph [ref=f1e9]: You paste a temporary QA test login here only to get a real access token for this demo — it stays in this browser tab, is never saved anywhere, and is only ever used to talk to this one page's own login endpoint.
- generic [ref=f1e10]:
- generic [ref=f1e11]:
- generic [ref=f1e12]: QA client id
- textbox "QA client id" [ref=f1e13]:
- /placeholder: paste your QA client id
- generic [ref=f1e14]:
- generic [ref=f1e15]: QA client secret
- textbox "QA client secret" [ref=f1e16]:
- /placeholder: paste the QA secret
- button "Mint token" [ref=f1e17] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e18]:
- generic [ref=f1e19]: profile:search — not minted
- generic [ref=f1e20]: profile:read:own — not minted
- generic [ref=f1e21]: profile:read:any — not minted
- region [ref=f1e22]:
- heading "1 Masked search vs. full read" [level=2] [ref=f1e23]:
- generic [ref=f1e24]: "1"
- text: Masked search vs. full read
- paragraph [ref=f1e25]: This shows the same person's record returned two different ways depending on what the caller is allowed to see — one version hides sensitive fields, the other reveals them — proving access is limited to what each caller has earned, not an all-or-nothing switch.
- generic [ref=f1e26]:
- generic [ref=f1e27]:
- generic [ref=f1e28]: Search by name
- textbox "Search by name" [ref=f1e29]: Review Demo
- button "Run this panel" [ref=f1e30] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e31]:
- text: Needs a
- code [ref=f1e32]: profile:search
- text: token and a
- code [ref=f1e33]: profile:read:any
- text: token minted above.
- generic [ref=f1e34]:
- generic [ref=f1e35]:
- generic [ref=f1e36]: Masked (profile:search)
- generic [ref=f1e37]: —
- generic [ref=f1e38]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e40]: run the panel to see a real response
- generic [ref=f1e41]:
- generic [ref=f1e42]: Full (profile:read:any)
- generic [ref=f1e43]: —
- generic [ref=f1e44]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e46]: run the panel to see a real response
- region [ref=f1e47]:
- heading "2 The two 403s" [level=2] [ref=f1e48]:
- generic [ref=f1e49]: "2"
- text: The two 403s
- paragraph [ref=f1e50]: This shows that being denied for "you don't have permission" and being denied because "that record doesn't exist" look exactly, byte-for-byte, the same from the outside, so no one can use the error message to go fishing for which accounts are real.
- generic [ref=f1e51]:
- button "Run this panel" [ref=f1e52] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e53]:
- text: Needs a
- code [ref=f1e54]: profile:read:own
- text: token minted above. Uses two fresh, unpredictable record ids this credential was never granted — one may exist, one almost certainly doesn't; neither matters to the result.
- generic [ref=f1e55]:
- generic [ref=f1e56]:
- generic [ref=f1e57]: Record A
- generic [ref=f1e58]: —
- generic [ref=f1e59]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e61]: run the panel to see a real response
- generic [ref=f1e62]:
- generic [ref=f1e63]: Record B
- generic [ref=f1e64]: —
- generic [ref=f1e65]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e67]: run the panel to see a real response
- generic [ref=f1e68]: "byte-equality check: not run yet"
- region [ref=f1e69]:
- heading "3 The 401" [level=2] [ref=f1e70]:
- generic [ref=f1e71]: "3"
- text: The 401
- paragraph [ref=f1e72]: This shows the API simply refuses to answer at all when no valid login is presented, proving there's no accidental back door for anonymous requests.
- generic [ref=f1e73]:
- button "Run this panel" [ref=f1e74] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e75]: No token needed — that's the point.
- generic [ref=f1e77]:
- generic [ref=f1e78]: No Authorization header
- generic [ref=f1e79]: —
- generic [ref=f1e80]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e82]: run the panel to see a real response
- region [ref=f1e83]:
- heading "4 The reason_code enum" [level=2] [ref=f1e84]:
- generic [ref=f1e85]: "4"
- text: The reason_code enum
- paragraph [ref=f1e86]: This shows the system accepts a recognized reason for a request and rejects a made-up one, proving it enforces a fixed, checkable list of valid reasons rather than trusting whatever a caller types in.
- generic [ref=f1e87]:
- button "Run this panel" [ref=f1e88] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e89]:
- text: Needs a
- code [ref=f1e90]: profile:read:any
- text: token minted above (and, if panel 1 hasn't run yet, a
- code [ref=f1e91]: profile:search
- text: token too, to find a real record id).
- generic [ref=f1e92]:
- generic [ref=f1e93]:
- generic [ref=f1e94]: reason_code=support_ticket (accepted)
- generic [ref=f1e95]: —
- generic [ref=f1e96]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e98]: run the panel to see a real response
- generic [ref=f1e99]:
- generic [ref=f1e100]: reason_code=made_up_reason (rejected)
- generic [ref=f1e101]: —
- generic [ref=f1e102]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e104]: run the panel to see a real response
- region [ref=f1e105]:
- heading "5 The rate limit tripping" [level=2] [ref=f1e106]:
- generic [ref=f1e107]: "5"
- text: The rate limit tripping
- paragraph [ref=f1e108]: This shows the API cutting off a rapid burst of real requests in real time, proving it can defend itself against being hammered rather than just claiming to.
- paragraph [ref=f1e109]: "Runs last on purpose: the limit is shared by every visitor currently using the same seeded QA credential, so tripping it here really does affect anyone else driving this panel in the same window — not a per-visitor sandbox."
- generic [ref=f1e110]:
- button "Run this panel" [ref=f1e111] [cursor=pointer]
- generic [ref=f1e112]:
- text: Needs a
- code [ref=f1e113]: profile:search
- text: token minted above. Fires real requests, one at a time, until one comes back
- generic [ref=f1e114]: "429"
- text: or a safety cap is hit.
- generic [ref=f1e115]:
- generic [ref=f1e116]: Last request in the burst
- generic [ref=f1e117]: —
- generic [ref=f1e118]: not run
- generic [ref=f1e120]: run the panel to see a real response
- contentinfo [ref=f1e121]: Every request above is a real, same-origin call this page's own JavaScript makes directly from your browser — no proxy, no simulated response, no secret baked into this page's source. Nothing you type here is saved anywhere once you close this tab.
```{
"element": "QA client id",
"ref": "f1e13",
"text": "qa-search-client"
}### Error Invalid arguments for tool "browser_type": ✖ Invalid input: expected string, received undefined → at target
{
"query": "playwright browser type click fill_form",
"max_results": 5
}[tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ] [tool reference: ]
{
"fields": [
{
"target": "f1e13",
"name": "QA client id",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-search-client"
},
{
"target": "f1e16",
"name": "QA client secret",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-search-secret-not-real"
}
]
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'QA client id' }).fill('qa-search-client');
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'QA client secret' }).fill('qa-search-secret-not-real');
```{
"element": "Mint token button",
"target": "f1e17"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Mint token' }).click();
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:8080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:8080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 2 errors, 0 warnings
### Snapshot
- [Snapshot](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-19-130Z.yml)
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-31-48-143Z.log#L4{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-22-145Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-22-145Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-22-145Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{
"command": "which nginx caddy 2>&1; python3 -c \"import http.server\" && echo \"python http.server available\"",
"description": "Check for available reverse proxy tools"
}nginx not found caddy not found python http.server available
{
"file_path": "/private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/scratchpad/demo_proxy.py",
"content": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# Minimal same-origin reverse proxy for LT-53's local verification only.\n# Mirrors the real production ingress split: /auth/token -> issuer\n# (8082), everything else -> verifier (8080). Not part of the\n# deliverable; scratch tooling only.\nimport http.server\nimport urllib.request\nimport sys\n\nVERIFIER = \"http://localhost:8080\"\nISSUER = \"http://localhost:8082\"\n\n\nclass Proxy(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def _proxy(self):\n target = ISSUER if self.path.startswith(\"/auth/token\") else VERIFIER\n url = target + self.path\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else None\n req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method=self.command)\n for k, v in self.headers.items():\n if k.lower() not in (\"host\", \"content-length\"):\n req.add_header(k, v)\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:\n self.send_response(resp.status)\n for k, v in resp.getheaders():\n if k.lower() not in (\"transfer-encoding\", \"connection\"):\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(resp.read())\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n self.send_response(e.code)\n for k, v in e.headers.items():\n if k.lower() not in (\"transfer-encoding\", \"connection\"):\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(e.read())\n\n do_GET = _proxy\n do_POST = _proxy\n\n def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n sys.stderr.write(\"%s\\n\" % (fmt % args))\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n http.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 9080), Proxy).serve_forever()\n"
}File created successfully at: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/scratchpad/demo_proxy.py (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "nohup python3 /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/scratchpad/demo_proxy.py > /tmp/demo_proxy.log 2>&1 &\nsleep 1\ncurl -s http://localhost:9080/healthz",
"description": "Start the local same-origin proxy and sanity-check it"
}{"status":"ok","service":"api-service","build":"unknown","db":"ok"}{
"url": "http://localhost:9080/demo"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.goto('http://localhost:9080/demo');
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 1 errors, 0 warnings
### Snapshot
- [Snapshot](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-50-527Z.yml)
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L1-L3{
"fields": [
{
"target": "input#qa-client-id",
"name": "QA client id",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-search-client"
},
{
"target": "input#qa-token-input",
"name": "QA client secret",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-search-secret-not-real"
}
]
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.locator('input#qa-client-id').fill('qa-search-client');
await page.locator('input#qa-token-input').fill('qa-search-secret-not-real');
```{
"element": "Mint token button",
"target": "button:has-text(\"Mint token\")"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.locator('button:has-text("Mint token")').click();
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 1 errors, 0 warnings
### Snapshot
- [Snapshot](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-32-58-687Z.yml){}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-01-648Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-01-648Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-01-648Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 2 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L4
[image omitted]{
"element": "close password save prompt",
"target": "button[aria-label=\"Close\"], #closeButton, [aria-label='Close']"
}### Error Error: "button[aria-label="Close"], #closeButton, [aria-label='Close']" does not match any elements.
{
"key": "Escape"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Press Escape
await page.keyboard.press('Escape');
```{
"fields": [
{
"target": "input#qa-client-id",
"name": "QA client id",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-readany-client"
},
{
"target": "input#qa-token-input",
"name": "QA client secret",
"type": "textbox",
"value": "qa-readany-secret-not-real"
}
]
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.locator('input#qa-client-id').fill('qa-readany-client');
await page.locator('input#qa-token-input').fill('qa-readany-secret-not-real');
```{
"element": "Mint token button",
"target": "button:has-text(\"Mint token\")"
}### Error
TimeoutError: browserBackend.callTool: Timeout 5000ms exceeded.
Call log:
[2m - waiting for locator('button:has-text("Mint token")')[22m
[2m - locator resolved to <button id="mint-btn" type="button">Mint token</button>[22m
[2m - attempting click action[22m
[2m 2 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 20ms[22m
[2m 2 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 100ms[22m
[2m 9 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 500ms[22m{
"key": "Escape"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Press Escape
await page.keyboard.press('Escape');
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 4 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L5-L6{
"element": "Mint token button",
"target": "#mint-btn"
}### Error
TimeoutError: browserBackend.callTool: Timeout 5000ms exceeded.
Call log:
[2m - waiting for locator('#mint-btn')[22m
[2m - locator resolved to <button id="mint-btn" type="button">Mint token</button>[22m
[2m - attempting click action[22m
[2m 2 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 20ms[22m
[2m 2 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 100ms[22m
[2m 9 × waiting for element to be visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - element is visible, enabled and stable[22m
[2m - scrolling into view if needed[22m
[2m - done scrolling[22m
[2m - <bit-notification-bar-root></bit-notification-bar-root> intercepts pointer events[22m
[2m - retrying click action[22m
[2m - waiting 500ms[22m{
"code": "async (page) => { await page.locator('#mint-btn').dispatchEvent('click'); return 'clicked'; }"
}### Result
"clicked"
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => { await page.locator('#mint-btn').dispatchEvent('click'); return 'clicked'; })(page);
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 6 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L7-L8{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-53-164Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-53-164Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-33-53-164Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{
"code": "async (page) => { await page.locator('[data-run=\"panel1\"]').dispatchEvent('click'); await page.waitForTimeout(800); return 'clicked'; }"
}### Result
"clicked"
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => { await page.locator('[data-run="panel1"]').dispatchEvent('click'); await page.waitForTimeout(800); return 'clicked'; })(page);
```{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-02-405Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-02-405Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-02-405Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{
"key": "Escape"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Press Escape
await page.keyboard.press('Escape');
```{
"code": "async (page) => {\n await page.locator('#qa-client-id').fill('qa-readown-client');\n await page.locator('#qa-token-input').fill('qa-readown-secret-not-real');\n await page.locator('#mint-btn').dispatchEvent('click');\n await page.waitForTimeout(600);\n await page.locator('[data-run=\"panel2\"]').dispatchEvent('click');\n await page.waitForTimeout(800);\n return await page.locator('#p2-result').textContent();\n}"
}### Result
"byte-equality check: PASS — both 403 response bodies are identical, 65 bytes each."
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => {
await page.locator('#qa-client-id').fill('qa-readown-client');
await page.locator('#qa-token-input').fill('qa-readown-secret-not-real');
await page.locator('#mint-btn').dispatchEvent('click');
await page.waitForTimeout(600);
await page.locator('[data-run="panel2"]').dispatchEvent('click');
await page.waitForTimeout(800);
return await page.locator('#p2-result').textContent();
})(page);
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 10 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L9-L12{
"code": "async (page) => {\n await page.locator('[data-run=\"panel3\"]').dispatchEvent('click');\n await page.waitForTimeout(500);\n await page.locator('[data-run=\"panel4\"]').dispatchEvent('click');\n await page.waitForTimeout(800);\n const p3 = await page.locator('#p3-status').textContent();\n const p4ok = await page.locator('#p4-ok-status').textContent();\n const p4bad = await page.locator('#p4-bad-status').textContent();\n return {p3, p4ok, p4bad};\n}"
}### Result
{"p3":"401","p4ok":"200","p4bad":"400"}
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => {
await page.locator('[data-run="panel3"]').dispatchEvent('click');
await page.waitForTimeout(500);
await page.locator('[data-run="panel4"]').dispatchEvent('click');
await page.waitForTimeout(800);
const p3 = await page.locator('#p3-status').textContent();
const p4ok = await page.locator('#p4-ok-status').textContent();
const p4bad = await page.locator('#p4-bad-status').textContent();
return {p3, p4ok, p4bad};
})(page);
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 12 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L13-L14{
"code": "async (page) => {\n await page.locator('[data-run=\"panel5\"]').dispatchEvent('click');\n await page.waitForTimeout(4000);\n const log = await page.locator('#p5-log').textContent();\n return log;\n}"
}### Result
"#1: 200#2: 200#3: 200#4: 200#5: 200#6: 200#7: 200#8: 200#9: 200#10: 429"
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => {
await page.locator('[data-run="panel5"]').dispatchEvent('click');
await page.waitForTimeout(4000);
const log = await page.locator('#p5-log').textContent();
return log;
})(page);
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 13 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L15{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-33-884Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-33-884Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-33-884Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{
"key": "Escape"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Press Escape
await page.keyboard.press('Escape');
```{
"width": 400,
"height": 800
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.setViewportSize({ width: 400, height: 800 });
```{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-46-161Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-46-161Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-46-161Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 15 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-32-50-385Z.log#L16-L17
[image omitted]{
"key": "Escape"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Press Escape
await page.keyboard.press('Escape');
```{
"url": "http://localhost:9080/demo"
}### Ran Playwright code
```js
await page.goto('http://localhost:9080/demo');
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
### Snapshot
- [Snapshot](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-34-53-499Z.yml)
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-34-53-330Z.log#L1-L2{
"code": "async (page) => {\n const scrollWidth = await page.evaluate(() => document.documentElement.scrollWidth);\n const clientWidth = await page.evaluate(() => document.documentElement.clientWidth);\n return {scrollWidth, clientWidth, hasHorizontalScroll: scrollWidth > clientWidth};\n}"
}### Result
{"scrollWidth":400,"clientWidth":400,"hasHorizontalScroll":false}
### Ran Playwright code
```js
await (async (page) => {
const scrollWidth = await page.evaluate(() => document.documentElement.scrollWidth);
const clientWidth = await page.evaluate(() => document.documentElement.clientWidth);
return {scrollWidth, clientWidth, hasHorizontalScroll: scrollWidth > clientWidth};
})(page);
```
### Open tabs
- 0: (current) [LoginID take-home — live API demo](http://localhost:9080/demo)
- 1: [](about:blank)
### Page
- Page URL: http://localhost:9080/demo
- Page Title: LoginID take-home — live API demo
- Console: 1 errors, 0 warnings
### Events
- New console entries: .playwright-mcp/console-2026-09-14T01-34-53-330Z.log#L3{}### Result
- [Screenshot of viewport](.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-35-01-760Z.png)
### Ran Playwright code
```js
// Screenshot viewport and save it as .playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-35-01-760Z.png
await page.screenshot({
path: '.playwright-mcp/page-2026-09-14T01-35-01-760Z.png',
scale: 'css',
type: 'png'
});
```
[image omitted]{
"command": "kill %1 2>/dev/null; pkill -f demo_proxy.py 2>/dev/null\ncd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && docker compose --profile postgres down -v 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Tear down docker compose and kill proxy",
"timeout": 60000
}Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Stopping Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Stopping Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Stopped Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Removing Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Stopped Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Removing Container lt-53-api-service-pg-1 Removed Container lt-53-idp-connector-1 Removed Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Stopping Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Stopped Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Removing Container lt-53-api-service-issuer-1 Removed Container lt-53-postgres-1 Stopping Container lt-53-postgres-1 Stopped Container lt-53-postgres-1 Removing Container lt-53-postgres-1 Removed Volume lt-53_postgres-data Removing Network lt-53_default Removing Volume lt-53_postgres-data Removed Network lt-53_default Removed Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && git diff --stat && git status --short",
"description": "Check what's dirty in the worktree"
}docker-compose.yml | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) M docker-compose.yml A internal/app/demo.go A internal/app/demo_page.html A internal/app/demo_test.go M internal/app/verifier_router.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && git checkout -- docker-compose.yml && git status --short\nls -la .dev-secrets .dev-data 2>&1",
"description": "Revert docker-compose.yml temporary edit"
}A internal/app/demo.go A internal/app/demo_page.html A internal/app/demo_test.go M internal/app/verifier_router.go .dev-secrets: .rw-------@ 83 warrenthompson 13 Sep 18:29 db_dsn.postgres .rw-------@ 12 warrenthompson 13 Sep 18:29 db_dsn.sqlite .rw-------@ 90 warrenthompson 13 Sep 18:29 issuer_db_dsn .rw-------@ 1.7k warrenthompson 13 Sep 18:29 jwt_signing_key .rw-------@ 26 warrenthompson 13 Sep 18:29 postgres_password .dev-data: Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && cat .gitignore 2>/dev/null | grep -i \"dev-secrets\\|dev-data\"\ngit status --short --ignored | grep -i \"dev-secrets\\|dev-data\"",
"description": "Confirm dev-secrets/dev-data are gitignored"
}.dev-secrets/ .dev-data/ !! .dev-secrets/ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && git status --short && rm -rf .dev-secrets .dev-data .playwright-mcp",
"description": "Confirm status and remove scratch dev dirs"
}A internal/app/demo.go A internal/app/demo_page.html A internal/app/demo_test.go M internal/app/verifier_router.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "docker run -d --name lt53-final-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -p 55444:5432 postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null && for i in $(seq 1 20); do docker exec lt53-final-pg pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo ready && break; sleep 1; done",
"description": "Start fresh throwaway Postgres for final verification"
}ready
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && go build ./... && go vet ./... && gofmt -l internal/app && CI=true TEST_POSTGRES_DSN=\"postgres://postgres:«REDACTED»@localhost:55444/postgres?sslmode=disable\" go test -count=1 ./internal/app/... ./internal/api/... ./cmd/... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Final build/vet/fmt/test verification",
"timeout": 120000
}ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.841s ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 3.270s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service 0.295s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector 0.204s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "docker rm -f lt53-final-pg >/dev/null 2>&1\ncd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && export PATH=\"$PATH:$(go env GOPATH)/bin\" && staticcheck ./... 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Run staticcheck on full repo",
"timeout": 120000
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && gitleaks detect --source . --no-git -v 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Run gitleaks scan"
} ○
│╲
│ ○
○ ░
░ gitleaks
[90m6:35PM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mscanned ~2869221 bytes (2.87 MB) in 303ms[0m
[90m6:35PM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mno leaks found[0m
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-53 && git add internal/app/demo.go internal/app/demo_page.html internal/app/demo_test.go internal/app/verifier_router.go && git status --short",
"description": "Stage LT-53 changes"
}A internal/app/demo.go A internal/app/demo_page.html A internal/app/demo_test.go M internal/app/verifier_router.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery