{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && sed -n '139,330p' internal/connector/handlers.go",
"description": "Read the full /auth and /identity handler bodies"
}// NewAuthHandler implements POST /auth. The caller (in this project's
// shape, cmd/api-service acting on an onboarding flow's behalf) must
// already be authenticated with a connector:identity-lookup-scoped,
// idp-connector-service-audience token — enforced by whatever middleware
// wraps this handler (internal/app.NewConnectorRouter), not by this
// function; AuthContextFromContext here is read-only identification for
// rate-limiting and audit purposes.
func NewAuthHandler(deps Deps) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
ac, _ := api.AuthContextFromContext(ctx)
sourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)
allowed, err := deps.Limiter.Allow(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, identityErrorBody{Error: "server_error"})
return
}
if !allowed {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, identityErrorBody{Error: "slow_down"})
return
}
var body authRequestBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, identityErrorBody{Error: "invalid_request"})
return
}
// Second rate-limit dimension — per (caller, attempted vendor
// username), not just per caller (attack-tree leaf 5, Tomasz
// Wrede's cold review of PR #40): gates BEFORE the vendor call,
// same as the caller-level Limiter above.
identityAllowed, err := identityGateAllow(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, body.Username)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, identityErrorBody{Error: "server_error"})
return
}
if !identityAllowed {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, identityErrorBody{Error: "slow_down"})
return
}
// accessToken is scoped to this block only — read from the
// vendor call's return value, written straight into the
// response, never assigned to any wider-scoped variable or
// logged. This IS the narrowest this value can be scoped given
// /auth's own contract: its job is delivering the token to the
// caller, so it necessarily reaches the response writer, but
// nothing else.
accessToken, err := deps.Vendor.Authenticate(ctx, body.Username, body.Password)
if err != nil {
deps.Limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
identityGateRecordFailure(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, body.Username)
logAuditOutcome(ctx, deps.AuditLog, ac.Sub, api.AuditAuthnFailure)
// Generic failure regardless of *why* the vendor rejected
// it (unknown username vs. wrong password vs. vendor
// unreachable) — connector-security.md §4: "must not leak
// which part of the credential was wrong."
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, identityErrorBody{Error: "vendor_authentication_failed"})
return
}
deps.Limiter.RecordSuccess(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
identityGateRecordSuccess(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, body.Username)
logAuditOutcome(ctx, deps.AuditLog, ac.Sub, api.AuditSuccess)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, authResponseBody{AccessToken: accessToken})
}
}
// identityRequestBody is the assignment's own fixed POST /identity
// contract — no credential field, since the vendor token travels as a
// request header instead (connector-security.md §1).
type identityRequestBody struct {
Phone string `json:"phone"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
type identityResponseBody struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Phone string `json:"phone"`
StreetAddress string `json:"street_address"`
Locality string `json:"locality"`
Region string `json:"region"`
PostalCode string `json:"postal_code"`
Country string `json:"country"`
}
// vendorAccessTokenHeader is the header /identity accepts the vendor's
// access_token on — a header, not a body field, since the assignment's
// fixed {"phone","name"} body has no credential field (LT-41 acceptance
// criteria).
const vendorAccessTokenHeader = "X-Vendor-Access-Token"
// NewIdentityHandler implements POST /identity. Every failure path
// (missing token, malformed-looking token, vendor rejection) returns
// through writeIdentityFailure after waitForFloor — the two calls
// together are what make the three branches content- and
// (approximately) time-identical, per connector-security.md §1/§4.
func NewIdentityHandler(deps Deps) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
ctx := r.Context()
ac, _ := api.AuthContextFromContext(ctx)
sourceIP := sourceIPFrom(r)
allowed, err := deps.Limiter.Allow(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, identityErrorBody{Error: "server_error"})
return
}
if !allowed {
// Not one of the three timing-oracle branches (it's an
// overt, openly-disclosed 429, not a covert signal) — no
// floor applied.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, identityErrorBody{Error: "slow_down"})
return
}
var body identityRequestBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
// A malformed body is a caller bug, not one of the three
// named credential/token-validity branches — ordinary 400,
// no floor.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, identityErrorBody{Error: "invalid_request"})
return
}
// Second rate-limit dimension — per (caller, attempted
// phone+name), not just per caller (attack-tree leaf 5, Tomasz
// Wrede's cold review of PR #40). Not one of the three
// timing-oracle branches (an overt 429, same as the caller-level
// gate above) — no floor.
attemptedIdentity := []string{body.Phone, body.Name} // hashed as separate components, never pre-joined (Oren Castellan, PR #40 review)
identityAllowed, err := identityGateAllow(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, attemptedIdentity...)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, identityErrorBody{Error: "server_error"})
return
}
if !identityAllowed {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, identityErrorBody{Error: "slow_down"})
return
}
token := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(vendorAccessTokenHeader))
if token == "" {
deps.Limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
identityGateRecordFailure(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, attemptedIdentity...)
logAuditOutcome(ctx, deps.AuditLog, ac.Sub, api.AuditAuthnFailure)
waitForFloor(start)
writeIdentityFailure(w)
return
}
// token is scoped to this function only, passed by value into
// FetchIdentity, and never assigned to any variable outside
// this block or returned — attack-tree leaf 4's control
// (connector-security.md §1/Attack-tree row 4).
identity, err := deps.Vendor.FetchIdentity(ctx, token, body.Phone, body.Name)
if err != nil {
deps.Limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
identityGateRecordFailure(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, attemptedIdentity...)
logAuditOutcome(ctx, deps.AuditLog, ac.Sub, api.AuditAuthnFailure)
waitForFloor(start)
writeIdentityFailure(w)
return
}
deps.Limiter.RecordSuccess(ctx, ac.Sub, sourceIP)
identityGateRecordSuccess(ctx, deps.IdentityLimiter, ac.Sub, attemptedIdentity...)
logAuditOutcome(ctx, deps.AuditLog, ac.Sub, api.AuditSuccess)
// Success is not part of the timing-oracle concern — no floor.
// identityResponseBody's fields are identical in name/order/type
// to Identity (only the json tags differ), so a direct type
// conversion is both valid and clearer than restating every
// field (staticcheck S1016).
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, identityResponseBody(identity))
}
}
// logAuditOutcome logs caller sub/scope/timestamp/outcome only — never
// the vendor username/password, vendor access_token, or any PII field
// value, per connector-security.md §3/§5's audit discipline.
func logAuditOutcome(ctx context.Context, auditLog api.AuditLogger, sub string, kind api.AuditEventKind) {
if auditLog == nil {
return
}
auditLog.Log(ctx, api.AuditEvent{
Sub: sub,
Scope: api.ScopeConnectorIdentityLookup,
Kind: kind,
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "grep -n '\"[A-Z][A-Z0-9]*\\(_[A-Z0-9]\\+\\)\\+\"' /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go | sed -E 's/.*(\"[A-Z0-9_]+\").*/\\1/' | sort -u",
"description": "Enumerate all ALL_CAPS string literals in config.go"
}"APP_MODE" "AUTH_JWKS_URL" "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE" "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER" "AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID" "AUTHZ_QA_SUB" "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID" "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET" "CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE" "DB_DRIVER" "DB_DSN" "HTTP_ADDR" "IDP_ABC_BASE_URL" "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID" "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET" "ISSUER_DB_DSN" "JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE"
{
"command": "grep -n \"_FILE\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Check for _FILE suffixed env vars missed by prior regex"
}28: DBDSN string // resolved value: DB_DSN_FILE content takes precedence over DB_DSN
55: // same way DBDSN is (ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE takes precedence over
83:// Load reads the process environment into a Config. DB_DSN_FILE, when set,
94:// In issuer mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must be set and the file it names
103: dsn, err := resolveDSNFrom("DB_DSN_FILE", "DB_DSN")
108: issuerDSN, err := resolveDSNFrom("ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE", "ISSUER_DB_DSN")
154:// "issuer" mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must name a regular file this
174: path := os.Getenv("JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE")
176: return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer requires JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE to be set")
180: return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not accessible: %w", path, err)
183: // no error, nothing distinguishing the two. JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE
191: return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is a directory, not a file", path)
195: return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is not readable: %w", path, err)
203: return "", fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE=issuer set but JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE %q is empty or unreadable: %w", path, err)
208:// resolveDSNFrom implements the DB_DSN_FILE-takes-precedence-over-DB_DSN{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 12
}1 // Package config loads the env-var configuration surface published in root 2 // PLANNING.md's Service boundaries section. Both cmd/api-service and 3 // cmd/idp-connector load through this package so the surface is defined once. 4 package config 5 6 import ( 7 "fmt" 8 "os" 9 "strings" 10 ) 11 12 // Config holds every environment variable named in PLANNING.md's Service
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\tcase service == \"idp-connector\":\n\t\treturn []string{\"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"}, true\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\tcase service == \"idp-connector\":\n\t\treturn []string{\"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"}, true\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n}\n\n// urlShapedEnvVars is the narrow set RequiredAuthEnvVars callers also\n// check for URL shape, not just presence — Ingrid Solano's review of PR\n// #53 (an env var can be non-empty garbage and still pass a bare\n// presence check) and Marcus Ilori's (02) ruling narrowing the fix to\n// exactly these two: AUTH_JWKS_URL and AUTH_JWT_ISSUER are the two\n// values this project's own live incidents actually broke on (empty\n// string, \"unsupported protocol scheme \\\"\\\"\"), and both are meant to be\n// absolute URLs the verifier/connector dial or compare against directly.\n// Deliberately not extended to every other env var (client IDs, audience\n// strings, etc. have no comparable \"must be a URL\" shape to check) —\n// Marcus's ruling: \"presence-plus-URL-shape is the control, don't extend\n// it further.\"\nvar urlShapedEnvVars = map[string]bool{\n\t\"AUTH_JWKS_URL\": true,\n\t\"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\": true,\n}\n\n// ValidateEnvVarValue rejects a structurally implausible value for env\n// vars in urlShapedEnvVars — value already known non-empty (presence is\n// each RequiredAuthEnvVars caller's own, separate check); this only\n// catches the \"non-empty but garbage\" case a bare presence check can't.\n// A no-op for every other env var name.\nfunc ValidateEnvVarValue(name, value string) error {\n\tif !urlShapedEnvVars[name] {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tu, err := url.Parse(value)\n\tif err != nil || u.Scheme == \"\" || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s=%q does not look like a valid absolute URL (a scheme and host are required)\", name, value)\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// OptionalEnvVars is every env var config.Load reads that is NOT gated\n// by RequiredAuthEnvVars, paired with the one-line reason it's exempt —\n// Marcus Ilori's (02) ruling on Ingrid Solano's second PR #53 objection:\n// a hand-maintained required-list with nothing checking it against the\n// code's own env reads is a convention, not a control, since a future\n// AUTH_*-prefixed field added straight to Load() (or read directly by\n// some other code, bypassing this package entirely) would silently\n// never be enforced by either the startup checks or the manifest test.\n// internal/config's own TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified scans\n// config.go's source for every env-var-shaped string literal and\n// requires each one to appear either in some RequiredAuthEnvVars\n// (service, mode) result or here — an unclassified new read fails that\n// test, not just an unenforced one.\nvar OptionalEnvVars = map[string]string{\n\t\"APP_MODE\": \"validated by config.Load's own dedicated check (must be \\\"verifier\\\" or \\\"issuer\\\"), not by RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n\t\"JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE\": \"validated by resolveSigningKeyPath's own issuer-mode-only check, not by RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n\t\"HTTP_ADDR\": \"listen address; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"DB_DRIVER\": \"database driver selector; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"DB_DSN\": \"database DSN fallback; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"DB_DSN_FILE\": \"database DSN source; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"ISSUER_DB_DSN\": \"issuer database DSN fallback; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE\": \"issuer database DSN source; no auth-enforcement concern\",\n\t\"AUTHZ_QA_SUB\": \"QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment\",\n\t\"AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID\": \"QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\": \"consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands\",\n\t\"IDP_ABC_BASE_URL\": \"optional real-vendor base URL; unset selects the stub vendor client by design (LT-41 non-goal: no real vendor exists for this take-home)\",\n\t\"IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID\": \"vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface\",\n\t\"IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface\",\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && grep -n \"for _, name := range required\" cmd/api-service/main.go cmd/idp-connector/main.go",
"description": "Find call sites to update with value-shape check"
}cmd/api-service/main.go:80: for _, name := range required {
cmd/idp-connector/main.go:39: for _, name := range required {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"offset": 76,
"limit": 10
}76 // rather than silently requiring nothing (the exact class of
77 // gap this function exists to prevent, moved one level up).
78 return fmt.Errorf("internal error: no RequiredAuthEnvVars entry for api-service mode %q", mode)
79 }
80 for _, name := range required {
81 if os.Getenv(name) == "" {
82 return fmt.Errorf("%s must be set in %s mode", name, mode)
83 }
84 }
85 return nil{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\tfor _, name := range required {\n\t\tif os.Getenv(name) == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s must be set in %s mode\", name, mode)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil",
"new_string": "\tfor _, name := range required {\n\t\tvalue := os.Getenv(name)\n\t\tif value == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s must be set in %s mode\", name, mode)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := config.ValidateEnvVarValue(name, value); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main.go",
"offset": 36,
"limit": 10
}36 // silently requiring nothing.
37 return fmt.Errorf("internal error: no RequiredAuthEnvVars entry for idp-connector")
38 }
39 for _, name := range required {
40 if os.Getenv(name) == "" {
41 return fmt.Errorf("%s must be set", name)
42 }
43 }
44 return nil
45 }{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main.go",
"old_string": "\tfor _, name := range required {\n\t\tif os.Getenv(name) == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s must be set\", name)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}",
"new_string": "\tfor _, name := range required {\n\t\tvalue := os.Getenv(name)\n\t\tif value == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s must be set\", name)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err := config.ValidateEnvVarValue(name, value); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/env_classification_test.go",
"content": "package config_test\n\nimport (\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"regexp\"\n\t\"sort\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n)\n\n// envVarLiteral matches an env-var-shaped Go string literal — all\n// uppercase, digits, and underscores, with at least one underscore, so\n// it doesn't also match unrelated all-caps literals like mode strings\n// (which config.go doesn't have any of, but a future edit could add\n// one).\nvar envVarLiteral = regexp.MustCompile(`\"([A-Z][A-Z0-9]*(?:_[A-Z0-9]+)+)\"`)\n\n// envVarNamesInConfigGo scans config.go's own source text for every\n// env-var-shaped string literal — not just the ones passed straight to\n// os.Getenv, since resolveDSNFrom's fileEnv/plainEnv parameters are\n// literal strings at their call sites, not inside os.Getenv itself.\n// Scanning the source text directly (this project's established style\n// for migrationSQL/manifest_test.go) catches both shapes without having\n// to special-case call syntax.\nfunc envVarNamesInConfigGo(t *testing.T) []string {\n\tt.Helper()\n\troot := repoRoot(t)\n\tsrc, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, \"internal\", \"config\", \"config.go\"))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"reading config.go: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tseen := make(map[string]bool)\n\tfor _, m := range envVarLiteral.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(src), -1) {\n\t\tseen[m[1]] = true\n\t}\n\tnames := make([]string, 0, len(seen))\n\tfor name := range seen {\n\t\tnames = append(names, name)\n\t}\n\tsort.Strings(names)\n\treturn names\n}\n\n// knownRequiredAuthEnvVars is the union of every env var\n// RequiredAuthEnvVars returns across every (service, mode) pair this\n// package currently recognizes.\nfunc knownRequiredAuthEnvVars() map[string]bool {\n\tunion := make(map[string]bool)\n\tpairs := [][2]string{\n\t\t{\"api-service\", \"verifier\"},\n\t\t{\"api-service\", \"issuer\"},\n\t\t{\"idp-connector\", \"\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, p := range pairs {\n\t\trequired, recognized := config.RequiredAuthEnvVars(p[0], p[1])\n\t\tif !recognized {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor _, name := range required {\n\t\t\tunion[name] = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn union\n}\n\n// TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified is Marcus Ilori's (02) ruling closing\n// Ingrid Solano's second PR #53 objection: RequiredAuthEnvVars is a\n// hand-maintained list with nothing checking it against config.go's own\n// env reads, so a new AUTH_*-prefixed field added straight to Load()\n// (or read directly elsewhere) could silently bypass both the startup\n// checks and the manifest test — the exact enforcement-site gap this\n// whole change exists to close, one level further up. Every env var\n// name found in config.go's source must appear either in some\n// RequiredAuthEnvVars (service, mode) result, or in config.OptionalEnvVars\n// with a stated reason — an unclassified new read fails this test.\nfunc TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified(t *testing.T) {\n\trequired := knownRequiredAuthEnvVars()\n\n\tfor _, name := range envVarNamesInConfigGo(t) {\n\t\tif required[name] {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tif _, ok := config.OptionalEnvVars[name]; ok {\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"config.go reads env var %q, which is neither in any RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode) result nor in config.OptionalEnvVars with a stated reason — classify it as one or the other\", name)\n\t}\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/env_classification_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -50",
"description": "Build after Marcus's ruling changes"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && go vet ./... 2>&1 | tail -50 && echo \"---test---\" && go test ./... -v -run \"TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified|TestManifestsSetRequiredAuthEnvVars|TestValidateAuthConfig\" 2>&1 | tail -80",
"description": "Vet and run new/relevant tests"
}---test---
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/all_set:_ok
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/issuer_missing
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/audience_missing
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/jwks_url_missing
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/all_set:_ok (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/issuer_missing (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/audience_missing (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode/jwks_url_missing (0.00s)
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode/issuer_set,_audience/jwks_unset:_ok
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode/issuer_missing
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode/issuer_set,_audience/jwks_unset:_ok (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode/issuer_missing (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service 0.383s
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig/all_set:_ok
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig/issuer_missing
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig/jwks_url_missing
=== RUN TestValidateAuthConfig/connector_audience_missing
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig/all_set:_ok (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig/issuer_missing (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig/jwks_url_missing (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestValidateAuthConfig/connector_audience_missing (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector 0.333s
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 0.370s [no tests to run]
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.371s [no tests to run]
=== RUN TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified
--- PASS: TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified (0.00s)
=== RUN TestManifestsSetRequiredAuthEnvVars
--- PASS: TestManifestsSetRequiredAuthEnvVars (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.303s
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector 0.352s [no tests to run]
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao 0.303s [no tests to run]
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 0.373s [no tests to run]
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 0.346s [no tests to run]
testing: warning: no tests to run
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 0.334s [no tests to run]
? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files]
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && sed -n '1,60p' cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"description": "View existing api-service main_test.go structure"
}package main
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"loginid-takehome/internal/app"
)
// TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode is the live-review finding's own
// enforcement site: AUTH_JWT_ISSUER, AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE, and AUTH_JWKS_URL
// all missing from the deployed manifests (in two separate incidents)
// let the verifier come up cleanly and fail in a way that looked like an
// ordinary token rejection — this must fail startup loudly instead,
// naming exactly which variable is missing. validateAuthConfig reads the
// process environment directly (via config.RequiredAuthEnvVars), so
// these tests set/unset real env vars rather than constructing a
// config.Config.
func TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode(t *testing.T) {
allSet := func(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "https://issuer.example")
t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", "loginid-api-service")
t.Setenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL", "http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local:443/.well-known/jwks.json")
}
cases := []struct {
name string
unset string // one var to blank out after allSet, "" for the all-set case
wantErr bool
wantErrSubstr string
}{
{name: "all set: ok", wantErr: false},
{name: "issuer missing", unset: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"},
{name: "audience missing", unset: "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"},
{name: "jwks url missing", unset: "AUTH_JWKS_URL", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWKS_URL"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
allSet(t)
if c.unset != "" {
t.Setenv(c.unset, "")
}
err := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)
if c.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = nil, want an error")
}
if !c.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = %v, want nil", err)
}
if c.wantErr && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.wantErrSubstr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want it to name %q", err, c.wantErrSubstr)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode confirms issuer mode only requires
// AUTH_JWT_ISSUER — AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE and AUTH_JWKS_URL are meaningless
// here (the issuer mints each token's aud from the per-client
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"old_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string // one var to blank out after allSet, \"\" for the all-set case\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"audience missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)",
"new_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string // one var to blank out after allSet, \"\" for the all-set case\n\t\tgarbage string // one var to overwrite with a non-URL value after allSet, \"\" to skip\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"audience missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t// Ingrid Solano's PR #53 review: a non-empty value that isn't a\n\t\t// valid URL must fail too, not just an empty one — Marcus\n\t\t// Ilori's (02) ruling narrowed the fix to AUTH_JWKS_URL and\n\t\t// AUTH_JWT_ISSUER specifically.\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.garbage != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.garbage, \"not-a-url\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)"
}<tool_use_error>File has not been read yet. Read it first before writing to it.</tool_use_error>
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main_test.go"
}1 package main
2
3 import (
4 "strings"
5 "testing"
6
7 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
8 )
9
10 // TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode is the live-review finding's own
11 // enforcement site: AUTH_JWT_ISSUER, AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE, and AUTH_JWKS_URL
12 // all missing from the deployed manifests (in two separate incidents)
13 // let the verifier come up cleanly and fail in a way that looked like an
14 // ordinary token rejection — this must fail startup loudly instead,
15 // naming exactly which variable is missing. validateAuthConfig reads the
16 // process environment directly (via config.RequiredAuthEnvVars), so
17 // these tests set/unset real env vars rather than constructing a
18 // config.Config.
19 func TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode(t *testing.T) {
20 allSet := func(t *testing.T) {
21 t.Helper()
22 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "https://issuer.example")
23 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", "loginid-api-service")
24 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL", "http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local:443/.well-known/jwks.json")
25 }
26
27 cases := []struct {
28 name string
29 unset string // one var to blank out after allSet, "" for the all-set case
30 wantErr bool
31 wantErrSubstr string
32 }{
33 {name: "all set: ok", wantErr: false},
34 {name: "issuer missing", unset: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"},
35 {name: "audience missing", unset: "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"},
36 {name: "jwks url missing", unset: "AUTH_JWKS_URL", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWKS_URL"},
37 }
38 for _, c := range cases {
39 t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
40 allSet(t)
41 if c.unset != "" {
42 t.Setenv(c.unset, "")
43 }
44 err := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)
45 if c.wantErr && err == nil {
46 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = nil, want an error")
47 }
48 if !c.wantErr && err != nil {
49 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = %v, want nil", err)
50 }
51 if c.wantErr && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.wantErrSubstr) {
52 t.Errorf("error = %q, want it to name %q", err, c.wantErrSubstr)
53 }
54 })
55 }
56 }
57
58 // TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode confirms issuer mode only requires
59 // AUTH_JWT_ISSUER — AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE and AUTH_JWKS_URL are meaningless
60 // here (the issuer mints each token's aud from the per-client
61 // oauth_client.audience column, not from global config, and never
62 // verifies inbound tokens so it has no JWKS to fetch), so an issuer
63 // Deployment with neither set at all must NOT be rejected.
64 func TestValidateAuthConfig_IssuerMode(t *testing.T) {
65 cases := []struct {
66 name string
67 setIssuer bool
68 wantErr bool
69 }{
70 {name: "issuer set, audience/jwks unset: ok", setIssuer: true, wantErr: false},
71 {name: "issuer missing", setIssuer: false, wantErr: true},
72 }
73 for _, c := range cases {
74 t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
75 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "")
76 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", "")
77 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL", "")
78 if c.setIssuer {
79 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "https://issuer.example")
80 }
81 err := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeIssuer)
82 if c.wantErr && err == nil {
83 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = nil, want an error")
84 }
85 if !c.wantErr && err != nil {
86 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = %v, want nil", err)
87 }
88 if c.wantErr && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER") {
89 t.Errorf("error = %q, want it to name AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", err)
90 }
91 })
92 }
93 }
94 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"old_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string // one var to blank out after allSet, \"\" for the all-set case\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"audience missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)",
"new_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string // one var to blank out after allSet, \"\" for the all-set case\n\t\tgarbage string // one var to overwrite with a non-URL value after allSet, \"\" to skip\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"audience missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t// Ingrid Solano's PR #53 review: a non-empty value that isn't a\n\t\t// valid URL must fail too, not just an empty one — Marcus\n\t\t// Ilori's (02) ruling narrowed the fix to AUTH_JWKS_URL and\n\t\t// AUTH_JWT_ISSUER specifically.\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.garbage != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.garbage, \"not-a-url\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig(app.ModeVerifier)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/api-service/main_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main_test.go"
}1 package main
2
3 import (
4 "strings"
5 "testing"
6 )
7
8 // TestValidateAuthConfig is the live-review finding's own enforcement
9 // site: AUTH_JWKS_URL and AUTH_JWT_ISSUER were both silently absent from
10 // idp-connector's Deployment manifest, so every request 401'd in a way
11 // indistinguishable from an ordinary rejected token — this must fail
12 // startup loudly instead, naming exactly which variable is missing.
13 func TestValidateAuthConfig(t *testing.T) {
14 allSet := func(t *testing.T) {
15 t.Helper()
16 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "https://issuer.example")
17 t.Setenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL", "http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local:443/.well-known/jwks.json")
18 t.Setenv("CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE", "idp-connector-service")
19 }
20
21 cases := []struct {
22 name string
23 unset string
24 wantErr bool
25 wantErrSubstr string
26 }{
27 {name: "all set: ok", wantErr: false},
28 {name: "issuer missing", unset: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"},
29 {name: "jwks url missing", unset: "AUTH_JWKS_URL", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "AUTH_JWKS_URL"},
30 {name: "connector audience missing", unset: "CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: "CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"},
31 }
32 for _, c := range cases {
33 t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
34 allSet(t)
35 if c.unset != "" {
36 t.Setenv(c.unset, "")
37 }
38 err := validateAuthConfig()
39 if c.wantErr && err == nil {
40 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = nil, want an error")
41 }
42 if !c.wantErr && err != nil {
43 t.Fatalf("validateAuthConfig() = %v, want nil", err)
44 }
45 if c.wantErr && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.wantErrSubstr) {
46 t.Errorf("error = %q, want it to name %q", err, c.wantErrSubstr)
47 }
48 })
49 }
50 }
51 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main_test.go",
"old_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t{name: \"connector audience missing\", unset: \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig()",
"new_string": "\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tunset string\n\t\tgarbage string\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t\twantErrSubstr string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"all set: ok\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url missing\", unset: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t{name: \"connector audience missing\", unset: \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"},\n\t\t// Ingrid Solano's PR #53 review + Marcus Ilori's (02) ruling:\n\t\t// a non-empty but non-URL value must fail too.\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\"},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer garbage value\", garbage: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", wantErr: true, wantErrSubstr: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tallSet(t)\n\t\t\tif c.unset != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.unset, \"\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif c.garbage != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tt.Setenv(c.garbage, \"not-a-url\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\terr := validateAuthConfig()"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/cmd/idp-connector/main_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && grep -n \"^func Test\" internal/config/config_test.go | head -20",
"description": "Check existing config_test.go test names"
}13:func TestLoad_DSNFilePrecedence(t *testing.T) {
32:func TestLoad_DSNEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
45:func TestLoad_AppModeDefault(t *testing.T) {
61:func TestLoad_AppModeRejectsUnknownValue(t *testing.T) {
78:func TestLoad_IssuerModeRequiresSigningKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
92:func TestLoad_IssuerModeRequiresSigningKeyFileToBeReadable(t *testing.T) {
107:func TestLoad_IssuerModeRejectsDirectory(t *testing.T) {
119:func TestLoad_IssuerModeRejectsEmptyFile(t *testing.T) {
137:func TestLoad_IssuerModeWithSigningKeyFileSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
162:func TestLoad_VerifierModeIgnoresSigningKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "head -5 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config_test.go",
"description": "Check package name of config_test.go"
}package config import ( "os" "path/filepath"
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config_test.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 15
}1 package config
2
3 import (
4 "os"
5 "path/filepath"
6 "testing"
7 )
8
9 // TestLoad_DSNFilePrecedence asserts DB_DSN_FILE wins over DB_DSN when both
10 // are set, per PLANNING.md's Service boundaries and handoff-04-secrets.md's
11 // S7 revision — this is the enforcement site LT-34's acceptance criteria
12 // names for that precedence rule.
13 func TestLoad_DSNFilePrecedence(t *testing.T) {
14 dir := t.TempDir()
15 dsnFilePath := filepath.Join(dir, "dsn"){
"command": "tail -20 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config_test.go",
"description": "View end of config_test.go to append after"
}}
// TestLoad_VerifierModeIgnoresSigningKeyFile asserts the verifying binary
// never surfaces a signing-key path on Config even if the variable
// happens to be set in its environment (e.g. a stray value left over from
// a shared env template) — Config.JWTSigningKeyPath is the only thing
// anything downstream could use to find the private key, so it must be
// empty whenever AppMode is not "issuer", unconditionally.
func TestLoad_VerifierModeIgnoresSigningKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("APP_MODE", "verifier")
t.Setenv("JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE", "/should/never/be/read")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load returned error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath != "" {
t.Errorf("JWTSigningKeyPath = %q, want empty in verifier mode regardless of the env var", cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)
}
}{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config_test.go",
"old_string": "\tif cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath != \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"JWTSigningKeyPath = %q, want empty in verifier mode regardless of the env var\", cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\tif cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath != \"\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"JWTSigningKeyPath = %q, want empty in verifier mode regardless of the env var\", cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestValidateEnvVarValue is ValidateEnvVarValue's own direct unit\n// test — Ingrid Solano's PR #53 review (a bare presence check lets an\n// env var be non-empty garbage and still pass) and Marcus Ilori's (02)\n// ruling narrowing the fix to exactly AUTH_JWKS_URL and AUTH_JWT_ISSUER.\nfunc TestValidateEnvVarValue(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tenvName string\n\t\tvalue string\n\t\twantErr bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url: valid absolute URL\", envName: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", value: \"http://svc.cluster.local:443/.well-known/jwks.json\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url: no scheme or host\", envName: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", value: \"not-a-url\", wantErr: true},\n\t\t{name: \"jwks url: scheme but no host\", envName: \"AUTH_JWKS_URL\", value: \"http://\", wantErr: true},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer: valid absolute URL\", envName: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", value: \"https://auth.example.internal\", wantErr: false},\n\t\t{name: \"issuer: garbage\", envName: \"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", value: \"garbage\", wantErr: true},\n\t\t// A var not in urlShapedEnvVars is never shape-checked — this\n\t\t// deliberately narrow scope is Marcus's own ruling (\"don't\n\t\t// extend it further\"), not an oversight.\n\t\t{name: \"audience: not URL-shaped, anything passes\", envName: \"AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE\", value: \"not-a-url-and-thats-fine\", wantErr: false},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\terr := ValidateEnvVarValue(c.envName, c.value)\n\t\t\tif c.wantErr && err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"ValidateEnvVarValue(%q, %q) = nil, want an error\", c.envName, c.value)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !c.wantErr && err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"ValidateEnvVarValue(%q, %q) = %v, want nil\", c.envName, c.value, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation/internal/config/config_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -50 && echo \"---vet---\" && go vet ./... 2>&1 | tail -50 && echo \"---test---\" && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Full build/vet/test after adding new test coverage"
}---vet--- ---test--- ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service 0.382s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector 0.322s ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.568s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.305s ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && cp internal/config/config.go /tmp/config.go.bak\npython3 -c \"\nimport re\nwith open('internal/config/config.go') as f:\n s = f.read()\ns = s.replace('IssuerDBDSN: issuerDSN,', 'IssuerDBDSN: issuerDSN,\\n\\t\\tAppMode2: os.Getenv(\\\"UNCLASSIFIED_TEST_VAR\\\"),')\nwith open('internal/config/config.go', 'w') as f:\n f.write(s)\n\"\ngo test ./internal/config/... -run TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified -v 2>&1 | tail -20\ncp /tmp/config.go.bak internal/config/config.go\nrm /tmp/config.go.bak",
"description": "Inject an unclassified env var to confirm the drift test fails, then revert"
}# loginid-takehome/internal/config [loginid-takehome/internal/config.test] internal/config/config.go:136:3: unknown field AppMode2 in struct literal of type Config FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/config [build failed] FAIL Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && cp internal/config/config.go /tmp/config.go.bak\npython3 -c \"\nwith open('internal/config/config.go') as f:\n s = f.read()\ns = s.replace('func Load() (Config, error) {', 'func Load() (Config, error) {\\n\\t_ = os.Getenv(\\\"UNCLASSIFIED_TEST_VAR\\\")')\nwith open('internal/config/config.go', 'w') as f:\n f.write(s)\n\"\ngo test ./internal/config/... -run TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified -v 2>&1 | tail -20\ncp /tmp/config.go.bak internal/config/config.go\nrm /tmp/config.go.bak\ngo build ./... 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Inject an unclassified env var read, confirm test fails, then revert cleanly"
}=== RUN TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified
env_classification_test.go:89: config.go reads env var "UNCLASSIFIED_TEST_VAR", which is neither in any RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode) result nor in config.OptionalEnvVars with a stated reason — classify it as one or the other
--- FAIL: TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.160s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -30 && echo \"---test---\" && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -30 && echo \"---gofmt---\" && gofmt -l cmd/idp-connector cmd/api-service internal/config 2>&1 && echo \"---staticcheck---\" && $(go env GOPATH)/bin/staticcheck ./... 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Final full verification pass"
}---test--- ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service (cached) ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/app (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.090s ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] ---gofmt--- internal/config/config.go ---staticcheck--- Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && gofmt -d internal/config/config.go | head -40",
"description": "Show gofmt diff for config.go"
}diff internal/config/config.go.orig internal/config/config.go
--- internal/config/config.go.orig
+++ internal/config/config.go
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@
// test, not just an unenforced one.
var OptionalEnvVars = map[string]string{
"APP_MODE": "validated by config.Load's own dedicated check (must be \"verifier\" or \"issuer\"), not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
- "JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE": "validated by resolveSigningKeyPath's own issuer-mode-only check, not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
+ "JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE": "validated by resolveSigningKeyPath's own issuer-mode-only check, not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
"HTTP_ADDR": "listen address; no auth-enforcement concern",
"DB_DRIVER": "database driver selector; no auth-enforcement concern",
"DB_DSN": "database DSN fallback; no auth-enforcement concern",
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && gofmt -w internal/config/config.go && gofmt -l internal/config/config.go && echo CLEAN",
"description": "Apply gofmt to config.go"
}CLEAN Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20 && echo \"---gitleaks---\" && gitleaks detect --log-opts=\"origin/main..HEAD\" 2>&1 | tail -10",
"description": "Final re-verify after gofmt fix"
}ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/app (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.085s
ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached)
ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached)
? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files]
---gitleaks---
○
│╲
│ ○
○ ░
░ gitleaks
[90m9:45AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1m2 commits scanned.[0m
[90m9:45AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mscanned ~19249 bytes (19.25 KB) in 38.8ms[0m
[90m9:45AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mno leaks found[0m
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && git add -A && git status --short",
"description": "Stage all changes for Marcus's ruling"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M cmd/api-service/main_test.go M cmd/idp-connector/main.go M cmd/idp-connector/main_test.go M internal/config/config.go M internal/config/config_test.go A internal/config/env_classification_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nfix: URL-shape validation for AUTH_JWKS_URL/AUTH_JWT_ISSUER + config.go env-var classification test\n\nMarcus Ilori's (02) ruling on Ingrid Solano's two PR #53 objections:\n\n1. AUTH_JWKS_URL and AUTH_JWT_ISSUER now get a minimal URL-shape check\n (url.Parse requiring a non-empty scheme and host) on top of the\n existing presence check, in both binaries' validateAuthConfig - the\n actual failure mode the live incidents hit (empty value, no scheme),\n narrowed to exactly these two vars per Marcus's ruling (\"don't extend\n it further\").\n\n2. internal/config/env_classification_test.go scans config.go's own\n source for every env-var-shaped string literal and asserts each one\n is either in some RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode) result or in the\n new config.OptionalEnvVars map with a stated reason. Closes the loop\n Ingrid's second objection named: RequiredAuthEnvVars was a\n hand-maintained list with nothing checking it against config.go's\n actual reads, so a new AUTH_*-prefixed field added straight to Load()\n could have silently bypassed both the startup checks and the\n manifest test. Verified the new test actually fails when an\n unclassified env var is added to config.go, then reverts clean.\n\nStory: LT-41\nWork-By: Renata Cole (implementation); Ingrid Solano (02, review, found both gaps); Marcus Ilori (02, ruling)\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\"",
"description": "Commit Marcus's ruling implementation"
}[fix/idp-connector-config-validation a00c63f] fix: URL-shape validation for AUTH_JWKS_URL/AUTH_JWT_ISSUER + config.go env-var classification test 7 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/config/env_classification_test.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && git push origin fix/idp-connector-config-validation 2>&1 | tail -10",
"description": "Push Marcus's ruling implementation"
}To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git 69e39f2..a00c63f fix/idp-connector-config-validation -> fix/idp-connector-config-validation Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && gh pr comment 53 --body \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nMarcus (02) ruled on both of Ingrid's objections and both are landed in a00c63f:\n\n1. **URL-shape validation, narrowly.** `AUTH_JWKS_URL` and `AUTH_JWT_ISSUER` now both parse via `url.Parse` and require a non-empty scheme and host — the actual failure mode the live incidents hit. Nothing else gets this treatment (Marcus: \"presence-plus-URL-shape is the control, don't extend it further\").\n2. **Structural link to config.Load()'s own reads.** New `internal/config/env_classification_test.go` scans `config.go`'s source for every env-var-shaped string literal and asserts each one is classified — either in some `RequiredAuthEnvVars` result or in the new `config.OptionalEnvVars` map with a stated reason. Verified it actually fails on an unclassified new var (temporarily injected one, confirmed red, reverted).\n\nFull build/vet/test/staticcheck/gofmt/gitleaks clean. Ready for re-review/merge.\nEOF\n)\"",
"description": "Post follow-up PR comment on landed ruling"
}https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/53#issuecomment-5654629590 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation && for i in $(seq 1 20); do\n chk=$(gh pr checks 53 2>&1)\n if ! echo \"$chk\" | grep -q \"pending\"; then\n echo \"$chk\"\n break\n fi\n sleep 20\ndone",
"description": "Poll PR #53 CI checks until resolved",
"timeout": 420000
}Build images (no push) (api-service) pass 46s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756989462 Build images (no push) (idp-connector) pass 31s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756989464 Build, lint, test pass 3m7s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756576893 Detect whether image-buildable code changed pass 6s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756576659 GitGuardian Security Checks pass 0 https://dashboard.gitguardian.com Guard against the JWT signing-key Secret leaking into another manifest pass 4s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756576838 govulncheck pass 20s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34769574858/job/103756576776 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"to": "project manager",
"summary": "PR #53 green with Marcus's ruling landed, ready to merge",
"message": "PR #53 updated with Marcus's ruling on both of Ingrid's objections (commit a00c63f): URL-shape validation on AUTH_JWKS_URL/AUTH_JWT_ISSUER, and the new env_classification_test.go closing the RequiredAuthEnvVars-vs-config.Load() drift gap (verified it actually catches an injected unclassified var). All CI checks green. Ready to merge — https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/53\n\nMoving to LT-33 now per your ordering. Noted LT-44 (retention sweep CronJob) is also refined and handed off — I'll pick it up after LT-33/LT-43, in the order you gave.",
"type": "message",
"recipient": "project manager",
"content": "PR #53 updated with Marcus's ruling on both of In…"
}{"success":true,"message":"“PR #53 green with Marcus's ruling landed, ready to merge” → project manager (another Claude session on this machine)","msg_id":"2bdc42ec-f448-4be5-8ae6-e9b2282b0b79"}{
"command": "git -C /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID fetch origin && git -C /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery worktree list 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Fetch latest and list existing worktrees"
}/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/lint-fix 203d202 [fix/errcheck-app-test] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-32 3302245 [feature/LT-32] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-32-infra 3e61a65 [feature/LT-32-infra] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-36 93c7459 [feature/LT-36] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-37 06c132c [feature/LT-37] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-38 e80dfa7 [feature/LT-38] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-38-ci-skip-fix 01afbbe [fix/ci-skip-not-pass] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-38-db-isolation 50bc6c7 [fix/test-db-isolation] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-39 aacb633 [feature/LT-39] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40 6dc1341 [feature/LT-40] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40-config-fix 1faf0a8 [fix/jwt-config-validation] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-40-jwks-logging 5f658b7 [fix/jwks-fetch-observability] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41 38a2bdd [feature/LT-41] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-41-config-validation a00c63f [fix/idp-connector-config-validation] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-45 26de961 [feature/LT-45] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-47 d19896d [fix/deploy-paths-ignore] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51 b7db08e [feature/LT-51] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-51-phc-fix 2bf952c [fix/oauth-client-phc-hash] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-52 91069ec [fix/ci-db-services] /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-52-healthz 91bf00d [feature/LT-52-healthz-db]
{
"command": "git -C /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery worktree add /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 -b feature/LT-33 origin/main 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Create new worktree for LT-33 off latest origin/main"
}Preparing worktree (new branch 'feature/LT-33') branch 'feature/LT-33' set up to track 'origin/main'. HEAD is now at 21724b9 02: JWKS/config-verification hand-off addenda, Recreate-strategy ruling, LT-31 consolidated review record
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git config --worktree user.name \"Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery lead, Claude Sonnet 5)\" && git config --worktree user.email \"renata-cole@agents.loginid-takehome.invalid\" && git config --worktree user.name && git config --worktree user.email",
"description": "Set worktree git identity"
}Renata Cole (03-engineering-delivery lead, Claude Sonnet 5) renata-cole@agents.loginid-takehome.invalid Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && cat internal/app/verifier_router.go",
"description": "Study verifier router to see existing route registration pattern"
}package app
import (
"database/sql"
"net/http"
"time"
"loginid-takehome/internal/api"
"loginid-takehome/internal/config"
"loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
)
// jwksCacheTTL matches the token TTL per handoff-03-auth.md v4's own
// guidance ("Verifier caches the fetched key set in memory with a short
// TTL (matching token TTL is reasonable)") — using the upper bound of the
// 5-15 minute TTL range so a cache refresh never fires more often than a
// token itself could have already expired and been re-issued.
const jwksCacheTTL = 15 * time.Minute
// NewVerifierRouter builds api-service's real, authenticated router —
// LT-39's handlers (search/retrieve) wired behind LT-40's JWT
// verification middleware, plus /healthz. This is the ModeVerifier
// Deployment's router; the issuer Deployment (ModeIssuer) still uses the
// plain NewRouter above, since it has no need for any of this — it never
// verifies inbound tokens, only issues them.
//
// repo may be nil — cmd/api-service/main.go passes nil rather than
// crash-looping the whole process when the DAO repository couldn't be
// constructed at startup (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN yet, e.g. before the
// database exists in this environment). /healthz must stay reachable
// regardless (LT-34's live-URL story); the two protected routes fail
// closed with 503 instead of panicking on a nil Repository or silently
// pretending to work.
//
// pingDB (LT-52 criterion 5) is a separate, lightweight *sql.DB used
// only for /healthz's bounded connectivity probe — deliberately not the
// dao.Repository above, since 05's Repository contract exposes no Ping
// and this story has no reason to ask for one just for a health check.
// pingDB may be nil (same startup-failure path as repo above); either
// way /healthz keeps reporting "status":"ok" and "db":"down" rather
// than going unreachable — a DB outage is this router's problem to fail
// the two DB-backed routes closed on, not a reason to take the whole
// process's liveness probe down with it.
func NewVerifierRouter(cfg config.Config, repo dao.Repository, pingDB *sql.DB) http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", healthHandlerWithDB("api-service", pingDB))
auditLog := api.StdoutAuditLogger{}
keys := api.NewJWKSCache(cfg.AuthJWKSURL, jwksCacheTTL, nil)
authMiddleware := api.NewJWTMiddleware(keys, cfg.AuthJWTIssuer, cfg.AuthJWTAudience, auditLog)
// api.NewDeadlineMiddleware outermost: the deadline budget must cover
// JWT verification (including a JWKS cache-miss fetch) as well as
// the handler's own DAO call, per decisions/context-propagation.md's
// ruling — a single deadline, not the middleware's and the handler's
// own disagreeing.
protect := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return api.NewDeadlineMiddleware(authMiddleware(h))
}
var searchHandler, getHandler http.Handler
if repo == nil {
searchHandler = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { api.WriteServiceUnavailable(w) })
getHandler = searchHandler
} else {
deps := api.Deps{
Repo: repo,
RateLimiter: api.NewInProcessRateLimiter(),
TouchCounter: api.NewInProcessTouchCounter(
api.TouchCapPerWindow, api.TouchCapWindow),
AuditLog: auditLog,
Authz: &api.StopgapAuthorizer{
ReadOwnAllow: stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg),
},
}
searchHandler = api.NewSearchHandler(deps)
getHandler = api.NewGetProfileHandler(deps)
}
mux.Handle("POST /profiles/search", protect(searchHandler))
mux.Handle("GET /profiles/{id}", protect(getHandler))
return mux
}
// stopgapReadOwnAllow builds StopgapAuthorizer's hard-coded (sub ->
// allowed record id) map from cfg — empty (denies everything) unless
// both AuthzQASub and AuthzQAAllowedProfileID are set, which LT-51 does
// once the QA client credential and a matching seeded profile exist.
func stopgapReadOwnAllow(cfg config.Config) map[string]map[string]bool {
if cfg.AuthzQASub == "" || cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID == "" {
return nil
}
return map[string]map[string]bool{
cfg.AuthzQASub: {cfg.AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: true},
}
}
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && sed -n '120,220p' internal/api/tokenhandler.go",
"description": "Continue reading tokenhandler.go for the grant response shape"
} // RFC 6749 doesn't name a status for endpoint-level
// throttling (it's a brute-force control this project adds
// on top of the spec, not part of it) — 429 matches this
// API's own convention elsewhere (internal/api/ratelimit.go,
// internal/api/touchcounter.go) for the same class of
// decision.
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "slow_down")
return
}
if !hasBasicAuth {
// No Authorization header at all: reject before ever
// touching the client store — there is no client_id to key
// a store lookup by. RecordFailure still fires (keyed by
// sourceIP; clientID is "") so repeated no-credential
// requests still advance that source IP's backoff, same as
// any other failed attempt.
limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client")
return
}
rec, found, err := store.Get(ctx, clientID)
if err != nil {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error")
return
}
// Both branches run the SAME Argon2id comparison at the SAME
// cost before deciding anything — a found client with a real
// secret on file (secret_state = "set") compares against its own
// hash; every other case (client_id not found at all, OR found
// but secret_state is "none"/"revoked" and ClientSecretHash is
// empty) compares against the fixed dummyHash instead of
// skipping the comparison or short-circuiting on a malformed
// hash. Whichever branch runs, exactly one verifySecret call
// happens before the outcome is known, so an unknown client_id,
// a not-yet-secreted or revoked client, and a wrong secret for a
// fully provisioned one all take statistically indistinguishable
// time (Tobias Lindqvist's objection, LT-51 refinement) —
// closing the timing side-channel the identical response body
// alone leaves open.
var secretOK bool
if found && rec.ClientSecretHash != "" {
secretOK = verifySecret(clientSecret, rec.ClientSecretHash)
} else {
_ = verifySecret(clientSecret, dummyHash)
secretOK = false
}
if !found || !secretOK || !rec.Active {
limiter.RecordFailure(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client")
return
}
limiter.RecordSuccess(ctx, clientID, sourceIP)
// Opportunistic rehash-on-verify (Marcus Ilori's ruling,
// handoff-03-auth.md v7): reaching this point guarantees secretOK
// came from the real-hash branch above (the dummy-hash branch
// always sets secretOK=false), so rec.ClientSecretHash is a real,
// just-verified PHC string. If its embedded cost parameters have
// drifted from this package's current profile, re-hash the
// secret the caller just proved they hold and persist it — this
// is how an existing row migrates to a bumped cost profile
// without a live-credential migration. Best-effort: a failure
// here does not fail the grant already earned by a correct
// secret; it's logged and the next successful auth tries again.
// Bounded even under concurrent grants against the same
// still-drifted client: UpdateSecretHash's WHERE clause targets
// one row by primary key, serialized by Postgres's own row lock
// and capped by clientStoreQueryTimeout — a burst of redundant
// UPDATEs before the row migrates, not a table lock or a
// cascading write (Nolan Reyes, PR #39 review). This design
// assumes a cost-profile bump (and therefore a burst of drifted
// rows all rehashing near-simultaneously) is a rare, infrequent
// event, not something load-tested at scale.
if needsRehash(rec.ClientSecretHash) {
if newHash, err := hashSecret(clientSecret); err != nil {
log.Printf("api: opportunistic rehash for client_id=%s: hashing failed: %v", clientID, err)
} else if err := store.UpdateSecretHash(ctx, clientID, newHash); err != nil {
log.Printf("api: opportunistic rehash for client_id=%s: storing failed: %v", clientID, err)
}
}
// scope is optional per RFC 6749 §4.4: omitted means issue the
// client's full granted set, which — per ClientRecord's own doc
// comment on why GrantedScope is singular, not a set — is
// exactly one scope. A requested scope must equal that one
// scope exactly; anything else (a different scope, an empty
// string when one is explicitly passed, more than one
// space-delimited value) is invalid_scope. This is stricter than
// "subset of a set" only because the set this system provisions
// is never larger than one element to begin with.
requested := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostForm.Get("scope"))
if requested != "" && Scope(requested) != rec.GrantedScope {
writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_scope")
return
}
now := time.Now()
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\\|CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\\|TOKEN_URL\\|/auth/token\\|row 10\" PLANNING.md 02-ai-security-architecture/handoff-04-secrets.md 2>/dev/null | head -40",
"description": "Find intended token-endpoint URL config for api-service's outbound connector client"
}PLANNING.md:46:- **Config surface:** environment variables only (12-factor: config lives in the environment, not in checked-in files) — `DB_DRIVER` (postgres|cockroachdb|sqlite), `DB_DSN`, `DB_DSN_FILE` (file-mount path; takes precedence over `DB_DSN` when both are set, per 02's `handoff-04-secrets.md` S7 revision — a DSN's embedded password is as exposed by `kubectl describe`/crash dumps/env-in-child-process as any other secret in that inventory, so `DB_DSN` is now a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option), `HTTP_ADDR`, `AUTH_JWT_ISSUER` = `https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal` / `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `loginid-api-service` (literal values per `handoff-03-auth.md` — not secrets, safe to ship in config), `CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `idp-connector-service` (the connector's own inbound audience, distinct from `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` — `handoff-03-auth.md` v3 / `connector-security.md` §5, consistency-pass F15), `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15), `APP_MODE` = `verifier` (default) | `issuer` (selects which of `api-service`'s two Kubernetes Deployments a given pod is — the issuer Deployment alone mounts the JWT signing-key Secret, per 02/04's F13 fix in `handoff-04-secrets.md`/`containerization-design.md`; confirmed spelling from Theo), `IDP_ABC_BASE_URL`, `IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID`/`IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET`. No flags, no config files. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"http.NewRequestWithContext\\|BasicAuth\\|grant_type\" internal/api/tokenhandler.go | head; echo \"---clientstore---\"; grep -n \"GrantedScope\\|Audience\" internal/api/clientstore.go | head -20",
"description": "Check ClientRecord fields for audience handling"
}79: // BasicAuth so a misconfigured issuer fails identically for
97: if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "client_credentials" {
98: writeTokenError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type")
102: clientID, clientSecret, hasBasicAuth := r.BasicAuth()
105: // GrantLimiter gates BEFORE the hasBasicAuth check, not after —
130: if !hasBasicAuth {
---clientstore---
250: GrantedScope Scope // exactly one — see ClientStore's doc comment
251: Audience string // the JWT aud this client's tokens are minted for
258:// GrantedScope is a single Scope, not a set, even though
356: err := row.Scan(&rec.ClientID, &rec.Name, &secretHash, &scopesRaw, &rec.Audience, &status)
376: rec.GrantedScope = Scope(scopes[0])
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "mkdir -p /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding",
"description": "Create onboarding package directory"
}(Bash completed with no output)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding.go",
"content": "// Package onboarding implements LT-33: api-service's own outbound call\n// to cmd/idp-connector on an onboarding flow's behalf — the one story\n// that makes Q2 (api-service) and Q3 (idp-connector) one system, per\n// refinement/LT-33.md.\n//\n// This is a service-layer mediator, not a new public HTTP endpoint: no\n// assignment question asks for an onboarding endpoint, and this story's\n// own non-goals rule out a new client-facing surface. Acceptance (PO\n// review script item 7) is a unit/integration test exercising Service\n// against a fake ConnectorClient/TokenClient, not a live-URL check.\npackage onboarding\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/connector\"\n)\n\n// ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable is returned when the connector\n// couldn't be reached at all (dial/timeout/5xx after retries) or\n// api-service's own connector-scoped token couldn't be obtained — an\n// availability problem, never internal detail, per Marcus Ilori's (02)\n// ruling on this story's connector-unreachable failure mode.\nvar ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable = errors.New(\"onboarding: identity verification temporarily unavailable\")\n\n// ErrVendorCredentialRejected is returned when the connector was\n// reached fine but rejected the end-user's vendor username/password (a\n// genuine 401 from /auth) — distinguishable from\n// ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable so an onboarding flow can tell a\n// user to recheck their vendor login rather than \"try again later,\" but\n// carrying no finer detail than that: idp-connector's own /auth already\n// collapses \"unknown username\" vs \"wrong password\" vs \"vendor\n// unreachable\" into one generic rejection (connector-security.md §4),\n// and this package does not attempt to recover any of that distinction.\nvar ErrVendorCredentialRejected = errors.New(\"onboarding: vendor credential rejected\")\n\n// TokenClient is the seam this package uses to obtain api-service's own\n// connector-scoped client-credentials access token — satisfied by\n// HTTPTokenClient (token.go), or a fake in tests.\ntype TokenClient interface {\n\t// FetchToken exchanges clientID/clientSecret for a fresh\n\t// client-credentials token, per RFC 6749 §4.4. Returns the token's\n\t// stated lifetime as a duration (not an absolute time), since\n\t// TokenSource is the one thing responsible for turning that into an\n\t// expiry deadline.\n\tFetchToken(ctx context.Context, clientID, clientSecret string) (accessToken string, expiresIn time.Duration, err error)\n}\n\n// ConnectorClient is api-service's outbound seam to cmd/idp-connector's\n// own /auth and /identity endpoints (LT-41). ourToken authenticates\n// api-service itself to the connector (aud: idp-connector-service,\n// scope: connector:identity-lookup); vendorAccessToken is the end\n// user's vendor token, obtained from Auth and passed straight through to\n// Identity — Service.VerifyIdentity is the only place that ever holds\n// it, and only for the span of one call.\ntype ConnectorClient interface {\n\t// Auth returns ErrVendorCredentialRejected on the connector's own\n\t// generic 401 (vendor username/password rejected), or\n\t// ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable on anything else (network\n\t// error, non-2xx/401 status, malformed response) — never richer\n\t// detail than that.\n\tAuth(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string) (vendorAccessToken string, err error)\n\n\t// Identity returns the same two-error contract as Auth.\n\t// ErrVendorCredentialRejected here covers the connector rejecting\n\t// EITHER our own token (early/unexpected expiry — a 401 that looks\n\t// identical to a rejected vendor token from this seam's point of\n\t// view, by idp-connector's own deliberate design) or the vendor\n\t// token; Service.VerifyIdentity treats a 401 here as cause to\n\t// invalidate the cached own-token and retry once with a fresh one\n\t// before concluding the vendor token itself was the problem.\n\tIdentity(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error)\n}\n\n// connectorCallTimeout bounds every outbound call to idp-connector,\n// independent of whatever deadline the caller's ctx carries — the same\n// belt-and-braces pattern internal/connector's own HTTPVendorClient\n// uses for its calls to the vendor.\nconst connectorCallTimeout = 10 * time.Second\n\n// connectorMaxRetries/connectorRetryBackoff bound the retry loop this\n// story's \"connector unreachable\" criterion requires: a small, fixed\n// number of attempts with backoff, never an open-ended retry loop a\n// caller could turn into a self-inflicted flood against idp-connector.\nconst (\n\tconnectorMaxRetries = 2\n\tconnectorRetryBackoff = 250 * time.Millisecond\n)\n\n// Service mediates one onboarding attempt end to end: obtain our own\n// connector-scoped token, call the connector's /auth with the end\n// user's vendor credential, then its /identity with the resulting\n// vendor token — never persisting or logging the vendor password or\n// vendor access token at any point.\ntype Service struct {\n\tTokens *TokenSource\n\tConnector ConnectorClient\n}\n\n// VerifyIdentity is this package's one entry point. vendorAccessToken\n// never escapes this function: it's read from callAuth's return value\n// and passed straight into callIdentity as a parameter, never assigned\n// to any field of Service or any wider-scoped variable, and never\n// logged — attack-tree leaf 4's control (connector-security.md), applied\n// symmetrically to api-service per this story's own criterion.\nfunc (s *Service) VerifyIdentity(ctx context.Context, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tourToken, err := s.Tokens.Token(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// TokenSource.Token already logged this as its own distinct\n\t\t// failure class (a config/credential problem, not connector\n\t\t// downtime) — nothing further to add here.\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t}\n\n\tvendorAccessToken, err := s.callAuth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\tif errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) && s.retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation(ctx, ourToken) {\n\t\t// The connector rejected OUR token (not necessarily the vendor\n\t\t// one) — indistinguishable from this seam's point of view.\n\t\t// Invalidate the cache and retry once with a freshly-minted\n\t\t// token before concluding it was the vendor credential.\n\t\tourToken, err = s.Tokens.Token(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t\t}\n\t\tvendorAccessToken, err = s.callAuth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t}\n\n\tidentity, err := s.callIdentity(ctx, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t}\n\treturn identity, nil\n}\n\n// retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation always invalidates the cache and\n// reports true — a named helper purely so VerifyIdentity's own control\n// flow above reads as \"invalidate, then retry\" rather than a bare\n// s.Tokens.Invalidate() call with no explanation at its use site.\nfunc (s *Service) retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation(_ context.Context, _ string) bool {\n\ts.Tokens.Invalidate()\n\treturn true\n}\n\nfunc (s *Service) callAuth(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string) (string, error) {\n\tcallCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, connectorCallTimeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tvar lastErr error\n\tfor attempt := 0; attempt <= connectorMaxRetries; attempt++ {\n\t\tif attempt > 0 {\n\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\tcase <-time.After(connectorRetryBackoff):\n\t\t\tcase <-callCtx.Done():\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\ttoken, err := s.Connector.Auth(callCtx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\treturn token, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\t\t// Not transient — retrying an actually-rejected credential\n\t\t\t// against an unreachable connector wouldn't help, and\n\t\t\t// retrying it against a reachable one would just waste\n\t\t\t// idp-connector's own rate-limit budget on a doomed\n\t\t\t// request. Surface immediately.\n\t\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t\t}\n\t\tlastErr = err\n\t}\n\tlog.Printf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /auth unreachable after %d attempts: %v\", connectorMaxRetries+1, lastErr)\n\treturn \"\", ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n}\n\nfunc (s *Service) callIdentity(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tcallCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, connectorCallTimeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tvar lastErr error\n\tfor attempt := 0; attempt <= connectorMaxRetries; attempt++ {\n\t\tif attempt > 0 {\n\t\t\tselect {\n\t\t\tcase <-time.After(connectorRetryBackoff):\n\t\t\tcase <-callCtx.Done():\n\t\t\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tidentity, err := s.Connector.Identity(callCtx, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name)\n\t\tif err == nil {\n\t\t\treturn identity, nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tif errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tlastErr = err\n\t}\n\tlog.Printf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /identity unreachable after %d attempts: %v\", connectorMaxRetries+1, lastErr)\n\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding.go",
"old_string": "// VerifyIdentity is this package's one entry point. vendorAccessToken\n// never escapes this function: it's read from callAuth's return value\n// and passed straight into callIdentity as a parameter, never assigned\n// to any field of Service or any wider-scoped variable, and never\n// logged — attack-tree leaf 4's control (connector-security.md), applied\n// symmetrically to api-service per this story's own criterion.\nfunc (s *Service) VerifyIdentity(ctx context.Context, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tourToken, err := s.Tokens.Token(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// TokenSource.Token already logged this as its own distinct\n\t\t// failure class (a config/credential problem, not connector\n\t\t// downtime) — nothing further to add here.\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t}\n\n\tvendorAccessToken, err := s.callAuth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\tif errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) && s.retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation(ctx, ourToken) {\n\t\t// The connector rejected OUR token (not necessarily the vendor\n\t\t// one) — indistinguishable from this seam's point of view.\n\t\t// Invalidate the cache and retry once with a freshly-minted\n\t\t// token before concluding it was the vendor credential.\n\t\tourToken, err = s.Tokens.Token(ctx)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t\t}\n\t\tvendorAccessToken, err = s.callAuth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t}\n\n\tidentity, err := s.callIdentity(ctx, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t}\n\treturn identity, nil\n}\n\n// retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation always invalidates the cache and\n// reports true — a named helper purely so VerifyIdentity's own control\n// flow above reads as \"invalidate, then retry\" rather than a bare\n// s.Tokens.Invalidate() call with no explanation at its use site.\nfunc (s *Service) retryAuthAfterTokenInvalidation(_ context.Context, _ string) bool {\n\ts.Tokens.Invalidate()\n\treturn true\n}",
"new_string": "// VerifyIdentity is this package's one entry point. vendorAccessToken\n// never escapes attemptVerifyIdentity: it's read from callAuth's return\n// value and passed straight into callIdentity as a parameter, never\n// assigned to any field of Service or any wider-scoped variable, and\n// never logged — attack-tree leaf 4's control (connector-security.md),\n// applied symmetrically to api-service per this story's own criterion.\nfunc (s *Service) VerifyIdentity(ctx context.Context, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tidentity, err := s.attemptVerifyIdentity(ctx, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name)\n\tif errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\t// A 401 from the connector is ambiguous from this seam's own\n\t\t// point of view: it means either OUR token or the vendor's was\n\t\t// rejected — idp-connector's own uniform-response-content\n\t\t// design (connector-security.md §1/F3) gives no way to tell\n\t\t// which. Invalidate the cached own-token and retry the WHOLE\n\t\t// flow exactly once with a freshly-minted one before concluding\n\t\t// the vendor credential itself was actually the problem — the\n\t\t// \"refreshing ... on a 401\" half of this story's caching\n\t\t// criterion.\n\t\ts.Tokens.Invalidate()\n\t\tidentity, err = s.attemptVerifyIdentity(ctx, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name)\n\t}\n\treturn identity, err\n}\n\nfunc (s *Service) attemptVerifyIdentity(ctx context.Context, vendorUsername, vendorPassword, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tourToken, err := s.Tokens.Token(ctx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// TokenSource.Token already logged this as its own distinct\n\t\t// failure class (a config/credential problem, not connector\n\t\t// downtime) — nothing further to add here.\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\n\t}\n\n\tvendorAccessToken, err := s.callAuth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, err\n\t}\n\treturn s.callIdentity(ctx, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name)\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"ConnectorClientID\\|ConnectorClientSecret\\|CONNECTOR_CLIENT\" internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Find current ConnectorClientID/Secret field and Load() references"
}75: ConnectorClientID string
76: ConnectorClientSecret string
144: ConnectorClientID: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID"),
145: ConnectorClientSecret: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET"),
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"__unparsedToolInput": {
"raw": "{\"file_path\": \"/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go\", \"offset\": 100, 150}",
"len": 115
}
}<tool_use_error>InputValidationError: Read was called with input that could not be parsed as JSON.
You sent (first 115 of 115 bytes): {"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go", "offset": 100, 150}
Common causes: unescaped backslashes in file paths (use / or \\), unescaped control characters, or truncated output. Retry with valid JSON.</tool_use_error>{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 100,
"limit": 55
}100 // this still fails startup rather than serving traffic in a half-issuer
101 // state with no actual path to the private key.
102 func Load() (Config, error) {
103 dsn, err := resolveDSNFrom("DB_DSN_FILE", "DB_DSN")
104 if err != nil {
105 return Config{}, err
106 }
107
108 issuerDSN, err := resolveDSNFrom("ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE", "ISSUER_DB_DSN")
109 if err != nil {
110 return Config{}, err
111 }
112
113 appMode := os.Getenv("APP_MODE")
114 if appMode == "" {
115 appMode = "verifier"
116 }
117 if appMode != "verifier" && appMode != "issuer" {
118 return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("config: APP_MODE %q is not one of \"verifier\", \"issuer\"", appMode)
119 }
120
121 signingKeyPath, err := resolveSigningKeyPath(appMode)
122 if err != nil {
123 return Config{}, err
124 }
125
126 return Config{
127 AppMode: appMode,
128 JWTSigningKeyPath: signingKeyPath,
129 HTTPAddr: os.Getenv("HTTP_ADDR"),
130
131 DBDriver: os.Getenv("DB_DRIVER"),
132 DBDSN: dsn,
133
134 IssuerDBDSN: issuerDSN,
135
136 AuthJWTIssuer: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"),
137 AuthJWTAudience: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
138 AuthJWKSURL: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL"),
139
140 AuthzQASub: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_SUB"),
141 AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID"),
142
143 ConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
144 ConnectorClientID: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID"),
145 ConnectorClientSecret: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET"),
146
147 IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_BASE_URL"),
148 IDPABCClientID: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID"),
149 IDPABCClientSecret: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
150 }, nil
151 }
152
153 // resolveSigningKeyPath enforces LT-32's issuer-mode requirement: in
154 // "issuer" mode, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE must name a regular file this{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\tissuerDSN, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE\", \"ISSUER_DB_DSN\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}",
"new_string": "\tissuerDSN, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE\", \"ISSUER_DB_DSN\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}\n\n\t// CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET follow the same *_FILE-takes-precedence\n\t// pattern as DB_DSN/ISSUER_DB_DSN above (handoff-04-secrets.md row\n\t// 10) — Warren's approval to move to Vault Agent Injector delivery\n\t// (LT-46, Theo's story) means this code must stay indifferent to\n\t// whether the value arrives via a plain Kubernetes Secret or a Vault\n\t// Agent-rendered file; reusing resolveDSNFrom's existing\n\t// file-or-env-var resolution is what makes that true without this\n\t// package caring which mechanism actually wrote the file.\n\tconnectorClientID, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE\", \"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}\n\tconnectorClientSecret, err := resolveDSNFrom(\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE\", \"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn Config{}, err\n\t}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\t\tConnectorClientID: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\"),\n\t\tConnectorClientSecret: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\"),",
"new_string": "\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\t\tConnectorClientID: connectorClientID,\n\t\tConnectorClientSecret: connectorClientSecret,"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"ConnectorJWTAudience\\s*string\\|ConnectorClientID\\s*string\\|ConnectorClientSecret\\s*string\" internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Find struct field declarations to add doc comment"
}74: ConnectorJWTAudience string 75: ConnectorClientID string 76: ConnectorClientSecret string Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 70,
"limit": 10
}70 // only piece of QA-review config this track owns, and it's set to 71 // match whatever client_id the runbook seeds, not the other way 72 // around. 73 74 ConnectorJWTAudience string 75 ConnectorClientID string 76 ConnectorClientSecret string 77 78 IDPABCBaseURL string 79 IDPABCClientID string
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\tConnectorJWTAudience string\n\tConnectorClientID string\n\tConnectorClientSecret string",
"new_string": "\tConnectorJWTAudience string\n\n\t// ConnectorClientID/ConnectorClientSecret are api-service's own\n\t// client-credentials for obtaining a connector:identity-lookup\n\t// token from the issuer (LT-33, handoff-04-secrets.md row 10).\n\t// Resolved the same *_FILE-takes-precedence way DBDSN is\n\t// (CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE/CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE win over\n\t// the plain env vars when set) so this package stays indifferent to\n\t// whether the value is delivered as a mounted Kubernetes Secret or\n\t// (per Warren's approval, LT-46) a Vault Agent Injector-rendered\n\t// file — the delivery mechanism is 04's concern, not this one's.\n\tConnectorClientID string\n\tConnectorClientSecret string"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"RequiredAuthEnvVars\\|OptionalEnvVars\" internal/config/config.go | head -20",
"description": "Locate RequiredAuthEnvVars and OptionalEnvVars declarations"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "git -C /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery fetch origin && git -C /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery log --oneline origin/main -3",
"description": "Fetch latest main to confirm #53 merge commit"
}From github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome 21724b9..78832de main -> origin/main 78832de Merge PR #53: idp-connector startup guard, URL-shape validation, manifest-vs-config and env-classification tests (required config is a control) a00c63f fix: URL-shape validation for AUTH_JWKS_URL/AUTH_JWT_ISSUER + config.go env-var classification test 21724b9 02: JWKS/config-verification hand-off addenda, Recreate-strategy ruling, LT-31 consolidated review record
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git status --short && git add -A && git stash 2>&1 | tail -10",
"description": "Stash in-progress LT-33 work before rebasing"
}M internal/config/config.go ?? internal/onboarding/ Saved working directory and index state WIP on feature/LT-33: 21724b9 02: JWKS/config-verification hand-off addenda, Recreate-strategy ruling, LT-31 consolidated review record Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git rebase origin/main 2>&1 | tail -20",
"description": "Rebase LT-33 branch onto latest main (post PR #53)"
}Successfully rebased and updated refs/heads/feature/LT-33. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git stash pop 2>&1 | tail -30",
"description": "Restore stashed onboarding work on top of rebased branch"
}Auto-merging internal/config/config.go
On branch feature/LT-33
Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'.
Changes to be committed:
(use "git restore --staged <file>..." to unstage)
new file: internal/onboarding/onboarding.go
Changes not staged for commit:
(use "git add <file>..." to update what will be committed)
(use "git restore <file>..." to discard changes in working directory)
modified: internal/config/config.go
Dropped refs/stash@{0} (33345c1190dc8df67eada0d2f60e405e287bff9d)
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"RequiredAuthEnvVars\\|OptionalEnvVars\\|CONNECTOR_CLIENT\" internal/config/config.go",
"description": "View current state of RequiredAuthEnvVars/OptionalEnvVars after merge"
}81: // (CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE/CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE win over
124: // CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET follow the same *_FILE-takes-precedence
132: connectorClientID, err := resolveDSNFrom("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE", "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID")
136: connectorClientSecret, err := resolveDSNFrom("CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET")
250:// RequiredAuthEnvVars is the single source of truth for which auth-related
255:// TestManifestsSetRequiredAuthEnvVars, which parses the actual deployed
288:func RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode string) (required []string, recognized bool) {
307:// urlShapedEnvVars is the narrow set RequiredAuthEnvVars callers also
326:// each RequiredAuthEnvVars caller's own, separate check); this only
340:// OptionalEnvVars is every env var config.Load reads that is NOT gated
341:// by RequiredAuthEnvVars, paired with the one-line reason it's exempt —
350:// requires each one to appear either in some RequiredAuthEnvVars
353:var OptionalEnvVars = map[string]string{
354: "APP_MODE": "validated by config.Load's own dedicated check (must be \"verifier\" or \"issuer\"), not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
355: "JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE": "validated by resolveSigningKeyPath's own issuer-mode-only check, not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
364: "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID": "consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands",
365: "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET": "consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands",
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 284,
"limit": 20
}284 // require zero env vars, since that would make both enforcement sites
285 // (startup validation and the manifest test) blind to the exact class of
286 // gap this declaration exists to catch, just moved one level up into its
287 // own lookup (Oren Castellan, PR #53 review).
288 func RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode string) (required []string, recognized bool) {
289 switch {
290 case service == "api-service" && mode == "verifier":
291 return []string{"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE", "AUTH_JWKS_URL"}, true
292 case service == "api-service" && mode == "issuer":
293 // AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE deliberately absent here — the issuer mints
294 // each token's aud from the per-client oauth_client.audience
295 // column (tokenhandler.go), never from its own config, so
296 // requiring it would reject a valid issuer configuration for a
297 // variable it has no use for (validateAuthConfig's own doc
298 // comment states this same reasoning).
299 return []string{"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"}, true
300 case service == "idp-connector":
301 return []string{"AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", "AUTH_JWKS_URL", "CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"}, true
302 default:
303 return nil, false{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 340,
"limit": 30
}340 // OptionalEnvVars is every env var config.Load reads that is NOT gated
341 // by RequiredAuthEnvVars, paired with the one-line reason it's exempt —
342 // Marcus Ilori's (02) ruling on Ingrid Solano's second PR #53 objection:
343 // a hand-maintained required-list with nothing checking it against the
344 // code's own env reads is a convention, not a control, since a future
345 // AUTH_*-prefixed field added straight to Load() (or read directly by
346 // some other code, bypassing this package entirely) would silently
347 // never be enforced by either the startup checks or the manifest test.
348 // internal/config's own TestConfigGoEnvVarsAreClassified scans
349 // config.go's source for every env-var-shaped string literal and
350 // requires each one to appear either in some RequiredAuthEnvVars
351 // (service, mode) result or here — an unclassified new read fails that
352 // test, not just an unenforced one.
353 var OptionalEnvVars = map[string]string{
354 "APP_MODE": "validated by config.Load's own dedicated check (must be \"verifier\" or \"issuer\"), not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
355 "JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE": "validated by resolveSigningKeyPath's own issuer-mode-only check, not by RequiredAuthEnvVars",
356 "HTTP_ADDR": "listen address; no auth-enforcement concern",
357 "DB_DRIVER": "database driver selector; no auth-enforcement concern",
358 "DB_DSN": "database DSN fallback; no auth-enforcement concern",
359 "DB_DSN_FILE": "database DSN source; no auth-enforcement concern",
360 "ISSUER_DB_DSN": "issuer database DSN fallback; no auth-enforcement concern",
361 "ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE": "issuer database DSN source; no auth-enforcement concern",
362 "AUTHZ_QA_SUB": "QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment",
363 "AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID": "QA stopgap-authorizer seed, intentionally optional — empty means deny-by-default, per StopgapAuthorizer's own doc comment",
364 "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID": "consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands",
365 "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET": "consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands",
366 "IDP_ABC_BASE_URL": "optional real-vendor base URL; unset selects the stub vendor client by design (LT-41 non-goal: no real vendor exists for this take-home)",
367 "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID": "vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface",
368 "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET": "vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface",
369 }{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\": \"consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"consumed by LT-33's outbound connector client (in progress) — add to RequiredAuthEnvVars and remove this entry when LT-33 lands\",",
"new_string": "\t// CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET (LT-33) are NOT folded into\n\t// RequiredAuthEnvVars: that function's model is \"is this literal\n\t// env var name non-empty,\" which doesn't fit the *_FILE-takes-\n\t// precedence resolution these two go through (a Vault Agent\n\t// Injector delivery, per LT-46, may set only the _FILE variant and\n\t// leave the plain var genuinely empty on purpose). Presence is\n\t// instead validated where the resolved value is actually consumed:\n\t// internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource returns an error if\n\t// cfg.ConnectorClientID/ConnectorClientSecret are empty after\n\t// Load's own file-or-env resolution already ran.\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\": \"resolved via *_FILE precedence into Config.ConnectorClientID; presence validated by internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource, not RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE\": \"optional alternative delivery path for CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID — see that entry\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"resolved via *_FILE precedence into Config.ConnectorClientSecret; presence validated by internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource, not RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n\t\"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE\": \"optional alternative delivery path for CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET — see that entry\","
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 74,
"limit": 15
}74 75 ConnectorJWTAudience string 76 77 // ConnectorClientID/ConnectorClientSecret are api-service's own 78 // client-credentials for obtaining a connector:identity-lookup 79 // token from the issuer (LT-33, handoff-04-secrets.md row 10). 80 // Resolved the same *_FILE-takes-precedence way DBDSN is 81 // (CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE/CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE win over 82 // the plain env vars when set) so this package stays indifferent to 83 // whether the value is delivered as a mounted Kubernetes Secret or 84 // (per Warren's approval, LT-46) a Vault Agent Injector-rendered 85 // file — the delivery mechanism is 04's concern, not this one's. 86 ConnectorClientID string 87 ConnectorClientSecret string 88
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\tConnectorClientID string\n\tConnectorClientSecret string\n",
"new_string": "\tConnectorClientID string\n\tConnectorClientSecret string\n\n\t// IssuerTokenURL is where api-service itself calls POST /auth/token\n\t// to obtain its own connector-scoped token (LT-33) — the issuer\n\t// Deployment's in-cluster ClusterIP Service, e.g.\n\t// \"http://api-service-issuer.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local:443/auth/token\".\n\t// Not an auth-enforcement env var in RequiredAuthEnvVars's sense\n\t// (there's no \"must be set for tokens to verify\" incident this\n\t// guards against); internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource validates its\n\t// presence directly, the same as the connector client credential\n\t// above.\n\tIssuerTokenURL string\n\n\t// IDPConnectorBaseURL is where api-service calls idp-connector's own\n\t// /auth and /identity (LT-33) — the connector Deployment's in-cluster\n\t// ClusterIP Service, e.g.\n\t// \"http://idp-connector.loginid-takehome.svc.cluster.local:443\".\n\tIDPConnectorBaseURL string\n"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv\" internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Locate return-struct area to add new field wiring"
}192: IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_BASE_URL"),
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 183,
"limit": 15
}183 AuthJWKSURL: os.Getenv("AUTH_JWKS_URL"),
184
185 AuthzQASub: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_SUB"),
186 AuthzQAAllowedProfileID: os.Getenv("AUTHZ_QA_ALLOWED_PROFILE_ID"),
187
188 ConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv("CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE"),
189 ConnectorClientID: connectorClientID,
190 ConnectorClientSecret: connectorClientSecret,
191
192 IDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_BASE_URL"),
193 IDPABCClientID: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID"),
194 IDPABCClientSecret: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
195 }, nil
196 }
197 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\t\tConnectorClientID: connectorClientID,\n\t\tConnectorClientSecret: connectorClientSecret,\n\n\t\tIDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv(\"IDP_ABC_BASE_URL\"),",
"new_string": "\t\tConnectorJWTAudience: os.Getenv(\"CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE\"),\n\t\tConnectorClientID: connectorClientID,\n\t\tConnectorClientSecret: connectorClientSecret,\n\n\t\tIssuerTokenURL: os.Getenv(\"ISSUER_TOKEN_URL\"),\n\t\tIDPConnectorBaseURL: os.Getenv(\"IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL\"),\n\n\t\tIDPABCBaseURL: os.Getenv(\"IDP_ABC_BASE_URL\"),"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n '\"IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET\"' internal/config/config.go",
"description": "Locate end of OptionalEnvVars map"
}197: IDPABCClientSecret: os.Getenv("IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
400: "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET": "vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface",
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"offset": 396,
"limit": 6
}396 "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET": "resolved via *_FILE precedence into Config.ConnectorClientSecret; presence validated by internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource, not RequiredAuthEnvVars", 397 "CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE": "optional alternative delivery path for CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET — see that entry", 398 "IDP_ABC_BASE_URL": "optional real-vendor base URL; unset selects the stub vendor client by design (LT-41 non-goal: no real vendor exists for this take-home)", 399 "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID": "vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface", 400 "IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET": "vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface", 401 }
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go",
"old_string": "\t\"IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface\",\n}",
"new_string": "\t\"IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET\": \"vendor's own credential surface, not this project's own auth surface\",\n\t\"ISSUER_TOKEN_URL\": \"where api-service calls the issuer for its own connector-scoped token; presence validated by internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource, not RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n\t\"IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL\": \"where api-service calls idp-connector's /auth and /identity; presence validated by internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource, not RequiredAuthEnvVars\",\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/config/config.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && gofmt -w internal/config/config.go && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Format and build after config.go edits"
}# loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding internal/onboarding/onboarding.go:99:13: undefined: TokenSource Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go",
"content": "package onboarding\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// tokenCallTimeout bounds every call to the issuer's /auth/token,\n// independent of whatever deadline the caller's ctx carries — same\n// belt-and-braces pattern as connectorCallTimeout.\nconst tokenCallTimeout = 10 * time.Second\n\n// refreshMargin is how far before a token's stated expiry TokenSource\n// proactively treats it as stale and refreshes, rather than risk\n// presenting an already-(or nearly-)expired token to the connector —\n// standard OAuth2 client-credentials practice, per this story's own\n// caching criterion (Marcus Ilori's (02) correction).\nconst refreshMargin = 30 * time.Second\n\n// defaultTokenHTTPClient is a bounded-pool client, the same discipline\n// internal/connector's own outbound clients use.\nvar defaultTokenHTTPClient = &http.Client{\n\tTimeout: tokenCallTimeout,\n\tTransport: &http.Transport{\n\t\tMaxIdleConns: 10,\n\t\tMaxIdleConnsPerHost: 5,\n\t\tMaxConnsPerHost: 10,\n\t\tIdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,\n\t},\n}\n\n// HTTPTokenClient calls a real OAuth2 client-credentials token endpoint\n// (this project's own POST /auth/token, LT-51) over RFC 6749 §4.4's wire\n// format: HTTP Basic client auth, form-encoded body, no scope parameter\n// (the client's own single granted scope is issued when scope is\n// omitted, per tokenhandler.go's own doc comment).\ntype HTTPTokenClient struct {\n\ttokenURL string\n\thttpClient *http.Client\n}\n\n// NewHTTPTokenClient requires a non-empty tokenURL. httpClient defaults\n// to defaultTokenHTTPClient (bounded pool + timeout) if nil.\nfunc NewHTTPTokenClient(tokenURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*HTTPTokenClient, error) {\n\tif tokenURL == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: token URL must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\tif _, err := url.Parse(tokenURL); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: parsing token URL: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif httpClient == nil {\n\t\thttpClient = defaultTokenHTTPClient\n\t}\n\treturn &HTTPTokenClient{tokenURL: tokenURL, httpClient: httpClient}, nil\n}\n\ntype tokenSuccessBody struct {\n\tAccessToken string `json:\"access_token\"`\n\tExpiresIn int `json:\"expires_in\"`\n}\n\nfunc (c *HTTPTokenClient) FetchToken(ctx context.Context, clientID, clientSecret string) (string, time.Duration, error) {\n\tform := strings.NewReader(url.Values{\"grant_type\": {\"client_credentials\"}}.Encode())\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.tokenURL, form)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: building token request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\treq.SetBasicAuth(clientID, clientSecret)\n\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\t// Never wrap the raw dial/DNS error into the caller-visible\n\t\t// error — this seam's contract, matching HTTPVendorClient's own\n\t\t// convention, is \"succeeded, or a generic failure,\" never richer\n\t\t// detail than that.\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: token endpoint unreachable\")\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\t// Deliberately not logging or returning the response body —\n\t\t// same \"don't echo a vendor/issuer error payload back\" discipline\n\t\t// this project applies everywhere else it talks to another\n\t\t// service (connector-security.md §3).\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: token endpoint returned status %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\tvar body tokenSuccessBody\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil || body.AccessToken == \"\" || body.ExpiresIn <= 0 {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: malformed token response\")\n\t}\n\treturn body.AccessToken, time.Duration(body.ExpiresIn) * time.Second, nil\n}\n\n// TokenSource caches api-service's own connector-scoped client-\n// credentials token in memory and reuses it across calls until near\n// expiry, refreshing shortly before TTL or on an explicit Invalidate\n// (called when the connector itself rejects the token with a 401) —\n// per-replica only, no shared store, per this story's own caching\n// criterion (Marcus Ilori's (02) correction to this refinement's\n// original draft: this is our own client's token, standard OAuth2\n// client-credentials practice, a different risk class from the\n// end-user vendor token which is correctly never cached at all).\ntype TokenSource struct {\n\tclient TokenClient\n\tclientID string\n\tclientSecret string\n\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tcached string\n\texpiry time.Time\n}\n\n// NewTokenSource requires non-empty clientID/clientSecret — this\n// story's own credential-holding criterion; a construction-time error\n// here is what api-service's caller (cmd/api-service/main.go) uses to\n// decide whether the onboarding capability can be wired up at all,\n// rather than crash-looping the whole process over a capability that,\n// unlike auth verification itself, has an existing precedent in this\n// codebase for staying optional (NewVerifierRouter's own nil-repo\n// pattern: fail that one capability closed, not the whole binary).\nfunc NewTokenSource(client TokenClient, clientID, clientSecret string) (*TokenSource, error) {\n\tif clientID == \"\" || clientSecret == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID and CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET (or their _FILE variants) must both be set\")\n\t}\n\treturn &TokenSource{client: client, clientID: clientID, clientSecret: clientSecret}, nil\n}\n\n// Token returns a valid connector-scoped access token, from cache when\n// one exists and isn't within refreshMargin of its stated expiry,\n// otherwise by fetching a fresh one. Failure here is logged as its own\n// distinct class — a config/credential problem (this binary's own\n// client_id/secret rejected, or the token endpoint itself unreachable)\n// — separate from a downstream connector-unreachable failure, per this\n// story's own criterion that the two must not be lumped together.\nfunc (s *TokenSource) Token(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {\n\ts.mu.Lock()\n\tif s.cached != \"\" && time.Now().Before(s.expiry.Add(-refreshMargin)) {\n\t\ttok := s.cached\n\t\ts.mu.Unlock()\n\t\treturn tok, nil\n\t}\n\ts.mu.Unlock()\n\n\tcallCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, tokenCallTimeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\ttok, expiresIn, err := s.client.FetchToken(callCtx, s.clientID, s.clientSecret)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Printf(\"onboarding: failed to obtain api-service's own connector-scoped token (own-credential/config problem, not connector downtime): %v\", err)\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\ts.mu.Lock()\n\ts.cached = tok\n\ts.expiry = time.Now().Add(expiresIn)\n\ts.mu.Unlock()\n\treturn tok, nil\n}\n\n// Invalidate drops the cached token, forcing the next Token call to\n// fetch a fresh one — called when the connector rejects the cached\n// token with a 401 (early/unexpected expiry), per this story's own\n// \"refreshing before TTL or on a 401\" criterion.\nfunc (s *TokenSource) Invalidate() {\n\ts.mu.Lock()\n\ts.cached = \"\"\n\ts.mu.Unlock()\n}\n\n// unusedStrconv keeps strconv imported for a future numeric-expires_in\n// edge case without an unused-import error; removed once actually\n// needed. (Not present — see note below.)\nvar _ = strconv.Itoa\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go",
"old_string": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"",
"new_string": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\""
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go",
"old_string": "\n// unusedStrconv keeps strconv imported for a future numeric-expires_in\n// edge case without an unused-import error; removed once actually\n// needed. (Not present — see note below.)\nvar _ = strconv.Itoa\n",
"new_string": ""
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/token.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"refreshMargin\\|connectorRetryBackoff =\" internal/onboarding/*.go",
"description": "Check for duplicate const definitions"
}internal/onboarding/token.go:21:// refreshMargin is how far before a token's stated expiry TokenSource
internal/onboarding/token.go:26:const refreshMargin = 30 * time.Second
internal/onboarding/token.go:139:// one exists and isn't within refreshMargin of its stated expiry,
internal/onboarding/token.go:147: if s.cached != "" && time.Now().Before(s.expiry.Add(-refreshMargin)) {
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go",
"content": "package onboarding\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/connector\"\n)\n\n// httpConnectorCallTimeout is this client's own belt-and-braces\n// http.Client.Timeout, independent of connectorCallTimeout's\n// context.WithTimeout in onboarding.go — the same defense-in-depth\n// pattern internal/connector's HTTPVendorClient uses.\nconst httpConnectorCallTimeout = 10 * time.Second\n\nvar defaultConnectorHTTPClient = &http.Client{\n\tTimeout: httpConnectorCallTimeout,\n\tTransport: &http.Transport{\n\t\tMaxIdleConns: 10,\n\t\tMaxIdleConnsPerHost: 5,\n\t\tMaxConnsPerHost: 10,\n\t\tIdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,\n\t},\n}\n\n// HTTPConnectorClient calls cmd/idp-connector's real /auth and /identity\n// endpoints. Mirrors internal/connector.HTTPVendorClient's own\n// discipline: a bounded connection pool, and every request built fresh\n// inside each call — baseURL/httpClient are the only fields this type\n// holds, so a call's own bearer/vendor tokens are always per-call\n// parameters, never client-level state.\ntype HTTPConnectorClient struct {\n\tbaseURL string\n\thttpClient *http.Client\n}\n\n// NewHTTPConnectorClient requires a non-empty baseURL.\nfunc NewHTTPConnectorClient(baseURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*HTTPConnectorClient, error) {\n\tif baseURL == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: idp-connector base URL must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\tif _, err := url.Parse(baseURL); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: parsing idp-connector base URL: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tif httpClient == nil {\n\t\thttpClient = defaultConnectorHTTPClient\n\t}\n\treturn &HTTPConnectorClient{baseURL: baseURL, httpClient: httpClient}, nil\n}\n\ntype connectorAuthRequestBody struct {\n\tUsername string `json:\"username\"`\n\tPassword string `json:\"password\"`\n}\n\ntype connectorAuthResponseBody struct {\n\tAccessToken string `json:\"access_token\"`\n}\n\ntype connectorErrorBody struct {\n\tError string `json:\"error\"`\n}\n\nfunc (c *HTTPConnectorClient) Auth(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string) (string, error) {\n\treqBody, err := json.Marshal(connectorAuthRequestBody{Username: vendorUsername, Password: vendorPassword})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: encoding connector auth request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+\"/auth\", bytes.NewReader(reqBody))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: building connector auth request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\t// ourToken set on this request only — never a client-level default\n\t// header, never retained past this function returning.\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+ourToken)\n\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /auth unreachable: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\treturn \"\", ErrVendorCredentialRejected\n\t}\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /auth returned status %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\tvar body connectorAuthResponseBody\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil || body.AccessToken == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: malformed connector /auth response\")\n\t}\n\treturn body.AccessToken, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *HTTPConnectorClient) Identity(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\treqBody, err := json.Marshal(struct {\n\t\tPhone string `json:\"phone\"`\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t}{Phone: phone, Name: name})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: encoding connector identity request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+\"/identity\", bytes.NewReader(reqBody))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: building connector identity request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+ourToken)\n\t// vendorAccessToken travels as a header, matching idp-connector's\n\t// own fixed {\"phone\",\"name\"} body contract (LT-41) — never a body\n\t// field, and this is the one place this function ever reads it.\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Vendor-Access-Token\", vendorAccessToken)\n\n\tresp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /identity unreachable: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, ErrVendorCredentialRejected\n\t}\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: idp-connector /identity returned status %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\tvar body connector.Identity\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: malformed connector /identity response\")\n\t}\n\treturn body, nil\n}\n\n// connectorErrorBody is decoded nowhere in this file — idp-connector's\n// own failure responses are deliberately never parsed for their error\n// string, only their status code, per connector-security.md's fail-\n// closed-with-no-internal-detail discipline: this seam's callers get\n// ErrVendorCredentialRejected or a generic unreachable error, never the\n// connector's own \"slow_down\"/\"server_error\"/\"identity_lookup_failed\"\n// wording relayed upward.\nvar _ = connectorErrorBody{}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go",
"old_string": "type connectorErrorBody struct {\n\tError string `json:\"error\"`\n}\n\nfunc (c *HTTPConnectorClient) Auth",
"new_string": "func (c *HTTPConnectorClient) Auth"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go",
"old_string": "\tvar body connector.Identity\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: malformed connector /identity response\")\n\t}\n\treturn body, nil\n}\n\n// connectorErrorBody is decoded nowhere in this file — idp-connector's\n// own failure responses are deliberately never parsed for their error\n// string, only their status code, per connector-security.md's fail-\n// closed-with-no-internal-detail discipline: this seam's callers get\n// ErrVendorCredentialRejected or a generic unreachable error, never the\n// connector's own \"slow_down\"/\"server_error\"/\"identity_lookup_failed\"\n// wording relayed upward.\nvar _ = connectorErrorBody{}",
"new_string": "\t// connectorIdentityResponseBody's fields are identical in\n\t// name/order/type to connector.Identity (only the json tags\n\t// differ) — decoding into this shape then converting is required\n\t// since connector.Identity itself carries no json tags at all\n\t// (StreetAddress/PostalCode would otherwise silently fail to match\n\t// idp-connector's snake_case wire fields).\n\tvar body connectorIdentityResponseBody\n\tif err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&body); err != nil {\n\t\treturn connector.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf(\"onboarding: malformed connector /identity response\")\n\t}\n\treturn connector.Identity(body), nil\n}\n\ntype connectorIdentityResponseBody struct {\n\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\tPhone string `json:\"phone\"`\n\tStreetAddress string `json:\"street_address\"`\n\tLocality string `json:\"locality\"`\n\tRegion string `json:\"region\"`\n\tPostalCode string `json:\"postal_code\"`\n\tCountry string `json:\"country\"`\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/client.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Build after adding token.go and client.go"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go vet ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Vet after new package"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go"
}1 // Command api-service is the client-facing binary (Q1 DAO + Q2 REST API,
2 // bearer-token auth). Per decisions/go-layout-debate.md, this file is a
3 // thin wrapper — route registration and config loading live in
4 // internal/app and internal/config, not here.
5 package main
6
7 import (
8 "database/sql"
9 "fmt"
10 "log"
11 "net/http"
12 "os"
13
14 "loginid-takehome/internal/api"
15 "loginid-takehome/internal/app"
16 "loginid-takehome/internal/config"
17 "loginid-takehome/internal/dao"
18
19 // internal/dao/postgres's own blank import of pgx/v5/stdlib already
20 // registers the "pgx" database/sql driver this file uses directly
21 // for the issuer database below — Go dedupes an import by package
22 // path, so this isn't a second registration, and no separate blank
23 // import of that package is needed here.
24 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres" // registers "postgres" and "cockroachdb"
25 _ "loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite" // registers "sqlite"
26 )
27
28 // sqlDriverNameFor maps cfg.DBDriver ("postgres"/"cockroachdb"/"sqlite" —
29 // dao.Register's driver names, per dao/factory.go) to the underlying
30 // database/sql driver name each backend package registers itself under
31 // (internal/dao/postgres/postgres.go: "pgx"; internal/dao/sqlite/sqlite.go:
32 // "sqlite") — needed only for LT-52's separate /healthz ping handle, since
33 // dao.Repository itself exposes no Ping and this is a thin sql.Open, not a
34 // second copy of either backend's connection logic.
35 func sqlDriverNameFor(daoDriver string) string {
36 switch daoDriver {
37 case "postgres", "cockroachdb":
38 return "pgx"
39 case "sqlite":
40 return "sqlite"
41 default:
42 return ""
43 }
44 }
45
46 // validateAuthConfig catches exactly the two live-review findings that
47 // motivated it — first AUTH_JWT_ISSUER/AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE, then
48 // AUTH_JWKS_URL, silently absent from the deployed manifests, each time
49 // letting a verifier or issuer come up cleanly and fail in a way that
50 // looked like an ordinary token-rejection rather than a configuration
51 // gap. A verifier that quietly 401s everything, or an issuer that mints
52 // structurally-incomplete tokens, is worse than a crash-loop that names
53 // the exact missing variable.
54 //
55 // Reads config.RequiredAuthEnvVars(service, mode) — the single source of
56 // truth also read by internal/config's own manifest test — rather than
57 // hardcoding its own list, so this check and that test can never drift
58 // apart from each other. Checks the raw environment directly (not cfg's
59 // already-loaded fields): the manifest test checks for the same env var
60 // NAMES in the manifest text, so both sides operate on the identical
61 // primitive.
62 //
63 // Kept out of internal/config's shared Load() because AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE
64 // is meaningless to cmd/idp-connector (which has its own
65 // ConnectorJWTAudience instead) and a blanket check in the shared loader
66 // would wrongly fail that binary's startup too — idp-connector runs the
67 // equivalent check itself, against its own required list.
68 func validateAuthConfig(mode app.Mode) error {
69 required, recognized := config.RequiredAuthEnvVars("api-service", string(mode))
70 if !recognized {
71 // app.Mode's own constructor already rejects anything but
72 // "verifier"/"issuer" (config.Load's APP_MODE validation), so
73 // reaching this branch means RequiredAuthEnvVars itself has
74 // drifted out of sync with app.Mode's real values — a bug in
75 // this binary, not a bad deployment, and worth failing loudly
76 // rather than silently requiring nothing (the exact class of
77 // gap this function exists to prevent, moved one level up).
78 return fmt.Errorf("internal error: no RequiredAuthEnvVars entry for api-service mode %q", mode)
79 }
80 for _, name := range required {
81 value := os.Getenv(name)
82 if value == "" {
83 return fmt.Errorf("%s must be set in %s mode", name, mode)
84 }
85 if err := config.ValidateEnvVarValue(name, value); err != nil {
86 return err
87 }
88 }
89 return nil
90 }
91
92 func main() {
93 cfg, err := config.Load()
94 if err != nil {
95 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
96 }
97 if err := validateAuthConfig(app.Mode(cfg.AppMode)); err != nil {
98 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
99 }
100
101 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
102 if addr == "" {
103 addr = ":8080"
104 }
105
106 log.Printf("api-service: mode=%s listening on %s", cfg.AppMode, addr)
107
108 var handler http.Handler
109 switch app.Mode(cfg.AppMode) {
110 case app.ModeVerifier:
111 // The verifying Deployment is the one that talks to the
112 // database (LT-39's search/retrieve handlers) — the issuer
113 // Deployment (below) never needs a Repository at all, since it
114 // only mints tokens.
115 //
116 // A failure here does NOT Fatal: on a cluster where the database
117 // doesn't exist yet (no DB_DRIVER/DB_DSN configured — e.g. before
118 // PR #29's Postgres StatefulSet lands), or DB_DRIVER is simply
119 // misconfigured, this process must still come up and serve
120 // /healthz rather than crash-loop the whole verifying Deployment
121 // over a dependency only two of its routes need. repo stays nil;
122 // NewVerifierRouter fails those two routes closed with 503
123 // instead of panicking on a nil Repository.
124 repo, err := dao.New(cfg.DBDriver, cfg.DBDSN)
125 if err != nil {
126 log.Printf("api-service: opening DAO repository: %v — /profiles/search and /profiles/{id} will return 503 until this is resolved", err)
127 repo = nil
128 }
129
130 // A second, independent *sql.DB purely for /healthz's bounded
131 // connectivity probe (LT-52 criterion 5) — sql.Open never dials,
132 // it only validates the driver/DSN, so this never blocks
133 // startup; PingContext at request time is what actually checks
134 // connectivity, bounded to dbPingTimeout. Deliberately separate
135 // from repo above rather than routed through dao.Repository,
136 // which 05's contract doesn't expose a Ping through.
137 var pingDB *sql.DB
138 if driverName := sqlDriverNameFor(cfg.DBDriver); driverName != "" {
139 pingDB, err = sql.Open(driverName, cfg.DBDSN)
140 if err != nil {
141 log.Printf("api-service: opening /healthz DB ping handle: %v — /healthz will report db=down", err)
142 pingDB = nil
143 }
144 }
145
146 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)
147 case app.ModeIssuer:
148 // config.Load already fails startup if JWT_SIGNING_KEY_FILE is
149 // missing/unreadable in issuer mode (resolveSigningKeyPath) —
150 // LoadSigningKey failing here means the file is readable but not
151 // a valid RSA private key, a genuine misconfiguration this
152 // process cannot usefully run past (there is no "serve /healthz,
153 // fail closed" story for a router with no key at all: both of
154 // its routes need one). Fatal, not degrade — unlike the DAO
155 // repository above, which has a real story for "not there yet."
156 key, err := api.LoadSigningKey(cfg.JWTSigningKeyPath)
157 if err != nil {
158 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading JWT signing key: %v", err)
159 }
160
161 // issuerDB, like the verifier's pingDB, is opened independently
162 // of whether it can be reached yet — sql.Open never dials. Empty
163 // IssuerDBDSN (not configured yet) leaves issuerDB nil;
164 // NewIssuerRouter's /auth/token then fails every grant closed
165 // with server_error rather than panicking on a nil ClientStore.
166 var issuerDB *sql.DB
167 if cfg.IssuerDBDSN != "" {
168 issuerDB, err = sql.Open("pgx", cfg.IssuerDBDSN)
169 if err != nil {
170 log.Printf("api-service: opening issuer database: %v — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved", err)
171 issuerDB = nil
172 }
173 } else {
174 log.Printf("api-service: ISSUER_DB_DSN/ISSUER_DB_DSN_FILE not set — /auth/token will return server_error until this is resolved")
175 }
176
177 handler = app.NewIssuerRouter(cfg, key, issuerDB)
178 default:
179 // The unrecognized-mode fallback (NewRouter itself already logs
180 // loudly and treats it as verifier — see app.NewRouter's own doc
181 // comment) doesn't need the full verifier stack; NewRouter's
182 // /healthz alone covers it, matching the safer of the two route
183 // sets.
184 handler = app.NewRouter("api-service", app.Mode(cfg.AppMode))
185 }
186
187 if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, handler); err != nil {
188 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
189 }
190 }
191 {
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"",
"new_string": "\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/api\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/dao\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding\""
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "func main() {",
"new_string": "// newOnboardingService wires LT-33's mediating service — api-service's\n// own outbound call to cmd/idp-connector — from cfg's already-resolved\n// fields. Returns an error, not a Fatal-worthy one, when\n// CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET or the two connector-related URLs aren't\n// configured yet: unlike auth verification, this is a new capability\n// with no existing traffic depending on it, so main() logs and starts\n// up without it (the same \"fail this one capability closed, not the\n// whole binary\" precedent NewVerifierRouter's own nil-repo handling\n// already sets), rather than crash-looping api-service over a story\n// that may not have its manifest wiring in place yet.\nfunc newOnboardingService(cfg config.Config) (*onboarding.Service, error) {\n\tif cfg.IssuerTokenURL == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"ISSUER_TOKEN_URL must be set\")\n\t}\n\tif cfg.IDPConnectorBaseURL == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL must be set\")\n\t}\n\n\ttokenClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPTokenClient(cfg.IssuerTokenURL, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\ttokens, err := onboarding.NewTokenSource(tokenClient, cfg.ConnectorClientID, cfg.ConnectorClientSecret)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tconnectorClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPConnectorClient(cfg.IDPConnectorBaseURL, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\treturn &onboarding.Service{Tokens: tokens, Connector: connectorClient}, nil\n}\n\nfunc main() {"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"handler = app.NewVerifierRouter\" cmd/api-service/main.go",
"description": "Locate handler assignment line"
}180: handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"offset": 176,
"limit": 6
}176 pingDB = nil 177 } 178 } 179 180 handler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB) 181 case app.ModeIssuer:
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"old_string": "\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)\n\tcase app.ModeIssuer:",
"new_string": "\t\t// LT-33: api-service's own outbound call to cmd/idp-connector.\n\t\t// No public route consumes this yet (no assignment question asks\n\t\t// for an onboarding endpoint, and this story's own non-goals rule\n\t\t// one out) — constructed here so misconfiguration is visible at\n\t\t// startup, and available to whatever onboarding-flow handler is\n\t\t// added later. Best-effort like repo/pingDB above: this\n\t\t// capability not being ready yet must not crash-loop the whole\n\t\t// verifying Deployment.\n\t\tif _, err := newOnboardingService(cfg); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: onboarding (LT-33) connector integration not available: %v\", err)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlog.Printf(\"api-service: onboarding (LT-33) connector integration ready\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thandler = app.NewVerifierRouter(cfg, repo, pingDB)\n\tcase app.ModeIssuer:"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -60 && go vet ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Build and vet after main.go wiring"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go",
"content": "package onboarding\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/connector\"\n)\n\n// fakeTokenClient is a minimal TokenClient fake, per\n// decisions/test-double-strategy.md — satisfies only what this\n// package's tests actually exercise, not a general-purpose mock.\ntype fakeTokenClient struct {\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\tcalls int\n\ttoken string\n\texpiresIn time.Duration\n\terr error\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeTokenClient) FetchToken(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (string, time.Duration, error) {\n\tf.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer f.mu.Unlock()\n\tf.calls++\n\tif f.err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, f.err\n\t}\n\treturn f.token, f.expiresIn, nil\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeTokenClient) callCount() int {\n\tf.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer f.mu.Unlock()\n\treturn f.calls\n}\n\nfunc TestTokenSource_CachesAcrossCalls(t *testing.T) {\n\tfake := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"tok-1\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tts, err := NewTokenSource(fake, \"client-id\", \"client-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"NewTokenSource: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor i := 0; i < 3; i++ {\n\t\ttok, err := ts.Token(context.Background())\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Token() call %d: %v\", i, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif tok != \"tok-1\" {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"Token() = %q, want %q\", tok, \"tok-1\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif fake.callCount() != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"FetchToken called %d times, want 1 — a cached token must be reused across calls, not re-minted per call (this story's own caching criterion)\", fake.callCount())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestTokenSource_RefreshesNearExpiry(t *testing.T) {\n\tfake := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"tok-1\", expiresIn: refreshMargin - time.Millisecond}\n\tts, err := NewTokenSource(fake, \"client-id\", \"client-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"NewTokenSource: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := ts.Token(context.Background()); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Token() first call: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tfake.token = \"tok-2\"\n\ttok, err := ts.Token(context.Background())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Token() second call: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif tok != \"tok-2\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Token() = %q, want %q — a token within refreshMargin of its stated expiry must be refreshed proactively\", tok, \"tok-2\")\n\t}\n\tif fake.callCount() != 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"FetchToken called %d times, want 2\", fake.callCount())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestTokenSource_InvalidateForcesRefresh(t *testing.T) {\n\tfake := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"tok-1\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tts, err := NewTokenSource(fake, \"client-id\", \"client-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"NewTokenSource: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif _, err := ts.Token(context.Background()); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Token() first call: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tts.Invalidate()\n\tfake.token = \"tok-2\"\n\ttok, err := ts.Token(context.Background())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Token() after Invalidate: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif tok != \"tok-2\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Token() after Invalidate = %q, want a freshly-fetched %q\", tok, \"tok-2\")\n\t}\n\tif fake.callCount() != 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"FetchToken called %d times after Invalidate, want 2\", fake.callCount())\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials(t *testing.T) {\n\tfake := &fakeTokenClient{}\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname, id, secret string\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"empty id\", id: \"\", secret: \"secret\"},\n\t\t{name: \"empty secret\", id: \"id\", secret: \"\"},\n\t\t{name: \"both empty\", id: \"\", secret: \"\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tif _, err := NewTokenSource(fake, c.id, c.secret); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"NewTokenSource(%q, %q) = nil error, want an error\", c.id, c.secret)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n// fakeConnectorClient is a minimal ConnectorClient fake recording every\n// call's arguments, so tests can assert exactly which token/credential\n// values reached it and in what order — including whether a vendor\n// token was ever passed to the wrong call.\ntype fakeConnectorClient struct {\n\tmu sync.Mutex\n\n\tauthCalls []authCall\n\tidentityCalls []identityCall\n\n\tauthResult string\n\tauthErr error\n\tidentityResult connector.Identity\n\tidentityErr error\n}\n\ntype authCall struct {\n\tourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string\n}\n\ntype identityCall struct {\n\tourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeConnectorClient) Auth(_ context.Context, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string) (string, error) {\n\tf.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer f.mu.Unlock()\n\tf.authCalls = append(f.authCalls, authCall{ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword})\n\treturn f.authResult, f.authErr\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeConnectorClient) Identity(_ context.Context, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\tf.mu.Lock()\n\tdefer f.mu.Unlock()\n\tf.identityCalls = append(f.identityCalls, identityCall{ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name})\n\treturn f.identityResult, f.identityErr\n}\n\nfunc newTestService(t *testing.T, tokenClient TokenClient, connClient ConnectorClient) *Service {\n\tt.Helper()\n\ttokens, err := NewTokenSource(tokenClient, \"client-id\", \"client-secret\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"NewTokenSource: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn &Service{Tokens: tokens, Connector: connClient}\n}\n\nfunc TestService_VerifyIdentity_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{\n\t\tauthResult: \"vendor-token\",\n\t\tidentityResult: connector.Identity{\n\t\t\tName: \"Jane Doe\", Phone: \"+15551234567\", StreetAddress: \"1 Main St\",\n\t\t\tLocality: \"Springfield\", Region: \"IL\", PostalCode: \"62704\", Country: \"US\",\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\tidentity, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"vendor-user\", \"vendor-pass\", \"+15551234567\", \"Jane Doe\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"VerifyIdentity: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif identity != fakeConn.identityResult {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"identity = %+v, want %+v\", identity, fakeConn.identityResult)\n\t}\n\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Auth called %d times, want 1\", len(fakeConn.authCalls))\n\t}\n\tif fakeConn.authCalls[0].ourToken != \"our-token\" || fakeConn.authCalls[0].vendorUsername != \"vendor-user\" || fakeConn.authCalls[0].vendorPassword != \"vendor-pass\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called with %+v, want ourToken=our-token vendorUsername=vendor-user vendorPassword=vendor-pass\", fakeConn.authCalls[0])\n\t}\n\n\tif len(fakeConn.identityCalls) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"Identity called %d times, want 1\", len(fakeConn.identityCalls))\n\t}\n\t// The vendor access token Auth returned must reach Identity — and\n\t// ONLY Identity, never anywhere else (attack-tree leaf 4's control,\n\t// applied to api-service's own side of this call per this story's\n\t// own criterion).\n\tif fakeConn.identityCalls[0].vendorAccessToken != \"vendor-token\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Identity called with vendorAccessToken=%q, want %q\", fakeConn.identityCalls[0].vendorAccessToken, \"vendor-token\")\n\t}\n\tif fakeConn.identityCalls[0].ourToken != \"our-token\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Identity called with ourToken=%q, want %q\", fakeConn.identityCalls[0].ourToken, \"our-token\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestService_VerifyIdentity_OwnTokenAcquisitionFails(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{err: errors.New(\"issuer rejected our client credential\")}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t_, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"p\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable\", err)\n\t}\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 0 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called %d times, want 0 — must never call the connector at all if our own token couldn't be obtained\", len(fakeConn.authCalls))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestService_VerifyIdentity_ConnectorUnreachable(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authErr: errors.New(\"dial tcp: connection refused\")}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t_, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"p\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable — never the raw connector error\", err)\n\t}\n\t// connectorMaxRetries+1 attempts, no more, no fewer — bounded, not\n\t// an open-ended retry loop.\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != connectorMaxRetries+1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called %d times, want %d\", len(fakeConn.authCalls), connectorMaxRetries+1)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authErr: ErrVendorCredentialRejected}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t_, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"wrong-pass\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrVendorCredentialRejected\", err)\n\t}\n\t// A genuine rejection must not be retried against the connector —\n\t// retrying a doomed credential wastes idp-connector's own\n\t// rate-limit budget on a request that can't succeed.\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called %d times, want 1 — a rejected credential must not be retried\", len(fakeConn.authCalls))\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token-1\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authResult: \"vendor-token\"}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t// First Auth call rejected (ambiguous: could be OUR token or the\n\t// vendor's) — the fake token client then returns a different token\n\t// on its second FetchToken call, simulating a real refresh.\n\tcallNum := 0\n\tfakeConn.authErr = ErrVendorCredentialRejected\n\torigAuth := fakeConn.Auth\n\t_ = origAuth // silence unused-if-refactored warning; overridden below via a wrapper type instead\n\n\tsvc2 := &Service{\n\t\tTokens: svc.Tokens,\n\t\tConnector: &sequencedConnectorClient{\n\t\t\tfake: fakeConn,\n\t\t\tonAuthCall: func(n int) error {\n\t\t\t\tcallNum = n\n\t\t\t\tif n == 1 {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn ErrVendorCredentialRejected\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tfakeTok.token = \"our-token-2\"\n\n\tidentity, err := svc2.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"p\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"VerifyIdentity: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\t_ = identity\n\tif callNum != 2 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exactly 2 Auth attempts (initial + one retry after invalidation), got callNum=%d\", callNum)\n\t}\n}\n\n// sequencedConnectorClient wraps fakeConnectorClient's Identity behavior\n// while letting Auth's per-call outcome be scripted by call number —\n// needed only by TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401,\n// which must return different results on the 1st vs. 2nd Auth call.\ntype sequencedConnectorClient struct {\n\tfake *fakeConnectorClient\n\tcalls int\n\tonAuthCall func(callNumber int) error\n}\n\nfunc (s *sequencedConnectorClient) Auth(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword string) (string, error) {\n\ts.calls++\n\tif err := s.onAuthCall(s.calls); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\treturn s.fake.Auth(ctx, ourToken, vendorUsername, vendorPassword)\n}\n\nfunc (s *sequencedConnectorClient) Identity(ctx context.Context, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name string) (connector.Identity, error) {\n\treturn s.fake.Identity(ctx, ourToken, vendorAccessToken, phone, name)\n}\n"
}File created successfully at: /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go",
"old_string": "\tcallNum := 0\n\tfakeConn.authErr = ErrVendorCredentialRejected\n\torigAuth := fakeConn.Auth\n\t_ = origAuth // silence unused-if-refactored warning; overridden below via a wrapper type instead\n\n\tsvc2 := &Service{",
"new_string": "\tcallNum := 0\n\tsvc2 := &Service{"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Build after test file"
}Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go test ./internal/onboarding/... -v 2>&1 | tail -100",
"description": "Run onboarding package tests"
}=== RUN TestTokenSource_CachesAcrossCalls
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_CachesAcrossCalls (0.00s)
=== RUN TestTokenSource_RefreshesNearExpiry
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_RefreshesNearExpiry (0.00s)
=== RUN TestTokenSource_InvalidateForcesRefresh
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_InvalidateForcesRefresh (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_id
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_secret
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/both_empty
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_id (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_secret (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/both_empty (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_HappyPath
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_HappyPath (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_OwnTokenAcquisitionFails
2026/09/13 09:59:21 onboarding: failed to obtain api-service's own connector-scoped token (own-credential/config problem, not connector downtime): issuer rejected our client credential
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_OwnTokenAcquisitionFails (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_ConnectorUnreachable
2026/09/13 09:59:22 onboarding: idp-connector /auth unreachable after 3 attempts: dial tcp: connection refused
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_ConnectorUnreachable (0.50s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected
onboarding_test.go:257: Auth called 2 times, want 1 — a rejected credential must not be retried
--- FAIL: TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401 (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding 0.873s
FAIL
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "grep -n \"TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected\" -A 15 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go",
"description": "View the failing test to correct my wrong assumption"
}244:func TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected(t *testing.T) {
245- fakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: "our-token", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}
246- fakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authErr: ErrVendorCredentialRejected}
247- svc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)
248-
249- _, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), "u", "wrong-pass", "+1", "n")
250- if !errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {
251- t.Errorf("VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrVendorCredentialRejected", err)
252- }
253- // A genuine rejection must not be retried against the connector —
254- // retrying a doomed credential wastes idp-connector's own
255- // rate-limit budget on a request that can't succeed.
256- if len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 1 {
257- t.Errorf("Auth called %d times, want 1 — a rejected credential must not be retried", len(fakeConn.authCalls))
258- }
259-}{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go",
"old_string": "func TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authErr: ErrVendorCredentialRejected}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t_, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"wrong-pass\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrVendorCredentialRejected\", err)\n\t}\n\t// A genuine rejection must not be retried against the connector —\n\t// retrying a doomed credential wastes idp-connector's own\n\t// rate-limit budget on a request that can't succeed.\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called %d times, want 1 — a rejected credential must not be retried\", len(fakeConn.authCalls))\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "func TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected(t *testing.T) {\n\tfakeTok := &fakeTokenClient{token: \"our-token\", expiresIn: 10 * time.Minute}\n\tfakeConn := &fakeConnectorClient{authErr: ErrVendorCredentialRejected}\n\tsvc := newTestService(t, fakeTok, fakeConn)\n\n\t_, err := svc.VerifyIdentity(context.Background(), \"u\", \"wrong-pass\", \"+1\", \"n\")\n\tif !errors.Is(err, ErrVendorCredentialRejected) {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"VerifyIdentity error = %v, want ErrVendorCredentialRejected\", err)\n\t}\n\t// A 401 is ambiguous at this seam (our own token vs. the vendor's —\n\t// see VerifyIdentity's own doc comment), so VerifyIdentity always\n\t// invalidates and retries the whole flow exactly once with a fresh\n\t// own-token before concluding the vendor credential itself was\n\t// rejected — even a genuinely-wrong vendor credential costs exactly\n\t// 2 connector calls, never more (callAuth's own inner retry loop\n\t// does NOT retry a 401 on its own, which is what bounds this at 2\n\t// rather than connectorMaxRetries+1 per attempt).\n\tif len(fakeConn.authCalls) != 2 {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"Auth called %d times, want 2 (initial + one ambiguous-401 retry, never more)\", len(fakeConn.authCalls))\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go test ./internal/onboarding/... -v 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Re-run onboarding tests"
}=== RUN TestTokenSource_CachesAcrossCalls
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_CachesAcrossCalls (0.00s)
=== RUN TestTokenSource_RefreshesNearExpiry
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_RefreshesNearExpiry (0.00s)
=== RUN TestTokenSource_InvalidateForcesRefresh
--- PASS: TestTokenSource_InvalidateForcesRefresh (0.00s)
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_id
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_secret
=== RUN TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/both_empty
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_id (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/empty_secret (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestNewTokenSource_RequiresCredentials/both_empty (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_HappyPath
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_HappyPath (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_OwnTokenAcquisitionFails
2026/09/13 09:59:49 onboarding: failed to obtain api-service's own connector-scoped token (own-credential/config problem, not connector downtime): issuer rejected our client credential
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_OwnTokenAcquisitionFails (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_ConnectorUnreachable
2026/09/13 09:59:49 onboarding: idp-connector /auth unreachable after 3 attempts: dial tcp: connection refused
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_ConnectorUnreachable (0.50s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_VendorCredentialRejected (0.00s)
=== RUN TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401
--- PASS: TestService_VerifyIdentity_RetriesOnceAfterAmbiguous401 (0.00s)
PASS
ok loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding 0.778s
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && grep -n \"log\\.\\|Printf\\|Println\" internal/onboarding/*.go | grep -v _test.go",
"description": "Review every log call site in the onboarding package"
}internal/onboarding/token.go:158: log.Printf("onboarding: failed to obtain api-service's own connector-scoped token (own-credential/config problem, not connector downtime): %v", err)
internal/onboarding/onboarding.go:170: log.Printf("onboarding: idp-connector /auth unreachable after %d attempts: %v", connectorMaxRetries+1, lastErr)
internal/onboarding/onboarding.go:196: log.Printf("onboarding: idp-connector /identity unreachable after %d attempts: %v", connectorMaxRetries+1, lastErr)
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"offset": 1,
"limit": 10
}1 package main 2 3 import ( 4 "strings" 5 "testing" 6 7 "loginid-takehome/internal/app" 8 ) 9 10 // TestValidateAuthConfig_VerifierMode is the live-review finding's own
{
"command": "tail -5 /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"description": "Check end of file to append"
} t.Errorf("error = %q, want it to name AUTH_JWT_ISSUER", err)
}
})
}
}{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"old_string": "import (\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n)",
"new_string": "import (\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/app\"\n\t\"loginid-takehome/internal/config\"\n)"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go",
"old_string": "\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want it to name AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}",
"new_string": "\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"error = %q, want it to name AUTH_JWT_ISSUER\", err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestNewOnboardingService confirms LT-33's best-effort wiring: fully\n// configured succeeds, and each individually-missing piece of config\n// (the two connector-related URLs, or the client credential) is\n// reported as an error rather than a Fatal-worthy panic — this\n// capability must never crash-loop api-service over its own\n// misconfiguration, per newOnboardingService's own doc comment.\nfunc TestNewOnboardingService(t *testing.T) {\n\tfull := func() config.Config {\n\t\treturn config.Config{\n\t\t\tIssuerTokenURL: \"http://issuer.example/auth/token\",\n\t\t\tIDPConnectorBaseURL: \"http://connector.example\",\n\t\t\tConnectorClientID: \"client-id\",\n\t\t\tConnectorClientSecret: \"client-secret\",\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := newOnboardingService(full()); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"newOnboardingService(fully configured) = %v, want nil\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\tname string\n\t\tmutate func(*config.Config)\n\t}{\n\t\t{name: \"issuer token url missing\", mutate: func(c *config.Config) { c.IssuerTokenURL = \"\" }},\n\t\t{name: \"connector base url missing\", mutate: func(c *config.Config) { c.IDPConnectorBaseURL = \"\" }},\n\t\t{name: \"connector client id missing\", mutate: func(c *config.Config) { c.ConnectorClientID = \"\" }},\n\t\t{name: \"connector client secret missing\", mutate: func(c *config.Config) { c.ConnectorClientSecret = \"\" }},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tt.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\t\tcfg := full()\n\t\t\tc.mutate(&cfg)\n\t\t\tif _, err := newOnboardingService(cfg); err == nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"newOnboardingService(%s) = nil error, want an error\", c.name)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})\n\t}\n}"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main_test.go has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go build ./... 2>&1 | tail -60 && echo \"---vet---\" && go vet ./... 2>&1 | tail -40 && echo \"---test---\" && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Full build/vet/test after adding main_test.go coverage"
}---vet--- ---test--- ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service 0.352s ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector 0.285s ok loginid-takehome/internal/api 2.920s ok loginid-takehome/internal/app 0.530s ok loginid-takehome/internal/config 0.166s ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector 0.726s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao 0.155s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance 0.289s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres 0.198s ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite 1.294s ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding 0.620s Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && gofmt -l cmd/api-service internal/config internal/onboarding 2>&1\necho \"---staticcheck---\"\n$(go env GOPATH)/bin/staticcheck ./... 2>&1 | tail -60",
"description": "Run gofmt and staticcheck"
}internal/onboarding/onboarding.go ---staticcheck--- Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && gofmt -w internal/onboarding/onboarding.go && gofmt -l internal/onboarding/onboarding.go && echo CLEAN",
"description": "Apply gofmt fix"
}CLEAN Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && go build ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20 && $(go env GOPATH)/bin/staticcheck ./... 2>&1 | tail -40",
"description": "Re-verify after gofmt"
}ok loginid-takehome/cmd/api-service (cached) ok loginid-takehome/cmd/idp-connector (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/api (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/app (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/config (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/connector (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/conformance (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/postgres (cached) ok loginid-takehome/internal/dao/sqlite (cached) ? loginid-takehome/internal/model [no test files] ok loginid-takehome/internal/onboarding (cached) Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "grep -n \"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\\|Service boundaries\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/PLANNING.md | head -10",
"description": "Locate PLANNING.md's Service boundaries section"
}30:## Service boundaries (owned by 03, read by 04) 46:- **Config surface:** environment variables only (12-factor: config lives in the environment, not in checked-in files) — `DB_DRIVER` (postgres|cockroachdb|sqlite), `DB_DSN`, `DB_DSN_FILE` (file-mount path; takes precedence over `DB_DSN` when both are set, per 02's `handoff-04-secrets.md` S7 revision — a DSN's embedded password is as exposed by `kubectl describe`/crash dumps/env-in-child-process as any other secret in that inventory, so `DB_DSN` is now a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option), `HTTP_ADDR`, `AUTH_JWT_ISSUER` = `https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal` / `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `loginid-api-service` (literal values per `handoff-03-auth.md` — not secrets, safe to ship in config), `CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `idp-connector-service` (the connector's own inbound audience, distinct from `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` — `handoff-03-auth.md` v3 / `connector-security.md` §5, consistency-pass F15), `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15), `APP_MODE` = `verifier` (default) | `issuer` (selects which of `api-service`'s two Kubernetes Deployments a given pod is — the issuer Deployment alone mounts the JWT signing-key Secret, per 02/04's F13 fix in `handoff-04-secrets.md`/`containerization-design.md`; confirmed spelling from Theo), `IDP_ABC_BASE_URL`, `IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID`/`IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET`. No flags, no config files.
{
"command": "grep -n \"CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID\" /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/PLANNING.md",
"description": "Find the line in the shared root PLANNING.md"
}46:- **Config surface:** environment variables only (12-factor: config lives in the environment, not in checked-in files) — `DB_DRIVER` (postgres|cockroachdb|sqlite), `DB_DSN`, `DB_DSN_FILE` (file-mount path; takes precedence over `DB_DSN` when both are set, per 02's `handoff-04-secrets.md` S7 revision — a DSN's embedded password is as exposed by `kubectl describe`/crash dumps/env-in-child-process as any other secret in that inventory, so `DB_DSN` is now a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option), `HTTP_ADDR`, `AUTH_JWT_ISSUER` = `https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal` / `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `loginid-api-service` (literal values per `handoff-03-auth.md` — not secrets, safe to ship in config), `CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `idp-connector-service` (the connector's own inbound audience, distinct from `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` — `handoff-03-auth.md` v3 / `connector-security.md` §5, consistency-pass F15), `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15), `APP_MODE` = `verifier` (default) | `issuer` (selects which of `api-service`'s two Kubernetes Deployments a given pod is — the issuer Deployment alone mounts the JWT signing-key Secret, per 02/04's F13 fix in `handoff-04-secrets.md`/`containerization-design.md`; confirmed spelling from Theo), `IDP_ABC_BASE_URL`, `IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID`/`IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET`. No flags, no config files.
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/PLANNING.md",
"offset": 46,
"limit": 1
}46 - **Config surface:** environment variables only (12-factor: config lives in the environment, not in checked-in files) — `DB_DRIVER` (postgres|cockroachdb|sqlite), `DB_DSN`, `DB_DSN_FILE` (file-mount path; takes precedence over `DB_DSN` when both are set, per 02's `handoff-04-secrets.md` S7 revision — a DSN's embedded password is as exposed by `kubectl describe`/crash dumps/env-in-child-process as any other secret in that inventory, so `DB_DSN` is now a transitional fallback, not a permanent equal option), `HTTP_ADDR`, `AUTH_JWT_ISSUER` = `https://auth.loginid-takehome.internal` / `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `loginid-api-service` (literal values per `handoff-03-auth.md` — not secrets, safe to ship in config), `CONNECTOR_JWT_AUDIENCE` = `idp-connector-service` (the connector's own inbound audience, distinct from `AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE` — `handoff-03-auth.md` v3 / `connector-security.md` §5, consistency-pass F15), `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15), `APP_MODE` = `verifier` (default) | `issuer` (selects which of `api-service`'s two Kubernetes Deployments a given pod is — the issuer Deployment alone mounts the JWT signing-key Secret, per 02/04's F13 fix in `handoff-04-secrets.md`/`containerization-design.md`; confirmed spelling from Theo), `IDP_ABC_BASE_URL`, `IDP_ABC_CLIENT_ID`/`IDP_ABC_CLIENT_SECRET`. No flags, no config files.
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/PLANNING.md",
"old_string": "`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15), `APP_MODE`",
"new_string": "`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` (api-service's own client credential for obtaining a `connector:identity-lookup`-scoped token to call idp-connector on a caller's behalf — a secret, added to `handoff-04-secrets.md`'s inventory as row 10 per F15; resolved via `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE` taking precedence over the plain env vars when set, the same pattern as `DB_DSN_FILE`, so this is indifferent to Kubernetes Secret vs. Vault Agent Injector delivery per LT-46), `ISSUER_TOKEN_URL` (LT-33: where api-service calls the issuer's own `POST /auth/token` to obtain that token) / `IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL` (LT-33: where api-service calls idp-connector's `/auth` and `/identity`), `APP_MODE`"
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/PLANNING.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md",
"offset": 57,
"limit": 6
}57 ## Update — Marcus's (02) seat, added after initial hand-off 58 59 02 has a seat on this story's credential handling per its own security surface. Marcus supplied three items, incorporated above: (1) credential holding/rotation — points to `handoff-04-secrets.md` row 10, nothing new; (2) **a genuine correction to this refinement's original draft** — `api-service`'s own connector-scoped token should be cached and reused per-replica until near expiry (standard OAuth2 client-credentials practice), the opposite of what this doc originally specified (which conflated it with the vendor token's correctly-never-cached rule — a different token, a different risk class); (3) the connector-unreachable failure mode — bounded timeout/backoff, generic upward failure, never falls back to stale data, own-token-failure logged as a distinct class from connector-unreachable. All three folded into the acceptance criteria and PO review script above. 60 61 --- 62 Work-By: Naomi Voss (PO, refinement + correction incorporation); Desmond Okafor (claims check); Tobias Lindqvist (rate-limit-keying objection); Marcus Ilori (02, credential-handling spec + the token-caching correction); Renata Cole (03, implementation, pending).
{
"replace_all": false,
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md",
"old_string": "---\nWork-By: Naomi Voss (PO, refinement + correction incorporation); Desmond Okafor (claims check); Tobias Lindqvist (rate-limit-keying objection); Marcus Ilori (02, credential-handling spec + the token-caching correction); Renata Cole (03, implementation, pending).",
"new_string": "## Update — implementation (Renata Cole, 03)\n\nNew `internal/onboarding` package: `TokenSource` caches api-service's own connector-scoped client-credentials token per-replica, refreshing before TTL (a `refreshMargin` before stated expiry) or on an explicit `Invalidate` — called automatically by `Service.VerifyIdentity` whenever the connector returns an ambiguous 401 (idp-connector's own uniform-response design gives no way to tell whether it rejected our token or the vendor's; `VerifyIdentity` invalidates and retries the whole flow exactly once with a fresh own-token before concluding the vendor credential itself was rejected — a genuinely-bad vendor credential costs exactly 2 connector calls, never more). `HTTPConnectorClient`/`HTTPTokenClient` implement the real outbound HTTP calls (idp-connector's `/auth`+`/identity`, and the issuer's `/auth/token`), mirroring `internal/connector.HTTPVendorClient`'s own discipline: bounded connection pool, fresh headers built per call, no client-level token state. `Service.VerifyIdentity` bounds each connector call with its own `context.WithTimeout` plus a small fixed retry-with-backoff (`connectorMaxRetries`/`connectorRetryBackoff`) on genuine unreachability, collapsing to `ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable` — never internal detail — while a genuine vendor-credential rejection surfaces as the distinguishable `ErrVendorCredentialRejected`. Own-token-acquisition failure is logged as its own class (`TokenSource.Token`'s own log line), separate from connector-unreachable (`Service.callAuth`/`callIdentity`'s own log lines).\n\nNo new public HTTP endpoint: per this story's own non-goals and PO review script item 7, `internal/onboarding.Service` is wired into `cmd/api-service/main.go`'s verifier-mode branch (`newOnboardingService`) for startup-time visibility, best-effort like the existing DAO-repository/pingDB pattern — missing config logs a warning and the binary still starts, rather than crash-looping over a capability nothing yet depends on.\n\n**Vault-delivery indifference (PM relay, Theo's LT-46 in progress):** `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET` are now resolved via `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE`/`CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE` taking precedence over the plain env vars — the same `resolveDSNFrom` pattern `DB_DSN_FILE` already uses — so this code is indifferent to Kubernetes Secret vs. Vault Agent Injector delivery, per Warren's approval. Two new env vars this story adds: `ISSUER_TOKEN_URL`, `IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL` (documented in root `PLANNING.md`'s Service boundaries section). **Flag to Theo:** api-service's verifier Deployment manifest needs these two new vars plus the connector client credential wired in (`deploy/api-service.yaml`) before this capability is actually reachable in-cluster — `newOnboardingService`'s own startup log will say \"not available\" until then, by design, not silently.\n\nTest coverage: `internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go` — token caching/refresh/invalidation, the happy path (token flows correctly from `Auth` into `Identity` and nowhere else), own-token-acquisition failure (never calls the connector at all), connector-unreachable (bounded retry count, generic error), vendor-credential-rejected (no wasted retry against a doomed credential), and the ambiguous-401-retries-exactly-once case — against fake `TokenClient`/`ConnectorClient` implementations per `decisions/test-double-strategy.md`. `cmd/api-service/main_test.go` covers `newOnboardingService`'s own fail-open-with-a-log behavior per missing config field. Full `go build`/`go vet`/`go test`/`staticcheck`/`gofmt`/`gitleaks` clean.\n\n---\nWork-By: Naomi Voss (PO, refinement + correction incorporation); Desmond Okafor (claims check); Tobias Lindqvist (rate-limit-keying objection); Marcus Ilori (02, credential-handling spec + the token-caching correction); Renata Cole (03, implementation)."
}The file /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git add -A && git status --short",
"description": "Stage LT-33 implementation"
}M cmd/api-service/main.go M cmd/api-service/main_test.go M internal/config/config.go A internal/onboarding/client.go A internal/onboarding/onboarding.go A internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go A internal/onboarding/token.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git commit -m \"$(cat <<'EOF'\nfeat: LT-33 — api-service's outbound call to idp-connector (onboarding mediator)\n\nWires api-service to idp-connector as the one story that makes Q2 and\nQ3 one system, per refinement/LT-33.md.\n\ninternal/onboarding is the new mediating package:\n- TokenSource caches api-service's own connector-scoped\n client-credentials token per-replica, refreshing before TTL or on an\n explicit Invalidate (Marcus Ilori's (02) caching correction: this is\n our own client token, standard OAuth2 client-credentials practice,\n not the vendor token's correctly-never-cached rule).\n- HTTPConnectorClient/HTTPTokenClient implement the real outbound HTTP\n calls, mirroring internal/connector.HTTPVendorClient's own\n discipline (bounded pool, fresh per-call headers, no client-level\n token state).\n- Service.VerifyIdentity bounds each connector call with\n context.WithTimeout plus a small fixed retry-with-backoff on genuine\n unreachability (ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable, no internal\n detail ever surfaced), while a genuine vendor-credential rejection\n is distinguishable (ErrVendorCredentialRejected). An ambiguous 401\n (our token vs. the vendor's - idp-connector's own uniform-response\n design can't tell) triggers exactly one invalidate-and-retry of the\n whole flow before concluding the vendor credential was the problem.\n Own-token-acquisition failures are logged as a distinct class from\n connector-unreachable failures, per this story's own criterion.\n\nNo new public HTTP endpoint (this story's own non-goal, and PO review\nscript item 7): wired into cmd/api-service/main.go's verifier branch\nbest-effort, same \"fail this one capability closed, not the whole\nbinary\" pattern the existing DAO-repository/pingDB handling already\nuses.\n\nconfig.go: CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET now resolve via\nCONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID_FILE/CONNECTOR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE taking\nprecedence over the plain env vars (same pattern as DB_DSN_FILE), per\nthe PM's relay of Warren's approval to move to Vault Agent Injector\ndelivery (LT-46) without this code caring which mechanism wrote the\nfile. Two new env vars: ISSUER_TOKEN_URL, IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL -\ndocumented in root PLANNING.md. Both new vars and the connector\ncredential are classified in config.OptionalEnvVars (not folded into\nRequiredAuthEnvVars: that function's simple presence-of-named-var\nmodel doesn't fit the *_FILE resolution pattern - presence is instead\nvalidated at the point of use, internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource).\n\nStory: LT-33\nWork-By: Renata Cole (implementation); Naomi Voss (PO, refinement); Marcus Ilori (02, credential-handling spec, token-caching correction); Tobias Lindqvist (rate-limit-keying objection, resolved by inspection)\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>\nClaude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}[feature/LT-33 e508644] feat: LT-33 — api-service's outbound call to idp-connector (onboarding mediator) 7 files changed, 1008 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/onboarding/client.go create mode 100644 internal/onboarding/onboarding.go create mode 100644 internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go create mode 100644 internal/onboarding/token.go Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && gitleaks detect --log-opts=\"origin/main..HEAD\" 2>&1 | tail -15",
"description": "Run gitleaks scan on LT-33 commit"
} ○
│╲
│ ○
○ ░
░ gitleaks
[90m10:01AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1m1 commits scanned.[0m
[90m10:01AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mscanned ~41615 bytes (41.62 KB) in 52.1ms[0m
[90m10:01AM[0m [32mINF[0m [1mno leaks found[0m
Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && git push -u origin feature/LT-33 2>&1 | tail -10",
"description": "Push LT-33 branch"
}remote: remote: Create a pull request for 'feature/LT-33' on GitHub by visiting: remote: https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/new/feature/LT-33 remote: To github.com:wtvamp/loginid-takehome.git * [new branch] feature/LT-33 -> feature/LT-33 branch 'feature/LT-33' set up to track 'origin/feature/LT-33'. Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && gh pr create --title \"LT-33: api-service's outbound call to idp-connector (onboarding mediator)\" --body \"$(cat <<'EOF'\n## Summary\n\nThe story that makes Q2 (api-service) and Q3 (idp-connector) one system, per `03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md`.\n\nNew `internal/onboarding` package:\n- `TokenSource` caches api-service's own connector-scoped client-credentials token per-replica, refreshing before TTL or on an explicit `Invalidate` (Marcus Ilori's (02) caching correction to this refinement's original draft: our own client token, standard OAuth2 client-credentials practice — a different risk class from the vendor token, which is correctly never cached).\n- `HTTPConnectorClient`/`HTTPTokenClient` implement the real outbound HTTP calls, mirroring `internal/connector.HTTPVendorClient`'s own discipline: bounded connection pool, fresh headers built per call, no client-level token state.\n- `Service.VerifyIdentity` bounds each connector call with `context.WithTimeout` plus a small fixed retry-with-backoff on genuine unreachability (`ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable` — no internal detail ever surfaced), while a genuine vendor-credential rejection is distinguishable (`ErrVendorCredentialRejected`). An ambiguous 401 (our token vs. the vendor's — idp-connector's own uniform-response design can't tell) triggers exactly one invalidate-and-retry of the whole flow before concluding the vendor credential was the problem. Own-token-acquisition failures are logged as a distinct class from connector-unreachable failures, per this story's own criterion.\n\nNo new public HTTP endpoint (this story's own non-goal, and PO review script item 7): wired into `cmd/api-service/main.go`'s verifier branch best-effort, the same \"fail this one capability closed, not the whole binary\" pattern the existing DAO-repository/pingDB handling already uses.\n\n`config.go`: `CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID`/`SECRET` now resolve via `*_FILE` precedence (same pattern as `DB_DSN_FILE`), per the PM's relay of Warren's approval to move to Vault Agent Injector delivery (LT-46) without this code caring which mechanism wrote the file. Two new env vars: `ISSUER_TOKEN_URL`, `IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL` — documented in root `PLANNING.md`. Both, plus the connector credential, are classified in `config.OptionalEnvVars` (not folded into `RequiredAuthEnvVars`: that function's simple presence-check model doesn't fit the `*_FILE` resolution pattern — presence is validated at the point of use, `internal/onboarding.NewTokenSource`).\n\n**Flag for Theo (04):** api-service's verifier Deployment manifest needs `ISSUER_TOKEN_URL`, `IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL`, and the connector client credential wired in before this capability is reachable in-cluster — `newOnboardingService`'s own startup log says \"not available\" until then, by design.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...` — all clean.\n- `staticcheck ./...`, `gofmt -l` — clean.\n- `gitleaks detect` — clean.\n- `internal/onboarding/onboarding_test.go`: token caching/refresh/invalidation, happy path (token flows from `Auth` into `Identity` and nowhere else), own-token-acquisition failure (never calls the connector), connector-unreachable (bounded retry count, generic error), vendor-credential-rejected (no wasted retry), ambiguous-401-retries-exactly-once — against fake `TokenClient`/`ConnectorClient` per `decisions/test-double-strategy.md`.\n- `cmd/api-service/main_test.go`: `newOnboardingService`'s fail-open-with-a-log behavior per missing config field.\n\n## Who did the work\n\nRenata Cole (03, implementation) — Naomi Voss (01, PO, refinement) — Marcus Ilori (02, credential-handling spec + token-caching correction) — Tobias Lindqvist (01, rate-limit-keying objection, resolved by inspection against existing `identitylimiter.go` code) — Desmond Okafor (01, claims check).\n\nRefinement doc: `03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md`.\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)\n\nhttps://claude.ai/code/session_011Cuba4JUvrsQCrTdUj4yzk\nEOF\n)\""
}https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/54 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"description": "Oren review of PR #54",
"subagent_type": "oren-castellan",
"prompt": "Review PR #54 on the loginid-takehome repo (branch feature/LT-33): https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/pull/54\n\nContext: this is LT-33, the story that wires api-service (Q2) to call idp-connector (Q3) on an onboarding flow's behalf — the first story where these two previously-independent binaries actually talk to each other. Renata (03 lead) just implemented it. Refinement doc is 03-engineering-delivery/refinement/LT-33.md if you want the full acceptance criteria (touches things like: api-service must cache its own connector-scoped OAuth2 client-credentials token per-replica and reuse it until near expiry, refreshing before TTL or on a 401; must never fall back to stale/cached identity data if the connector is unreachable; must bound each outbound call with a timeout and a small number of retries with backoff, rate-limited independent of caller retries; must surface only a generic failure upward on connector-unreachable, logging own-token-acquisition failures as a distinct class from connector-unreachable failures; the end-user's vendor access token must be scoped to the narrowest function possible and never logged or persisted).\n\nNew code, all in a new `internal/onboarding` package plus small changes to `cmd/api-service/main.go` and `internal/config/config.go`:\n- `internal/onboarding/token.go`: `HTTPTokenClient` (calls the issuer's real POST /auth/token) and `TokenSource` (caches/refreshes the resulting token, `Invalidate()` on demand).\n- `internal/onboarding/client.go`: `HTTPConnectorClient` (calls idp-connector's real /auth and /identity endpoints with our own bearer token + the vendor credential/token).\n- `internal/onboarding/onboarding.go`: `Service.VerifyIdentity` — the mediating orchestration: get our own token, call connector Auth, call connector Identity, with a bounded context.WithTimeout + fixed retry-with-backoff (connectorMaxRetries=2, connectorRetryBackoff=250ms) on each call, collapsing any connector-unreachable failure to ErrIdentityVerificationUnavailable, but surfacing a genuine vendor-credential rejection as the distinguishable ErrVendorCredentialRejected. A subtlety: idp-connector returns a 401 for BOTH \"your own token was rejected\" and \"the vendor credential was rejected\" (uniform response by design on the connector's side, from LT-41), so this seam can't tell which happened from one 401 alone. VerifyIdentity's own top-level wrapper treats any ErrVendorCredentialRejected as ambiguous and invalidates the cached own-token + retries the WHOLE flow exactly once with a fresh token before concluding the vendor credential itself was actually rejected.\n- `cmd/api-service/main.go`: `newOnboardingService(cfg)` constructs the above from config, called best-effort in the verifier-mode branch (logs and continues on missing config, doesn't crash-loop the binary).\n- `internal/config/config.go`: CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET now resolve via *_FILE-takes-precedence (like DB_DSN_FILE); two new env vars ISSUER_TOKEN_URL and IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL added, classified in config.OptionalEnvVars rather than RequiredAuthEnvVars (reasoning: RequiredAuthEnvVars's simple presence-check model doesn't fit the *_FILE resolution pattern, so presence is validated where the value is actually consumed instead, in onboarding.NewTokenSource).\n\nPlease do your usual detail-hawk second-pass review — error semantics, nullability, off-by-one, race conditions — but specifically dig into:\n1. The retry/invalidate-on-401 logic in `onboarding.go`'s `VerifyIdentity`/`attemptVerifyIdentity`/`callAuth`/`callIdentity`: is there any scenario where this could retry more than once, loop, or double-count towards `connectorMaxRetries` in a way that isn't actually bounded? (e.g. does the ambiguous-401 retry at the VerifyIdentity level interact badly with callAuth's own internal retry loop?)\n2. `TokenSource`'s mutex usage in token.go — is there a race between the cache-read fast path and the fetch-and-write slow path if two goroutines call `Token()` concurrently right as a cached token expires (e.g. could this cause a stampede of redundant FetchToken calls, and if so, is that actually a problem worth fixing, or acceptable for this take-home's scale)?\n3. Whether the vendor access token or the client secret could ever reach a log line, an error string, or get captured in a closure that outlives the call — trace every place ourToken/vendorAccessToken/clientSecret flow through client.go and token.go.\n4. Whether `newOnboardingService`'s best-effort/non-fatal behavior in main.go is consistent with how the rest of that file handles similar optional capabilities, or whether it's a NEW pattern that should have been Fatal instead (check the existing precedent it claims to follow — repo/pingDB in the same file).\n5. Whether config.OptionalEnvVars' reasoning for NOT putting CONNECTOR_CLIENT_ID/SECRET/ISSUER_TOKEN_URL/IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL into RequiredAuthEnvVars is sound, or whether this is actually a gap Marcus (02) should weigh in on given RequiredAuthEnvVars was specifically built (PR #53) to prevent exactly this class of \"config exists in code but nothing enforces it\" bug.\n\nRead the actual diff (gh pr diff 54, or check out the branch) rather than trusting this description. Report back findings in under 350 words — concrete issues only, with file:line references."
}Async agent launched successfully. (This tool result is internal metadata — never quote or paste any part of it, including the agentId below, into a user-facing reply.) agentId: af97cf9c083c9f0e6 (internal ID - do not mention to user. Use SendMessage with to: 'af97cf9c083c9f0e6', summary: '<5-10 word recap>' to continue this agent.) The agent is working in the background. You will be notified automatically when it completes. You know nothing about its results until that notification arrives — do not report, assume, or predict them; continue other work or respond to the user in the meantime. Do not duplicate this agent's work — avoid working with the same files or topics it is using. output_file: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-warrenthompson-Source-LoginID-03-engineering-delivery/35c20edc-753d-4d96-b512-7114684706eb/tasks/af97cf9c083c9f0e6.output Do NOT Read or tail this file via the shell tool — it is the full subagent JSONL transcript and reading it will overflow your context. If the user asks for progress, say the agent is still running; you'll get a completion notification.
{
"command": "cd /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33 && for i in $(seq 1 20); do\n chk=$(gh pr checks 54 2>&1)\n if ! echo \"$chk\" | grep -q \"pending\"; then\n echo \"$chk\"\n break\n fi\n sleep 20\ndone",
"description": "Poll PR #54 CI checks until resolved",
"timeout": 420000
}Build images (no push) (api-service) pass 43s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103759224983 Build images (no push) (idp-connector) pass 38s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103759224947 Build, lint, test pass 3m30s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103758715418 Detect whether image-buildable code changed pass 4s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103758715331 GitGuardian Security Checks pass 1s https://dashboard.gitguardian.com Guard against the JWT signing-key Secret leaking into another manifest pass 3s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103758715455 govulncheck pass 45s https://github.com/wtvamp/loginid-takehome/actions/runs/34770360479/job/103758715498 Shell cwd was reset to /Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID/03-engineering-delivery
{
"file_path": "/Users/warrenthompson/Source/LoginID-worktrees/LT-33/cmd/api-service/main.go",
"offset": 108,
"limit": 30
}108 return nil, fmt.Errorf("IDP_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL must be set")
109 }
110
111 tokenClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPTokenClient(cfg.IssuerTokenURL, nil)
112 if err != nil {
113 return nil, err
114 }
115 tokens, err := onboarding.NewTokenSource(tokenClient, cfg.ConnectorClientID, cfg.ConnectorClientSecret)
116 if err != nil {
117 return nil, err
118 }
119 connectorClient, err := onboarding.NewHTTPConnectorClient(cfg.IDPConnectorBaseURL, nil)
120 if err != nil {
121 return nil, err
122 }
123 return &onboarding.Service{Tokens: tokens, Connector: connectorClient}, nil
124 }
125
126 func main() {
127 cfg, err := config.Load()
128 if err != nil {
129 log.Fatalf("api-service: loading config: %v", err)
130 }
131 if err := validateAuthConfig(app.Mode(cfg.AppMode)); err != nil {
132 log.Fatalf("api-service: %v", err)
133 }
134
135 addr := cfg.HTTPAddr
136 if addr == "" {
137 addr = ":8080"